

ANVIL - a student socialist magazine

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Be Happy, Go Liberal

By Harvey Swados

Germany After Geneva

Communism in Bobbysox

The "Religion of Sociology"

Liberalism's Hartz Mountains

American Policy Toward Africa

Koestler—the Unpolitical Political

Reviews - Poetry - Editorials

ANVIL

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Where Anvil Stands...

Anvil and Student Partisan wishes to express the ideas, criticisms and proposals of students who believe in democratic socialism. We address ourselves to those who seek the preservation and extension of democratic values to all forms of political and economic life. We firmly contend that this end must be pursued without deference to the status quo of private property interests, social inequality and human oppression which are characteristic of Western capitalism. At the same time, we are fully aware that totalitarian collectivism (Stalinism), which presently dominates much of the eastern world with its new exploitation and oppression, is the very antithesis of the democratic and equalitarian society which we seek.

We further believe that democracy and socialism are inseparable. Guarantees of democratic rights to all people, without any restrictions, in a society based upon private ownership of the basic means of production and human exploitation, are as impossible as achieving socialism in any society where democratic control is absent from nationalized productive facilities. Socialism cannot exist without democracy. Democracy can only flourish when all human needs are satisfied. Furthermore, a socialist society can only be attained through the conscious thoughtful efforts of a majority of the world's peoples. For this reason we see our task today as an educational and propagandistic one. We seek to encourage a socialist choice as a solution to the power struggle which holds the world in continuous fear and anxiety. This socialist choice must reject both the Western and Stalinist blocs, neither one of which offers hope of democracy, peace and security. Consequently, the socialist choice is a third choice which must embody and express the hopes and desires of the world's peoples in order to triumph.

Anvil and Student Partisan is open to those who desire to critically examine the socialist tradition and to reevaluate those aspects of it which are no longer applicable. But as our name implies, we claim no impartiality on the major social questions of our time, nor the forces behind them. We will defend colonial movements struggling for freedom from foreign domination and at the same time we will extend our hand to those behind the iron curtain who seek to overthrow their oppressive masters. We will seek to create sympathy for the aspirations of working class movements throughout the world. And we will support the struggles of the American labor movement for a larger share in that better life of which socialism is the final consummation.

INTERNATIONAL

Germany After Geneva

-A Dissent From Power Politics

I
IN DISCUSSING THE SIGNIFICANCE of the Geneva conference, we must remind ourselves that the basic issue in the world today is freedom, and that the wars as well as the great power conferences of the past forty years have contributed to the contraction rather than the expansion of the area of freedom. Wherever some degree of freedom has been attained, be it in India or Indonesia, or Tito's break with the Soviet Union, it came as the result of the struggles of autonomous political forces. A relatively favorable international situation was, to be sure, necessary for their success; but this was and is a passive and conditioning factor, not a creative one.

The *rapprochement* which took place at Geneva did not arise from the issues which formally occasioned the conference; it remained in a purely subjective sphere. The issues themselves were presented rather than debated, and their negotiation was postponed. No tangible commitments were made by the participating powers, yet the *détente*, which they officially initiated at Geneva, is a very real and important fact. What then is the objective meaning of this conference?

First, it implies an attempt, obviously aimed at by the Russians and supported by the British, to slow the pace of political developments. Time tends to favor the necessarily gradual build-up of Russia's internal strength and external

positions; while Great Britain, for its part, does not want a strong Germany, and is not averse to seeing a diminution of America's power status.

Secondly, the U. S. could not avoid taking part in the conference, and this not merely because it stood officially committed to reciprocate, by a course of conciliatory diplomacy, the Russian withdrawal from Austria. There were deeper reasons, which may be stated as follows:

The Korean war decided nothing as to the relationship of forces on the world scene; however, the brittleness of the system of Western alliances was clearly exposed by the reluctance displayed by its members in consigning troops and matériel, and by the rising domestic opposition to their participation. The position of Communist China as the greatest Asian power could not possibly be challenged by the U. S. without allies. Two years later Dienbienphu again tested the Western alliance; again the U. S. was compelled to abstain from intervention by England's refusal to render its support. In Europe, German rearmament proved to be a divisive issue from its inception in 1950. Germany's admission to NATO came as an anti-climax; its regaining of a quasi-"Great Power" status, far from strengthening the Western alliance, greatly increased the pressures for an accommodation with Russia.

The American "Policy of Strength"

The Geneva Conference of August 1954 and the defeat of the European Defense Community by the French parliament in the same month made obvious the blind alley into which American foreign policy had worked itself. It was clear that American foreign policy was not yielding any results internationally; rather, it made a full-scale war more likely. It tended to isolate the U. S. externally, while it strengthened the Republican right wing and its radical offshoots domestically. A war, or even intensive preparations for one, could have had the most unwelcome repercussions on the structure of American politics and of the economy. No analysis of the changes it would have occasioned can be attempted here; suffice it to say that the balance which has, with few interruptions, traditionally prevailed in this country between political power and economic interests, would have been upset, with the former uncontrollably increasing, to the grave detriment of the entire social order.

Russia has of course, whenever possible, promoted the disintegrative tendencies within the Western alliance. But the fundamental causes of these tendencies reside simply in the naturally divergent interests of the major allies, and these divergencies have become sharper the more that economic recovery has restored a measure of independence to them. Those who are perturbed by these trends, seeing in the disintegration of the Western alliance a boon to Russia, base themselves implicitly on Dulles's much-touted "policy of strength," which may indeed have preserved a rough balance of world power, but which has had no relevance to the decisive social and political problems which shake our world, other than to aggravate them.

II

This is exemplified by the case of Germany. We choose the example of Germany, because it is particularly relevant to our subject, although other significant examples could be discussed. In Germany, the "policy of strength" has supported all that is anachronistic and authoritarian in its economic and political life, while at the same time imposing upon the German nation a course in foreign affairs manifestly alien to its own interests. We will analyze these effects in some detail; since Chancellor Adenauer is not only *the* exponent of Amer-

ican policy in Western Europe, but also a symbol of the *nature* of European recovery, it is convenient to examine an article of his which appeared in the *N. Y. Times Magazine* of June 26, 1955.

Adenauer first defines Germany's "mission" in the present era: it is to form a "dam" against Communism, to contribute to the salvation of Western civilization and its Christian foundations. Adenauer is not concerned with, or is unaware of, the implicit shortcomings of this approach. His use of the metaphor of a "dam" in defining Germany's task betrays the static, inelastic conceptual framework with which the mind of the bourgeois statesman attempts to deal with the great issues confronting him today. Indeed, Germany's latest "mission" was initiated not by Adenauer, but developed out of the needs arising from America's position after 1945.

Attempt to Restore European Bourgeoisie

The European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) had as its salient *social* aim the restoration of Western European bourgeois society. The motivation of the ERP was the isolation threatening the U. S. in a world whose common denominator was a profound hostility to capitalism. ERP succeeded in restoring, but not re-invigorating, the West European bourgeoisie. The social system, and therefore the vested interests of Western Europe, and especially of West Germany, where the process of dissolution had gone deepest, entered into a relationship of dependence on the U. S. In the political arena this dependence could not, of course, find a direct and true expression, since traditional national interests persisted and gradually began to reassert themselves. At the same time, Stalinism acted as a brake upon the political development of the labor movement (in the sense either of a threat to its gains, achieved in the most difficult conditions, as in Germany; or as a disorienting factor, as in France and Italy). The virtual absence of a vigorous labor movement which could challenge and replace the old ruling strata did not strengthen the latter's position; rather, it deepened the stagnation of society as a whole. This had the objective effect of enhancing the hegemony of the U. S. and, indirectly, that of the Soviet Union, in all matters affecting the existence of the West European nations as nations—i.e., not the details of their domestic politics, but their moral sovereignty.

Adenauer argues that three courses are open to Germany: it can join the Soviet orbit; it can remain allied to the West; or it can become a "neutral." The last course, Adenauer contends, is tantamount to the first—"the Germans would live in constant fear of future developments, and sooner or later would inevitably succumb to the suction of the East bloc." In this manner Adenauer contests the concept of German neutrality which, he alleges, is implicit in the policies advanced by his German opponents. Indeed, Germany cannot be a Switzerland or an Austria. But it is exceedingly doubtful whether, if war came, she would suffer less if she were armed — and thus runs Adenauer's central argument — than if she remained unarmed. Adenauer obscures the deeper significance of German neutralism. He will not admit that neutralism is not a passive yearning for peace and not a snare of the Kremlin; but rather that it is a form of opposition to the hegemony of the U. S., and, in Germany, is directed against Russia as well. It has become a mode of articulating the national interest and is, as a movement, closely associated and identified with the Social Democrats and the trade unions.

That this should be the case arises from an elementary and crucial fact: German democracy—and we need not stress that German democracy, as all modern democracy, is inseparable

from the labor movement—cannot develop, cannot become the decisive force in Germany, unless it joins hands with the people of the Russian zone, with whom it has always shared its traditions and aspirations. Reunification, if it were to take place, would not simply mean a proportional increase of the parliamentary representation of the Left; it would spell a basic realignment in the political arena, which could not but threaten the Rhenish conservatism of Adenauer's coalition, together with the forces on which it is based. Thus, neutralism is a form of class struggle, and this is not the least reason for the bitterness with which Adenauer attacks it.

It has been Adenauer's purpose to tie Germany to the West; more specifically, to establish a bloc of Catholic states, weaker physically than either the U. S. or the Soviet Union, but stronger morally, which "by virtue of its internal structure . . . could never be an aggressor," and would be able to "throw (its) weight in favor of peace at crucial moments." These generalities have no concrete political meaning, since this "Third Force" is not to be dissociated from the U. S. The idea of a "Third Force" in Western Europe has always had a strong and justified appeal there; but its essential function has been to make German rearmament palatable and it has been subverted thereby into a device to manipulate public opinion.

No doubt rearmament would enhance the autonomous base of power of the German bourgeoisie; this not only in terms of internal "stability," of physically safeguarding its peculiar institutions, but also in the sense of the pervasiveness of the influence on German society of a renascent militarism, in circumstances of potential irredentism. The period during which the alliance with the West was an inescapable condition of West Germany's revival thus is ending, and with it Adenauer's role. But can the German bourgeoisie re-establish its *national* position by a resolute struggle for reunification? It is unlikely. For it cannot do so by military force and it will not do so by political means, since this would activate great popular forces which it could not hope to master. Thus, while its very existence no longer depends on the Western alliance, it nonetheless continues to be bound to it.

Geneva and the Failure of U. S. Policy

Washington, in turn, consistent with its "policy of strength," while guaranteeing West German conservatism, has conditioned the granting of sovereignty on what is virtually continued military occupation and a collaboration so close as to deprive this sovereignty of all but its formal meaning. Precisely the *unconditional* restoration of sovereignty to the Germans would have been the effective answer to the Stalinist totalitarians, precisely *because* it would have liberated the great political energies necessary for the achievement of a united and democratic Germany. Moreover, the repercussions such a development would have had upon Stalinism and the nations of Eastern Europe would have been incalculable.

IV

It is indeed the rise of autonomous national forces—such as the German SPD and trade unions, Mendès-France, Tito, Nehru, etc.—which alone can create the *objective* conditions for peace, since they make any consolidation of power on the part of either Russia or the U. S. progressively more difficult. Neither of these powers can, however, tolerate genuine independence. They both have a record of bitter resistance to all assertions of intermediacy on the part of countries strong and confident enough to make them. The praise which in recent weeks has been bestowed by Russia upon Switzerland for its "neutrality" indicates what is *really* desired: a neutrality

from weakness, not from an infectious will to preserve one's freedom against the encroachments of alien interests.

At Geneva all the powers gave lip service to the Germans' fundamental democratic demand for unity, but none wanted this to be a unity in freedom. The West conditioned unity on Germany's continued adherence to the Paris pact, under which that country retains its military advance base; the Soviet Union would concede unity only to a "neutral" Germany, neutrality to be guaranteed by the presence of East German representatives—i.e., of Russian agents—in an "all-German" government. *All* the powers, then, wish to prevent the rise of a *free* Germany. This is not because, as some apologists contend and as Bulganin implied, they fear the alleged innate aggressiveness of the Germans, but because a free Germany spells a revitalized Western Europe, which would present a formidable challenge in the world arena.

V

The era of good feeling ushered in by Geneva is based not on compromise but on mutual recognition of the status quo in Europe. It is not, of course, an explicit and legal recognition, but a moral one, arising not so much from the text as the tone of the declarations and conversations of the conferees.

The content of the speeches made at Geneva revealed important shifts of emphasis in the positions of the participants. At the Berlin conference of February 1954, the reunification of Germany was the major topic of debate between Molotov, on the one hand, and Eden and Dulles on the other, with Bidault playing a minor role. At Geneva the task of presenting the West's position on Germany was left to Faure, the representative of a secondary power, whose hostility to Germany's resurgence is a matter of record. Eisenhower's addresses were couched entirely in cautious generalizations and were important only in that they set the tone for others. Eden displayed a striking reticence which can be explained only by the assumption that he recognized in the Russian approach to the German question a basis for mutually advantageous future agreements (tacit or explicit), which he did not wish to jeopardize by any sharply defined formulations, whose public character would unduly commit him. This basis was laid by Bulganin's initiative in outlining a comprehensive approach to a system of European security. The German question remained subordinate, and only a small portion of his major speeches was devoted to it. He indicated that a divided Germany would be entirely compatible with his concept of security; and there can be little doubt today that the Russians prefer the continued division of that country to the imponderables of an ever so "neutral" united Germany. Eden's proposal of a demilitarized buffer zone in Central Europe, being similarly based on some form of continued surveillance over Germany, was quite in the spirit of Bulganin's stiff political traditionalism. The sense, not the details, of this proposal was meant to be taken seriously.

Conspiracy Against the German People

At Berlin, Eden and Dulles had insisted on free elections in all of Germany, under Four Power or U. N. supervision, and the subsequent creation of an all-German government, formed on the basis of the election results. However, under the terms of the Bonn agreement of May 1952, such a government was not to be free to take any actions considered prejudicial to the interests of the Western powers. Since furthermore these powers did not surrender, rather they explicitly stipulated their continued right to declare martial law and, in effect, to maintain the present order of government in West Germany by force of arms, should they believe it to be

endangered, free elections, even if the Russians had consented to them, would certainly not have meant an automatic restoration of national freedom to the Germans. Nevertheless, they would undoubtedly have created very favorable conditions for a progressive internal development upon which control from the outside could not have been imposed for long, and which therefore would have presented the Western powers with unwelcome and intractable complexities. For this reason it can be assumed that the "Eden Plan" (i.e., free elections, etc.) was not advanced with the intent of realizing it, but because it was known to be unacceptable to the Russians. The latter had but six months before been given stunning evidence of the likely results of free elections in the form of the great uprising of June 17, 1953. Molotov, on the other hand, had proposed the formation of an all-German government *prior* to any elections, the members of which were to be designated on the basis of consultations between the existing regimes in West and East Germany and which, as he plainly indicated, was to have the task of controlling the conditions under which the elections were to take place—an old Stalinist trick to confer a sham autonomy and to involve the participants in their own servitude. The "neutral" Germany, which was to result, was to join in a collective security arrangement also proposed by Molotov. However, the security aspect was at Berlin still subordinate to the great prize represented by Germany herself: the Western powers had not yet suffered their defeat in Indo-China, EDC was still a good possibility, a voluntary withdrawal of Russian troops from their zone could still be speculated upon. The Russians, in turn, had analogous reasons for keeping *their* fingers in the German pie.

For all the shifts in emphasis at Geneva, the issue of a divided Germany will not cease to plague the powers. The preoccupation with security obscures but does not remove the problem. It would be tedious to go into the details of the disarmament and inspection proposals made at Geneva, whose effectiveness, if indeed they reach the stage of treaty obligations, is not likely to be greater than that of their numerous predecessors in the inter-war years. The preoccupation with "security," necessary though it is to insure the desired status quo, serves to perpetuate the division of Germany, hence that of Europe. The "Geneva spirit" does not make this division less real or even less dangerous, but only less apparent.

VI

It is in the nature of the present *détente* to help stabilize the Stalinist regimes: to allow them to devote a greater share of their resources to civilian pursuits, possibly to secure their social bases and institutional patterns. This is a likely, not a necessary effect of the *détente*—no one not in intimate touch with the internal situation of the Eastern bloc countries can foresee the forms which developments there will take. We say it is a *likely* effect because of the *political quality* of the period of *détente* which we have entered.

Power Politics Not Ended by *Détente*

The politics of the coming period will not, as we have sought to demonstrate, be less a politics of power merely because its emphasis has changed from hostility to cordiality, important as that change may be. The essential characteristic of the West's cold war politics was *not* to create alternatives to Stalinism, but simply to secure its own predominance by means of imposing and supporting reactionary governments wherever feasible. This objective is not changed by the *détente*—though the latter may make its attainment more difficult in the more highly developed countries, or easier in areas where either a measure of Stalinist cooperation can be

expected or native forces remain in isolation. Thus, if cold war politics had no basic reference to the causes of Stalinism, the chance of this being the case in the time ahead is obviously less. On the contrary, the "spirit of Geneva," being a synonym for "peaceful coexistence," involves a degree of normalization of relations, of mutual accommodation which, by definition, precludes all serious political warfare.*

Furthermore, since a conference of the very heads of state cannot be allowed to fail, and must at least appear to succeed, given the stakes and the prestige involved, all participants gain in moral authority. And doubly so the Stalinists: they not only initiated the conference, but retained the initiative, and proved capable of veiling reactionary ends by positive proposals, which had the additional virtue of being plausible to a war-weary and spiritually fatigued world. Hence, Geneva constituted a renewed legitimation of the Soviet rulers before the eyes of the nations.

Geneva Spirit vs. Independent Action

Notwithstanding the designs of the great powers, the *détente* offers an opportunity to those who have the will and the ability to shape their own political fate. It is the creation of new centers of political independence, not the good intentions of the Geneva conferees, which will secure peace. For the polarization of world power into two camps has a grave, unstabilizing effect which can be offset only by the rise of such new centers.

As we have shown, efforts in this direction have in the past and will continue to be resisted by the great powers; the conference itself was one of the forms taken by this resistance. As if by tacit consent, none of the participants alluded to each other's political status. The West avoided all reference to the totalitarian nature of its opponent's regime; the Soviet leaders refrained from all comment on the aggressive character of American military policies. It is, of course, true that a balance of terror exists now, which makes war an unfathomable risk, to be taken only in the ultimate extremity. This fact enhances the deceptiveness of the "spirit of Geneva." People tend to place an undue confidence in the doings of the great power representatives, and conversely to view their own efforts as of small or no consequence. The "Geneva Spirit," is intended to emasculate or capture independent political action.

In this the methods of the Stalinists will be more insidious, more corruptive of public life than those used by the West, but the objectives will not differ. To the extent to which they succeed in thus perpetuating the polarization of world power, they will make a third world war more likely.

On the other hand, however, and perhaps more decisively, the mere fact that the Geneva conference took place shows that neither the Soviet Union nor the U. S. are able to continue to monopolize the arena of world politics; the day is breaking for those with the will to make it theirs. Upon them will depend whether the present *détente* will turn into an era of real peace.

H. B.

October 1955

*Of symptomatic interest is the recent toning down of the Voice of America. With the broadcast of V. Matskevich, Soviet agricultural minister, who toured U. S. farms during the summer months, it became another voice of "peaceful coexistence." This is not to say that the reaction of the American farm people in the Midwest to the Russian delegation, in the face of years of cold war, was not exceedingly heartening. But it was a reaction of people to people, taking place within dimensions which cannot possibly compare with those within which international politics must operate.

The Unpolitical Political

Koestler Suspended in Mid-Air

IN THE LITERATURE OF YUGOSLAVIA, there is an old and famous poem about the battle of Kossovo. On the very eve of the fighting, Elijah in the form of a bird comes to the Tzar, and asks him what he wants: the earthly kingdom or the heavenly kingdom.

*"If you want an earthly kingdom,
Saddle your horses, tighten your horses girths,
Gird your swords . . .
But if you want a heavenly kingdom,
Build you a church at Kossovo . . ."*

The Tzar chooses the heavenly kingdom—and is decisively defeated.

In our own time, Arthur Koestler has posed a choice in almost the same terms: the Yogi or the Commissar, the heavenly kingdom or the sword. Yet Koestler, unlike the Tzar, cannot choose. In theory, he hovers between a half-hope that the Commissar will be transformed, that the illusion of Stalinism will become real, or that there will be a new party, a new religious order but of no Church. In practice, he has committed himself politically to supporting the Western camp in the Cold War.

