

APPENDIX:

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF "LEFT" AND RIGHT OPPORTUNISM

Marxist-Leninist literature is filled with references to particular deviations being right or ultra-left, but the only authoritative article we know of which takes up the question of recognizing errors as "left" or right in a fairly broad way is Foto Cami's "The Objective and Subjective Factors in the Revolution," Albania Today #1 (8), 1973, pp. , which we strongly recommend for further study. We also found the mimeographed pamphlet What are "Left" and Right Errors? and the relevant portions of the P.U.L.'s 2, 3 Many Parties of a New Type? valuable both for their content and for pointing out many of the readings we used in our own study. The latter was instrumental in freeing us from some of the myths current in the U.S. communist movement about how to tell "leftism" from rightism.*

We had to go "back to the basics" to try to correct our own understanding of "left" and right opportunism, and there is scarcely a statement in the body of this appendix that is not based directly on a reliable Marxist-Leninist source. We have meticulously noted these sources to enable readers to do further study on any particular points we state--or to check up on us where they think we are wrong.

Some comrades have paid little attention to learning how to recognize "left" errors, believing that most questions are answered when they have grasped that modern revisionism has been the main worldwide danger to the revolutionary movement for some time. The P.U.L. explains in detail why the problems afflicting one country's communist movement, in a given period, cannot be identified by such a generalization.¹ Here we will only state that dialectics identifies both the typical ? phenomena of a period, which are primary and determine the overall character of events, and the atypical, secondary phenomena, and requires us to examine each concrete problem so that we can know which category it falls into. (For example, Lenin pointed out that one writer's attempt to deduce the imperialist character of any particular war from the fact that

*While we disagree with a number of the P.U.L.'s particular conclusions about what is "left" or correct in current conditions, in the main we agree with their general statements about the characteristic features of rightism and "leftism" and think that comrades who remain unclear on this subject should consult their book, especially pp. 61-76; also 115-96. Readers who simply cannot accept what they and we say about anarcho-syndicalist forms of "leftism" should read Anarchism & Anarcho-Syndicalism, a New World Paperbacks collection of works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

~~However, not all the sources contain the general statement on "leftism" or rightism made in our own text. Some just provide examples in which a particular case of the type of error we discuss was labeled "left" or right.~~

it was taking place during the era of imperialism was "to abuse the very concept 'era.'"² Such deductions from a general, worldwide main danger are no more permissible.)

There is also the question of identifying a "main danger" not in the sense of relative prevalence, but as simply having more potential for harm if it dominates the line of the communists. Mao points out that ultra-lefts, being revolutionaries, consciously prefer to err on the side of the revolutionary excesses of "leftism," rather than to risk reformism, which they consider more harmful. But they are absolutely wrong; Lenin, Stalin, and Mao all found that both kinds of deviations have equal potential to cripple the work.³ Here we give somewhat more attention to "leftism," as it is less well known and seems to have ~~more forms~~ (the familiar "left" dogmatism, plus the less familiar anarchist and syndicalist tendencies) than right opportunism.

Several factors complicate the problem of distinguishing "left" and right errors from each other. One is the serious misconceptions on the subject prevalent in our movement, misconceptions that almost invariably permit "leftism" to be identified as rightist. Furthermore, no checklist of positions on different questions solves the problem, [both because rights and "lefts" often arrive at nearly identical positions by different routes,⁴] and because on some issues one or the other deviation can appear in several different forms. Finally, opportunism is not all that consistent. Some forces combine elements of rightism and "leftism" at the same time. Moreover, petty-bourgeois revolutionists, lacking stable principles, will often "flip-flop" between "left" adventurism and right conservatism, as they experience the failure of each one-sided approach.

Examples?
Misleading
implication?
(See my notes on this.)

Most of the text below deals with typical ways "lefts" and rights handle various problems facing the revolution. These problems are deeply interconnected, leading unavoidably to a certain amount of arbitrary division in trying to consider them one at a time, as well as to some redundancy. We begin, therefore, with a summary overview of each type of deviation, to help ground the reader in overall conceptions of them. It should be kept in mind that, while we state fairly extreme, clear-cut forms of the deviations, in practice opportunism often shows up in less developed tendencies in the same directions.

In an attempt to limit the length of this appendix, we do little to contrast our analysis with others current among communists, and we have provided almost no concrete examples. Readers will have to consciously compare the principles outlined here to their own conceptions of rightism and "leftism," as well as to try to concretize the generalizations with examples from forces in our movement.

A question of method.

An Overview

Right opportunists are too patient and cautious, fearing any revolutionary initiative. They oppose conscious intervention in the spontaneous development of the working-class movement, exaggerate our weakness relative to the class enemy, fear sharp class struggle, accept reforms as steps towards socialism, and will give up anything to avoid alienating those--like the liberal bourgeoisie--whom they erroneously judge to be consistently important allies. They are submerged in the general level of the mass movement or even seek to put a brake on its militant development. Not being serious about revolution, they are content with loose forms of organization, instead of consciously building a disciplined party and powerful mass organizations.

Either they ignore politics altogether, sticking safely to trade-unionism, or they engage in bourgeois reformist politics and act as if socialism can be achieved by electing socialists to office and wheeling and dealing in a parliament or Congress. They see no need to teach the workers scientific socialism, instead waiting for them to arrive at the necessary level of understanding solely through their own struggles. They minimize the need for theory, since they do not plan to use it to educate the proletariat or to guide their own work by a conscious plan. They fear that airing theoretical differences will lead to unnecessary splits. Their conciliation to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois interests leads them to support "their own" bourgeoisies in imperialist wars and to accept the nationalism of whatever people they are working with. If they do support demands for equality of nationalities, they will do so timidly and in a reformist manner. Within the trade unions, they tend to oppose bringing in political issues or struggling for the unions to align themselves with the communist party. In reactionary unions, those controlled by agents of the bourgeoisie, they will seek to persuade the leadership to move to the left.

Ultra-lefts are petty-bourgeois revolutionists, impatient and voluntarist, but they are right in essence because they objectively hold back the revolution, too. They recognize no objective ^{pre}conditions for the revolutionary battles they seek to wage, either believing that the only variable is the people's (or their own) will to struggle, or subjectively assessing conditions as being more favorable than they are. Often they have an "eve-of-the-revolution" mentality, believing that the masses are on the point of imminent rebellion. They view each struggle as decisive, which objectively makes them militant reformists (since they fight a particular bourgeois attack as if victory there would really change the overall situation, instead of connecting it to a longer and more basic struggle to overthrow capitalism). Or they refuse to struggle for reforms and concessions at all, seeing them as only bourgeois illusions.

Or they substitute more "revolutionary" demands like "workers' control," again objectively promoting the reformist idea that such control can be won under capitalism. ?

