

WORLD OUTLOOK

PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

Un service de presse ouvrier

Vol. 2, No. 39

November 13, 1964

21, rue d'Aboukir - PARIS-2

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THE END OF THE PAZ ESTENSSORO REGIME

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THE END OF THE PAZ ESTENSSORO REGIME

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was sworn in as co-chairman of the junta with General Alfredo Ovando Candia on November 5. A few hours later he announced that Ovando had "resigned."

Paz Estenssoro was toppled by an army revolt following several weeks of violent repression of protesting miners and students. [See World Outlook November 6.]

Paz Estenssoro fell victim to his own policy of relying on U.S. aid and advice. Bolivia's reactionary armed forces were destroyed by a popular revolution in 1952 and replaced by a workers and peasants militia. In 1954 Paz Estenssoro began rebuilding a regular army. Bit by bit he sought to cut down the militia and to divide the workers and peasants, seeking to build a base among the peasantry by granting them some reforms. Finally he and his American backers considered his position strong enough to begin economic measures that stirred great unrest among the populace. Moves were begun to disarm the workers. Their voice in the regime was cut down. All this led up to the rigged election last May in which Paz Estenssoro, bowing to army pressure, named Barrientos vice-president.

But at the very moment Paz Estenssoro sought to convert his rule into a naked military dictatorship, he lost all working-class support and thus became a prisoner of the officer caste. This was symbolized by his breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba. The only thing that is really novel is the speed with which Barrientos moved to take over.

The downfall of Paz Estenssoro recalls the similar fates of Frondizi in Argentina and Arosemena in Ecuador. Both of them were ousted by military juntas shortly after they bowed to pressure from Washington and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The situation in Bolivia is far from stable and it remains to be seen whether Barrientos can consolidate his power. The explosiveness of the situation is indicated by the fact that the junta felt uncertain enough to bring in Juan Lechin as a gesture to the workers. They also abolished the "state of siege," cancelled the new constitution, and reportedly did away with Paz Estenssoro's political police.

But an incipient division was evident in the program announced by the junta which offers a vague democracy and "respect of international agreements" (the formula for getting recognition from Washington) and the program of a newly formed "Revolutionary Committee of the People." The latter, whose relations to the junta are not clear from dispatches, demands maintenance of nationalization of the mines, continuation of the agrarian reform, maintenance of universal suffrage, preparation for a plan to develop the country, protection of national industry, defense of state industries, suspension of usurious taxes, granting of state credits, and a series of democratic guarantees.

WILSON BEGINS LABOUR'S PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE

By T.J. Peters

LONDON, Nov. 6 -- In the weird quasi-medieval setting of the Speech from the Throne at the opening of parliament, the Wilson government announced to the world that it would carry out the program to which the Labour party was pledged in the recent elections. This includes nationalization of the steel industry, against which the ruling class has keyed its whole agitation, renewing the clamour that in 1951 brought down the first postwar Labour government.

For all the regal trappings and the anachronistic pomp in which this announcement was wrapped -- so glaringly contrasting with the universally applauded aim of a new, modern Britain -- it would nevertheless be wrong to ignore the progressive significance of this move. It has to be seen in proper historical perspective to be judged correctly.

It is not customary for social democrats to match words with deeds, even when they are of the "left" variety. Their normal tendency is to yield to the heavy pressures exerted by the capitalist economy and its superstructure, against which they have foresworn revolutionary action as a matter of principle, so to speak. Particularly is this so in a critical situation that permits a hullabaloo to be raised for compromise "in the national interest." Such a situation exists, in fact, in Britain at present. And the wafer-thin majority of the Labour party in parliament could serve as a plausible pretext to follow social-democratic precedent. It was not followed. Wilson has proceeded with a relative boldness which is unaccustomed coming from that quarter.

In part this reflects the character of the individual. But the individual is shaped by the social forces of the times he lives in, by his political background. The measures Wilson has placed on the parliamentary agenda for the coming session -- aside from the major one mentioned, there is also the abolition of all charges on medicines as the first step in re-establishing a free National Health Service, repeal of the rent act which abolished controls, the setting up of a Land Commission to nationalize urban land and a whole series of drastic reforms in various spheres, from social security to trade-union rights -- proclaim more than an unreeling of the Tory film of thirteen years of placing the burden for the flowering of a profiteering "free enterprise" upon the shoulders of the working class and those social layers least able to bear it. They also constitute a break with the policy pursued in the latter half of Attlee's tenure of office, when Hugh Gaitskell came into prominence as his Chancellor of the Exchequer.

It must be remembered in this connection that Wilson left the Labour cabinet at that time, along with Aneurin Bevan, in protest against the first charges imposed by Gaitskell upon the previ-

ously free Health service. Gaitskell was then yielding to the demands of the bankers for an "orthodox" financial solution of a crisis caused by the Korean war and the ensuing armament expenditure. It is evident, therefore, that Wilson's present course is a direct continuation of the line Bevan and he took then. To give it an historic context, it is a "Bevanite" line that is being put into practice now.