The cosmic images and absolute dichotomies in which Koestler expresses himself are peculiarly his own; his indecision is not. He stands for part of a generation, those who went through the disillusioning experience of the Stalinist movement and who, because of it, have lost all faith in politics—and perhaps faith in the possibilities of man's reason. In this sense, he is of interest not only because he is the political man uninterested in politics, but also because his failure, his indecision, his inability to choose between struggle or the church at Kossovo are the very fabric of our political life today.

Yogi vs. Commissar

The most familiar form in which Koestler has presented his dilemma is in the image of the Yogi and the Commissar. In the two essays specifically concerned with this metaphor, the Yogi stands for the man who seeks to change the world through a change in the self. The position is a religious one, and for Koestler its most distinguished partisan in our time has been Gandhi. On the other side, the Commissar is characterized by a scientific attitude toward human beings; he attempts to change the world from the outside, by manipulation. His modern prototype is Stalin.

Between the extremes of Yogi and Commissar stand the majority of people in the world. Koestler is not with the majority: his thought is polar, and he approaches problems from the point of view of the extremes. In doing so, the Yogi and Commissar take on characteristics more ultimate than the opposed images of Gandhi and Stalin. The Commissar comes to stand, in certain important contexts, for reason, and the Yogi for mysticism.

At this point, however, what must be emphasized is the fact that Koestler's thought is disjunctive, that it is a matter of either/or. Because of this, the synthesis, the third choice, is almost inevitably ruled out—it is part of the middle ground. And rather than reaching a conclusion, Koestler's work is marked by the warring of opposites: in R. H. S. Crossman's

perceptive comment, "The Yogi looks in the mirror, sees the Commissar, and breaks the glass in rage."

Thus, in *Darkness at Noon*, Ivanov, the old Bolshevik (a person to whom Koestler is obviously sympathetic), remarks: "I don't approve of mixing ideologies. . . . There are only two conceptions of ethics and they are at opposite poles. One of them is Christian and humane, and declares the individual to be sacrosanct. . . . The other starts from the basic principle that a collective aim justifies all means. . . . The first conception could be called anti-vivisection morality, the second, vivisection morality."

And in *The Age of Longing*, Julien (of all his characters the one most clearly identified with the author) says, "You can't get out of the dilemma between thought and action. There were idyllic periods in history when the two went together. In times like ours, they are incompatible."

Almost all of Koestler's work flows from this absolute notion of opposites. It is his basic definition. In the two essays entitled "The Yogi and the Commissar," he attempts to limit the terms to the recognizable types of Gandhi and Stalin. Yet throughout his writing, they burst the confines of these two personality types, and become explanations of history, meditations on thought and contemplation, analyses of the relative values of faith and reason. And each reappearance is in the same form, that of the absolute disjunction. Given only two choices, either/or, it is not surprising that Koestler is unable to choose either.

At various times, Koestler has attempted to make a synthesis, to escape from his dilemma. Thus, in the second essay on the Yogi and the Commissar, he writes, "Neither the saint nor the revolutionary can save us; only the synthesis of the two." And in *Arrival and Departure*, Peter Slavek is finally able to act, but only because he chooses to ignore the fact that in his own terms he cannot do so. In that book, the impossible situation has three elements: Russia or "utopia betrayed"; the bourgeois democracies or "tradition decayed"; and Nazism, "destruction arrayed." Slavek believes in none of the three, and he goes off to struggle against the third convinced that little good will come of it, as "a duty, not a mission."

And yet Koestler himself has admitted that he has no solution for the problem which he poses. In *Promise and Fulfilment* (a long essay on Palestine and Zionism), he calls for a limited use of means in a world which he has defined as incapable of such a use; in one of the essays on "The Yogi and the Commissar," he admits that the synthesis of the revolutionary and the saint is actually impossible, for the two "do not mix, and this may be one of the reasons why they have made such a mess of our history." His latest affirmation was in the second volume of his autobiography, where he remarks that "in rare moments of grace, we are able to decipher a small fragment" of the world.

Orwell has described this basic attitude of Koestler's as a "conservative pessimism." The term is apt. For once the definition of the world as an either/or of Yogi and Commissar is accepted, once there is no middle ground, choice and change are out of the question. At bottom, such a position is unpolitical, it is cosmic, a journalism of epochs and aeons written by

the "Author at Thirty-Five and After," a man who intends to "live happily ever after, until the Great Mushroom appears in the skies" (so Koestler describes himself in *The Invisible Writing*). On a formal level, this is indeed a conservative pessimism as Orwell would have it, but emotionally it is a romanticism, and it is no accident that Koestler inscribed *Arrival and Departure* with these lines from *Cyrano*:

But one does not fight for the hope of success.

No. No. The fighting is more beautiful if it is doomed.

II

Thus Koestler's philosophy: unpolitical, conservative, romantic. Yet the man himself has been intensely political, an activist, a realpolitiker. He has delivered himself of judgments upon immediate events like the Wallace campaign and the Irgun and discussed socialist theory, psychology, religion and almost everything else of importance in the modern world. At first, this would seem to be a paradox, if not a contradiction. Yet, when Koestler's particular attitudes are examined carefully they betray the presence of The Author at Thirty Five and After, the philosopher, they occur in the terribly simplified world of either and or.

Take, for example, Koestler's critique of Stalinism. *Darkness At Noon* has been considered sufficiently political to merit burning by both the Nazis and the East German Stalinists, a fact which makes the writer understandably proud. When it was performed this year as a television play, the Vice President of the United States cited it as an excellent aid in Knowing the Enemy. And yet, if this book is taken in itself and in the context of Koestler's other writing, it becomes apparent that he is stating another one of his insoluble philosophic dilemmas and not engaging in political analysis. (A novelist is, of course, under no obligation to perform the latter, and the former may be better art; the important point here is that *Darkness at Noon*, and many of Koestler's books, have been taken as political analyses.)

In *Darkness at Noon*, Rubashov makes a statement of Koestler's basic criticism of socialist thought: "The mistake in socialist theory was to believe that the level of mass consciousness rose constantly and steadily. . . . We believed that the adaptation of the masses' conception of the world to changed circumstances was a simple process, whereas . . . the capitalist system will collapse before the masses have understood it." Leaving aside the accuracy of Koestler's characterization of socialist theory (a point with which I would emphatically disagree), I want to go behind this statement in order to probe its real foundation—and to indicate its actual place in Koestler's thought.

Two Views of the Russian Revolution

On the face of it, this passage would seem to rely upon a sociological analysis, a sort of Marxist refutation of Marxism. But go back for a moment to *The Gladiators*, a novel which Koestler wrote shortly after his break with Stalinism. In dealing with the revolt of Spartacus during 73 to 71 B. C., Koestler accounts for its failure with a series of materialist arguments, chiefly that the economic level of the Roman Empire made a socialist revolution impossible. The point is the exact reverse of the one in *Darkness At Noon*—here, it is the material condition and not the consciousness which is at fault—but the method of discussion is the same.

Alongside of this point of view in *The Gladiators* there is another: that the revolution failed, not because of economic level or of consciousness, but because of a fundamental flaw in human nature. Once more, we are confronted with the interpenetration of Yogi and Commissar, and the case is not unrelated to *Darkness at Noon* since *The Gladiators* is clearly an

allegory of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. If "consciousness" is understood in this context, it is no longer a relationship to material conditions but a cosmic fact, an attribute of human nature no matter what the historical moment may be.

This does not mean that the Koestler of *The Gladiators*, or of *Darkness at Noon*, is simply The Yogi for whom political failures are merely failures of the spirit. This point of view, put forth by Merleau-Ponty in *Humanisme et Terreur*, cannot account for the fact that Koestler's attitude is a tension of his polarities, neither Yogi nor Commissar, but both. The important point which I would find in *The Gladiators* is the ambiguity, the fact that Koestler is not sure of his most basic point.

Return now to *Darkness at Noon*. The theory of the lag of consciousness behind the material changing of the world is now seen as the reappearance of Koestler's favorite dichotomy. The material world, and with it science, is the Commissar; consciousness, and with it religion, is the Yogi. This fundamental division is repeated over and over throughout Koestler's work. In *Insight and Outlook*, it is psychological: "The symptoms of our Western crisis may thus be summarized as the effects of a hypertrophy of the self-asserting drives with a corresponding decline of the self-transcending drives." In still another context, "consciousness" is opposed to scientific knowledge.

The Impossible Solution—in Religion

Given this insoluble dilemma, this war of Yogi and Commissar, it is not surprising that Koestler has attempted to find a solution in religion. He rejects all traditional churches as "intellectual suicide and surrender of the critical faculties." Yet over and over Koestler hopes for a religious revival: a new movement "whose preachers would probably wear monk's cowls and walk barefoot on the roads of a Europe in ruin." (*Scum of the Earth*); "a new spiritual ferment . . . as spontaneous and irresistible as early Christianity" (*Age of Longing*); a "new party" whose members will "wear monk's cowls, and preach that only purity of means can justify the end" (Rubashov, in *Darkness at Noon*).

The strange thing about this religious image of Koestler's is not only its persistence—it is also the way in which it is under-emphasized, a sort of surprise on the part of the author at his own feelings. This is still another manifestation of Koestler's fundamental ambiguity. For he is religious within the context of a militant opposition to all organized religion, just as he is the Yogi when criticizing the Commissar, the Commissar when criticizing the Yogi. All of his attempts at synthesis are thus inevitably doomed to failure because of the very polarity of the irreconcilables which he would reconcile.

But this ambiguity about religion is not only a function of Koestler, the Cosmologist; it is an intimate expression of the man's personality. In his autobiography, Koestler tells about his experience in Franco's prison. It was there that he first began to really doubt his commitment to Stalinism, and it was also there that he admits to having had something of a mystical experience. He attempts to discuss it in Freudian terms, as the "oceanic sense," but still he cannot dismiss it. Finally, he simply comes to the conclusion that he doesn't want to talk about it, that he doesn't think such things should be spoken of, he affirms his embarrassment.

And yet, as long as Koestler maintains that there is no real critique of the Commissar other than the one given by the Yogi, he is forced to continue in his unreligious religious hope. True, he must bring this in half-heartedly and in such a way as to make it impossible to develop any real alternative; he must be embarrassed. But he has no place else to go. The

result is, once again, Koestler's one consistency, his one intellectual resolution: a pervasive ambiguity, an inability to choose sword or the Church at Kosovo.

In his most recent statement, this religious feeling is even more in evidence. Writing in *Encounter*, Koestler says "My own guess and hope . . . is the spontaneous emergence of a new type of faith which satisfies the 'great sober thirst' of man's spirit without asking him to split his brain into halves; which restores the navel cord through which he receives the saps of cosmic awareness without reducing him to mental infancy; which relegates reason to its proper humble place yet without contradicting it."

This last quotation should bring us back to the original point—that even in his most political analyses, Koestler is concerned with absolutes, with aeons rather than decades. The statement occurs in an essay entitled "The Trail of the Dinosaur." In this piece, there is a political point of view, one of more or less unqualified support to the Western camp in the cold war, but its function is merely to provide a breathing spell, a fulness of time in which an apocalyptic resolution of the opposition of Yogi and Commissar can take place. And this hope for some kind of resolution is based, not upon any action by man, but upon "some unexpected mutation in man's dominating passions and interests."

A Final Apocalyptic Hope

This final and apocalyptic hope is, in a sense, an essential expression of Koestler's personality and a summation of his intellectual indecision. This is the voice of the man who conceives of his politics in cosmic metaphors, who faces an immediate and concrete problem of political analysis in terms of historical and psychological *Weltanschauungs*. Although it is given the appearance of a choice, of a hope, it is actually an admission of bankruptcy. For Koestler is ultimately pushed to plight his faith in . . . a miracle, to hope only on the basis that all of his knowledge will be contradicted by an inexplicable eruption of mystery. His unpolitical politics eventually issue into an irreligious religion.

And yet, as pointed out before, this is an almost inescapable conclusion of Koestler's basic method, of the initial either/or and the division of the world into Yogi and Commissar with the helpless millions caught in between. In such a world, political programs are out of the question. In this regard, Koestler is not unlike Calvin, the dichotomy of saved and unsaved, the sense of helplessness being the same, and the conclusion also the same—that man will be saved by faith and not by good works, by a new religious order and not by political struggle.

All of this is, of course, on an intellectual level. On a practical level, Koestler is quite willing to give very real support to the Western Camp, to participate in American political campaigns and the proceedings of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. His rationale for all of this political activity is not, however, political. The place of NATO in his thought is fundamentally as the pre-condition of a miracle, as a stop-gap until mystery shall come as "some unexpected mutation in man's dominating passions and interests."

Thus, the paradox of Koestler: that the best-known political journalist of our day is not political; that the analysis of Stalinism, the support of the West in the Cold War, all his various positions, are subordinate to the cosmic struggle of the Yogi and Commissar, religion and reason, ethics and science, consciousness and material world. The man's personal tragedy would seem to be that he himself has not found that "cosmic awareness" which he seeks. But it is to his significance as a public figure, as a participant in the drama of his own times,

and an interpreter of the significance of Stalinism that I now wish to turn.

III

Arthur Koestler's membership in the Communist Party was fairly brief. He joined in Germany, toured Russia, was a journalist in Spain where he was captured and almost executed, and by the end of the Thirties was disillusioned. Yet although his actual participation in the Stalinist movement was short-lived, it is the phenomenon of Stalinism that is most basic to his thought. For once having experienced the disillusionment and betrayal, he turned, in theory, from politics altogether. And his practical political work became more and more a penance for his Party membership. Yet throughout Stalinism remained the defining experience: the Yogi is more a reaction to the Commissar than anything else.

How polar a term Stalinism is for Koestler can be seen in the ambiguity of *Darkness at Noon*; it is as if he himself realized that his rejection of the Commissar was a rejection of politics, of a secular hope, and fought against it. In *Promise and Fulfillment*, Koestler tells of having met a young man who became more sympathetic to Stalinism through reading that book. And this, I think, is because Rubashov fails to answer Gletkin and Ivanov, that he has no answer. As he is about to die, he has the vision of the new religious order, but emotionally this cannot contradict the political capitulation.

This is the same ambiguous attitude which appeared in Koestler's article in *The God That Failed*. He ends his memoir with this parable: "I served the Communist Party for seven years—the same length of time as Jacob tended Laban's sheep to win Rachel his daughter. When the time was up, the bride was led into the dark tent; only the next morning did he discover that his ardors had been spent not on the lovely Rachel but on the ugly Leah. . . . I wonder whether the happy end of the legend will be repeated: for at the price of another seven years labor, Jacob was given Rachel too, and the illusion became flesh." (My emphasis.)

Does this mean that Russia will return to being what it had been? Probably not. But what it indicates is that Koestler has defined socialism in terms of Stalinism, or more broadly, politics in terms of socialism, and that he can only look to a miracle which will transform the Commissar. The Yogi, Koestler's reaction to the Commissar, is however unacceptable to him, and here also, he must look for a miracle, "an unexpected mutation," in order to provide hope.

Understood in this sense, Arthur Koestler is an extremely articulate representative of part of a generation, of those intellectuals who made of their disillusionment in Stalinism a denial of politics. True, he continues to act politically as a vociferous supporter of the West, but his commitment lacks a certain conviction. He sees it as providing a breathing spell, a space in which apocalypse may occur. He has no idea of how to act to further that event; he is not even sure of the event.

As a result, Koestler is a man in mid-air. The Commissar of Stalinism has disillusioned him in all politics; the Yogi provides no alternative answer. Yet he projects the two into an explanation of the universe, of politics, psychology, religion. His proper conclusion would be resignation but, like Peter Slavek in *Arrival and Departure*, he goes on and commits himself to a struggle which he feels to be hopeless. The unpolitical political, he leads nowhere and follows half-heartedly the West, hoping for apocalypse.

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The "Religion of Sociology"

—The "Science With the Hollow Frontier"

LIKE OTHER NATIONAL INDUSTRIES, present-day American sociology is marked by an extensive division of labor, a high rate of productivity and a vast output. No area of modern life is safe from the intrusion of the "social scientist" in quest of raw material, whether it be the family, industry, the church or politics. The areas embraced by the science are indeed ambitious, there being among others a sociology of industrial relations, a sociology of politics, a sociology of religion, and a sociology of knowledge. Doctoral theses, field studies and books proliferate in an ascending geometrical progression.

And yet, the *mood* within the ranks of the sociologists themselves is not a happy one. To what avail this tireless zeal, this commendable accumulation of facts, the ever-mounting pile of monographs on this or that circumscribed area, if from it all emerges no integrated theory, no general explanation of what is happening and what will happen in and to society? How can this science exert its beneficent influence on the direction society is taking if the sociologist lacks a perspective, if he doesn't even know the meaning of the facts he gathers?

Writing in the September, 1955 issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* on "Sociological Theory and Contemporary Politics," Barrington Moore Jr., of the Harvard Russian Research Center comments ruefully, "A major source of our self-criticism is the absence of any sizable core of established theory, any framework of general propositions strong enough to convince a substantial part of the profession. As one of my colleagues is fond of remarking, sociology is the science with the hollow frontier."*

To Moore's complaint, one must add the frank and categorical confession of Talcott Parsons, an outstanding writer in the field of social theory: "A general theory of the processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge." (*The Social System*, 1951.) A strange state of affairs indeed! Here is a "scientific" discipline that approaches its subject matter without a generally accepted theory. That is, if we are to believe some of its practitioners, American sociology is no science at all.

Neither Theory Nor Practice

Not having a general theory is bad enough. But even in that area where American sociology believes itself strongest—the empirical study of some aspect of the social process—the results are apt to be either confusing or disturbing. As a wonderful model of confusion, take the discussion which recently filled the pages of *Commentary* on the connection between social mobility and the absence of rigid class lines and class conflict in America.

The first salvo of the battle was fired in the *Commentary* of November 1953 by a complacent member of the profession,

*Dissatisfaction in the field of the social sciences is by no means confined to sociology. In his recent book, *Becoming*, the Harvard psychologist Gordon Allport, expresses his discontent with the "positivist" approach of American psychologists. The positivists, he writes, prefer "externals rather than internals, elements rather than patterns. . . ." He says that what is needed is a psychological theory which treats of the totality and not the parts, which grasps the human being as a totality in the process of "becoming."

one William Peterson. Peterson advanced figures to sustain one of the cherished dogmas of American sociology—that the continuous expansion of the economy and the possibility of personal advancement deriving therefrom go a long way toward explaining the fluidity of the American social system. Seymour Lipset and Natalie Rogoff joined the discussion in the December 1954 issue, and challenged Peterson's views. They announced that a study had revealed a rate of social mobility in Western Europe which compared favorably with that in the United States. Therefore, the factor of social mobility alone could not explain the difference in social structures. The final blow in this comedy of confusion was registered in the September 1955 issue by the European writer, Herbert Luethy, who remarked caustically that the factor of social mobility was pretty much irrelevant in analyzing European society and that the methods of American sociology, when applied to the problems of European society, result in findings that are very nearly pointless. Out of politeness, Luethy did not say what many American sociologists feel to be true: that these same methods, described by Luethy as the "art of social engineering," are also sterile when applied to the problems of American society.

The Dubious Dogmas of Sociology

When the methods of American sociologists don't produce confusion, they tend to yield some very disturbing and depressing results. Depressing, because they challenge another of the unwritten dogmas with which the sociologist starts out: to wit, that American society and its institutions are viable, and that the democratic process is self-perpetuating.

If he is honest, the American sociologist sees what everyone else sees, that American society is travelling in the direction of a totalitarian society. In the article by Barrington Moore Jr., cited earlier, there is a footnote which recognizes that ". . . American society, now openly hostile to the Soviet system, has begun to show increasing signs of a totalitarian tendency."

Moore invokes the pressure of Russia to explain this trend. But this explanation evades the question which is pertinent: why is American society responding in just this fashion to the external totalitarian threat? Can it be that there are powerful tendencies of just this kind at work within American society, waiting to find release?

This is just what one sociologist, Seymour Lipset, finds to be true when dealing with one particular, and rather important factor in American life today, the trade union movement. In an essay entitled "The Political Process in the Trade Unions," which appeared in a collection published under the heading *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*, Lipset finds that American trade unions are heading in an authoritarian direction. Lipset has applied the central concept of the Weber-Michel school of sociology: all large-scale social organization induces a rationalized bureaucratic pattern of behavior. Lipset believes that bureaucracy and the democratic process are antithetical, and the trade unions are taking the bureaucratic road. He tells us that he is "pessimistic" about the long-term chances for democracy in trade unions.