They are ever on the offensive tactically and see retreat and acceptance of compromise as treachery. Their impetuosity and subjective optimism blind them to the need for allies, and they refuse to make the concessions needed to actually build alliances. In a similar way, they end up way out in front of the masses, for whom they have little real patience. "Left" dogmatists may isolate themselves by overrating the people's ability to learn from pure propaganda, while those with anarchist leanings can go it alone either because they despair of "the mob's" ever taking real action, or because they expect their own heroics to unleash the rebellion that simmers beneath the surface. They will not do serious work in reactionary trade unions--where the people are--preferring to set up new, pure, "revolutionary workers' unions." They are also unwilling to unite with other communists with whom they have differences, seeking to magnify the differences rather than to overcome them. Overall, relative isolation is a hallmark of ultra-leftists, while rightists go with the flow of the masses (and bourgeois allies) and are only isolated if they try to impose such conservative tactics that the people become disgusted with them.

Dogmatic ultra-lefts^{who?}--the only kind many of us know about--may concoct inflexible plans, try to teach the workers revolutionary theory at a level at which they cannot comprehend it, believe that book-learning divorced from practice is knowledge, and see antagonism in every theoretical difference. But at least as significant historically are those with anarchist or syndicalist leanings. They, like the rights, bow to spontaneity, but in different ways. They base their tactics on their own spontaneous feelings of indignation, and they glorify any spontaneous, militant mass upsurge, such as riots. They want action, not clear programs and plans. They want to keep the workers "keyed up," as Lenin put it, and--like the rights--do not bother trying to build real organization among the masses. Such revolutionaries have little respect for the people and focus on rousing the workers, not trying to educate them as to the course of social development. They, too, tend to leave the workers' attention focused on economic struggles, since they disdain political struggles (except for terrorism or rioting) and use of the parliamentary platform as reformist. (True syndicalism even replaces insurrection with the general strike, since it focuses on the trade unions as the sole revolutionary organizations.) These people, valuing only militant action, have no more interest in theory than the rightists. They, too, often demand unity (unity with their petty-bourgeois revolutionism, that is) at the expense of struggle over theoretical differences.

Distinction based on P.C.L.: dogmatists and spontaneists

(cf. COSMOL on RCP on this point.)

While "lefts" can find super-revolutionary ways of "sup-

porting" internationalism, many also have as disgusting a history of social-chauvinism as rightists.

In sum, the differences between right and "left" are those between conservatism and caution, on the one hand, and swaggering militance and impetuosity, on the other; between fatalism and voluntarism; between following the masses, or even trying to hold them back, ^{leaping ahead or} and artificially trying to stir them up in the most primitive ways; between reliance on bourgeois political and trade-union institutions, and abandoning those ^{between} arenas for organizations controlled by the revolutionaries; ^{giving up} giving up independence to allies, and not knowing how to make alliances at all--these are what distinguish rights and "lefts" from each other. Some of the alleged hallmarks of right opportunism, such as focus on economic struggles at the expense of political ones, bowing to spontaneity (in different forms), disdain for theory, and social-chauvinism, ^{are} common to both forms of opportunism. ^{But more common to Right opportunism.}

The rest of the appendix considers these and related topics in detail.

Pace of the Revolution

Rights

. . . the philosophy of spontaneity, passivity, of observation that overestimates the [role of] objective conditions and waits with folded arms until all the factors of the revolution are ripe.¹

These people fail to see that the struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. . . . [T]hey cannot march ahead to guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.²

Right opportunists are overly patient, willing to wait. At the extreme, they would simply let social development take its course, holding that there is little that we can do to affect the situation.

However, it is a mistake to identify every failure to keep up with events as rightist. "Lefts" can fail to recognize the transition from a more favorable or revolutionary situation to a more difficult one.³

"Lefts"

Some comrades, disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, suffer from the malady of revolutionary impetuosity. . . .⁴

. . . [S]ome "left" elements deny the necessity of the "back work", of the struggle for the economic, social and political demands of the working people, of legal work and of work in the organizations of the masses, . . . they are partisans of the immediate revolution, of the struggle for the seizure of state power and the establishment of socialism at one stroke.⁵

They . . . [R]iddled with illusions, [they] want only to do big things.⁶ They lack any historical sense of the revolution, appraising every struggle as decisive⁷ and operating from a subjective "eve-of-the-revolution point of view."⁸

On the other hand, "lefts" sometimes correctly recognize that they are not in a revolutionary situation but then make a different error. Still declaring themselves only "in favor of direct action when the time came, and not of dilatory and roundabout actions,"⁹ their "tactics amount to waiting for 'great days' along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events."¹⁰

Role of Economic Development

Rights

Relying on spontaneous economic development to bring the transition to socialism,¹¹ claim that it is resolving the contradictions of capitalism,¹² or falsely hold that economic development has not sufficiently heightened class contradictions to permit communist mass work. Each of these errors justifies passivity.

"Lefts"

Oblivious to the role of capitalist development in creating the necessary conditions for socialist revolution: "The will, not economic conditions, is the basis of his [the anarchist Bakunin's] social revolution."¹³ This is further developed below, under "Stages."

Stages of the Revolution

Rights

Fail to move from one stage to the next, e.g., not moving immediately towards the socialist revolution after victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution.¹⁴

(Note: the question of stages in this context should not be confused with the "opportunist theory of stages" which Lenin opposed in What is to be Done?. That theory held that agitation on political ~~issues~~ was appropriate only at a "stage" which had to be prepared for by a lengthy period of trade-unionist economic agitation.¹⁵)

"Lefts"

Insist on the "pure" proletarian socialist revolution in all circumstances, failing to grasp the intermediate stage of struggling for the proletarian-led bourgeois-democratic revolution where power is held by pre-capitalist absolutists, foreign imperialists, or fascists. Failing to see that the bourgeois-democratic revolution creates the conditions for the socialist revolution, they objectively sabotage both by splitting the class forces that could unite to carry through the first stage.¹⁶

On a less historic scale, ultra-leftists tend to skip stages in the development of the mass movement, e.g., setting up a "revolutionary workers' union" instead of struggling to win over the masses within the reactionary trade unions, as if the masses of workers were already revolutionary.¹⁷

Reforms

Rights

"The revisionists. . . regard reforms as a partial realization of socialism,"¹⁸ rather than as "a by-product of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat."¹⁹ They believe that socialism can be won "by extending bourgeois democracy and its institutions, by gradually occupying important economic and political positions in order to later seize the whole power and ensure the transition to socialism."²⁰ By failing to teach the need for revolution while participating in struggles for reforms, rightists objectively adapt their work to what is acceptable to the bourgeoisie.²¹

"Lefts"

". . . [S]ome 'left' elements deny the necessity of the 'back work' of the struggle for the economic, social and political demands of the people. . . ." ²² Justifying such a policy by a reluctance to "promote illusions" about the capacity of the system to be changed through reform, they forget that struggles for partial demands usually are the arenas in which we can organize and train the workers, can win concessions that strengthen the proletariat's fighting capacity or broaden its freedom of action, and provide the context for proving that the contradictions facing the workers under capitalism cannot be fundamentally or permanently resolved through reforming that system.

In a variation on this, Trotskyites and other "lefts" sometimes promote "transitional" demands which are supposedly more revolutionary than demands for concessions and reforms. For example, they call for "workers' control" in the management of individual factories in their agitation during strikes. While this seems much more "left" than struggling for better wages, hours, and working conditions under capitalist management, in essence it is no different from the "structural reforms" which revisionists demand. Both give the impression--if the workers believe such utopias--that the proletariat can acquire enough power through piece-meal struggles under capitalism to make the system meet their needs.²³

A comparable "left" error is throwing all into the struggle against a particular capitalist-perpetrated outrage, forgetting that our task is the mustering of forces to overthrow capitalism itself. This, too, turns out to be militant reformism.²⁴

The Objective Situation and Our Power to Change It

Rights

Before the victorious proletarian revolution, generally

justify their fear of advancing and taking revolutionary initiative by assessing the balance of class forces as less favorable to the proletariat than it actually is, while minimizing the ability of conscious activity of the vanguard to change the situation. Thus they underrate the favorability of objective conditions and overrate the role of such conditions in determining the course of events.²⁵ However, after the revolution the rights tend to ^{under}estimate the strength of the class enemy and the necessity for determined measures against it, as well as the need to move rapidly in the socialist transformation of the economy.²⁶

"Lefts"

Fail to see the importance of a sober assessment of concrete conditions (e.g., strength of the enemy, preparation of the class vanguard and of the proletariat generally, who the middle forces are and the degree of their support or opposition), or base their impetuosity in an over-optimistic appraisal of these factors and a belief that contradictions have developed further than they actually have.²⁷ Furthermore,

These "left" trends see the will of the revolutionaries for action, their determination to throw themselves into struggle irrespective of the conditions and situation, as the only determining factor.*²⁸

However, after the revolution in Russia, ultra-lefts overesti-

*Some comrades express this (or other) concepts in the shorthand expression, "overrating the subjective factor." This leads to endless confusion because of the different meanings of the words in the expression. First, the subjective factor can mean either the conscious ~~revolutionary~~ revolutionary forces, or it can mean the state of preparedness of the masses--in terms of their morale or understanding. Ultra-lefts tend to assess both as more favorable than they actually are (while underrating the importance of ~~really in assessing the~~ subjective factor in the second sense.) But in this ^{first} sense they also "overrate" the objective factor--the favorability of the basic conditions the proletariat or its vanguard is faced with. Moreover, it can also mean (correctly) that they overrate the significance of the subjective factor and minimize the need for a sober assessment of the objective alignment of forces. Thus the way they "underrate" the objective factor--the catch-phrase that accompanies the statement that "lefts" overrate the subjective factor--is by underestimating its significance.

Similarly, when these expressions are turned around, people say that rights overestimate objective conditions and underestimate the subjective factor. The statement is true if one means that they overestimate the relative significance of obstacles posed by objective conditions and underrate our ability to change those conditions, but false if one means that they overestimate the favorability of objective conditions or minimize the significance of the subjective state of preparedness of the masses.)

mated the strength of internal enemies and the danger of capitalist restoration, basically despairing of building socialism through patient work in one country, yet calling for a "fantastic plan of super-industrialization."²⁹ They can also rely on despair and pessimism to justify adventurism instead of retreat and compromise, feeling that all is lost anyway, so there is no point in accepting a painful compromise.³⁰

Tactics*

Rights

Overly frightened of the class enemy, insist on defensive tactics even when bold initiatives are needed.³¹ "Even when revolutionary situations arise, they do their utmost to curb the revolutionary movement of the masses, they prevent them from dealing the decisive blow to the ruling classes."³² They actually fear the revolution, and they are also afraid of the likelihood that militant action would provoke retaliation from the bourgeoisie or alienate bourgeois liberal allies.³³ At the extreme, they are opposed to violent revolution altogether.³⁴ After the revolution, they oppose continuing the struggle against the class enemies, generally arguing that this is no longer necessary.³⁵

Rights understand the need to make tactical compromises, but instead of giving up only what the situation requires, they capitulate to the demands of the bourgeoisie or the ally with whom agreement must be reached.³⁶

"Lefts"

Adventurist, ready to throw all forces into the struggle regardless of the actual alignment of forces.³⁷ They have "[b]lind faith in the miracle-working power of all direct action."³⁸ Rather than keeping a strategic overview of a protracted struggle, they evaluate each battle as decisive (thus justifying their willingness to stake everything on it).³⁹ To them, talk of retreats and defense in order to gather strength in periods of relative weakness is impermissible.⁴⁰ If reality makes it impossible to justify this by overestimating our own strength relative to that of the enemy,⁴¹ confirmed ultra-lefts can insist on adventurist tactics out of despair, as noted above. All is lost whatever we do, they reason, so why be so conservative?⁴²

"Lefts" oppose compromise as fervently as they do retreats, being unwilling to accept humiliating terms from the enemy, even when necessary. They "renounce in advance any change of tack, or any utilisation of a conflict of interests (even if temporary) among one's enemies, or any conciliation or compromise with possible allies (even if they are temporary, unstable, vacillating or conditional allies). . . ." ⁴³

*See also "Unity and Struggle," "Work in the Trade Unions," and "Political Struggle," below.

Rights

Overrating the difficulties facing us, they unneces-
sarily subordinate the independence of the proletariat (to
avoid antagonizing non-proletarian allies), while over-
rating the revolutionary or progressive potential of those
allies. Thus in the problem of unity and struggle within
a united front, the right tends towards all unity, no strug-
gle.⁴⁴ In practice, they neglect "to protect the complete
ideological, political, and organizational independence of
the Party in the Democratic Front."⁴⁵ (The correct princi-
ple, generally speaking, is to unite around common interests;
struggle against policies and ideas which harm the interests
of the proletariat, within the limits required to maintain a
necessary alliance. The problem comes in judging these limits,
as well as the importance of the alliance relative to what
is being compromised.) Rightists often tend to conciliate
with the interests and outlook of the petty bourgeoisie.⁴⁶
At the extreme, they even regard the liberal bourgeoisie as
potentially consistent allies who need only to be pushed to
the left.⁴⁷ This can reach the point of foregoing unity
with more consistently revolutionary forces to avoid an-
tagonizing more reactionary forces that for the moment are
more powerful.⁴⁸

Applying this all-unity, no-struggle policy to the com-
munist party can lead to the position that "the party should
be an unprincipled union of all the factions or trends which
proclaim themselves socialist or communist."⁴⁹ Not that this
means that rights automatically subordinate themselves to
the discipline of the party: they are entirely capable of
holding on to the circle spirit and engaging in factional
activity to promote implementation of their line.⁵⁰

"Lefts"

Fail to "pay attention to winning over all the allies that
should be won over," in accordance with their overestimation
of our strength and underestimation of the strength of the
opponent.⁵¹ This is also tied to the skipping of stages,
since by demanding the proletarian-socialist revolution in
colonial or semi-colonial countries, ultra-leftists narrow
the social basis of the national liberation movement.⁵²
Differences with potential allies are handled according to
the policy of "all struggle and no alliance."⁵³ There is a
refusal to recognize that genuine compromises must be offered
to win over necessary allies;⁵⁴ instead, "[t]he forces of the
revolution must be pure, absolutely pure."⁵⁵

When it comes to uniting with the masses, they perpe-
trate

cases of the confusing of the people with the enemies, of
the assessment of non-antagonistic contradictions among

the people as antagonistic, of lack of the patience to work with those who are politically unclear, etc.⁵⁶