While we do not subscribe to Lipset's analysis, his explanations are revealing. The anti-democratic trend in the trade union movement stems, essentially, from the fact that the trade union leadership has absorbed the material and moral values of bourgeois society. To maintain a standard of living consonant with their status as community leaders, they must resist the dangers of the democratic process—a fall from office and consequent loss of their high income.

II

It may be an exaggeration to say that American sociology is suffering from a "failure of nerve." What is true, however, is that some dissatisfied sociologists have begun to turn a cold and critical eye on the very nature of the science. And one of the more curious spectacles of the time is the fury with which sociology and its pretensions are being attacked by . . . sociologists.

No one is more effective in laying an axe to the root of the science than Albert Salomon in his book, *The Tyranny of Progress*, which bears the sub-title, "Reflections On the History of French Sociology."

Ostensibly, Salomon concerns himself with the origins of sociology in the systems of Saint-Simon and Comte. But his attack on the French Fathers of the science is also extended to their modern American progeny, the practitioners of what Salomon ironically calls the "religion of sociology."

Sociology Without Socialism

Salomon clearly and correctly establishes the line of descent between Saint-Simon, Comte and American sociology. If American sociology today lacks theory, it does not lack dogmatic assumptions of whose origin it seems to be blissfully unaware. On this score Salomon writes, "Surely it is not an accident that sociology today is an American science, practiced in its 'pure form,' without reference to socialism, only in ica:" And the reason for this is that:

. . . the ideas of these sociologists [Saint-Simon and Comte] do have a genuine relevance to recent American experience. A conviction of the basic unity of management and labor and the absence of any concept of class struggle have much more affinity to our ways of thinking than to Marxism. If we are fascinated by technological and managerial problems and devoted to hierarchy rather than to the disruptive elements of social antagonism, we should turn to Saint-Simon and Comte for their vision of the most efficient managerial society in Western thought.

Salomon's attack on sociology is as simple as it is bold: it is to establish a correlation between sociology and—totalitarianism! American sociologists, he says, are simply naive in taking for granted that social thinking arises only in a liberal and democratic context. Historically, this is not true. "Sociology, which at its inception was a philosophy of total progress—really the rationalization of concurrent political, social and industrial revolutions—showed the way to total revolution at a time when capitalism was still in its early stages." And, adds Salomon, this affinity is not merely a matter of the past. "In fact, the correlation between sociology and totalitarianism in a period of bureaucratization and planning as in the contemporary world, should cause us much concern."

What exactly is the nature of the historic affinity, the correlation Salomon finds between modern totalitarianism and the sociological theories conceived by Saint-Simon and Comte? He says that the total state, as we know it is such by virtue of the fact that a small minority completely controls the "activities, thoughts and attitudes of its citizens with the aid of the technological potential of an industrial mass society." And if we compare the social systems ruled over by Hitler and Stalin in our day to the total systems envisaged by Saint-Simon

and Comte, we find a remarkable correspondence. There is the same emphasis on a powerful industrial base; there is rule by a small elite; there is the total organization of society in which the individual counts for nought; and, adds Salomon, there is the same contempt for politics, tradition and the institutions on which they rest.

A "Curious" Historical Process

Not only is there an "affinity" between modern totalitarianism and the sociology of Saint-Simon and Comte. There is, in Salomon's opinion, a relation of cause and effect between their ideas and the modern reality. To be sure the founders of French sociology are not to blame for Hitler and Stalin. Nevertheless, their philosophic ideas had a social impact which cleared the way for the rise of the total state.

Of course, Salomon is too sophisticated to insist upon a literal and total application of his thesis. He has a lively appreciation of the reciprocal interaction of ideas and events, and at times even comes close to stating the exact opposite of his initial view. He writes:

Sociology's tendency toward totalitarianism has been abetted by a *curious* [our italics—AS] historical process. A concomitant of the growth of the constitutional state was the loss of the very freedom which the state had been created to protect. The more the state strove to give security to the individual, the wider the scope of its responsibilities became. The antagonism between social classes, an inevitability under unrestricted capitalism, induced the individual to seek the protection of its state until at length the state extended its influence over the citizen's most private life. Social and industrial legislation made the national state a monolith.

In effect, then, it was not the ideas that spawned the social reality of the total state, but that the social reality objectively and independently moved closer to the pattern anticipated by the fathers of French sociology. If Salomon finds this historic process "curious," it is because he insists on the causal role of ideas, because he denies that society is, in any sense, governed by "natural" and "inevitable" laws.

III

To Salomon, the sociology of Saint-Simon and Comte (and their modern American disciples) is a religion and not a science because it is constructed on the dogma of progress. This law of universal progress—which foresees the increasing and harmonious association of men within a hierarchical society, a development made possible by the advancement of scientific ideas and technology—this law is a myth and a dangerous one at that. In the first place, it subordinates the individual to a new and false god, the abstraction, "society"; in the second place, it assigns men the role of natural objects governed by inescapable natural law and thereby denies them subjective freedom and the exercise of reason; and finally since this scientific knowledge of social law is the privilege of an "enlightened" few, it leads to the rule of an elite over all of society. Salomon has some harsh things to say about this secular religion of progress:

Social scientists must look upon these religions of progress, which have identified society with the meaning of divine providence, as demonic phenomena. They are demonic because they believe the powers of man to be absolutely meaningful in themselves, and because they do not recognize a frame of reference that transcends the nature of man. The present world is demonic by virtue of its power to control nature. And in the final analysis, satanism and demonism coincide.

To declare that the present world is demonic because of its power to control nature, that a science which locates man's destiny in this world, and none other is equally demonic, this is to renounce reason and retreat into the wilderness of

religious obscurantism. So far as Salomon is concerned man cannot be explained primarily or totally by any natural, historical or social law. It is not that Saint-Simon and Comte may have misconstrued the kind of laws that regulate society and determine the manner of its transformation. All theories which comprehend man's destiny in terms of nature and history only, are wrong. Salomon saves man's freedom by shifting its site to heaven. The transcendent, ahistorical relation to God is decisive for man. Elsewhere he has written,

Primarily, the religious experience is the axis around which all other experience revolves. It sets the center and describes the horizon of the human scene, and so disposes into their places all the other goods of civilization without ever being itself disposed by them. (*Commentary Magazine*.)

Does Salomon's obscurantism and renunciation of reason render his critique of the original dogmas of sociology altogether null and void? The answer is, no. He is historically right on at least two points: the systems of Saint-Simon and Comte, above all, that of the latter, did deny freedom to men in viewing them as *completely* governed by "natural" laws; these systems did have authoritarian strains in looking to a scientific and managerial elite, instructed in the laws of the new science, as the administrators of society.

To those who are unaware that socialists have generally claimed Saint-Simon as their own, Salomon's indictment of the "utopian socialist" as a theoretical forerunner of modern totalitarianism may come as something of a surprise. But nothing is easier from Salomon's point of view.

He can easily ignore the marvelous insight of Saint-Simon, who grasped the fact that the key to modern society was its economics, and wrote, "Society as a whole is based on industry. Industry is the only guarantor of its existence, and the unique source of all wealth and prosperity." He can pass over in silence a principle which Saint-Simon laid down as the basis of an equitable society, that "all men should work." And to Salomon, Saint-Simon's vision of the need for central planning in a society based on a highly developed division of labor, is an example of "total" social thinking and therefore a form of "demonism."

It is in Comte that the authoritarian strains implicit in Saint-Simon come to full light of day. For this reason, it is worthwhile examining Comte's ideas and the interpretation Salomon puts upon them. There is a sort of historic justice in this, since it was August Comte who coined the term "sociology" and proclaimed it an independent science.

Comte asserted that the new science was to be "positive"

A Doctrine of Order, Not Revolution

in character. And in the meaning he ascribed to the term "positive" is contained the key to Comte's ideas and intent. The new science was positive, first of all because it based itself on observation of existing facts and from them derived social laws modeled on those of the natural sciences. In this way a grand synthesis of all domains of scientific thought would be achieved. Again, it was positive because it was opposed to all "philosophies of negation" by which Comte meant revolutionary doctrine.

Salomon is right in attacking Comte for wanting to reduce men to the status of natural objects who must submit to the laws that govern society. But how wide he is from the mark when he declares Comte was motivated by revolutionary intent! To Comte, the positive laws he had discovered meant that society could escape the convulsions of revolution and the turmoil of politics and class conflict! That is, his intent

was reactionary in character. His aim was not to overthrow existing society, but to conserve it.

Comte was born in the post-revolutionary period and came to manhood after Napoleon's downfall. From this entire historic experience he absorbed a horror of revolutionary upheavals, class-conflict and the disorder of politics. Comte was quite conscious of the functions his science was to have and wrote that it would serve the cause of order, was destined to organize and not destroy. This intent was translated into the world of ideas. True enough that from the philosophers of the French Enlightenment he took the principle of progress, but he grafted upon it the principle of order! Comte believed the rulers of society could escape the disorder of politics if they would only recognize the inevitable truth of his sociological laws.

Salomon is perfectly aware of the intimate connection between Comte's thought and the nature of the period in which he lived. But he is not at all interested in attacking the reactionary intent of Comte's concept of society since he agrees, as we shall see later, with its cardinal tenet. What he wants to expose is its claim to being scientific and its "total" thinking.

IV

With deliberate and conscious irony, Salomon invokes the "sociology of knowledge" against Saint-Simon and Comte and reinforces it with the technique of "typology" so dearly beloved of Weber, Scheler and Company, to explain their motivation.

The radical nature of Comte's thinking, Salomon declares, is due to the fact that he was that unfortunate child of bourgeois society, the declassed, bohemian intellectual. Standing on the edge of respectable society, the irresponsible bohemian intellectual can drive his criticism to the extreme. He compensates for his own marginal existence by demanding and creating an impossible ideal of perfection.

Intellectuals, Bohemians and Bohemianism

Denis Diderot, the Encyclopedist, is the outstanding example of the bohemian intellectual in the 18th century. In fact, he was the originator of the "pattern of bohemianism which was to emerge in the age of total revolution. . . ." Saint-Simon and Comte are among its intellectual representatives in the 19th.

When Salomon links Diderot with Comte on the ground that both were declassed bohemian intellectuals, and therefore driven to the extreme of irresponsible criticism and system building, he reveals the shortsightedness of the . . . bourgeois sociologist. It is worth pausing for a moment to examine Salomon's analysis.

He confuses the issue by emphasizing the adjectives, "declassed" and "bohemian" at the expense of the substantive "intellectual." Now there is nothing necessarily attractive or creative about bohemianism as such. A "bohemian" is simply a person who has drawn the most rigorous conclusions about his private life in terms of bourgeois society. Theoretically and practically, he has concluded that the freedom of the individual is not real unless it is absolute. To be a "self" is to be "selfish," and indulge one's impulses to the limit. To achieve this aim, the bohemian must come into sharp conflict with society.

The intellectual, too, if he wants to be free, that is, free to be an intellectual, must renounce all loyalties to existing social institutions and forms. And this was what happened in Diderot's case. Only in this fashion could he escape a one-

sided development and ward off the material chains of academic or professional success that would bind him to the status quo. Anyone who has read Diderot's youthful correspondence with his father on the question of his career learns that he was acutely aware of this. He wrote, "There is no career that interests me. . . ." He wanted to remain in Paris and study "Latin, Greek, English, Italian, mathematics, the natural sciences—everything I can." In reality, the "bohemian" way of life that Diderot chose did not determine his point of view but was the price he paid to have the freedom to express it. What is an end in itself for the bohemian was only a means to Diderot.

Salomon *almost* gets the point. Puzzled by Diderot's incredible industry, he writes, "One can only marvel at the concentration which produced one of the greatest summaries of the scientific mind, the *Encyclopedie*, which he managed to finish only after twenty years of constant and bitter conflict with ecclesiastical and political powers. . . . It would seem that the specific social situation of the bohemian creates the only pattern by which a certain type of intellectual can accomplish his task."

"They Are Driven Theoretically . . ."

Salomon, by the way, is as wrong in his facts as he is in theory. In fact, Diderot managed to achieve a good measure of respectability. Like every bourgeois intellectual, two souls dwelt within his breast, one of which wanted to follow the path of "bohemianism" and another which longed to achieve a measure of respectability in life. A recent biographer has written of Diderot that he had "one morality in which he abandoned his objective rationalism and followed the sentimental bourgeois impulses of his heart. It was the Christian morality of some of his writings and much of his life. At the other extreme was the ethical theory of Diderot the rebel, the atheistic materialist who insisted on a complete and almost anarchic liberty for the individual." This struggle between order and anarchy Diderot recorded in that wittiest and most malicious of masterpieces, *Le Neveu de Rameau*."

And the truth is that the intellectual is never free to the extent that he engages in theoretical or creative work, i.e., he is never merely an individual. He always represents some social class or layer. The crude determinist, the "materialist," Salomon, sees in Diderot's bohemian and declassed way of life the factor that was primary and decisive in shaping his intellectual outlook. The "idealist" Marx, expresses the relationship between the intellectual and the different classes in a slightly different and more accurate manner. In the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx wrote:

What makes them representative . . . is the fact that in their minds they do not go beyond the limits which the latter [the members of a given class—AS] do not go beyond in life, that they are consequently driven theoretically to the same tasks and solutions to which material interest and social position practically drive the latter. *This is in general the relationship of the political and literary representatives of a class to the class they represent.*

Let us, however, accept for the moment Salomon's "typological" description that both Diderot and Comte were declassed, bohemian intellectuals in the same "positivist" tradition. Yet, a world separates them. Diderot is the ideological spokesman of a bourgeoisie engaged in a general struggle to clear away all the rubbish of feudal-absolutist France. (This explains the encyclopedic character of Diderot's interests.) He heralds the revolution to come, and his scientific "positivism" is radical in character. In the name of rationality, he con-

demns the existing facts and calls in effect for the abolition of a social order that supports them. His science is not a weight that ties men down, but a practical means of political and social change. Theoretically, it has in view the liberation of the individual, in reality the class.

Comte is the same declassed, bohemian intellectual *after* the revolution, and his task is to defend the existing bourgeois order. His positivism is not a criticism of the given society but a means to its salvation. And it is at this point that that Salomon's "typological" explanation of Comte's total thinking runs into trouble. It no longer suffices to describe him as a declassed, bohemian intellectual of the same kind as Diderot, for there is too great a difference. Salomon now resorts to the "sociology of knowledge." He explains that Comte—and Saint-Simon as well—were the true ideological spokesmen for the "collective," that is, the masses, and were moved by the same feelings of resentment. ". . . they wished to construct a brave new world of universal happiness, brought into being by the actions of the collective itself, not by the stumbling, uncertain haphazard effects of individual men." This accounts for their contempt for the individual, subjective freedom, justice and politics.

This is certainly a curious explanation. For in the first place, Comte directed his appeals primarily to the ruling class. But there is the question of history. What class fought for democracy, subjective freedom and justice throughout the entire 19th century and the early part of the twentieth? Certainly not the bourgeoisie. For what else does the history of the 19th and 20th centuries show but the increasing incompatibility between capitalism and democracy, between capitalism and politics? No, Comte is the intellectual representative of the bourgeoisie. It is their social needs and interests that he represents.

V

As part of his attack upon the "total thinking" of Comte's social concept, Salomon devotes one chapter of his book to drawing a parallel between Comte and Hegel. The points of identity are easy to see. In both cases there is an all-embracing system. Both are concerned with man in terms of history and explain it in the language of idealism: history is the progress of an idea, or, if you will, the idea of progress. Hegel called it the "Absolute Spirit"; Comte, the "Spirit of Positivism."

Hegel, Comte and Marx

There was, however, one essential difference which Salomon ignores. In Hegel, history moves forward in terms of a dialectic—a struggle of classes disguised as a conflict of ideas. In Comte, the dialectic motor is missing and the development of society takes the form of a smooth and continuous ascension. Any breaks in the line of advancement are not integral but a deviation into anarchy. Hegel's method was conceived in the spirit of critical "negativity." It was revolutionary in character and diametrically opposed to Comte's conservative "positivism."

The road Hegel's "Absolute Spirit" travelled led to absolute freedom. While Comte, as Salomon never tires of pointing out, charted a path that ended in total order. By freedom, Hegel meant the ever-growing consciousness of men that they themselves create the conditions of their own existence, and that this process is social in nature.

In *his Phenomenology of the Mind*, Hegel presented this dialectic of developing self-consciousness in all its historical wealth. A complex and interrelated dialectic reveals man's relation to man and to nature. The first is the struggle of

master and slave, the latter the relation of mind to its own work.

To arrive at absolute freedom, complete self-consciousness, the slave must become aware and transcend his alienation from himself. The labor process is the historic means at hand. Through it, the slave simultaneously wins his liberation from his lord, and masters the natural world by transforming and humanizing it. The object of his work becomes an objective mirror which returns to man a rational (that is, social) image of himself.

The Young Marx praised the *Phenomenology of the Mind* because in it, Hegel had "conceived of man's essence as labor," that is, the means of his emancipation. Marx appropriated the two-fold dialectic, stripped it of its mystical and idealistic form and adapted it to his revolutionary critique of modern bourgeois society.

Had Salomon drawn a comparison between Comte and Marx it would have been more legitimate and enlightening. Marx insisted he had scientifically laid bare the economic and social laws that govern the motion of capitalist society. But unlike Comte, he repudiated the idea that these laws deprived men of their freedom to act. "Men," said Marx, "make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under any circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past."

The vital difference between Marx and Comte bears directly upon Salomon's position that any science of society is a denial of man's freedom. For Comte, the more men were subjected to the social laws he thought he had discovered, the more rational society became. But for Marx, so long as society was governed by economic and social laws which exerted their force in a blind, natural form, just so long was society irrational.

The Predecessor of Elton Mayo

Marx believed that the contradictions of capitalist society provided a way out of the kingdom of natural law. The contradictions expressed themselves in and through the class struggle. In the course of the class struggle the workers would awake to a consciousness of their intolerable condition and the fact that a rational reorganization of society was both necessary and possible. Their *freedom* lay in the recognition of this necessity.

Salomon has scanned his Marx, no doubt, but the implications of the latter's ideas have clearly escaped him. Marx, so far as he is concerned, remains something of a "utopian" and "romantic," with his notions of class-consciousness and class struggle. It is the fathers of French sociology who are the realists:

What Marx had found unacceptable in the French school was the theory of cooperation between capital and labor as the most productive means of running an industrial society. But in America today, where management counselors devote themselves to keeping the workers happy, there exists a society in which basic class warfare is impossible. The French sociologists understood that, in reality, the interests of the two forces in the process of production were identical . . . the grimly realistic French showed the way by which planning might enable an industrial society to avoid the hostilities of class war.

But was Marx such a "utopian" with his notion of the "class struggle"? Throughout the entire course of his book Salomon fails to mention one crucial point where the reality of the modern total state departs from the previsions of Saint-Simon and Comte. The founders of French Sociology believed a process of enlightenment would persuade the rulers of

society to adopt the program of "positivism" as a way of saving society from the anarchy of politics and class struggle. The creation of a harmonious society would be a peaceful, educational process.

But the modern "total" state, above all in its fascist form, was the violent response on the part of the ruling class to the threat of revolution, *the most aggravated form of the class struggle*. Most certainly they achieved a "harmony of social interests" but only by a bloody suppression of the class struggle. When Salomon speaks of "totalitarian despotism" under the control of radical masses and parties, he ignores the central fact: the program of totalitarianism is directed against the decisive class in modern society—the working class. Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin share one common feature—they crushed the organizations of the working class and reduced it to helplessness.

The irony of Salomon's position is that in rejecting Marx's concept of the class struggle as "utopian" he is compelled to accept the central dogma of the very sociology he has condemned: the harmony of interests between the classes. Now what is this natural "harmony" but the law of increasing association expounded by the fathers of French Sociology and the very basis of their "total" systems?

To be sure he dresses this dogma in a different political language, which is less than total. But he, too, dreams of "enlightenment." In a half-century wracked by the violence of total wars, revolution and counter-revolution he believes that "evolutionary progress" can take place if

. . . the responsible and thoughtful classes can accomplish the inevitable transformation as social democracy. Such progress can be described as conservative and liberal. It is the specific postulates of our contemporary scene to be liberal in order to remain conservative. We can secure the continuity of our social and intellectual worlds as conservative reformists.

Such a transformation is devoutly to be wished for. But apparently the liberal conservative Albert Salomon has not read what the conservative liberal Albert Salomon has written on the alarming increase in bureaucracy and totalitarianism in modern American society. Isn't there some connection between the harmony of class interests, bureaucratization and the totalitarian trend in the United States? It doesn't matter. So long as we avoid the curse of "total thinking."

O brave new world! O brave new science! Truly we can agree with Barrington Moore that "sociology is the science with the hollow frontier."