"Lefts" think we should refuse to work with other socialists or leaders of progressive proletarian movements, even when we have little influence among the workers and popular acceptance of the opportunist doctrines would be a step forward from complete enslavement to bourgeois ideology and politics.⁵⁷ They also reject the tactic of concluding alliances with the reactionary leaders of organizations that have a genuine mass base and certain common aims, failing to recognize that under many circumstances this is precisely the means to gain access to the progressive members and win them away from their opportunist leaders.⁵⁸

Though ultra-lefts typically seek to deprive the proletariat of its allies, some are definitely partial towards students and intellectuals or other revolutionary petty bourgeois strata. Sometimes this reaches the point of denying the unique importance of fusing socialism with the proletariat, the vanguard class, or ^{else} of foisting petty-bourgeois socialism on the workers.⁵⁹

The "left," sectarian attitude towards alliance and compromise, when applied to other communists, leads to unprincipled splitting or refusals to unite, elevating all differences--including tactical ones that must be tolerated within a single party--to a level of principle, and undue harshness in dealing with comrades who have made mistakes.⁶⁰ They reduce the struggle against opportunism to seizing on every opportunist error as a chance to "expose" honest comrades who make such errors, rather than patiently correcting the comrades.⁶¹

Like many rightists,⁶² some Trotskyites even make the freedom to form factions a point of principle, viewing unity and discipline as abnormal.⁶³ Despite their usual sectarianism, they are also capable of forming unprincipled blocs to oppose a consistent Marxist-Leninist trend,⁶⁴ or of accepting all, regardless of outlook, into their "party of action."⁶⁵

Relationship to the Masses

Rights

Rather than providing leadership, tail the mass movement, afraid to intervene in its spontaneous development. They are unwilling to advance when the people are ready to advance. They may justify their low assessment of the people's consciousness by focusing their attention on the more backward forces.⁶⁶ This tailing may lead to overemphasizing economic struggles at the expense of political ones and to

failure to provide workers with a scientific understanding of the society they live in; but "lefts" can make the same mistake, as we explain below. The "distinguishing characteristic" of rights is their failure to lead the class because they submerge themselves in it or drag at its tail, as opposed to "lefts'" inability to lead because their petty-bourgeois revolutionist line isolates them from the people.

While sectarianism towards the masses is routinely used as a synonym for ultra-leftism,⁶⁷ it is also possible for communists to be so rightist--so conservative in their line and tactics--that they "isolate themselves from the revolutionary demands of the masses, . . . lose the confidence of the masses and . . . [are] tossed to the rear by the revolutionary current."⁶⁸

by PLA too.
But is that
sectarianism?

"Lefts"

Sectarianism towards the people is so typical that their form of opportunism is often simply labeled "sectarianism."⁶⁹ Most of the errors listed in this appendix cause "lefts" to divorce themselves from the masses. To their impetuosity they often add an arrogant and commandist attitude towards the masses and a lack of patience with those who accept backward ideas (or a tendency to ignore the problem and act as if people were more developed).⁷⁰ In practice they will advance when the people will not yet follow them, so they are objectively adventurists--a small handful engaging in struggles that only the masses could even hope to win.⁷¹

Another way that "lefts" isolate the revolutionaries is by insisting that the program of an awakening mass movement be doctrinally pure.⁷² They may also monopolize leading positions in mass organizations or political bodies.⁷³ Many ultra-lefts, from Nineteenth-Century anarchists to today's advocates of guerrilla warfare in the absence of a party and a mass movement, have taken political adventurism to the extreme of individual or small-group terrorism.⁷⁴ They typically either disdain the masses too much to believe that they will ever take revolutionary action themselves, or believe that "excitative terror" and "propaganda of the deed" will unleash popular uprisings. Another variant of "left" sectarianism towards the people was the "theory of cadres" of the Albanian Trotskyites, who insisted on educating cadres and keeping them out of mass work until conditions permitted decisive proletarian revolutionary action.*⁷⁵

check

Isolation from the people is so characteristic of ultra-

*This is a good example of ultra-leftism coming full circle to rightism. The fear of coming out of hiding and of giving any leadership to the mass movement would be indistinguishable from simple rightism if one knew nothing else of the line and practice of those who expressed it.

But this is
"left" sectarianism

leftism that on one occasion, at least, Stalin supported his opinion that "leftism" was the main danger in one communist party simply by pointing to that party's inability to win much influence among the workers, under conditions in which parties in other countries had done so.⁷⁶

Spontaneity and Consciousness

In the practice of our days too, life confirms great Lenin's conclusion that the roots, the ideological sources of opportunism, both right and left, reside in advocating spontaneity in the revolutionary movement.⁷⁷

Rights

Oppose carefully planned leadership and conscious intervention in the spontaneous working-class struggle with the notions that socialist consciousness develops among the workers spontaneously and that the development of productive forces is spontaneously moving society towards socialism.⁷⁸

"Lefts"

. . . [S]ome representatives of the "leftist" forces, irrespective of their subjective aims and objectives, also stand on a position of advocating spontaneity. . . . [T]hey oppose the necessity of working out clear political programmes, scientific strategy and tactics. According to them the important thing is to start and carry out the revolution. . . .⁽⁷⁹⁾

check

Some believe that "consciousness and organization are spontaneously acquired [by the masses] in the process of the struggle."⁸⁰ Speaking of terrorists, who represent the extreme of "left" adventurism, Lenin explained that they "bow to the spontaneity of the passionate indignation of intellectuals, who lack the ability or opportunity to connect the revolutionary struggle and the working-class movement into an integral whole."⁽⁸¹⁾ Thus both the right and the "left" forms of subservience to spontaneity objectively lead to letting the workers wage their day-to-day, mainly economic struggles, leaving the political struggle to others.⁸² (See also "Political Agitation," below.)

Note Lenin's characterization of how "lefts" bow to spontaneity.

By not of-fering M-L leadership.

Organization

Part of the preparation of the working class for revolution is training it in organized struggle, through the building of a disciplined party as well as broader organizations.

Rights

Have historically favored broad, loose, undisciplined organizational forms for the party,⁸³ and, by focusing on the struggle to reform the old society, stand in the way of uniting "the workers in big, powerful and properly functioning organizations, capable of functioning well under all circumstances, permeated with the spirit of the class struggle,

clearly realizing their aims and trained in the true Marxist world outlook."⁸⁴

"Lefts"

Lack the patience to build such organizations through participation in the struggles of non-revolutionary times.⁸⁵ They favor "anarchistic looseness of the organization" and "keeping the workers keyed up instead of creating a firm 'stronghold of class organization.'"⁸⁶ This can take such forms as believing that mass struggle will spontaneously build organization,⁸⁷ that such organization is unnecessary because the workers can cause the collapse of capitalism by a general strike, without prior preparation and training,⁸⁸ or that the activities of bands of terrorists or "the warfare of guerillas not based on an organized broad political mass movement" are sufficient.⁸⁹

"Lefts" are as capable of both small-circle spirit⁹⁰ and the substitution of broad, open, and loose organizational forms for the Leninist party⁹¹ as rightists. However, while opposing the building of "truly organized" mass revolutionary forms, "lefts" can apply tight, undemocratic discipline in their own sects.⁹²

Educating the Proletariat

Rights

In tailing the spontaneous development of the working-class movement, they oppose actively raising the consciousness of the workers and teaching them socialist consciousness and socialist theory.⁹³ They pay no attention to distinguishing the more developed workers from more backward strata and to meeting the intellectual requirements of the former.⁹⁴

"Lefts"

First form (dogmatism): Try to teach the broad masses through doctrinaire preaching of abstract truths which they are incapable of grasping.⁹⁵ This form of ultra-leftism, best exemplified in this country in recent times by the Revolutionary Wing (PRRWO-RWL), is often considered the only form by our movement. But from what we have seen in classical Marxist-Leninist literature, the second form seems historically more prevalent.

Second form (anarchism and/or syndicalism):

They rise against the necessity of introducing socialist consciousness into the working class and the labouring masses; they say that the vanguard role can also be played by an "active minority" which emerges as a ferment of revolution,

← Note
↓

check

check

But not in
PH-L manuscript?

that consciousness and organization are spontaneously acquired in the process of the struggle.⁹⁶

The anarchist Bakunin wrote,

And what are we going to do? Teach the people? That would be stupid. The people know themselves, and better than we do, what they need. Our task is not to teach the people but to rouse them.⁹⁷

(Cf. the later Russian syndicalists--also ultra-lefts--who favored "keeping the workers keyed up instead of creating a firm 'stronghold of organization.'"⁹⁸ Lenin also characterized the mass work called for by the anti-theoretical, "even-of-the-revolution" line of a later terrorist as the distribution of hundreds of thousands of leaflets "containing the summary call, 'Bang them--knock 'em down!'"⁹⁹ . . . Food for thought for comrades who assume that the RCP's "We're-mad-as-hell" agitation must be rightist.)

But RCP doesn't fit this description.

Bakunin saw the people as cannon fodder, glorified the "unleashing of what are today called the evil passions" in spontaneous rioting, and held that the "revolutionary idea" was to be monopolized by a tiny party of intellectuals who would serve as the guiding force of the popular anarchy.^{100*} In like manner, the Narodnik terrorists, contemptuous of "the mob" and denying its ability to do more than "blindly follow the 'heroes,'" substituted individual terrorism for the task of educating the workers.¹⁰¹

Political Agitation and Political Struggle

Rights

First form: Either openly call for restricting the workers' struggle to the economic sphere (the trade-unionist struggle against employers), and perhaps for protective legislation, or objectively promote the same restriction by postponing broader political agitation and the political struggle until the development of the trade-union struggle spontaneously turns workers towards politics. The Russian Economists, by promoting this line before the bourgeois-democratic revolution, were in effect calling for leaving politics to the liberal bourgeoisie.¹⁰²

Economism

Second form: Present correct democratic demands in a reformist manner,¹⁰³ or consider participation in bourgeois

Parliamentary criticism;

*Albanian "lefts" introduced a comparable focus on educating a few party members but not the proletariat. History of the PLA, p. 59. Many present-day Trotskyites actually promote the idea of young intellectuals, students, as the vanguard. Agim Popa, "Present-Day Revolutionary Movement and Trotskyism," Albania Today #5 (6), 1972, p. /4/.

Bourgeois parliamentarism

parliaments as an end in itself, as if socialism could be won through parliamentary means.104

"Lefts"

First form: Carry on political agitation and propaganda, but keeping it at a "high" level, inaccessible to those to whom it is directed, or making poorly-documented assertions that are unpersuasive to workers beset by bourgeois illusions. None of the literature we have reviewed goes into this form of ultra-leftism, but we have seen plenty of examples in the practice of U.S. communists in recent years. ?
Dogmatism?

Second form: "Left" economism, negating political agitation and the political struggle just as much as the better-known right economism.105 The reasoning is ultra-left: the struggle for democratic demands is "contradictory" to socialist revolution because it creates illusions about what is achievable under capitalism.106 Rightist fascination with political reforms is countered with "revolutionary" denial of their value or of the training that can be acquired in the struggle for them. Often the result is syndicalism --a form of ultra-leftism that envisions workers taking power through their trade unions, usually via a general strike, and that negates political struggle.107 Or the result can be the terrorist's logic of economic struggle for the workers, political struggle (through "heroic" acts of terror) for the revolutionary intellectuals.108 The effect: "Subordination of the working class to bourgeois politics in the guise of negation of politics."109
Check
check
check

"Lefts" extend their negation of politics to refusal to use the platform of parliament or Congress, despite the excellent opportunity it offers for agitation and propaganda. They fear compromising their "revolutionary" purity by participating in, or "recognizing," reactionary bourgeois institutions.110

Work in the Trade Unions

Rights:

Explicitly narrow communist work to trade-unionism111 or advocate trade union neutrality (refusal to build a close relationship between the unions and the proletarian political party, i.e., insulating the unions from proletarian politics).112

In reactionary and reformist unions, rights may substitute attempts to persuade the top leaders to adopt a proletarian stand for the policy of exposing them and driving them out.113

"Lefts"

That is, treat enemies as friends.

check

Can disdain work in reactionary trade unions, where the workers are, in favor of setting up "new and artificial forms of labour organization." The few most developed workers are drawn into separate organizations, and the mass of organized workers are abandoned to their reactionary leaders.¹¹⁴

But in U.S.
Some of these
orgs. exist even
"pure" or
revolutionary,
e.g. RU's +
A's.

Another form: Revolutionary syndicalism¹¹⁵ (see section on political struggle, above).

Combining Open and Secret Forms of Work*

Rights

First form: Fail to prepare for repression, based on their illusions about liberal bourgeois allies and bourgeois democracy.

Second form: Cower in underground forms to the point of failing to carry out revolutionary mass work, out of exaggerated fear of the class enemy.

"Lefts"

First form: Unnecessarily confine themselves to conspiratorial forms, failing to take advantage of the opportunities for legal work afforded by bourgeois democracy because of dogmatically seeing the state as always repressive, and subjectively judging the struggle to be sharper than it is.

Second form: Fail to prepare for repression, based on adventurist illusions of their invincibility, or overrating their own political strength.

Revisionism and Dogmatism

Rights

When right opportunism openly denies the fundamental truths of Marxism-Leninism, those that show the inevitability of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is revisionism. Liberal-bourgeois reformist positions are cloaked in Marxist phrases, under the false pretense that changed conditions have rendered the old truths invalid.¹¹⁶

} only "class"?