ABE STEIN

Abe Stein is a regular contributor to ANVIL and *The New International*.

THE REVOLT AGAINST REVOLT

*The flesh of their wives is soft,
The hair of their daughters long,
"Perhaps they are right," the writer said
To the ears hung framed in their rooms.*

*No happiness in opposition, it's cold
Standing out in the cold,
The present's as real as the future
When anarchists bomb no more*

*And Blimp goes technicolor
When caricature's touch is lost,
When the revolutionist's non-violent children
Engineer and translate poems.*

—Frank Marcus

Be Happy, Go Liberal

— *The New Expulsion From The Garden of Eden*

THERE HAS BEEN in recent years an increasing tendency on part of certain of my contemporaries (roughly, those who were undergraduates in the Thirties) to regard international communism as one vast scheme designed solely to make them look ridiculous. Indeed, they sometimes give one the impression that their resentment against Stalinism was originally aroused not by oppression, violence, and subversion, but by shame at the temporary success of the Communists in hoodwinking them during the Thirties. This resentment, far from resembling the dull anguish of the East European directly overborne by Communist tyranny, seems more akin to the anger of the man who finds out, after he has bought it, that the Brooklyn Bridge was not for sale. And since ours is an age when political judgment becomes more acceptable when couched in the vocabulary of theology, we find those who have been "had" describing their common experience not as gullibility, early error, or youthful naivete, but in terms of guilt, penitence, and absolutism.

There are two principle aspects to this concern with the question of political guilt, particularly as it is being codified in the writings of critics like Diana Trilling and Leslie Fiedler (*An End To Innocence*, Beacon, 1955.) First, it is not stated personally, in the manner of those who feel impelled to repent their youthful sins before congressional committees, but instead aims at including an entire social category (e.g. the liberal intellectuals) in its denunciation of past guilt. Second, it is circular to the point of effectively paralyzing any legitimate social action on the part of the condemned group. One can imagine the following dialogue:

"The first thing we must do is to understand that we were guilty of the sin of pride back in the Thirties; that for a time we wilfully misrepresented tyranny, to ourselves and to others, as the beginning instead of the end of freedom; that we were horribly duped, and less right, actually, than those whom we ridiculed at the time."

"What next?"

"We must make it crystal clear, first to ourselves and then to the others, that we are not being taken in any longer, and that we have 'done great evil' (the words are Mr. Fiedler's)."

"Yes. But *then* what?"

The answer to this question has thus far been only a restatement of the guilt of the liberal "we."

Who is this "we"? Since, as I have noted, the imputation of guilt is seldom personal, it would seem a primary duty to make it quite clear who is being whipped for the "great evil." Mrs. Trilling, in an essay on "The Oppenheimer Case" (in *Partisan Review*, November-December 1954), underlines the absurdity of Dr. Oppenheimer's having been granted clearance when he was a pro-Stalinist and refused clearance when he was just as demonstrably an anti-Stalinist. "In effect," she says, intimating that just the *opposite* course should have been followed, "this tragic ineptitude . . . constitutes a projection upon Dr. Oppenheimer of the punishment we perhaps owe to ourselves for having once been so careless with our nation's security."

Granting Mrs. Trilling the saving "perhaps," who are the "we" who are hereby charged once again with sinning? The

American people? Surely not all of them. Surely not the FBI? Surely not the Republican Party? The Democratic Party, then? Or perhaps only its "left" wing? and with that "left" or "liberal" wing, the liberal-intellectuals who were so pro-Soviet throughout the Thirties?

One can only guess. Just as one can only guess at what is meant by "our nation's security." The context would lead one to conclude that Mrs. Trilling is not referring to questions of the United States Army's being either too large or too small, nor to bombers being contracted for at the expense of fighters, or vice versa, nor even to the manufacture of atomic bombs being carried forward at the expense of research into the possibility of hydrogen bomb construction (in any case, discussion of these matters has been declared unofficially out of bounds by our Secretary of Defense, who asserts that they are questions for experts only). No, the apparent meaning of this deadly charge, meriting "punishment," is that the liberal attitude of pooh-poohing the Russian Communist danger led directly to the employment—in government and in scientific research laboratories—of men who were either, like Dr. Oppenheimer, temporary dupes of the Stalinists, or, like Rosenberg, Greenglass, and the rest, deliberate foreign agents. If this interpretation is correct, Mrs. Trilling is asking us to assume with her that "our nation's security" was so endangered by these termites that punishment must be assigned even to those not formally guilty of legal crimes.

But there are other voices than Mrs. Trilling's, voices which seem with a little reflection to present a more balanced picture of recent history. There is for example the eminent mathematician Norbert Wiener, who, speaking (in *The Human Use of Human Beings*) of the demand for "the utmost of secrecy for modern science in all things which may touch its military uses," noted that: "This demand for secrecy is scarcely more than the wish of a sick civilization not to learn of the progress of its own disease." It may be disappointing to those seeking to relate crime and punishment to science and research, but Prof. Wiener summed up without so much as a nod to the question of liberal guilt, pointing out that "the dissemination of any scientific secret whatever is merely a matter of time, that in this game a decade is a long time, and that in the long run, there is no distinction between arming ourselves and arming our enemies."

These words were first published in 1950, a remarkable tribute to Prof. Wiener's prescience, given what we now know and did not know at that time about hydrogen bombs. But since there may be those who feel that Prof. Wiener has disqualified himself as a commentator by virtue of his very standing as a heterodox scientist, it may be illuminating to consider what the distinguished conservative observer, Walter Lippmann, has learned from recent scientific developments.

It is in connection with "the spying out of secrets," wrote Mr. Lippmann in his column of August 28, 1955, "that informed opinion is changing. The Geneva conference on nuclear energy has proved conclusively what scientists have long been saying—that scientific secrets do not last long because what one scientist can discover, others—since they deal

with the same natural world—will discover too. It is also plainer than it was a few years ago that what you can hide temporarily from the Russians, you must hide also from your own scientific community. The net of it is that the preservation of scientific secrets is not nearly so important as it once seemed because there are so few real scientific secrets.”

This statement would seem not merely a triumphant vindication of Norbert Weiner's warning, but a practically incontrovertible statement of the spying-science-secrets question vacating the whole liberal-guilt mythology of any practical significance. Seen in this light, Mrs. Trilling's argument seems probably untrue, and certainly foolish and unimportant.

Let us return therefore to the question of the identification of the liberal “we” and to the further guilt of this group. Mr. Fiedler is somewhat more precise than Mrs. Trilling: “I use the word ‘liberal’ (and ‘intellectual’ is, for better or worse, historically synonymous with it in America) to mean all those who believe or believed Sacco was innocent, who considered the recognition of the Soviet Union not merely wise strategically but a ‘progressive’ step, and who identified themselves with the Loyalist side during the Spanish Civil War.”

It is worth pointing out that Mrs. Trilling, who comes to conclusions somewhat similar to Mr. Fiedler's, uses different criteria in defining her “liberal-progressive” or her “intellectual.” Mr. Fiedler will have his Sacco, while Mrs. Trilling tells us that in the days of Sacco and Vanzetti “nothing could be more typical of (Dr. Oppenheimer's) time than the intellectual's separation from the concerns of his nation and the world.” I mention this not to prove that two literary critics have different conceptions of who belongs in the liberal-progressive-intellectual grouping that is still so poorly aware of its guilt that it must be continually reminded of it, but to demonstrate the ultimate irrelevancy for them of all liberal attitudes other than that towards the Soviet Union. *There* is where the guilt lies, we are told over and over, not in how “we” felt about Sacco or Haywood or Mooney or Dreyfus or other ultimately secondary concerns. The Soviet Union is the touchstone; the international communist conspiracy is the arch-menace; those who at any time harbored illusions about the Soviet Union or cooperated in making the Communist agents respectable are guilty as hell and must acknowledge their guilt before they can make so bold as to again present themselves to the public as worthy of serious consideration.

Mr. Fiedler drives the point home in a reduction that must be quoted precisely if one is not to be accused of misinterpretation: “The unpalatable truth we have been discovering is that the buffoons and bullies, those who *knew* really nothing about the Soviet Union at all, were right—stupidly right, if you will, right for the wrong reasons, but damnably right.” Who were wrong, and therefore guilty? “We.”

What Mr. Fiedler is saying here can hopefully be made more clear by analogy. Suppose that a heterogeneous group of citizens, all cigarette smokers, were gradually to become convinced that cigarettes cause lung cancer. These citizens, idealists of one sort or another, had previously been identifiable primarily on the basis of their enthusiastic enjoyment of cigarettes and on their insistence that their fellow-citizens learn to enjoy the weed. Now, however, a series of medical studies appear demonstrating irrefutably that the cigarette is a deadly poisonous enemy of mankind—even more deadly when one considers its smiling disguise. The basically reasonable idealists, convinced—some sooner, some later—by the evidence, give up cigarettes, in accordance with their individual capacities urge others to stay away from the deadly poison, and concern themselves with other pressing problems. (We recognize, but for the sake of argument, ignore other reasons possi-

ly involved in swearing off cigarettes: social pressure from the majority who despise cigarettes, unattractiveness of ceramic ashtrays, and so on.)

Surely this is enough? Not so, says Mr. Fiedler. It is not enough to condemn the cigarette manufacturers and the advertising agencies, and to dissociate ourselves from them. We must recognize that each of us who ever offered a friend—or, worse, a stranger—a cigarette, shares in the guilt. Each of us who ever dragged on the poison and said aloud, Ah, this is good, shares in the guilt. More: *Before* concerning ourselves with other pressing problems, we must publicly affirm, painful as it may be, that every crank and health nut, every anti-saloon-league - prohibitionist - vegetarian - temperance - union-Bible-thumper who ever thundered against tobacco as an agency of Satan leading to feebleness, impotence, insanity, and everlasting hellfire, was right—stupidly right, accidentally right, right for the wrong reasons, but damnably right. Never mind that it turns out to be a chemical in the cigarette paper, and nothing in the tobacco itself, which is the carcinogenous agent. Never mind that feebleness, impotence, insanity and everlasting hellfire have very little to do with lung cancer. Never mind that the cranks had centered their fire on tobacco precisely because it seemed to many mistaken people to offer pleasure and relief from tension, nor that “we” had touted tobacco for just those generous but mistaken reasons. What counts is that they warned against it and “we” didn't.

Well, maybe. Some of us can remember a time, after “we” ourselves had gotten good and scared of tobacco, when the cranks suddenly began selling it on a tremendous scale because it had become politic to do so—not for long, and from the highest of motives, but still . . .

Of course they were “right” and we were “wrong.” Of course the Hearst press was “right” when it condemned the Soviet Union, if somewhat inaccurately, as a pesthole of nationalized women run by bearded bombthrowers; and the liberal press was “wrong” when it presented Stalin's Russia with varying degrees of sympathy, based on wishful thinking, misinformation, and occasional distortion of the facts. But is that *all* we have learned from the Thirties, the Forties, and the Fifties? Is that the sole lesson the liberal must draw from the Moscow Trials, the Spanish betrayal, the Nazi-Soviet pact, World War II, the fall of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and the atom-hydrogen bomb race—that “we” were wrong, wrong, wrong, and they were “damnably right”?

Small wonder that for Mr. Fiedler other problems, such as the behavior of the liberal (read: ex-communist) on the witness stand, must be discussed with a knowing grin at the stupidity of the “we” who persist in being shocked when one of their own names friends of a generation ago as Communists. “When such a witness . . . identifies for the investigators the utterest scoundrel in the pro-Soviet camp, he finds himself scorned and ostracized by the kind of ‘sincere’ liberal who gasps horrifiedly: ‘He named names!’—as if to ‘rat’ were the worst of crimes. It is not, however, really the boys’ code of not squealing which is at stake, but the whole dream of an absolute innocence.” Mr. Fiedler is so enamored with this little conceit that he uses it also in his essay on “Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of Innocence”: “Hiss, sensing his inestimable advantage in a society whose values are largely set in boyhood when snitching is the ultimate sin, had traded on his role as the honest man confronted by the ‘rat.’”

Let us set aside the question which seems never to have so much as occurred to Mr. Fiedler: from where is the boys’ code received, from Heaven or from the adult world? and consider instead what is more important. Namely, that our political moralist, so profoundly concerned with guilt and shame and

ambiguities and ambivalences, can dismiss with a wave of the hand as unworthy of consideration *nowadays* the problem of "snitching," "squealing," "ratting." After all, there are so many more important and subtle questions to ponder than the motivation of the man who saves his own career and earns the praise of a Congressman Walter at the expense of those who were his comrades in the Thirties and may now be no more Communists than he . . .

Just so, the man who persists in using such old-fashioned expressions as "selling out" is nowadays regarded as hopelessly naive and behind the times—after all, selling out would imply that there is still an enemy (other than the perpetually useful Communists who if they no longer existed would surely have to be invented) to sell out to; but "we" should all know by now that the enemy has been "damnably right" about the central problem, that he is therefore not really an enemy any more when we are all menaced by Stalinism, that the real enemy is probably the "we" who have been so damnably wrong.

One finds more understanding of what is going on in America on any page of Louis Kronenberger's *Company Manners* than in the whole of Mr. Fiedler's collected prose, for all of the latter's praise by his fellow-authority on liberal guilt, Mr. Irving Kristol, as a "brilliant and imaginative" social critic, and for all of the former's not troubling to identify himself with the liberal "we." Mr. Kronenberger observes that there is a logical result of our outgrowing such gaucheries as selling out: this new breed "don't sell out at 40, they sign up at 20. One can even at moments understand why there are now, along with so many shameless young careerists, so many tight-lipped young prigs: they are sitting full-time, in judgment on a society that cries out to be judged."

I should like to make only one further comment on Mr. Fiedler's method of political analysis. In each of his political essays he assumes what is presumably the standard liberal posture: in "Afterthoughts on the Rosenbergs," he argues that these spies should *not* have been executed; in the Hiss piece that "there is no magic in the words 'left' or 'progressive' or 'socialist' that can prevent deceit and the abuse of power"; in "McCarthy and the Intellectuals," that Joe McCarthy is a scoundrel and McCarthyism "a psychological disorder." Obviously however there is no flavor to such dull stuff; and so the spice of neo-liberalism is added—the running condemnation of the liberal "we," the discovery that it is "we" who are as much to blame as anybody for what Hiss did, for what the Rosenbergs did and what was done *to* the Rosenbergs, and for what Joe McCarthy has done. That being the case, since "we" are partially responsible not only for how far the Communists managed to get before they were stepped on, but also for such consequent excrescences as McCarthyism, what is the point in

our going on at all? Why not turn the whole show over to those who were "damnably right"?

"The fight against McCarthyism," Mr. Fiedler informs us with a turn of phrase that might well leave Arthur Koestler writhing with envy, is among other things "a war for the truth we cannot help betraying even as we defend it . . ." Elegant; but will it do for those who really want to fight against McCarthyism and not against the straw men of the Thirties? Let it be noted that practically every anti-McCarthy statement is qualified (or "balanced") with an attack on his liberal critics, that the condemnation of the death sentence for the Rosenbergs is stretched to include those who protested that death sentence *before* it was carried out: why on earth should a man still want to consider himself as a liberal after reading these exercises in self-scorn, unless he wishes to gain happiness through the purifying flames of suffering?

* * * *

"It is not necessary that we liberals be self-flagellants." The words are Mr. Fiedler's—their denial is his book. Since he has been joined in this denial by Mrs. Trilling and a host of others to whom abasement before the errors of the past and acknowledgement of the wisdom of those who rule at present seems to obviate any possibility of their concern with our future, perhaps it may be as well for the impatient to leave them in full possession of their liberalism.

For there are problems demanding the attention of serious and articulate idealists, people who are not satisfied with the world in which we live and who believe that the expression "a better world" is neither sinister nor old hat: There is the problem of how to reach the Russian people in this perhaps temporary period of thaw. There is the problem of how to energize Americans to regain democratic control of their political destinies in a country where 24,900,000 families own their own homes. There is the problem of how to cope with the vulgarization of culture in modern society—Russian or American. There is the problem of what the Geneva revelations—of the possibility of absolutely unlimited power through hydrogen fusion in our own lifetime—can mean to all who are concerned with questions of democratic planning and progress. Let those of us therefore who are going to be grappling with these radical problems in the years to come proudly call ourselves radicals, and leave the word liberal to those who claim possession of it but warp its militant tradition to fit a passive literary pattern of fashionable nuances which serve only to conceal their own utter emptiness and prostration before the status quo.

HARVEY SWADOS

Harvey Swados is the author of *Out Went the Candle* (Viking, 1955) and contributes to *Partisan Review* and other periodicals.

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Communism in Bobbysocks

—The Political Rock and Roll

OF THE HUNDREDS OF BOOKS and thousands of articles written in recent years about the "communist conspiracy" in the United States, few have even attempted to examine the real nature of the stalinist movement. They have generally assumed from the outset that the Communist Party and its network of front organizations were either a vast espionage apparatus concerned with collecting military intelligence, or else a group of potential armed insurrectionists "conspiring" against the government.

Such an approach makes analysis of the communist movement in America very easy. It automatically excludes consideration of stalinism as a political movement, which makes an appeal for free and open support and gains adherents for its point of view. Therefore such authors do not bother their heads about why the stalinists expand in one period, lose support in another, adopt one political line today and another tomorrow.

The Stalinist youth movement is one of the best examples of the political side of stalinism. Its members are not engaged in espionage nor do they function in any fundamentally different way than do other political organizations, aside, of course, from those political characteristics which distinguish them as a particular *kind* of political group.

YCL, AYD, and YPA

In the past fifteen years, the Communist Party has organized a rather bewildering number of youth movements, each with varying degrees of formal ties to the CP. In each of these cases, the organizational character of these groups corresponded to the political aims of the CP at that time. Until 1943 its youth work was centralized and carried out principally through the Young Communist League, which was directly affiliated to the party and had as its main function the training and recruiting of future CP members. The dissolution of the YCL was dictated by the same considerations that caused the CP to turn itself into an innocuous "political association." Cashing in on the wartime alliance with Russia which made any form of criticism of "our great Soviet Ally" a sort of second degree treason, the stalinists sought to make themselves into nothing but "the most advanced section of the peoples' movement."

The American Youth for Democracy was to be the application of this new line to the youth field. Founded by the same delegates who the day before had dissolved the YCL, the AYD carried out what later was to become notorious as "the Browder policy" in high schools and college campuses across the country. Patriotism was its stock in trade; "national unity" its slogan. No task was too menial, no sacrifice too great. Scrap collections, blood donations, and letter writing campaigns to soldiers became the "prime tasks of the vanguard of the democratic youth."

One of the consequences of the cold war which followed the complete breakdown of "Big Three Unity" was to destroy the basis for the political line put forward by the AYD. "Peaceful collaboration" went out the window and with it all the super-patriotic claptrap that had been the stock in trade of the CP in this "harmonious" period.

Finding an ex-Vice-President available, the CP undertook

to break up its "broad peoples' coalition" and embark upon the organization of the Progressive Party, which had as its campus arm the Young Progressives of America. The YPA began to attract large numbers of non-stalinist liberals to its banner through a militant election campaign in 1948, and by offering Wallace as the peacemaker who would end the cold war by "washing our own hands" before meeting the Russians at the conference table.

Neither the AYD nor the YPA were officially affiliated with the CP. In fact the CP has not had a youth affiliate since the old Young Communist League days. The YPA, however, was a very broad organization, needing a more disciplined stalinist youth counterpart. So it was not surprising to see the Labor Youth League being formed in 1949.

LYL—Half-Way House

The LYL is in a line of descent from the Young Communist League and the American Youth for Democracy, but it is a different kind of organization from a loose conglomeration of fellow travelers like the Young Progressives of America. This is an important fact to remember, for when the LYL was formed the YPA was still an active force on the campus. It was the YPA which participated actively in campus politics while the LYL was a much less active organization of young Stalinist militants. LYL members usually also participated in the YPA. This relationship of the YPA as the active political organization, more or less supporting the CP line, and the LYL as a small, inactive, strictly Stalinist organization continued until 1952.

But the LYL was not simply composed of Young Communists, or at least that was the idea. At its convention in 1948, the Communist Party recognized "the need for an independent non-party Marxist youth organization." This organization was to be organizationally independent of the CP and was to attempt aggressively to recruit young non-Communists into its ranks. The convention warned against "any concept that it is going to be some kind of simple process of just giving youth cards to the young Communists in the Party."

Whether or not the LYL (or its predecessors, for that matter) is in reality the independent organization it claims to be, or whether it is under the complete domination of a caucus of Communist Party members within it, as others claim, is largely irrelevant to this discussion. The important point is that the LYL makes no real pretensions to *political* independence. Since its inception, it has always followed the Communist Party line and has defended and supported the CP as an organization, as well as the entire world Stalinist movement.