While dogmatism as a consistent pattern of opportunism is a form of ultra-leftism (see below), rightists, too, can latch on to an old solution to a problem that appears in new

✓
dogmatically

*We rely here on our own understanding of this problem, having found no "classical" references to the subject at this time.

forms, when the older method would tend more towards reformism *incorrect.* or capitulation than the correct approach.¹¹⁷ *The correct approach would be to all.*

"Lefts"

Dogmatism as a consistent political approach is "left."¹¹⁸ *check* (However, not all "leftists" are dogmatists.) "Lefts" can justify their unwillingness to make alliances by quoting fundamental propositions on the opportunist or treacherous inclinations of the forces in question (ignoring different conditions that can make the alliance correct, as well as the emergence of particular forces who are atypical of the general pattern).¹¹⁹ They divorce themselves from the mass movement by using Marxism as a rigid credo, which they would force on those with whom they should work, rather than as a guide to action in complex situations.¹²⁰ They mechanically apply foreign experience and that of previous periods--rather than analyzing what is required in their own time, place, and conditions--in a manner that often cuts them off from the masses and "justifies" adventurism.¹²¹

The current leadership of the Communist Party of China has introduced some confusion on the relationship between revisionism and dogmatism. In the course of tying the campaign against ~~the alleged~~ *the alleged* ultra-left line of the so-called "gang of four" ✓

to previous struggles against (right) revisionism, they began stating that dogmatism is a form of revisionism. While dogmatism "revises" Marxism in the sense of distorting its meaning, Marxists have long used revisionism to specify rightist removing of the revolutionary essence from Marxism, and dogmatism (in its broad sense) to mean ultra-left inflexibility.¹²² Marxist-Leninist writings, including those of Mao Tse-tung, often specifically contrast revisionism with dogmatism.¹²³ *check*

Theory and Practice

Rights

". . . [Do] not recognize the mobilizing, organizing and transforming role of advanced theory. . ."¹²⁴ Since they bow to the spontaneous development of the working-class movement, they have no need to guide their practice by the lessons of history and an understanding of their own society's particular path of development, nor to introduce such knowledge to the workers in general.¹²⁵ In minimizing the role of theory, rights also free themselves for eclecticism and lack of principle in their work and seek to evade criticism of their own line.¹²⁶ As noted above ("Unity and Struggle. . ."), they also tend to avoid the struggle over theoretical differences within the party or with allies, for fear of splitting those whom they think should be united.

*But also Mao's view dog-
matism as a 'part' of empiricism. This is
the better usage. The two (revisionism +
dogmatism) are not in the same level, or 2
par-*

It also seems to us that rights could justify inaction and a lack of revolutionary initiative by overemphasizing the need for study and investigation before intervening in the class struggle.*

No, this is a "Left" error.

"Lefts"

First form: Dogmatically disconnect theory from practice, relying on book-learning (often only concerning foreign experience) as complete knowledge and trying to implement "pure truths" of Marxism-Leninism.¹²⁷ Or they may adopt the "theory of cadres," studying Marxism in small circles until social development in a backward country makes conditions ripe for an immediate proletarian revolution.¹²⁸ Within the party they can adopt "the policy of ideological struggle carried to excess"¹²⁹ and deal with theoretical differences in a splittist way.**

one way or the other: is it "L" or "Right"?

For all their insistence on correct theory, dogmatists are in reality theoretically weak. They are "lazy-bones" who rely on general truths instead of studying particular problems.¹³⁰ "[I]nsufficient theoretical preparation" is one of the conditions that permits dogmatism to take root in the first place.¹³¹

Not dogs. Trotsky, e.g.

Second form: Unlike dogmatists, those whose ultra-leftism tends towards anarchism and/or syndicalism ignore the value of theory and put all their stock in what they see as revolutionary action.

They negate the necessity of theory, scientific consciousness; they rise against Lenin's thesis that without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement; they deny the role of the vanguard armed with the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism; they oppose the necessity of working out clear political programmes, scientific strategy and tactics. According to them the important thing is to start and carry out the revolution. . . .¹³² (Foto (Zui)?)

"The anarchist mode of thought" is "[b]lind faith in the miracle-working power of all action directe; the wrenching of this 'direct action' out of its general social and political context, without the slightest analysis of the latter" ⁽¹³³⁾ Entranced by their own heroic actions or the

check

*Cf. the PLA's evaluation of the Trotskyite "theory of cadres" (that communist work should consist solely of educating party cadres, with no mass work) "as defeatist and opportunist, for it isolated the communists from the masses, kept them as a sect trailing behind the masses. . . ." History of the PLA, p. 88. (The authors of this book use opportunism to refer to rightism only.) However, the line was "left" in form in Albania, because of the character of the arguments used to justify it and its relationship to the overall "left" line of its promoters. (Cf. Lenin's remark about "waiting for great days," quoted on p. //19/, above.)

**See "Unity and Struggle Among Potential Allies," above.

spontaneous mass upsurge which they believe near, they can show an "infinite disregard for theory," dismiss concern with theoretical questions as "bookishness," and show "supreme contempt for durable programmes."¹³⁴ They utter "general platitudes against exploitation" but lack a scientific understanding of its causes or of the course of social development.¹³⁵ The anarchist Bakunin actually urged students to forsake the pursuit of knowledge; Engels ridiculed him for this.¹³⁶

What do "lefts" substitute for real knowledge of history and concrete conditions? Meaningless phrase-making, ultra-revolutionary slogans, and often utopianism and grand, idealist plans.¹³⁷ All-sidedness--dialectical analysis of all aspects of a thing--may strike them as sophistry¹³⁸ or make them fear that we are giving too favorable a picture of something which the proletariat must be taught to oppose.

Like anti-theoretical rightists, "lefts" can oppose attention to theory so that they may shield their own line from criticism, justify their own theoretical vacillation and spontaneous drift in their practice, and even to call for broad unity (with their petty-bourgeois revolutionism) at the expense of principle.¹³⁹

Proletarian Internationalism

Rights

In their conciliation to the bourgeoisie, have supported imperialist war as "defense of the fatherland,"¹⁴⁰ accepted colonization for its "civilizing" influence,¹⁴¹ and conciliated to bourgeois nationalist prejudices among the people.¹⁴² Other right deviations would be the raising of democratic demands for oppressed nationalities in a reformist way, or a false claim that the development of capitalism is itself ending national oppression.

"Lefts"

Equally capable of national chauvinism. During World War I, wrote Lenin, "The natural 'appendage' to [right] opportunism. . . namely, the anarcho-syndicalist trend, has been marked by a no less shamefully smug reiteration of the slogans of chauvinism. . ."¹⁴³ "Lefts" have opposed demanding the right of self-determination for nations as being reformist, meaningless because politically free nations would still be dominated economically, and equivalent to chauvinist "defense of the fatherland" (for the oppressed nation).¹⁴⁴ They can refuse support for wars of national liberation through their "revolutionary" belief that only proletarian-socialist, not national, movements are to be supported, or that the only genuine revolution is the one that will break out worldwide all at once.¹⁴⁵

They can present the opposite pole of rightist refusal to struggle against nationalist sentiments among the people by voluntaristically brushing such sentiments aside, as if

the problem did not exist. (146) Their tendency to liquidate the struggle for reforms can be manifest in a refusal to demand check democratic rights for oppressed nationalities.

They can also make an ultra-left commitment to internationalism, e.g., through phrase-mongering promises to start in immediate uprising if imperialist war breaks out (regardless of conditions), (147) or by demanding support for a non-existent national revolutionary movement. check

NOTES TO APPENDIX

- 1'. P.U.L., pp. 55-61.
- 2'. "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism," LCW 23: 36-37.
- 3!. Things are Beginning to Change, MSW V: 440-41; "Left-Wing" Communism --An Infantile Disorder, LCW 31: 31-36, 103; The Fight Against Right and "Ultra-Left" Deviations, SW 8: 1-4; The Right Danger in the CPSU(B), SW 11: 242; note 6 to Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, MSW I: 250-51.
- 4'. "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov," LCW 13: 167-68; "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism," LCW 23: 13; Once More on the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party, SW 9: 11-12. ^{Stalin}
1. Foto Cami, "The Objective and Subjective Factors in the Revolution," Albania Today, Jan.-Feb., 1973, pp. /3-4/.
2. "On Practice," MSW I: 307. See also "Differences in the European Labour Movement," LCW 16: 349.
3. "The Fight Against Right and 'Ultra-Left' Deviations," SW 8: 1-2; "Against Boycott," LCW 13: 36-44.
4. "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," MSW I: 107.
5. Cami, p. /3/.
6. Mao, loc. cit.
7. Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, MSWI: 220, and "On Policy," MSW II: 441.
8. What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 10.
9. History of the Party of Labor of Albania, p. 54.
10. "Differences in the European Labour Movement," LCW 16: 349. See also "Speech at a Meeting of the Moscow Soviet," LCW 30: 420. For an example, see History of the PLA, p. 59, and Ch. 1, Parts 3 & 4, passim.
11. Cami, p. /3/.
12. E.g., the theory of "ultra-imperialism" refuted in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, LCW 22: 267-76, 292-98.
13. Marx, Comments on Bakunin's Book, Statehood and Anarchy, MESW 2: 411-12.
14. History of the CPSU(B), pp. 184-89; "On New Democracy," MSW II: 360.
15. What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 402.
16. Agim Popa, "Present-Day Revolutionary Movement and Trotskyism," Albania Today, #5 (6), 1972, p. /3/; History of the PLA, pp. 50-60; "On New Democracy," MSW II: 358-60; "On Policy," MSW II: 441.
17. The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee, SW 8: 185-93.
18. "Differences in the European Labour Movement," LCW 16: 349.
19. "The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism," LCW 33: 115.
20. Cami, p. /3/; see also p. /2/.

21. The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, LCW 28: 314-20; "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," SW 7: 59.
22. Cami, p. /3/. See also Stalin, loc. cit.
23. See Popa, p. /4/.
24. "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," LCW 13: 79-80, 91-93.
25. See "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," MSW I: 118-119; Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, *ibid.*, 206-07; Cami, p. /4/; On Practice, MSW I: 306-07; On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy, MSW IV: 181.
26. The Right Danger in the CPSU(E), SW 11: 240; History of the PLA, p. 660; History of the CPSU(B) p. 233-34.
27. See Mao's writings cited in n. /15/, above, and Central Committee, CPC, A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement (PLP Peking: 1963), p. 24, and *ibid.*, p. /2/.
28. Cami, p. /4/.
29. Stalin, loc. cit. n. /26/, *ibid.*
30. "Strange and Monstrous," LCW 27: 56-75.
31. Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, MSW I: 206-07.
32. Cami, p. /4/.
33. "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCW 12: 370-71; Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, LCW 9: 107-08; What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 392.
34. The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, LCW 28: 239.
35. History of the CPSU(B), pp. 273-94.
36. "Left-Wing" Communism--an Infantile Disorder, LCW 31: 36-39.
37. Cami, p. /1/; "Bellicose Militarism," LCW 15: 195-96.
38. Lenin, *ibid.*
39. Problems of Strategy. . ., MSW I: 203-04; On Policy, MSW II: 441-42.
40. Problems of Strategy. . ., MSW I: 204-07.
41. *Ibid.*
42. "Strange and Monstrous," LCW 27: 56-75.
43. "Left-Wing" Communism. . ., LCW 31: 28, 36, 66-77.
44. The Political Tasks of the Unity of the Peoples of the East, SW 7: 153-54; The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War, MSW II: 208; "Introducing The Communist," MSW II: 290-91; On Policy, MSW II: 442.
45. History of the PLA, pp. 660-61.
46. See, e.g., "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCW 12: 371.
47. Editors' footnote to Telegram to Comrade William Z. Foster, MSW II: 287-88; Lenin, loc. cit. n. 46 *ibid.*, pp. 370-71.
48. See, e.g., editors' footnotes to "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," MSW I: 13-14, and to "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," MSW I: 23-24.

49. Popa, p. /5/.
50. "To the Party," LCU 7: 186-87; The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War, MSW II: 205-07; MS. editors' footnote cited at n. /47/, above.
51. On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy, MS IV: 181-82.
52. Popa, p. /3/; The Political Tasks. . ., SW 7: 153-54.
53. On Policy, MSW II: 442.
54. "Left-Wind" Communism. . ., LC. 31: 70-75.
55. On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism, MSW I: 154.
Mao called the "left" opposition to united-front work "closed-door" tactics.
56. History of the PLA, p. 660.
57. "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCU 12: 363-65.
58. The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee, SW 6: 194-202. For more on the application of this tactic, see History of the PLA, pp. 130-36, 145-48.
59. "The Basic Thesis Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries," "Extract from an Article Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries," and "Outline of an Article Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries," LCU 6: 271-73, 285-86, 462-63 (see "Revolutionary Adventurism," LCU 6: 184 et seq., for the characterization of the S-R.s as ultra-left); Popa, p. /4/.
60. See, e.g., History of the PLA, Ch. 1, passim; Role of the Chinese Communist Party. . ., MSW II: 207 (identified as "left" on 205; On Policy, MSW II: 441.
61. E.g., "A Caricature of Bolshevism," LCU 15: 391-92.
62. Sometimes Trotskyites provide good examples of ultra-leftism, but their "unprincipled vacillations to the 'left' and right" (Popa, p. /3/) mean that one cannot mechanically take their mistakes as examples of the "left." However, we think that it is clear that factionalism--the topic addressed above--can easily come from the general attitude of ultra-lefts towards unity and struggle, as well as towards authority and discipline.
63. Popa, pp. /3, 5/.
64. *Ibid.*, p. /2/.
65. "The Basic Thesis Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries," LCU 6: 273.
66. History of the CPSU(8), p. 35; What is to be Done?, LCU 5: The Present Situation and Our Tasks, MSW IV: 171; A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the Shansi-Suiyuan Daily, MSW IV: 243; On Coalition Government, MSW III: 266.
67. E.g., History of the PLA, 660, 578-79; The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, SW 7: 59.
68. A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement, (FLP: Peking, 1963), p. 25. See also P.L.L., p. 49, and What Are "Left" and Right Errors?, p. 9.
69. See n. 67, above; also, Cami, p. /1/.