As to its relationship with the CP, it states: "Because of the very nature of our organization we will develop the warmest fraternal relations with the Communist Party which is the leading party of the American working-class. No one can learn about Marxism, without getting to know how and by whom Marxist policies are applied from day to day in the interests of our country and its people. We know that our young people have much to learn from the Communist Party, from Foster, from the heroic twelve on trial."

Naturally this feeling of "fraternal love" is mutual. The CP states in its "theoretical" organ, *Political Affairs*, that: . . . the building of the LYL is the task not only of Marxist youth, but is a particular responsibility of Communist parents.

The Line Changes

Let us proceed to the history of the LYL since 1952. That year marked a basic change in the CP line. Since 1947, the CP had followed the line of attacking both political parties and attempting to build a third party which they could control and which would make a broad appeal to "progressive" elements in the country, concentrating on a pro-Stalinist peace line. In 1952 the Progressive Party failed miserably to attract even the usual fellow-travelling liberals represented by men like I. F. Stone. After the election the CP proceeded to ditch the remnants of the Progressive Party and to allow their campus affiliates to die a slow death.

In place of the old line of building the "progressive" movement, i.e., the CP and its assorted fronts, the CP came up with a different line. With this new line the CP has been attempting to join forces with virtually everybody. It no longer refers to the "progressive forces" or even the "democratic forces." It now wants unity with all "pro-democratic" forces. In the youth field the new slogan is to be "For Democratic Youth Unity." In practice this means entry into groups of almost any kind.

Thus, in the August 1955 issue of *Political Affairs*, an article by one Julian Lowitt praises the Young Democrats, the Christian Youth Movement, the Young Adult Council (the American affiliate of the World Assembly of Youth, the pro-American answer to the Stalinist International Union of Students) and the NAACP. Not only are these organizations specifically anti-Stalinist and exclude Stalinists from membership, but some, like the Young Democrats, have been active supporters of the witchhunt. This is the "youth" side of the line which now calls for "progressives" to register in one of the major parties.

In order to carry out the new line, and fill the gap left by the disappearance of the YPA, the LYL, beginning in 1952, began to take over the program and audience of the YPA. Leon Wofsy described this change in his address to the 1955 LYL convention:

For a whole period we tended to underestimate just how strong the potential for anti-McCarthy struggle was among young Americans. Although we have always called for unity up until the beginning of 1952, we have often stood off to the side . . . We misjudged the ability of the League to grow and develop in the face of McCarthyism. In some clubs, an atmosphere of false "discipline" was permitted to develop and such high standards of membership set that no "ordinary" young mortal could be expected to join. In certain instances, there were distortions of the educational character of the League, the basic principle that in the LYL a young person is free to question and discuss, but does not necessarily have to agree.

This bit of Stalinist "self-criticism" is interesting in the way it skirts around the reasons for the change in tactics and never quite lets the non-stalinist LYL'ers in on the secret. It is not merely that a new atmosphere has developed in which growth is possible (though in a certain sense this is true), but that the Stalinists have changed the organizational character of the LYL because of the demise of the YPA and in order to take over its functions on the campus. This is what Wofsy means when he inveighs against "false discipline" and "high standards of membership." In passing it is interesting to note the reference to the "educational" character of the League which makes it possible to allow free discussion. The obvious inference from this is that in a *political* Stalinist organization—

i.e., the CP, and to some extent the old LYL—the luxury of democracy could not be allowed. And these people call for "Democratic Youth Unity!"

So today the LYL is an organization distinctly different from the pre-1952 LYL and the old YPA. It is an organization whose members have a far greater commitment to Stalinism than most of the YPAers; yet the political program that it presents on campus is of a broader, more amorphous nature. The YPA, being tied to the Progressive party, had at least to come out in support of the positions that party took on various issues. Furthermore the LYL makes no real attempt to relate its current political program to its ostensible commitment to Marxism. Thus the LYL presents the picture of a small, tightly organized group advocating a broad vague program.

A brief look at LYL publications will give an idea of its political approach. At present LYL puts out two periodicals, both an an amazingly low political level. The most ridiculous of the two is a pocket-sized magazine, the *New Challenge*, designed to be mistaken for one of the commercial slicks of the *Jet*, *People Today* type. In the June issue we find a stimulating article on Rock and Roll, a personal interview with Theresa Brewer, an article on the YWCA, and an article which explains why Soviet athletes are better than ours. In the midst of all this there is one article which might possibly be considered political: it states that it is a good thing that the Big Four are going to meet. And finally, if we have good eyesight, we can discern a statement in very small type on the next to last page, which says that the editors of the magazine interest themselves "in Marxism, which offers a scientific view of society and the hope of a bright future for youth."

Civil Liberties and the Negro

The second publication, *Campus Sense*, concerns itself more directly with politics and is aimed at the college audience. This is not to say that *Campus Sense* merely narrows its audience down to those vaguely interested in politics. Its appeal can be gathered from the editorial in the first issue which is entitled "Our Credo":

If you attend football games, if you belong to a campus dramatics club, if you are the average college student, striving to learn and develop in your chosen field, desirous of living in and contributing to a peaceful world, then we hope our newspaper will be deserving of a spot between your notebook pages.

The news in *Campus Sense* is mainly in the fields of civil liberties, peace, and racial integration. To fill out the pages there are regular columns on sports and high-fidelity.

On the campus the LYL tends to emphasize the non-political aspects of its organization. In one pamphlet it states:

We say it's great to be alive in 1954 . . . We say it by our spirit in every one of our many activities: when we sing dance, meet, play ball, give out leaflets, go on picnics, act to defend our rights, or study."

Thus we see that the LYL is addressing itself to a broad stratum of students with only the vaguest notions and feelings about politics. Furthermore there is no indication in its press or pamphlets that it makes any attempt to develop real political maturity on the campus. Its approach in many ways is adapted to the modern political scene where the mass of students are apolitical and shy away from any real political responsibility or serious thinking. The LYL requires very little of this from its supporters—all they have to do is sing a bit, play the banjo, and mutter a few phrases every now and then about "peaceful coexistence."

By so doing the LYL not only does not contribute to the political education of the American student, but in many ways hinders it. This, of course, is to be expected, for a politically aware and alert student body would be repelled by the Stalin-

ist program and politics. One must not conclude from the vague, seemingly apolitical appeal of the LYL that it is *not* a political movement. For it is exactly this amorphousness that makes up the politics of the Stalinists today. The complete demise of the Progressive Party and its youth organization, the YPA, in 1952 pointed to the impossibility of the Stalinists building any sort of movement based on Stalinist politics.

Therefore they had to resort to all sorts of non-political or vaguely political appeals in order to recruit on the American campus. Furthermore, as will become clear, this amorphousness fits in well with the present Stalinist line in this period of "the Geneva spirit" when the Stalinists want to co-exist with everybody.

If we turn to the content of the LYL's program, we find that in general it attempts to interpret all political issues from a special "youth" point of view. While the youth of America, as well as of other countries, have problems uniquely their own, the LYL makes this the whole of their approach.

To get an idea of the length to which the LYL has gone in order to build up the idea of the youth as a "minority group" one must look at the June issue of *New Challenge* which contains an article on Soviet Athletics. After pointing out that Soviet athletes are better than ours because of a national athletic program, the writer urges that the youth of America struggle during the 1956 election for a national athletic program. Make this an agitational demand and participate in mass demonstrations against the oppression of the American youth, is the LYL's ludicrous approach.

Within the context of this "youth" approach, the LYL stresses three main issues: civil liberties, Negro rights, and "peaceful coexistence." In the civil liberties field it acts as the great civil libertarian. And this act has undoubtedly been effective within the context of the increasingly strong civil libertarian sentiments on the campus today. But the LYL's commitment to Stalinism prevents it from being a sincere defender of civil liberties. Not only must the LYL defend the action of the CP during the war of supporting the use of the Smith Act against the Trotskyists, but also it must defend the anti-civil libertarian aspects of the Soviet Union.

Here we come to what was once the greatest political asset of the Stalinists and is today their greatest liability; that is, their unqualified support of the Soviet Union. It has become increasingly apparent, both in America and in the rest of the world, that Russia, far from being the hope of the world, is in reality the exact opposite. For all its demagogic use of socialist slogans and "Marxist" theory, it is an anti-socialist and anti-democratic force because the working class and the people generally have no power and the country is under the strangling grasp of the Stalinist bureaucracy which rules the country in its own interests through the Communist Party.

All the wishful thinking of the Sweezys and Hubermans aside, nationalization of industry cannot be equated with socialism. When the government controls the industry the important question is then, "Who controls the government?" In Russia the people have no control. They are controlled. The government is by, for, and of the bureaucracy. When the LYL states that it favors socialism "which is no longer a dream but which has already been realized in the Socialist Soviet Union." it favors not socialism, but Stalinism, with all its totalitarian oppressions. Thus, fundamentally, the LYL, because of its support of the anti-democratic regime in Russia, cannot be true civil libertarians.

In the field of Negro rights, the Stalinists have attempted to capitalize on the strivings of the Negro people for full equality in America. The bankruptcy of the Stalinist approach

to the Negroes becomes clear when we look at two things. In the first place, unlike socialists and Negro militants, the Stalinists are not sincerely dedicated to this struggle. They support it only because it is a good issue with which to attack American capitalism in justification of their support of Russia.

The complete insincerity of the Stalinists' claim to be defenders of the American Negro can be illustrated by the famous "March on Washington" incident during World War II. At this time many Negro leaders usually looked upon as "conservative" proposed a March on Washington to protest Jim Crow in the Armed Forces and to press for a civil rights program. Here, during a war supposedly waged to defend democracy, the American Negro was being discriminated against at home and in the Army where he was called upon "Fight for Democracy." But the Stalinists couldn't see it that way. It might irritate an ally of the Workers Fatherland. So they did their best, not only to oppose the march, but to wreck the entire movement. Thus whenever the struggle for Negro rights conflicts with the needs of the bureaucrats in the Kremlin, the Stalinists have always and will always choose to support the Kremlin.

At one time the Stalinists urged the formation of a Negro republic in America. This essentially reactionary and chauvinistic line repelled the Negroes as they wanted integration with the whites on a basis of full equality, not some sort of "apartheid" policy of separation of the races. In the second place, it is not enough to agitate for immediate demands without realting these to some ultimate solution for the problem. When we look at the nature of the Stalinist "solution" for the problem of racial equality in the U. S., we see at once that the Stalinist movement is the enemy of the people.

Today the Stalinist solution is not much better—a Stalinist America. The Stalinists point to the Soviet Union as an example of a country where there is equality. Paul Robeson in an address to the 1950 LYL convention stated: "The people of the Soviet Union have abolished race hate and made any expression of it punishable by law, have wiped out poverty, have built a land in which people whose colors are as varied as those of all of us in this auditorium live in peace, friendship and a society of flourishing independent cultures." No mention here of the absence of democracy, of the suppression and obliteration of whole cultures and ethnic groups, of anti-semitism, and the like. It gets back to the basic argument: the LYL supports the Russian totalitarianism and thus cannot have a real, intrinsic interest in Negro rights.

The LYL has met with its greatest success pushing the slogans of "peace" and "peaceful coexistence." The old line of blaming the cold war entirely upon the West ceased to be very effective following the failure of the Wallace movement. It presented a picture too contrary to fact to convince many. Its main strength lay in the weakness of its pro-State Department opponents who were forced to defend colonialism and such dubious men as Franco, Chiang and Rhee.

But while continuing to push this line, the LYL places more emphasis on the idea of "peaceful coexistence." In essence Stalinists are now saying that while you may disagree with their view of the Soviet Union, you must at least favor working out some sort of agreement between the two great powers. The causes of the cold war boil down to the simple fact that we just don't "understand" each other. Just as a quarrel between two individuals can best be ended by talking things over, so with world affairs. Why not stop this silly power struggle business and disarm? The best way to prevent war is for everybody to be good friends.

Concomitant with this way of thinking, the LYL has

pushed, as a major aspect of its politics, the various projects for student exchanges with the Soviet Union. When it was announced that Russian editors were coming to the U.S.A. they claimed that "U.S. students have scored a big victory for world understanding and peace."

It is a shame that we are not in the realm of personal likes and dislikes; it is too bad that we live in the realm of power relations, of struggles for imperialist domination. But unless one realizes that the world is at present torn in two by a struggle between two great powers and their allies for world domination, day to day events simply make no sense. To build up sightseeing visits as ways to world peace is nonsense; or worse than that, deliberate hoodwinking.

Since the LYL says it is a Marxist organization let us see what a real Marxist, Rosa Luxemburg, had to say about such "peace Utopias." In 1911 she exposed the panaceas of an earlier generation:

The bourgeois friends of peace endeavor—and from their point of view this is perfectly logical and explicable—to invent all sorts of "practical" projects for gradually restraining militarism and are naturally inclined to consider every outward and apparent sign of a tendency toward peace as the genuine article, to take every expression of diplomacy in this vein at its word, to exaggerate it into a real basis for earnest activity . . . The tasks of the social-democracy . . . can only be to expose the idea of a partial limitation of armaments in all its impracticability as a half measure, and to endeavor to make it clear to the people that militarism is closely linked up with colonial politics and that therefore, the nations of today, if they are really

serious and honest in their wish to call a halt to competitive armaments, would have to begin by disarming on the commercial field, by giving up predatory colonial campaigns by abandoning the international politics of spheres of influence in all parts of the world.

This challenge of Luxemburg's holds good today. A Socialist says to both the Soviet Union and the West: if you are sincerely interested in peace, give up your colonies, be they in Eastern Europe, Latin America, or Africa. Give these up and we will believe you. But you will not and can not give them up for they are the foundations of your social systems. Both the Stalinist bureaucracy and the Western capitalist class live by exploitation at home and domination abroad. Peace did not come in 1911 from the exploitative powers; it will not come from them in 1956. We must look elsewhere for the power that will bring peace to the world.

As Rosa Luxemburg did in 1911 and as Socialists have always done, we must look to the exploited and oppressed of the world to forge a third way to peace. The great potential strength which exists in these people erupted in the East German uprisings in June, 1953; in the recent mass anti-rearmament movements in Western Germany in the struggles of the colonial peoples in North Africa, Malaya, Vietnam and elsewhere against imperialism.

But the LYL doesn't look this way. Its eyes are on mother Russia; its loyalties to the Soviet bureaucracy.

TIM WOHLFORTH

Tim Wohlforth was formerly chairman of the Debs Club, Oberlin College, and editor of *Coops in Action*.

Against Jim Crow Terror!

The Till case has aroused the conscience of America. But whenever such an outrage occurs, students remain apathetic and ask: "What can we do?" Where can we find the direction in which such crimes can be stopped? At a recent demonstration of 20,000 workers in New York, called to protest the Till outrage, the Young Socialist League (one of the organizations which supports ANVIL) participated in the distribution of a leaflet which we are reprinting below. The editors of ANVIL feel that the leaflet points in the right direction and hope that it will open up new pathways for the uncertain and show those who want to do something where we think action must be taken.

We must demonstrate on the streets of Manhattan for democracy and civil rights in Mississippi. The people must act because the politicians whom we have elected do nothing. North, South, East, West . . . Republicans . . . Democrats . . . they rule in Washington and in all the states. Yet lynch law remains.

The twelve jurors who released the murderers of Emmet Till were people whose minds are warped and twisted by the disease of race prejudice or who live in fear of it. The South is ruled by reactionary Democratic party machines tied in with big landowners and capitalists; it is they who defend and preserve everything backward and rotten: Jim Crow; anti-unionism; ignorance; low living standards. The Southern system rears the murderers of Till and their friendly jurors. The same system creates anti-union, anti-labor open shoppers.

Negroes and organized labor make common cause against Southern reaction.

But not with the Republican party. It makes promises but does nothing. It does not want to antagonize the race haters and reactionaries of the South. It wants their votes in '56.

And not the Democratic party. Certainly not! Reactionary Democrats rule the South. Liberal Democrats are only liberal with promises and lavish with speeches. But they are united with the lynchers in one party. They too want the support of the reactionary wing of their own party and from Stevenson on down are set on remaining united with the open enemies of labor and Negroes at the expense of civil rights and unionism.

So the years go by. One administration, then another. From Democrat to Republican and back. But nothing is done to curb the power of Southern reaction and no protection is given to its victims.

The people must act! Here, unionists and Negroes demonstrate side by side. Let it be an example for workers in every city. Let a united labor movement join with the organizations of the Negro people in a mighty series of demonstrations, demanding an end to lynch law and discrimination.

And let us go further. No more votes to politicians who are linked up with the anti-union race haters. No support to those who tolerate Southern reaction and compromise with it.

It is time for organized labor and the Negro people to form their own independent political party to fight against reaction everywhere.

TODAY: A mass demonstration of labor.

TOMORROW: a new political party of labor.

Issued jointly by: Independent Socialist League and Young Socialist League, 114 West 14th Street, N. Y. C.

The Hartz Mountains of Liberalism

—The Illusion of Power vs. Going Forward

LEWIS CARROLL'S *Alice in Wonderland* tells of a foot-race in which as the result of the lack of clarity on the part of the participants as to the nature of the game no one could decide who had won. The Dodo perceptively solved the problem by declaring, "Everybody has won, and all must have prizes."

The official ideology of American politics has much in common with the Dodo's precept; it refuses to acknowledge that there are winners and losers in American life. This situation has been achieved, as C. Wright Mills observed in an earlier issue of ANVIL,* by divorcing the ideals of Nineteenth Century liberalism from any realities of modern social structures that might serve as the means of their realization, and then transforming this bodiless ideology into the universal rhetoric of American political life.

This divorce of the language of an ideology from any mooring in social reality has left many American liberals in a peculiar situation. They have the illusion of success because of this universalization of their rhetoric, but they feel uneasy because they cannot fail to see that the price has been high: being forced to give up their own program. Instead of pushing ahead, they became the defenders of the status quo at home, having been unable to take any significant step forward since the beginning of World War II in the direction of the program of moderate social reform begun under the New Deal. They have become the carriers of a foreign policy which they consider progressive because it speaks in terms of America's "responsibility" to the "free world," rather than in terms of isolation and "fortress America," and consider themselves daring because they recognize the existence of the colonial revolution. But the pathos of the liberals' approach to foreign policy is that they are consistent in one way only—in their constant submission to the demands of *realpolitik*, in which the rhetoric of responsibility and of recognition of the colonial revolution becomes lost in a program of military expansion and support of reactionary regimes and dying colonial powers.

In a half-conscious way, the more perceptive of the liberals have recognized their dilemma of having no political program, and no place to go. They feel uneasy, and yet cannot move forward. Nowhere is this more poignantly demonstrated than among many liberal academicians, in particular historians, sociologists, economists and political scientists. Each month they produce a new crop of books and articles as part of the search for a new theory of American society to replace the doctrine of progress which has been stolen from them.

The New Conservatives in Wonderland

Intellectual journals resound with the skirmishes and forays of the "new conservatives" versus the new liberals. A historian in the twenty-fifth century so unfortunate as to have only the academic journals and the little magazines of our moment to utilize as source material will be forced to conclude that the major political conflict of our era was between new conservative Clinton Rossiter, and new liberal Arthur Schles-

inger Jr. And if such a historian had any perception he would conclude that the argument was mere play acting; that the Rossiters and the Schlesingers were really saying much the same thing after all. In a recent issue of the *Reporter*, Professor Rossiter half-acknowledged this in reply to Schlesinger's criticism of his new conservatism. Rossiter wrote, "It is, indeed, as Mr. Schlesinger remarks, 'hard to tell,' why I style myself a 'conservative rather than a liberal'—especially since I have never styled myself one way or the other. When I make up my own mind whether I am a conservative liberal or a liberal conservative, I will let you know." How reminiscent of that point at the Mad Hatter's Tea Party when the Dormouse woke up in the middle of a furious argument and replied to the Mad Hatter, "Of course, of course; just what I was going to remark myself!"

The term "new conservative" which Rossiter and Peter Viereck have adopted for themselves is a misnomer. In their dedication to the social program of the New Deal and in their concern with looking for the magic formula which will somehow place the Stalinists outside of the pale of society and at the same time preserve civil liberties, they indicate that they have more in common with such official spokesmen for liberalism as Schlesinger than with "fellow new conservative" Russell Kirk, who is opposed to the program of the New Deal and who has no qualms about being an anti-civil-libertarian.

The Transcendent American Liberal

The recent work by Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*,* is an excellent example of the new literature of American liberalism, for in a certain sense he sums up its dilemma. He can recognize weaknesses in American society without being able to offer a program that will successfully bring into being the necessary changes. He writes that the historian with his point of view is destined in

two ways to be a less pleasing scholar than the Progressive; he finds national weaknesses and he can offer no absolute assurance on the basis of the past that they will be remedied. He tends to criticize and then shrug his shoulders, which is no way to become popular, especially in an age like our own. But even if there were not an integrity to criticism which ought to be kept inviolate at any cost, this mood is not without constructive virtue. It reminds us of a significant fact: that instead of recapturing our past, we have got to transcend it. As for a child who is leaving adolescence, there is no going home again for America.

Hartz is sensitive to the problems of American society. He is disturbed by its tendency toward totalitarianism and its inability to meet the challenge of Stalinism. He contends that the absolutism in American society stems from the fact that it is one in which hardly anyone questions the natural rights absolutes of Lockean liberalism, in which virtually everyone accepts liberal democracy and capitalism without dissent.

This liberal absolutism, Hartz believes, explains why we cannot understand other nations in which the same absolutism does not prevail. Hartz is disturbed by the fact that: "The red

*"Liberal Values in the Modern World," ANVIL AND STUDENT PARTISAN, Winter 1952.

*Louis B. Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*. Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York. \$4.75.

scare . . . is not only our domestic problem: it is our international problem as well. When the nation rises to an irrational anti-communist frenzy, it replies to the same instinct which tends to alienate it from Western democratic governments that are 'socialist.' When it closes down on dissent, it answers the same impulse which inspires it to define dubious regimes elsewhere as 'democratic.'"

Hartz maintains that the crucial problem for American foreign policy is that Americans, blocked by the limits of absolutist liberalism, cannot comprehend social revolution abroad. "The American way of life," furthermore, is unexportable because it has nothing to do with the historic experience of non-American peoples. American liberalism has only one way out, Hartz concludes, "a transcending of irrational Lockeanism, in which an understanding of self and an understanding of others go hand in hand."

America and the Absence of Feudalism

His major contention is that the determining factor in American history has been that America did not go through a feudal stage of history and that therefore it is a "liberal society." "One of the central characteristics of a non-feudal society," Hartz contends, "is that it lacks a genuine revolutionary tradition, the tradition which in Europe has been linked with the Puritan and French revolutions; that it is 'born free,' as de Tocqueville said. And this being the case it lacks also a tradition of reaction; lacking Robespierre, it lacks de Maistre, lacking Sydney, it lacks Charles II." All political struggles in the United States have gone on within the confines of a liberal democracy and capitalism.

If this is true, Hartz declares, then the historian who emphasizes conflict in American history is misleading his readers. For a proper perspective, the historian must minimize conflict and maximize the trend toward unanimity and conformity. Thus, when Hartz deals with the American Revolution of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, he argues that in contrast with the French Revolution which was a social revolution in which feudalism was destroyed, the American Revolution was a very mild affair, in which both "radical" and "conservative" were liberals who shared much the same ideology. When he deals with the Southern ideologists who elaborated a defense of slavery and of the political demands of the Southern plantation aristocracy, Hartz argues that their work was doomed to failure because it did not accept the framework of liberalism.

Hartz is quite correct in pointing to the differences between the bourgeois revolution in France and the process whereby capitalism triumphed in the United States. The lack of a genuine feudal aristocracy did mean that American capitalism lacked a feudal aristocratic opposition. This fact colored the course of history in the United States in many significant ways. However, by his insistence on either minimizing or completely ignoring the conflicts which did take place, Hartz is unable to come to grips with almost every real problem in American history.

It is one thing to observe, quite properly, with Richard Hofstadter, that there is a need to reinterpret our political traditions in a manner which emphasizes the common climate of American opinion and to recognize that "the existence of such a climate of opinion has been much obscured by the tendency to place political conflict in the foreground of history." Hofstadter demonstrates that major *political* conflicts in American history have been fought out between capitalist classes, between landed capital and financial or industrial capital, between old and new enterprises, large and small property.

However, it is another thing to completely discard the social and economic setting in which political life goes on, and to deal only with the writings of the ideologists, without continually and consistently tying them down to material reality. Hofstadter, reviewing Hartz's volume for the *New York Times*, mistakenly praised it uncritically because of the surface resemblance between his central theme and Hartz's. In so doing he ignores the fact that Hartz fails to do that which made Hofstadter's *American Political Tradition* a classic work—to relate ideological conflicts to underlying social and economic reality.

Strawmen, Class Harmony and Omissions

Hartz delights in setting up straw men and then valiantly knocking them down. For example, no reputable historian of recent date has maintained that American development was identical with that of France, that the American Revolution was not in many ways different than the French Revolution, and that feudalism was not weaker in British America than in Europe. But this does not mean that the American Revolution did not grow out of the conflicts of social classes, albeit not in the same way as in France. A difference does not demonstrate the non-existence of something.

Hartz scarcely mentions the kind of class struggle that provided the political background for the American Revolution—a class struggle which broke out into armed uprisings in every colony and in virtually every decade from the 1660's to the end of the Revolution itself. For example, Professor Merrill Jensen in his volume *The New Nation*, has very cogently analyzed the conflict in the decade between the defeat of the British and the adoption of the Federal Constitution—a conflict between wealthy merchant, planter and military elite on the one hand, and urban artisan and frontier agrarian on the other.

Not only does Hartz ignore pertinent discussion which has important bearing on what he does deal with, but he virtually completely ignores certain subjects which he is obliged to treat. The most important omission is the lack of any discussion of the period between 1860 and 1890, the period of the industrial capitalist transformation of American society. The Civil War, Reconstruction, the forging of the chains of a colonial relationship between the dominant capitalistic North and the defeated South, the increasing monopolization of American industry, and the violent labor-capital struggles of the 1870's and 1880's find no place in Hartz's volume.

These events, as should be obvious, are crucial to Hartz's thesis concerning the relationship between the lack of a feudal past, the consequent liberal society, and the comparative lack of class consciousness and class conflict among the American people. Hartz's failure to discuss them constitute the clue to the major weakness of the book. Caught up within the mood of the present, in which virtually all segments of society talk of class harmony, Hartz insists on reading this mood and half-reality back into the past. However, as he is unable to deal with the triumph of industrial capitalism, and the consequent struggles between workers and small agrarians on the one hand and industrial capitalists on the other, solely in terms of his thesis, he must somehow by-pass them.

Eric McKittrick, one of the liberal supporters of Hartz, in his review in the *New Republic*, gently chides Hartz for not discussing one of these matters, the Civil War. McKittrick maintains that Hartz could easily have included such a discussion, without damaging his thesis, for everyone knew ". . . before Beard and his generation came along with *their* philosophical confusion . . ." that the Civil War was fought over the moral issue of slavery. In order to supply part of the major,

and devastating, gap in Hartz's work, McKittrick resorts to a gross oversimplification which Hartz avoids.

Hartz further displays the weakness of his approach in his discussing of American socialism. It displays the same tendency to analyze only ideologies as if they existed in a vacuum. He devotes a good deal of space to this discussion of American socialism, which is not surprising considering that he fights a running battle with Marx throughout the book. His thesis on the subject should by now be obvious. Socialism was irrelevant in the United States because it did not share the "Lockean liberal ethos."

There is little question that the lack of a history of feudalism in America has been a factor in the failure of the American working class to develop a class consciousness comparable to that of European working classes. David Shannon in his recent history of *The Socialist Party of America* explains the relationship as follows:

When a modern capitalistic system of production developed in the United States, it did not displace a large and settled class of craftsmen, as happened in the Old World. From these displaced artisans in Great Britain, for example, came many of the Luddites and Chartists, and these movements tended to create a sense of class solidarity among British workers. The absence of a need for unpropertied Americans to battle for the franchise and political representation in anything like the way the Chartists had to fight for these rights likewise tended to blur class lines. It was difficult for [European] workmen not to conclude that their states were for the advancement and protection of the propertied classes when they had to struggle so long and arduously with these classes for the right to participate in politics. The American workman, on the other hand, received the franchise relatively early and with comparative ease, leaving only social and economic lines between him and men of property, lines less definite than the political line had been.

Shannon, Hartz and American Socialism

The American middle class had a comparatively easy time in coming to power. Shannon writes:

The United States has had nothing comparable to the Puritan Revolution, the agitation for the Reform Bill in 1832, or the French Revolution. This is significant because where there has been sharp conflict between an aristocracy and a middle class, radical and class-conscious ideas have gained circulation among the working class. But in America there has been no middle-class revolt to call forth a Gerrard Winstanley or a Babeuf.

Hartz, however, makes this lack of a feudal tradition the single-factor tool of analysis to explain all American history, including the weakness of the American socialist movement. It is this quality of his analysis that permits all sorts of confusion to enter. If this single-factor is sufficient to explain all phenomenon, as Hartz assumes throughout, then there is very little need to do more. In his evaluation of American socialism, therefore, he does not, for example, investigate other, more contemporary possible sources of its weakness. He does not look at the development of the American economy, based upon exceptionally rich natural resources, a tremendous internal domestic market, and the rise of American imperialism as crucial to the development of the American working class. Although the distribution of the gross national product in the United States has been very far from equitable, and the percentage of it shared by the working class has not increased over time, nevertheless the economic pie to be divided has been so huge as to provide a better standard of living for the American working class than enjoyed by most European workers.

Hartz never analyzes the composition of the American working class, a class divided into national, ethnic and racial

against each other. The steady stream of immigrants to the United States made organization of American workers more than usually difficult.

Furthermore, Hartz does not concede any weight to a groups which could be and were manipulated and played off host of other considerations. What of the internal failures of the Socialist Party; the presence in America of an anti-theoretical pragmatism, which scorned Marxism as impractical; the impact of Stalinism on the development of American socialism?

Flirtation With Marx, Retreat to Ethos

Hartz's methodology is based on a confusion of points of view, a set of confusions which place him close to brilliance at one moment, and leave him virtually speechless at the next. The key to this situation is to be found in Hartz's continual preoccupation with Marxism and socialism throughout the book. Often one half feels that Hartz is about to utilize a type of analysis which has much in common with that of historical materialism.

However, Hartz does not do this. In fact, at no point does he deal directly and concretely with social and material reality; with, for example, feudalism or capitalism as *social systems*. Instead his entire discussion is pitched on the level of discussing values, attitudes, spirits of the age, and so forth, all of which seem to float in a non-material world in which changes in technology and in the relations of production do not have any significant impact. J. H. Powell, who reviewed the book for the *Saturday Review*, remarks that all Hartz seems able to do is to discuss variants of that fuzzy word, "ethos"—the feudal ethos, the bourgeois ethos, the ethos of the small and independent liberal, the property owning, entrepreneurial ethos of Locke, the absolute moral ethos, the success-failure ethos, and . . . the Horatio Alger ethos!

This separation of ideologies from the struggles within a social system is clearly demonstrated in Hartz's discussion of socialism. For him socialism is not a political movement which stems from the objective development of economic forces and a social system; from the development of capitalism, which brings into being a working-class which raises certain demands against that system, as almost everyone had previously thought. Rather, "socialism is largely an ideological phenomenon, arising out of the principles of class and the revolutionary liberal revolt against them which the old European order inspired. . . . The hidden origin of socialist thought everywhere in the West is to be found in the feudal ethos."

A Critique Without a Program

Hartz is perceptive to the point of sensing significant problems, is able to come within the general vicinity of understanding them, and senses the difficulty of the present position of American liberalism. Yet he is unable to penetrate these problems, coming up instead with crude single-factor oversimplifications which he states in the form of paradoxical aphorisms. He furthermore is certainly unable to develop anything like a program whereby America can successfully "transcend" its liberalism."

As we have said above, a reader of Hartz who is also a reader of Marx, continually feels that because of the problems Hartz is dealing with, and his tendencies to deal with them within the same broad tradition of historical analysis of which Marxism is a part (as are such anti-Marxists as Weber and Schumpeter), he would escape his confusions if he did utilize a Marxian analysis. He virtually acknowledges this himself. At one point he even writes, "The European word of Marxism need not, of course, have been applied as the American Marx-

ists applied it: 'instead of using it to impose a European pattern on America they could have used it to discover the irrelevance of the European pattern here.' One would expect that if a Marxist analysis could succeed so well in accomplishing what, after all, Hartz wants to accomplish, he would attempt to utilize such an analysis.

To point this out is not merely the device of a devout church-goer who declares, "If you belonged to my church, brother, you would be saved." For if Hartz senses the need to transcend liberalism, if he sees the failures of American politics in terms of its inability to understand the world revolution of our time, and if he wishes that a genuine historical materialist analysis of American history be undertaken, one must ask whether Hartz can accomplish these things in any other way than by becoming an historical materialist.

But of course, Hartz is not about to do any such thing. On the lowest level the reason for this is obvious. For Hartz, historical materialism and Marxism are virtually identified with the twists and turns of the Communist Party line, in which Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt became the great gods in the Stalinist pantheon, and in accordance with which the Stalinist version of American history twisted and turned.

American Marxism for many American academicians is identified with Popular Front Stalinism, in particular those like Hartz who absorbed much of their purported Marxism from the then fellow-traveling liberal Max Lerner, and the then Stalinist intellectual hacks, Edward Mims and Granville Hicks. Whenever Hartz wishes to discuss American Marxism in the 'thirties in a serious fashion, he talks about Lerner, Mims and Hicks. If Hartz had looked, for example, to the early writings of Sidney Hook, in particular his *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, or to the works of Matthew Josephson (*The Politicos*) and Lewis Corey (*The Decline of*

American Capitalism) he might not have been compelled to believe that the method of analysis of Marx had much relationship to the caricature of Marxism put forth by the various Stalinists and liberals of that period.

The failure on the part of liberals, such as Hartz, who feel uneasy about the present role of American liberalism to look toward socialism as the way out of their dilemma obviously goes much deeper than this identification of socialism and Marxism with Stalinism. One must admit that even if the Hartzes did not insist on such confusions they still would be unlikely to "go forward from liberalism."

The Liberals' Illusions of Grandeur

The liberal intellectuals have a notoriously short memory, a phenomenon related to their basic underlying frame of reference. Caught up in the present, in which as a result of the permanent war economy and American imperialism the crisis of capitalism during the depression years appears to them to be only an interesting historical footnote, they attempt to justify their present mood by an historical analysis which purports to demonstrate that in reality things were always as they are at the present. Moreover, they draw the conclusion that things will always remain so.

Socialism for them is neither right nor wrong—but irrelevant. Absorbed as they are in their commitment to being a part of the going power system, they dare not break with it in order to offer a program which will attempt to solve the problems of that system, for such a program would have to aim at changing it. Therefore, they talk of "transcending liberalism," while at the same time attempting to discredit socialism and the socialist movement—which in reality *does* transcend liberalism.

GEORGE RAWICK

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Third Way Conference: A Step Toward A Democratic Peace

AN INTERNATIONAL "Third Way" Conference was held in London from September 3-6 to set up machinery for an international Third Camp movement composed of those socialist, pacifist, libertarian, and other organizations and individuals who oppose both Moscow and Washington war blocs. The editors of ANVIL are greatly encouraged by the fact that such a conference was held, and are enthusiastic about even its moderate success.

This Conference was called by American, British and Dutch Third Camp movements for the purpose of bringing together all those who oppose both Russian and American war camps; who refuse to give support to the war preparations of either of the two blocs or to any alternative military alliance; who believe unequivocally in human rights, including the right of all peoples to independence from foreign control; who are dedicated to waging war on want; and who stand for a program of political and economic democracy at home and abroad. Representatives from Third Camp groups from Syria and Lebanon, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Holland, Australia, the War Resisters International and the Movement for Colonial Freedom participated in the conference. In addition visitors from the Ceylonese Socialist Party and the Indian Praja Socialist Party, along with others from Denmark, Madagascar, and Italy were also present.

The notable personages lending their support to the conference included Fenner Brockway, British M. P. and long identified with the fight for colonial independence, Joseph Murumbi, former secretary of the Kenya African Union and at present secretary of the Movement for Colonial Freedom in London, and Czeslaw Milasz, author of *The Captive Mind*.

The absence of representatives from the large Asian socialist parties which took a Third Camp position at the Rangoon Conference last summer and from the large African nationalist movements was a serious failing of the conference. However, the representatives to the conference did affirm their solidarity with the anti-colonial movements.

The resolution adopted by the Conference appealed for the support of democratic movements in Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America. The Conference pledged to "do what we can to support your struggles for complete national emancipation and revolutionary social and economic change." The resolution recognized that the colonial revolution helps European and American groups in their struggle to arouse the conscience and consciousness of the people of their countries to the role their governments and ruling classes compel them to play in the world.

The Conference brought together representatives of a variety of socialist and pacifist groups who have arrived at similar positions via differing routes, analyses, and traditions. In this unanimity of groups with differing backgrounds lies the ultimate strength of the movement brought into being by the Third Way Conference. ANVIL, as a magazine which has always aimed at uniting socialists and pacifists, pledges its support to furthering the aims of this conference.

America's Policy Toward Africa

—An Examination of Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism

BENEATH THE GENEROUS ROOF of the House of Commons ("the best club in London"), a delegation of African nationalists were holding a press conference. Their leader spoke out strongly: "We want our independence. It is no joke. We intend to get our independence. Let us have no quibbling. We shall fight if necessary. We shall go to all lengths." Unable to believe his ears, the correspondent of an old-fashioned colonial gazette raised a question: "Does the delegation mean physical fighting, fighting in the normal sense of the word?" The African's reply consisted of one word: "Yes!"

The earth beneath the Mother of Parliaments seemed to tremble for a moment in response to a tremor more pronounced than that produced by the nearby Metropolitan transport system. Impossible as these menacing words, uttered by a young Ugandan, might sound—breaking abruptly into a Thackerian rather than a Dickensian-flavored Victorian atmosphere—the accent was unmistakably historic. From infinite distance the challenging voice of a faraway people in a sunny land had penetrated into the innermost courts of imperialist tutelage, finding its expression beneath the very roof where upholders of the system felt most cosily at home, most effectively insulated from what some call "reality" and others "undue interruption."

Africa, the Colonial Powers, and the U. S.

It has become a truism that Africa is an awakening giant; a truism, too, that fired by the Asiatic example, Africans are increasingly demanding the right to control their own destinies. Indeed, so accustomed have the colonial powers become to these "new" ideas that they no longer find in them a spur driving them to adapt to the new conditions. Because of the preeminent position of the United States as a world power, therefore, the best hope of evolving beyond the old pattern of colonial domination toward a new pattern, in which the West and Africa may continue their traditional association upon a new basis, lies in an enlightened American policy towards Africa. Should no such policy be forthcoming, or should an anti-African policy be engendered, there remains no outcome but interracial conflict, and the mutual blighting of present-day African and American potentialities.

In this respect we hardly need point out that encouraging the modernization of the colonial system by programs of neo-colonialist reform is obviously inadequate. America's mission should plainly be to foster in other lands the application of the principles to which she is dedicated—democracy and freedom. For these are the principles in which we believe—the dogmas on which we take our stand, in the face of all totalitarian alternatives. Without faith in these principles, American history becomes deprived of meaning. Furthermore, as some circles like to remind us, the advocacy of anti-colonialism is not in opposition to America's economic and political interests. Without this affective ideological link binding together peoples of different cultures in their progress toward a common future, the Africans would lose the benefit of American techniques of speeding their advance by decades; the Americans would lose access to those African raw materials (primarily metals) without which the present American economy would be utterly dislocated. The question, therefore, must

necessarily be asked: "What is the U.S. doing to help or to hinder the African peoples in their struggles for independence?" Let us examine the record. Before doing so, however, it is as well to recall that, politically speaking, three types of territories are found in Africa today—U. N. Trust Territories, non-self-governing territories, and self-governing territories. We shall consider these separately.

THE U.N. TRUST TERRITORIES

The U.N. Trust territories in Africa are former German or Italian colonies which have been placed under international control. They are usually given to an administering power until such time as they shall be ready for self-rule. There are eight such territories. In four of them—the British and French Cameroons and the British and French Togolands—political divisions have created such complexity and confusion that it is difficult, with so many factions claiming to speak in the name of the people, to ascertain the true wishes of the Cameroonians and the Togolandians. Consequently, American policy has not yet been able to crystalize sufficiently to be worthy of analysis. In the other four territories, however—Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, Somaliland, and South-West Africa—situations have arisen which have obliged the United States to assume a definite attitude. In all four instances the attitude of the United States has been hostile to the aspirations of the African peoples.