70. History of the P.L.A., pp. 640, 649; The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee, SW 8: 199; On Coalition Government, MSW III: 266.
71. "On Practice," MSW I: 307; Talk to Shansi-Suiyuan Daily Editorial Staff, MSW IV: 243.
72. "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCL 12: 363-64.
73. See, e.g., On Policy, MSW II: 447.
74. Editors' n. 22, LCL 12: 521; History of the CPSU(B), pp. 10-11; Popa, p. /3/; Cami, p. 4.
75. History of the P.L.A., 59, 74-75, 58.
76. The Fight Against Right and "Ultra-Left" Deviations, SW 8: 6-7.
77. Cami, p. /4/.
78. Ibid., and What is to be Done?, LCL 5: 391-92, 418.
79. Cami, p. /4/. See also "The Basic Thesis Against the Socialist-Revolutionaries," LCL 6: 272-73.
80. Cami, p. /2/.
81. What is to be Done?, LCL 5: 418.
82. Ibid.
83. See, e.g., One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, LCL 7: 381-85; History of the CPSU(B), pp. 42, 45-50; What is to be Done?, LCL 5: 451-67; To the Party, LCL 7: 452-53.
84. "Differences in the European Labour Movement," LCL 16: 349.
85. Ibid.
86. "Preface to the Pamphlet by Volin. . .," LCL 13: 167-68. See also "Anarchism and Socialism," LCL 5: 328.
87. Cami, p. /2/.
88. What is to be Done?, LCL 5: 445; "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism," LCL 23: 13 & n. 4.
89. Popa, p. /3/.
90. History of the P.L.A., p. 85.
91. What is to be Done?, LCL 5: 460-67, 493. For an example of the syndicalist form of this deviation (i.e., that the trade unions are the highest form of working-class organization), see History of the CPSU(B), p. 253.
92. Marx and Engels, "The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men's Association," in Anarchism & Anarcho-Syndicalism, pp. 107, 111-20.
93. History of the CPSU(B), pp. 35, 37; Cami, p. /4/.
94. "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy," LCL 4: 255-85.
95. "The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion," LCL 15: 403-10.
96. Cami, p. /2/.
97. Quoted in Marx and Engels, "The Alliance of Socialist Democracy.

...," in Anarchism & Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 113.

98. "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov," LCW 13: 166.

99. What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 512-13.

100. Marx and Engels, loc. cit. n. 87. above, pp. 111-14.

101. History of the CPSU(8), pp. 1-11. See also "Anarchism and Socialism," LCW 5: 328, and What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 418.

102. History of the CPSU(8), pp. 19-21, 23, 35; What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 393-408.

103. "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism," LCW 23: 18.

104. "Against Boycott," LCW 13: 16-20; "Resolutions of the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of Proletary," LCW 15: 445; The Social-Democrats and Electoral Agreements, LCW 11: 277-79; "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCW 12: 372-73.

105. Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, LCW 9: 111; "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism," LCW 23: 13 & n. 4.

106. Engels, On Political Action of the Working Class, in Anarchism & Anarcho-Syndicalism, pp. 51-52 (see also next selection in the book); "Anarchism and Socialism," LCW 5: 328; "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism," LCW 23: 13-18.

107. Marx, letter to P. LaFargue, in Anarchism & Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 46; "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism," LCW 23: 13; "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCW 12: 372; "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov," LCW 13: 27; "Marxism and Revisionism," LCW 15: 38 & n. 18.

108. What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 328.

109. "Anarchism and Socialism," LCW 5: 328.

110. "Left-Wing" Communism. . ., LCW 31: 26, 34-36, 56-65.

111. What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 453-57.

112. History of the CPSU(8), p. 91; "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," LCW 13: 87-89; "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov," LCW 13: 166-67.

113. See Principles of Party Organization (Theses adopted by Third Congress, Communist International), reprinted by Mass Publications (Calcutta: 1975), p. 20.

114. "Left-Wing" Communism. . ., LCW 31: 46, 51-56; The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee, SW 8: 185-93.

115. "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCW 12: 372; "Marxism and Revisionism," LCW 15: 38 & n. 18.

116. "Marxism and Revisionism," LCW 15: 31-33; On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World (FLP: Peking, 1964), p. 1; "Leninism and Modern Revisionism" (Hongkong editorial) in Whence the Differences (New Era reprint: Bath), pp. 77-98; "More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," *ibid.*, pp. 336-37; Speech at the CPC's National Conference on Propaganda Work, PSW V: 434-35; Things are Beginning to Change, MSW V: 440-41; The Party of Labor of Albania in Battle Against Modern Revisionism, pp. 300-66; Lani, p. 71/.

117. "Against Boycott," LCW 13: 1a-2a; "Left-Wing" Communism. . . . LCW 31: 102-03; "Our Revolution," LCW 33: 476-80.
118. "More on the Differences. . .," in Whence the Differences?, pp. 336, 340-42; Things Are Beginning to Change, MSW V: 440-41; History of the PLA, pp. 678-79; Cami, p. /1/.
119. On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism, MSW I: 164-65.
120. "Preface to F. Sorge Correspondence," LCW 12: 363-65.
121. "More on the Differences. . .," in Whence the Differences?, pp. 341-42; "Left-Wing" Communism, LCW 31: 102-04.
122. The sources cited in notes 116 and 118, above, make this clear.
123. Speech at the CPC's National Conference. . . , MSW V: 434-35; "More on the Differences. . .," in Whence the Differences?, p. 336; Cami, p. /1/. *Things Are Beginning to Change, MSW V: 440-41.*
124. History of the CPSU(B), p. 117.
125. Ibid., p. 3a; What is to be Done?, LCW 5: 365.
126. What is to be Done?, ibid., pp. 366-69, 364.
127. Rectify the Party's Style of Work, MSW III: 37-43. See also: "Revisionism and Dogmatism," above.
128. History of the P.L.A. The "theory of cadres" is described on p. 59 and 74-75, but it is difficult to grasp its connection to a "left" line without reading all of Ch. I.
129. The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War, MSW II: 207.
130. On Contradiction, MSW I: 321.
131. History of the P.L.A., p. 679.
132. Cami, p. /4/.
133. "Bellicose Militarism," LCW 15: 195 (second emphasis added).
134. What is to be Done?, ^{LCW 5:} 511-13, & fn. on 513.
135. "Anarchism and Socialism," LCW 5: 327-28; Marx, letter to F. Solte, in Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 58; "Introducing The Communist," MSW II: 293.
136. ^{Marx and Engels,} The Alliance of Socialist Democracy. . . , in Anarchism & Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 113.
137. "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality," LCW 27: 343; History of the CPSU(B), p. 116; Popa, p. /4/.
138. "Anarchism or Socialism," SW 1: 308-10.
139. "Revolutionary Adventurism," LCW 6: 185-87.
140. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy," LCW 21: 31-32; The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, LCW 28: 287-88.
141. "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," LCW 13: 75-77.
142. Rights and "Lefts" in the National Republics and Regions, SW 5: 315-17.

143. "The War and Russian Social-Democracy," LCU 21: 12. See also "Speech at a Meeting of the Moscow Soviet. . .," LCU 30: 420.

144. "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economics," LCU 23: 10, 18-19; "A Caricature of Marxist and Imperialist Economics," LCU 23: 71-75, 30-34, 58-59.

145. Pops, p. /4/, and see History of the P.S.D., pp. 53-54, and "A Caricature of Marxism. . .," LCU 23: 58-61.

146. Cf. Rights and "Lefts" in the National Republics and Regions, SW 5: 317-19.

147. "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," LCU 13: 79-80, 91-93.