Tanganyika is the largest U.N. Trust Territory not only in Africa but also in the whole world. Britain is the administering power. Eight million people live in Tanganyika. Belonging to tribal groups, they live as peasant farmers and as they awake to the realities of the modern world—as they hear how India has thrown off colonial rule, how the Gold Coast is moving to independence, and how colored people everywhere are beginning to outgrow the period of white domination—they, too, are beginning to long for independence. Periodic visiting missions from the U.N. arrive in Tanganyika to obtain first-hand reports on conditions, and to make recommendations. Last year a four-man U. N. Mission visited Tanganyika. They found the Tanganyikans eager to know more about the U.N., eager to see the U.N. flag flown beside the Union Jack, and eager to prepare to run their own country. Although the New Zealand representatives dissented, the majority of the Mission—consisting of the El Salvador representative, the Indian representative, and the American representative (Mr. Mason Sears) — recommended that a target date for Tanganyikan self-government in 20 or 25 years be established. The setting of a target date around 1975 or 1980, it was felt, would do more than anything else to stimulate progress.

The British, however, having other plans for Tanganyika, were hostile to the recommendation. The British intention, rarely openly avowed in view of the hostility it arouses among Africans, is to work towards a political federation of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, on the lines of the Central African Federation, which was pushed through (against the wishes of all the African peoples concerned) in 1953. The other colonial powers, also chary of the principle of self-determination for subject peoples, joined with the British to oppose the estab-

ishment of a target date for self-government for Tanganyika. Pressure was brought to bear on the American Government, with the result that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called Mason Sears into a private conference. Upon emerging from this conference Mason Sears reversed his previous position, saying that, whatever his private opinions, as the representative of the U.S. Government he would vote *against* a target date for self-government for Tanganyika on the floor of the Trusteeship Council. This was a blow to African confidence in the United States not only in Tanganyika, but in every African country where men are beginning to dream of and work for independence.

The Belgian administered territory of Ruanda-Urundi, which adjoins the Congo, was also visited by the Mission in the course of its duties. Here again a target date for self-government was recommended by three of the four United Nations men, including the U. S. delegate. Back in the Trusteeship Council, however, Mason Sears stated: "Here again, as in the case of Tanganyika, I must record the opposition of the United States Government to the timetable principle for Ruanda-Urundi."

Travels in the Congo and Somaliland

Although, like the Cameroons and Togoland, Somaliland is divided, unlike the people of the two West African territories, the Moslemized Somalilanders are in agreement. Their aim is simply a united Somaliland. This aim is not easy to achieve, however, for Somaliland is divided into five parts—British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland, Kenyan Somaliland, and the Italian-administered U. N. Trust Territory of Somaliland. The task of the Somalis might appear insurmountable were it not for the fact that the greater part of "Italian" Somaliland (as the U.N. Trust Territory is habitually called) is already half-way through its ten-year period of preparation for independence in 1960. The Somali people, therefore, regard their immediate political task as reclaiming the second largest slice—"Ethiopian" Somaliland. "Ethiopian" Somaliland consists of three slices of Somali territory which the British have handed over to Ethiopian control. The right of the Somalis to claim these territories can hardly be doubted, for not only are they exclusively inhabited by Somalis, but these Somalis are religiously, ethnically, linguistically, historically, culturally, and economically differentiated from—and opposed to the Ethiopians to whom they have been handed over. The inhabitants of the three territories in question—regions known as the Ogaden, the Haud and the Domo—originally placed themselves under British protection in the 19th century. In return for a promise of neutrality from Ethiopia, at a time when the British were fighting the Mahdists in the Sudan, Britain promised to hand over Somali territory to Ethiopia after a fifty-year interval. The fifty years having expired, the British have redeemed their treacherous promise. They "honored" a short-sighted expedient made in the hey-day of imperialism and handed the Somalis over to their traditional enemies. Many symptoms could be cited to show that the British conscience is more than a little troubled on this score. But the fact remains that in 1948 the Ogaden, and in February, 1955 the Haud and the Domo, were handed over to Ethiopia.

There the matter might have ended, but for a complicating factor. Eighty per cent of the Somalis are still a nomad people. Possessing large cattle herds (they export hides) they graze their animals in different regions in different seasons. Political boundaries hold no meaning for them within traditional Somali territory. Consequently, the United Nations finds itself responsible for the welfare of people who spend part of the

year in "Italian" Somaliland, and part of the year in the Ethiopian-occupied territories of the Haud and the Domo. The Somalis, therefore, have been in a position to raise the question of their alienated territory before the United Nations. While the matter is not yet decided (it is to be raised again at the General Assembly late in 1955), hitherto at the Trusteeship Council, the U. S. voting has consistently supported (although in view of the circumstances, not always openly) the Ethiopian position of curtailing discussion and confronting the world with a *fait accompli*.

"There Shall Be No Interference . . ."

The only possible conclusion is that because American air bases are being established in Ethiopia, the U. S. has adopted a policy of "my ally right or wrong." The situation is not improved by the fact that the colonial powers, who have no direct interest in the question, are nevertheless supporting the American attitude in order to seek reciprocal favors when other embarrassing questions concerning other subject peoples are later raised. The U. S., however, despite its professions of concern for human rights and international justice, can hardly expect to maintain itself in good repute among Africans by following such courses of action.

South-West Africa is a territory considerably larger than Texas. Between the two world wars it was administered as a mandate by the Union of South Africa. After the Second World War, however, when South-West Africa became U. N. Trust Territory, the South African Government refused to send in reports on progress in South-West Africa, and later announced that the region had now become, in effect, South African and not U. N. territory. Since then South Africa has shown sovereign contempt for the United Nations, its resolutions, and its recommendations. It has not gone unnoticed, however, that the United States, together with the colonial powers, has almost consistently abstained from voting on the South-West African issue, thus supporting the colonial contention that "interference in the internal affairs" of other nations must be avoided. After several years of this policy, however, which did much to discredit America in African eyes, the United States began to adopt a more flexible approach at the U. N. Aware of the suspicions that were being awakened regarding American complicity in present-day South African policies, the United States, which had for a time refused to sit on the U. N.'s South-West Africa Committee, in 1954 proclaimed its willingness to return to the committee. Encouraging as this may be, this late reversal cannot easily dissipate, in African eyes, nine years of failure to show any concern for the Ovambo, Herero and Damara people, abandoned to the "care" of the South African Government. On this issue the United States—along with Britain, France and Belgium—stands condemned at the bar of African opinion. The initial attempt to bar the Rev. Michael Scott, spokesman for the Herero people, from attending the United Nations by refusing to grant him a visa, and—after the granting of the visa—the refusal of the State Department to permit Scott to leave a restricted area of Manhattan, or to speak to the American public, did nothing to dissipate the prevailing impression that America was seeking to muzzle the South-West Africa issue in order to maintain good relations with the gold-and-uranium exporting government of South Africa.

THE NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

The non-self-governing territories in Africa consist of the various colonies, protectorates, high commission territories, and other regions administered by the colonial powers. The Central African Federation may be included in this group although it has been nominally "self-governing" since 1953.

American policy towards these non-self-governing territories has varied considerably according to local conditions and international circumstances. In general it may be said that American policy has been to work towards breaking down the colonial trade monopolies, while at the same time maintaining a united front with the Western European imperialist nations against the Stalinist empire. Those who have had contact with representatives of the colonial powers will be well aware of the resentment engendered in colonial circles by the American pose of anti-colonial altruism which, it is felt, is only a cloak, whether admitted or not, to disguise national rivalry in the economic sphere. In practice this American policy creates the most paradoxical situations—as on the occasion when, on June 23rd of this year, the U. S. Congress passed a resolution (367 votes to none) condemning colonialism and Communism in the same breath, while on the same day the United States promised colonial France priority in supplying helicopters to combat nationalists fighting the French in the hills of Eastern Algeria.

Similarly, while sufficiently embarrassed by the pro-colonial activities of W. W. Baldwin (an American who enlisted in the British forces fighting Mau Mau in Kenya, and who has killed 12 Kenyan Africans) to urge him to return home, the U. S. government is, at the same time, sufficiently interested in maintaining the colonial status quo to shore up the tottering Kenyan economy with an F.O.A. grant of \$3,887,240. Although this does not constitute direct military assistance to what is perhaps the most notorious colonial administration now in existence, it is indisputable that the Kenyan economy as a whole was, in view of the diversion of funds to combat the "Emergency," rapidly nearing the point of total collapse at the moment the grant was made.

"America's Business Is Business"

In West Africa, however, where happier conditions prevail, American policy has been sympathetic to the prospect of the emergence of self-governing African states. One might be tempted to think that this is through genuine sympathy with the African peoples' aspirations towards freedom, had we not the examples of American policy towards those states which are already "self-governing." *Cherchez l'intérêt* ("Seek the motive") is a wise French saying. Indeed, one does not have to look far. The very first signs of American interest in Africa appear to have been commercial. In 1795 Mungo Park, the Scots explorer sent out by the African Association, referring to the trade in slaves, gold dust, ivory, beeswax, and hides, reported that "Americans have lately sent a few vessels to the Gambia by way of experiment." Today, more than at any other point in American history, "America's business is business." American business has every interest in the overthrow of the colonial regimes with their trade monopolies, and in their replacement by national regimes, led by such politicians as Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, Dr. Azikiwe in Nigeria, or President Tubman of Liberia who are willing to talk business with U.S. corporations. In general, however, it may be said that whereas this result appears practicable in West Africa, the remoteness of East African countries, their relative unfamiliarity with business precepts, and their sensitivity to Asian or Egyptian religious and political influences, preclude the possibility of America's seeking to dislodge the already unstable colonial regimes in the area. Since both American and colonial influence have shallow roots here, rivalry, under such conditions, could only lead to the disappearance of all Western influence, colonial and American alike. A marriage of convenience has consequently been arranged between these forces.

Africa's self-governing territories are Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and the Union of South Africa. Between the Union of South Africa and the United States there are strong commercial ties. South Africa is also penetrated by a considerable amount of American capital investment. However, American practices, based on expediency, are at complete variance with the Nationalists' stubborn metaphysical belief in the divinely appointed status of the white man, and the divinely designed inferiority of the black. This bigotry, in American governmental eyes, is not so much immoral as it is against the best interests of South Africa (and America). Consequently, although tentative attempts are periodically made to reach military agreements, these agreements are never concluded. This is because to the United States "the Enemy" is international Communism, but to the South African government "the Enemy" is the African who refuses to accept his inferior status. Furthermore, knowing the force of public opinion in Asia, Latin America, and even in Europe, in favor of the people of South Africa who endure humiliation, insult and injury at the hands of their white rulers, America dare not too openly support the present South African regime, however close the commercial ties, and however pressing America's demands for South African uranium. Nevertheless, up to 1953 alone, the Union of South Africa was the recipient of \$81,600,000 in dollar aid.

Since Egypt is a country which stands at the crossroads of East and West as well as of Africa and the Mediterranean, it is obviously preferable to avoid discussion of America's Egyptian policy in this context, since it involves consideration of many complex problems with which we are not here concerned. In view of its growing influence on African affairs the role of Egypt must nevertheless be born in mind for the future. However, in considering American policy towards Africa's self-governing states, we shall obtain more rewarding impressions by focussing on the three remaining countries—Libya, Liberia and Ethiopia.

From the Halls of Montezuma . . .

Libya, having been successively an Italian colony and a U. N. Trust Territory, has been independent since 1951. Since then, the relative growth of American influence in this large but infertile country has been considerable. Money and military power combined have made American influence predominant. Up to mid-1954, Libya received \$4,291,000 from the United States. A glowing example has been given to the future rulers of nearby North African countries that alliance with America pays off. Nevertheless, as the *New York Times* commented in an editorial on February 15th 1954: "To tell such a people and such a country that they are 'independent' is, of course, a mockery." After pointing out that Britain, France and the United States share "the burden," the *Times* went on to comment: "For the United States the interest is a simple but important one: we have one of our key air bases at Wheelus Field, outside Tripoli."

We have already seen, in considering the Somali question, that U. S. policy is influenced by its alliance with Ethiopia. Except for the interlude when Ethiopia was over-run by Mussolini's forces, the Ethiopian government has followed a policy of playing one European power against another. Of late, however, American influence has been waxing strong, so that, while multifarious European influences are still in evidence, America's role has been becoming increasingly predominant. Ethiopian banknotes are now printed in the U. S.; American capital is flowing into the country; American educators and missionaries are at work; and, since 1953, a treaty has been in

force concerning the establishment of U. S. air bases in Ethiopia. Under this agreement it is possible that American troops may be sent to help Haile Selassie put down the constant revolts which break out against his rule. For the fact is that the Amharic ruling class, of which the Emperor is the symbol, is heartily disliked in many regions, as the recent Galla and Issa revolts, to say nothing of the constant clashes with the Somalis, bear witness. Frequent public executions, torture, and slavery are all features of present-day Ethiopian society, not to speak of a censorship which virtually blots out news of the outside world lest it lessen adoration of the Emperor, or challenge the absolute concepts on which the backward Coptic Church bases its power. Yet were it not for the support of the American government this anachronistic regime—whose adherents still literally believe and teach that the earth is flat—would have to modernize or perish.

Ethiopia, however, is an inaccessible country on the farther side of Africa. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate with any degree of exactitude the effect of American policy when so many other factors are also influencing conditions. One must turn to the African country where American influence is paramount to see in what direction American policy toward African countries in general tends.

Slaves to Lords Under U. S. Tutelage

Liberia was originally purchased from the local African chiefs by the American Colonization Society in much the same way that Manhattan was purchased from the Indians by the Dutch. The intention of the Colonization Society was to provide a homeland for the liberated American Negro slaves. Today the descendants of these slaves, numbering approximately 20,000, and with an admixture of white American ancestry, form a tightly-knit ruling caste which exercises political and economic domination over two million Liberian Africans—the “Aborigines,” as they somewhat quaintly style themselves. Despite superficial emulation of American democracy, the elections, although regularly held, are farcical in character. Up to 1955, only the True Whig candidate was permitted to run for election. When, in 1951, an opposition candidate—Didwo Twe, an Aborigine—attempted to contest the election, he was driven out of the country.

In 1955, “free elections” were permitted for the first time. However, President Tubman preceded the “free election” (at which the opposition party was intimidated into withdrawing its opposition) by suppressing the opposition newspaper, *The Independent*; by publicly manhandling political opponents (beating them, making them clean the presidential latrines, etc.); and by throwing *potentially* hostile voters into prison, or transporting them to camps in the interior. Tubman further ensured his return at the polls by posting detachments of armed soldiers at key points on polling day. He felt strong enough to behave in this way because he enjoyed the security of American support, ratified during his visit to Washington in October 1954.

Despite this political repression, however, it may be pointed out that the United States, up to mid-1953, had given Liberia \$36,566,700—more than to any other African country except the Union of South Africa. Doubtless—the uninformed observer might be tempted to conclude—the Liberian people have reaped some benefit from their association with America. The contrary has been true. Conditions in the interior of Liberia in medicine and education alone are far behind those in the old-style British colony of Sierra Leone next door. Furthermore, in Sierra Leone the Africans, no less than the Creole commercial class, are beginning to participate in the political activity that is leading to self-government. And,

whatever its drawbacks, the city of Sierra Leone possesses the usual public amenities. In Liberia's capital city of Monrovia, however, there is no sewage system, no telephone system, and—despite a plethora of expensive American cars—not very much road. As for the thirty-six million dollars, some idea of why this sum has had relatively little effect on the situation may be gained when one appreciates the fact that the presidential inaugural celebrations alone, after the 1951 election, cost over a million dollars. One can only hope that the \$15,000,000 credit just granted to Liberia by the U. S. Export-Import Bank, for the purpose of constructing roads, will be spent to better effect.

The United States has, however, conferred one substantial benefit on Liberia. During World War II, when American military installations were established in the country, a deep-water port was built at Monrovia. Today this is being used almost exclusively by the Firestone Rubber Company and the Republic Steel Corporation for shipping Liberia's rubber and iron ore back to the United States. The “dollar aid” paid to the Liberian government must therefore be considered as hush-money to ensure that no African protest is raised against the fact that the profit from Liberia's wealth is being drained away to America. The effective working of this system of “milking” Liberia's resources is illustrated by the fact that even the Liberian trade union movement is controlled by the Tubman administration, and is thus discredited not only among the “Aborigines,” but also among the whole trade union movement abroad.

State Department Motivations

Having considered the workings of American policy towards Africa, one is inevitably driven to the conclusion that the State Department's policy is motivated by two interrelated considerations:

First, the establishment of military bases which serve the purpose both of strengthening the ring of such bases around the globe, and of enabling American negotiators to exert psychological pressure against local administrations.

Second, the creation of conditions which permit the efficient exploitation of African resources for the benefit of U. S. capitalism. This consideration involves the judicious weakening, when possible, of colonial regimes in order to break their trade monopolies to allow fresh outlets for American goods.

In conclusion, it is evident that such a policy is not in the best interests of the African people. This is not the place to examine the impact of Western culture upon Africa, but there is no lack of evidence to show that, despite certain benefits, the African peoples are in effect being debased, impoverished and exploited by the West. What is now needed is a policy which will enable the African people to receive the education for which they are thirsting, to learn the skills they are eager to acquire, to participate in the decisions which affect their lives, to trade with the outside world on a fair basis, and freely to form their own democratic institutions.

The aim of the American State Department, *if* it is an agency representative of a democratic people who truly believe in helping the peoples of the unindustrialized areas, should plainly be to initiate such a policy. The basic question is, can such a democratic policy be initiated or carried out by America under its present leadership? One has only to examine the record to see that it cannot. To disprove the implications of political and moral impotency, the present rulers have only to implement such a policy. Let us challenge them to try!

NAOMI TCHADIRDJIAN

Naomi Tchadirdjian covers African affairs at the United Nations.

IN REVIEW

FILM—Strategic Air Command

Strategic Air Command, with James Stewart and June Allyson.

It appears that for some time bombers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) have been "hypothetically" wiping out American cities from altitudes of 45,000 feet. That the public has been totally unaware of these training missions, and of the other no less glamorous activities of SAC, has apparently become a source of concern to the U. S. Air Force. Enlisting the aid of Paramount Studios, SAC has abandoned its former policy of complete security blackout, and entered the "public relations" field. The result is *Strategic Air Command*, a mediocre film which has been given the full Hollywood treatment, from motorcades and advanced prices, to a symphonic score and Vista-Vision.

Dedicated to the present personnel of SAC and "to the young men of America who will one day take their places beside them," it is on one level merely an animated recruiting poster. Dramatically, however, the film is addressed to the problem of civilian morale. How can a young wife and mother (June Allyson) be persuaded to surrender her husband (Jimmy Stewart) to an arduous, dangerous, and low-salaried job (\$8500 a year), when the country is not officially at war? This insistent query is answered by a barrage of prepared speeches which comprise the overt propaganda content of the film.

The Air Force ideology is predictably barren: a capacity for "massive retaliation" is the surest guarantee of peace. The hero, a reserve officer recalled to active duty in the midst of a successful baseball career, is gradually won over to the Air Force point of view. But the young wife remains unconvinced, until the *coup de grâce* is administered by the head of SAC himself: "Mrs. Holland, I too have no choice." Ultimately she is offered no stronger incentive for her personal sacrifice than this dutiful acceptance of blind necessity.

All of this would be intolerably dull, except for the homosexual implications of the film. The major dramatic conflict is between married love and a flying career, and the emotional content of the latter is not hard to determine. The husband's new career represents at the very least a disruption, and perhaps an evasion, of mature sexuality.

As the film opens, a housewarming party—the American symbol of solid domesticity—is interrupted by the husband's orders to report for active duty. In a subsequent "nightgown scene" at their new quarters on the airbase, a tender connubial embrace is interrupted when the house shudders (and not in the Hemingway fashion) from the reverberations caused by a passing jet. Later on the point is made explicitly by the wife, apropos of her pregnancy. It's a good thing, she remarks to her husband, that it happened prior to his induction, for "judging by my short experience in the Air Force, it couldn't have happened afterwards." How, then, is the Air Force endowed with those qualities which supplant Miss Allyson as the first object of her husband's affections?

To begin with, the hero's baseball career is not without significance. There is a concerted effort to link the two careers, for the Air Force would like to transfer all of the associations of "teamwork" and playground morality to its own field of operations. "The B-47," says a General, "is on third base. It's up to you to bring it home." A Flight Sergeant remarks of a select combat crew: "One man lets the crew down, everyone gets demoted. It keeps them in there pitching." Moral complexities are thus reduced to manageable size, as life becomes just another ball game.

The point is that the ballplayer-flyer remains a perennial adolescent. In transferring from civilian to military life, he has merely moved from one all-male society to another. The difference, in terms of his marriage, is that his wife cannot "crash" the new male milieu, can no longer be "one of the boys." In the world of baseball, there is the institutionalized role of the "fan," from which women are not excluded, but not even Miss Allyson—she of the husky voice and slit-pocket skirt—not even she can crash the security-encircled male world of SAC. She always seems to be watching her husband through a wire fence. This, too, is the point of her stupid questions, which provide the audience with a few laughs at the expense of the excluded female.

The real emotional content of the film is defined through a not-too-subtle pattern of symbolism. As the hero stands in a hangar, admiring the new B-47, he assumes a tone of ecstasy: "She's the most beautiful thing I've ever seen in my life . . . I'd sure like to

get my hands on one of these." Like the jet-bombers, cigars play an important symbolic role, and the two symbols are fused in a memorable line: "Colonel, you want to see the rest of this big cigar?"

The climax of the film is achieved through a kind of immense, transcontinental orgasm, as the hero's plane, enroute non-stop from Florida to Japan, refuels over Seattle. The sleek jet approaches a chubby little tanker from behind, and after lowering a long tube, the two aircraft couple in mid-air. The following earphone conversation is recorded verbatim: "Tanker ready for contact." "Receiver ready for contact." "CONTACT." "Your position is good—pressure thirty-five pounds." "Transfer completed—you may disconnect when ready." That this playful piece of Pentagon pederasty escaped the official censorship is attributable only to Eric Johnson's naivete.

Meanwhile the film moves toward its *dénouement*. What can only be described as a romantic triangle has developed between the flyer, his wife, and General Hawkes. Torn between his wife's entreaties and his own desire to re-enlist, the flyer develops a paralysis in his right arm which the film formally attributes to a crash-injury. In any event, the paralysis extricates him from the Air Force. "I've got to let him go," says General Hawkes reluctantly to Mrs. Holland. "He's all yours." It is an empty victory, however, for the wife has come to see the error of her ways, and is thoroughly ashamed of her earlier unpatriotic attitude.

And this is precisely the point, for the infantile sexuality of the film makes no sense aside from its ideological content. The wife's capitulation amounts to an ignoble surrender to the military as father-image, as a substitute for independent thought. "SAC's best hope," Gen. Hawkes remarks reassuringly, "is to prevent a war from ever starting." It is this childish notion—the notion that an atomic armaments race is the path to peace—which permeates the film. In this context, the ideological and emotional levels of the film fuse and become one. For on both levels, submission to General Hawkes involves an abdication of adult responsibility.

BOB BONE

Bob Bone is an instructor at Yale University and the author of a forthcoming book on Negro literature in America.

The Infamous Dreyfus Affair

Captain Dreyfus, by Nicholas Halasz. Simon and Schuster, 1955.

In this age of cowardice and conformity, it is rare to find a book published that offends powerful interests by illuminating an important and scandalous event, and also casts fresh light on a crucial contemporary issue.

An extraordinary work, in this respect, is

the fascinating study of the Dreyfus affair by Nicholas Halasz, for that *cause celebre* of the late 19th century may well be viewed as an historical antecedent of McCarthyism. The same factors and forces which grip nations in periods of uncertainty, and create an atmosphere of hysteria fed by the fires of prejudice and passion, were present in both periods.

Captain Dreyfus was framed by the French General Staff as a traitor because he was a Jew—and this verdict was backed by powerful Catholic-Monarchist forces determined to turn back the clock to pre-revolution days. When Dreyfus' "guilt" was reaffirmed, by the expedient Brass Hat device of finding the real traitor, Count Esterhazy, innocent, one read in *Civilita*

Catholica, the official organ of the Jesuit order in Rome: "The Jew was created by God to serve as a spy wherever treason is in preparation." It was a clarion call for fomenting a tidal wave of anti-Semitism.

Remember: the country was France and the time was the 1890's. For a vivid picture of the fantastic machinations used to cover up the frame-up; of the incredible venality of the French press and the vile anti-Semitism that was the open policy of the clergy in judging this case and using it politically—nothing has been written better than Halasz's book. The whole affair reached the tragic proportions we moderns usually reserve for judging the Moscow Trials, or Hitler's persecution of the Jews.

Honorable Men

For a study of the military mind—and the deadly effects of militarism cloaked in the mantles of catch-phrases, such as "bulwark of the nation," "Honor of the Army," "national security," etc.—the Halasz book does for the French generals what so many writers have done for the Reichswehr. This is the breed of whom Clemenceau later said, "War is too important a business to be run by generals."

How did such a shocking event occur in a modern nation which proclaimed itself the center of world culture and civilization? It began in the rout at Sedan in the war of 1870, and in the fear of the bourgeoisie of another Paris Commune. It was preceded by the burlesque of the Boulanger movement, and it was nourished by the poison of anti-Semitism fed to the populace by the Jesuits and their allies.

Once Dreyfus was convicted by the court-martial, and the reactionary offensive took place, France became a nation of hysteria. So many scenes are reminiscent of contemporary events. Demagogues and the national press inflamed the popular mind and

always in the worship of the illusory God of "national security."

How does a nation turn from this dark and tragic course? When does a nation regain its sanity? Will the hysteria ever end? In the early days of the Dreyfus ordeal at Devil's island, an optimistic answer to these questions seemed Utopian . . . as do many answers today.

But it did happen, and the story of it is one of the great events of modern history. What a stirring struggle against seemingly insurmountable odds. It began when a handful of dissidents studied the case, and decided that Dreyfus was innocent—as his family and friends had proclaimed when all appeared lost. One man's thundering voice challenged the army, the church and the government, and re-opened the case before French and world opinion. Emile Zola deliberately committed a felony to intervene in the Dreyfus affair. He pulled no punches. "To proclaim Dreyfus innocent is to indict the French General Staff!" Jean Jaures, the great socialist leader, Georges Clemenceau, the 'Tiger' of French politics, Anatole France, and others joined in this deadly battle.

The Persecution of Zola

The path to freedom is tortuous. At the dramatic trial of Zola, the new Chief of French Intelligence, Colonel Piquart swore that Dreyfus was innocent. As a reward for his honesty he was reviled by 100 officers and his superiors, and dismissed from the Army. Zola was found guilty of libel and had to flee the country to escape the chauvinistic mobs. Even after a Major Henry confessed he forged documents to implicate Dreyfus, the French press, with small exception, stood behind the army; the anti-Semitic press incited large riots.

Often, the struggle for Dreyfus' vindication was a nightmare within a nightmare. Public debate was vitriolic, and sometimes

settled by blows. The intellectuals and the socialist movement rallied for a counter-offensive. Finally, due to their efforts, Captain Dreyfus was given a retrial, and to the amazement of the world he was found guilty again. Only this time it was "under extenuating circumstances." The Brass Hats had not lost their influence or power-behind-the-scenes yet. This verdict came after Esterhazy, the real traitor on the staff, who had fled to England, admitted he wrote the document attributed originally to Dreyfus!

The Vindication

The tide continued to change. The Dreyfusards became bolder, and stronger. A pardon was given to Dreyfus as a means of "compromising" the affair all the way around. It didn't work. Finally in 1906, another trial was held, and the foul records of the past were wiped out. Dreyfus was restored to full rank and given the French Legion of Honor medal. Outside, 200,000 Parisians who had gathered spontaneously, cheered him in the same city where mobs had tried to kill him a dozen years before. The loser in the affair was the Catholic Church—in power, influence and control of the schools. Republicanism established itself firmly.

Emile Zola had achieved world fame in his time as a novelist. In this affair he won immortality as a symbol of mankind emancipating itself from barbarism and prejudices. "*J'Accuse*" will always stand as the battle cry of the dissident against tyranny, no matter what the form. It speaks eloquently in this epoch of McCarthyism. Nicholas Halasz has done well to remind us of this pertinent fact in his timely and brilliant work.

B. J. WIDICK

B. J. Widick is the co-author of *The UAW and Walter Reuther* and a contributor to the *New Republic*.

Populism and the New Deal—A Class Analysis

The Age of Reform, by Richard Hofstadter. Alfred Knopf, 1955.

During the 1930's, liberal historians revised American history to bring it into line with the New Deal. Roosevelt, according to their theories, was the inheritor of the tradition of the populists and the progressives. Toward the end of this period, this point of view found its most characteristic expression in Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s *Age of Jackson*. The alliance between farm and labor which was described in that book was obviously intended as a prototype of a movement one hundred years later—the New Deal.

More recently, a new revision has taken place. The turbulent days of the New Deal are past; an era of internal social peace and immense foreign responsibilities has come to the United States. In this atmosphere, the American tradition is being reinterpreted once more, this time in a more conservative fashion. Louis Hartz in his *Liberal Tradition in America* attempts to prove that the Parrington-Beard economic interpretation of our history over-emphasizes the class struggle and fails to realize that America has always been built on a liberal consensus; in the *Reporter*, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. confesses that he finds it

difficult to differentiate his liberalism from the neo-conservatism of a scholar like Clinton Rossiter.

In this development, Richard Hofstadter is something of an anachronism. He remains a Beardian, locating the dynamic of American history in the interplay of classes and the conflict of material interests. His *American Political Tradition*, available in soft covers, is a brilliant series of essays in the Beard tradition; his *Social Darwinism in America* is soon to be republished. Now he has appeared with a new book, *The Age of Reform*, which is a description of the three great American reform movements: populism, progressivism and the New Deal. Although it is not as fine a work as his *American Political Tradition*, it still is an excellent dissent from the contemporary trend.

Class Analysis

Hofstadter's fundamental characterization of each of the movements with which he deals is in class terms. By the use of this method, he breaks sharply with the Schlesinger approach which sees the New Deal as a simple continuation of American non-conformism and reform. For he treats populism, progressivism and the New Deal in their historical contexts and not as

mythical prototypes.

The initial American ideology was based upon the conviction that the backbone of democracy was the independent farmer. His republican virtues were contrasted with the autocracy of capital and the sinfulness of the cities. He was viewed as a non-commercial, idealist element in a crass world. It was this myth which was the source of populist strength. After the Civil War, American capitalism began to expand at a rapid rate, converting America into a first-class power within a matter of forty years. This process brought with it an antagonism between the farm and the new forces of capital.

And yet, it was a myth which the populist movement built upon. The farmers, Hofstadter contends, had never been the uncommercial visionaries of their own imagination. Their pressure organizations were market and money oriented. They had a very real conflict with Eastern capital, to be sure, but it was not the black and white of their own version of historical reality. However, at a certain point in American history, the economic situation and their own tradition allowed them to fashion a movement, in alliance with organized labor, which challenged the growing power of capital.

Hofstadter distinguishes sharply between the "soft side" of populism which grew out of the agrarian myth, and its "hard side" which grew out of the commercial reality. After the defeat of the populist movement—and in a period in which the percentage of farmers in the population declined—they left much of their ideological rhetoric behind and organized as effective minority pressure groups. The paradox, Hofstadter finds, is that they achieved their goals as a minority and not as the leaders of the majority.

Progressivism—A Status Revolt

Around the turn of the century, a new reform movement sprang up. It was connected with the populist tradition, sharing some of its slogans, but differed basically in its class composition. Progressivism is described by Hofstadter as a "status revolt" of the old middle class, the lawyers, ministers and doctors, against the new capitalist society which did not pay them their accustomed homage. It was white, Protestant, proper and American, often achieving strength by pointing to the dangers inherent in the rise of a socialist movement. It opposed the bigness of the corporations—this was the period of anti-trust agitation—but was confronted with the paradox that in order to do so it had to favor the bigness of the government.

When World War I came the populist tradition—rural, anti-European, isolationist—was a source of anti-war sentiment. But the Progressive movement became the official rhetorician of the War. It was this fact which partially accounts for its disastrous decline at the end of World War I when a

great revulsion against that conflict took place. This, in brief outline, is Hofstadter's view of the development of the two great American reform movements.

The New Deal was another matter. In this book, Hofstadter continues his analysis of it as an opportunistic attempt at capitalist reform, although the hostility towards it which he showed in his *American Political Tradition* seems somewhat mitigated. But more basically, he distinguishes it in historical and class terms from the Progressive and Populist movements. It is here that he breaks with much of the liberal writing of the Thirties. The first and most important point of difference which he cites is this: that the New Deal arose at a time of the economic collapse of the system, and that it was predicated upon a sick economy, while the previous reform movements had assumed the reform of a healthy economy. This does not mean, of course, that economic crisis played no role in Populism and Progressivism; it does mean that it played a different kind of role.

The Class Nature of the New Deal

In historical terms, Hofstadter is here distinguishing between reform movements which grow out of the problems created by the ascendancy of capitalism, and those which arise in the periods of its deep crisis. By discussing the matter in this fashion, he automatically sets himself apart from historians like Hartz who maintain that the rhythms of capitalist development had little or nothing to do with American history. Given this basic differentiation, it is inevitable that Hofstadter will mark off the New Deal in class terms and thus further

separate it from the older American tradition of reform.

This he does by bringing in the role of the working class during the period of the New Deal. The Thirties, he writes, marks the first emergence of a mass, social democratic rhetoric in the United States. And this was because the Thirties was essentially different, in class terms, from all previous eras of reform in America. This was the voice of the labor movement and of the unemployed. It did not give rise to a socialist consciousness, although it accomplished a basic transformation of American politics. Unfortunately, Hofstadter does not project this movement into the period of the Permanent War Economy—our period—but his main thesis is still a needed corrective to the current revisionism.

The "long view" becomes difficult to maintain in those periods in which all of society seems to be contradicting it; class analysis of the past is made more difficult by the class peace of the present. Hofstadter accomplishes the difficult intellectual task of seeing beyond the present period. He does this in looking toward the past. Yet all of those who are looking toward the future can profit by his work. American capitalism has had an exceptional development, to be sure, and in its current period it appears as harmonious and productive; but the major antagonisms which Hofstadter describes remain unsolved; American exceptionalism does not abstract it from history.

EDWARD HILL

Edward Hill writes regularly for the *Young Socialist Challenge*.

The Strange Case of Mr. Jim Crow

The Strange Career of Jim Crow, by C. Vann Woodward. Oxford University Press, 114 Fifth Avenue, New York 11. 1955, 155 pp., \$2.50.

The death of Charles A. Beard deprived the U. S. of the greatest historian this country has produced. During his long and productive life, his courage and breadth of grasp was an inspiration to several generations of social scientists. And although he was not a Marxist, he did more to pioneer the interpretation of American history in terms of the class struggle than any other writer. His *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* is in a class by itself and is the beginning of wisdom for any study of this nation. Beard's broader *Rise of American Civilization* is a classic and is far and away the most satisfying American history, even after several decades.

All of which would seem to have little to do with C. Vann Woodward, were it not for the fact that he promises to come as close as anyone in our times to filling Beard's shoes. *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* is the freshest evidence of his growing stature. Woodward is a conscious disciple of Beard's and openly acknowledges it today when the old master is under attack both for his earlier radical bent and for his bitter isolationism in the World War II era. Woodward understands the effect of the play of economic forces, as did Beard, and to this he adds excellent psychological insight and

an understanding of sociology. His latest work may be purchased for a pittance and read in an afternoon, and all serious socialists, honest radicals, principled liberals, small "d" democrats, and aspirant or practicing social scientists should do so forthwith.

The Strange Career of Jim Crow is a history, not of the Negro in America (which would require much more than 155 pages) but of the *segregation* of Negroes in the South. Because Woodward is a Southerner, and has been researching in and writing about southern history all of his life, he is admirably qualified to make this study.

Woodward's discoveries are amazing to someone not familiar with the history of the South, which unfortunately includes many enemies of Jim Crow, Negro as well as white. For he shows, with conclusive evidence, that *segregation* did not grow out of the Reconstruction period, as virtually everyone believes. The average non-Southerner knows that southern whites coerced and intimidated the Negro in order to end "Carpenter" Republican rule in the South after the Civil War. He assumes that this coercion and humiliation of the Negro increased after troops were withdrawn from the former Confederacy in 1877.

As a matter of fact, as Woodward shows, the South, on the whole, attempted to accept the Negro as a citizen and to work out its new destiny on a democratic basis. The leaders of the South—the so-called "Re-

demptioners" who had succeeded in restoring home rule to the South—did not do this as much out of idealistic considerations as out of practical motives. They were willing to accept the Negro as a citizen as part of the price paid the North for the right to run their own states. Furthermore, these "Redemptioners" were ready to turn their backs on slavery, secession, and a plantation economy. They hoped to imitate the capitalists of the North in developing their region into an industrial one—into a "New South." With such a perspective, they realized that the Negro was an important regional human resource. And at the time, the North was still carefully keeping an eye on the South to see how the Negro would be treated.

As a result, in the post-Reconstruction South, Negroes voted without restriction and held office. They rode in the same railroad coaches, diners, and steamships, ate at the same restaurants, drank at the same saloons, and intermingled with whites at the theater or fair. There was, it was true, a rabid pro-segregation minority among some of the "crackers," but the responsible leaders of the South held it in check.

The barriers against racial fanaticism began to weaken in the 1890's and collapsed completely early in the 20th century. The forces which drove the South inexorably to turn upon itself in the social cannibalism which the imposition of the Jim Crow system represented had their

origin, not in the South, but with northern capitalism. Woodward makes this very clear.

The post-civil war South was a ruined and impoverished region. Triumphant big business in the North, firmly in control of the national government, treated the South politically as a "conquered province" and economically as a colony. The direct domination (in the form of occupying troops) ended in 1877, but the economic domination continued. (For the nature of the *raprochement* between Northern and Southern capitalism which ended military occupation, see Woodward's earlier work, *Reunion and Reaction, The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction.*)

The dream of a new industrial South did not materialize, at least in the post-Civil War period. Republican-Big Business control of the national government was used to expropriate the farmer for the purpose of capital accumulation (which, as an aside, is excellent moral grounds for eventual nationalization of industry.) The chief mechanism by which this was accomplished was the tariff. Farmers (and the South was a farming region) bought manufactured goods at artificially high, protected prices, but sold their crops at a price set in the unprotected world market. In addition to tariff oppression, the farmers also had their pockets picked by the robber baron government through currency manipulation which drove agricultural prices lower and lower. Far from sharing in the benefits of this, the hopeful southern capitalists were numbered among the victims of this policy. They were treated as a colony, not as junior partners.

The result was slow ruination of the

farmer, in both South and West, culminating finally in the bitter protest movement of Populism. This swept through the South as well as the West, and was the signal to the southern rulers to unleash racial hatred and thus end the threat of Negro and white farmers uniting under the radical populist banner. (The Southern capitalists were hoping desperately to attract northern investment; they knew they could not, if their state legislatures passed into the hands of agrarian levellers.)

Therefore, in that vast poor house which was the South in the nineties—where cotton had gone from 24 cents a pound in 1866 to five cents a pound in 1898, the Southern rulers launched a program of anti-Negro agitation coupled with the demands for segregatory laws. It was a deliberate policy, and it was initiated not by "poor white trash," but by the leaders of southern society. The poison did its corrosive work; the acid dissolved the newly forged bonds of the inter-racial populists, and consigned the movement to oblivion in the South. Instead of relief from the agricultural depression (which the Southern ruling class could not have provided, anyway) the poor southern white was given the psychological "comfort" of being placed in a superior position *viz-a-viz* his Negro neighbor—and not by elevating the white, but by depressing the Negro. It was in this period that Jim Crow as a social pattern appeared—which, by the way, knocks in the head the contention that segregation is an ancient and immutable southern "folkway."

A contributing factor to the erection of racial barriers in the period around the turn of the century was the appearance of imperialism in the North. The "White

Man's Burden" rationalizations which President Teddy Roosevelt gave for brutally suppressing the "insurrection" of the "little brown brothers" of the newly-acquired Phillipines were the same rationalizations which the *Negrophobes of the South had used to justify first slavery and then Jim Crow*. With the party of Lincoln preaching white supremacy on a world scale, what was to deter the Southern racists?

The concluding chapters of Woodward's book consider the post-World War II drive for Civil Rights as exemplified by the recent Supreme Court decision on education, and related Executive Orders dealing with the armed services, federal contracts, government employment, and the like. It is a tentative attempt (as any attempt this early must be) to assay this "New Reconstruction" of the South, as Woodward terms it. The major defect of Woodward's consideration of this movement is his neglect of the role of the labor movement, and particularly the CIO, in the fight for Negro rights. In other respects, however, the treatment is suggestive and stimulating. With the excellent studies of E. R. McKimney in the socialist press of several years ago, and the recent piece by Bob Bone in *Dissent*, Woodward's last chapter is one of the first instances of a theoretical consideration of the outcome of the "New Reconstruction." The outcome is not yet decided. Books like this, at any rate, help the forces of democracy and socialism to make sure that the outcome is the proper one.

GERALD MCDERMOTT

Gerald McDermott is a student of American labor history who is a contributing editor of ANVIL.

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