There is no question that this line is very popular with the working class today; it struck deep roots when it was first brought into public view in 1951. It can be said without doubt that it was the strength of this line in the Labour party, as that of a growing opposition, which sustained the big working-class support for the party throughout the years of Tory rule, and that finally toppled that rule in the last elections, when it took on more positive form with the emphasis on greater planning. To the workers this means even more comprehensive nationalization, a more determined attack on the citadels of capitalist power and the economic anarchy and social insecurity of which they are the fountainhead.

The Achilles heel of Bevanism, it might be said, was the fact that its bias in domestic policy (which clearly reflected the feelings and aspirations of the working class) was never matched by an equal distinction from the Labour right wing in foreign policy. It never took an outright stand against the Korean war or against NATO, or any of the capitalist alliances even in its most "leftist" phase. Only when the home front was affected did the Bevanites react. In foreign policy too, the Wilson leadership carries the stamp of its Bevanite origin. But here, if anything, a far greater leaning to the right is discernible, which is also mirrored in the composition of the government as a whole, and of course in the "Speech from the Throne."

It can be stated confidently that the alliance with the capitalist West, particularly with capitalist America, no less than the self-imposed restrictions on anticapitalist action at home, will soon face the Wilson government with dilemmas, that will inevitably pose in sharpest form the alternative: either the development of an all-encompassing anticapitalist policy, home and foreign, that will push it further to the left; or increasing estrangement from its working-class base, from the bulk of the activists in the party itself.

In this honeymoon period of his administration, Wilson enjoys considerable popularity within the working class. It is enhanced by such showmanship as the firm tone he has taken toward the white settlers in Rhodesia, although he is only continuing an agreed policy of yielding to "the winds of change" in Africa which the Tories pursued with hypocrisy and diplomatic soft soap before. It is furthered by such actions as the "unparliamentary" attack in the House of Commons on the Tory elected at Smethwick by countenancing racialist propaganda. It is bolstered by the refusal to yield on

steel and the contemptuous rejection of a deal with the Liberals in return for such yielding.

But among the party activists the initial "tough" talk to the restive dock workers (since dropped) by the right winger Ray Gunter as Minister of Labor has given cause to misgivings. So has the failure of the "left winger" Anthony Greenwood, as Colonial Secretary, to review and change the setup for the coming elections in British Guiana developed by his Tory predecessor under promptings from Washington, where the determination to get rid of the pro-Castro Jagan government is well known.

Marxists will go through this new experience side by side with the British working class, promoting its participation in mass action in favor of the Wilson government where it clashes with the class enemy and against it where it yields to capitalist pressures.

DE GAULLE ROCKS THE BOAT

PARIS, Nov. 10 -- During recent weeks, a severe crisis has flared in the European Common Market. Daily newspapers in France, Holland and Great Britain -- some of them as "responsible" as the Paris Le Monde -- are talking about a plan cooked up by the French government to leave both the Common Market and NATO, the Washington-sponsored military alliance. According to these reports, the plan may be announced in spectacular fashion at de Gaulle's next press conference.

Spaak, the Common Market's Belgian "elder statesman," rushed to Paris to try to bring the general to his senses. Even Adenauer, now nearly ninety years old, has made a pilgrimage to see the French sphinx and is now in Paris seeking to save his brain child, the Paris-Bonn axis. Among both bourgeois and working-class circles, where the Common Market has come to be regarded as definitively established, there was considerable surprise over the sudden crisis.

No doubt there is a large element of bluff in de Gaulle's threats. He is not basically opposed to either the Atlantic military alliance of Western imperialism or to "European integration" (among capitalist governments). What he wants is a change in balance. He wants to reduce what he considers to be the excessive weight of American imperialism and its closest allies and win promotion for France (and himself) to the status of "privileged ally" in NATO and "leader" in the Common Market.

These objectives were crystallized in his plan to set up a "NATO directorate" composed of the U.S., Britain and France, in which the decision on using nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would be exercised in common. Since France quite evidently cannot

match U.S. imperialism in power, such a "directoriate" has no chance of being constituted unless de Gaulle can succeed in speaking in the name of all six Common Market countries. This slight possibility in turn presupposes success in another objective; i.e., to set up in Paris a "political secretariat" of the six Common Market countries, unifying their foreign and military policies. In practice, de Gaulle's scheme boils down to weaning the West German bourgeoisie away from their position as "privileged" ally of Washington in return for close collaboration with Paris.

These plans seemed to be enjoying some success so long as Adenauer remained chancellor. However, Marxist analysts pointed out at the time that the majority of the West German bourgeoisie, for self-evident economic and military reasons, felt that a course of systematic opposition to Washington would be suicidal. Adenauer's persistence along this line was a major factor in his displacement by Erhard.

With Erhard in the driver's seat, Western Germany dropped back into the well-worn rut of alignment with Washington, reducing the "Paris-Bonn axis" to a mockery. It is the only major European power to accept the Pentagon's multilateral nuclear force. It is now creating more and more obstacles to further West European economic integration, turning instead toward broader trade relations with the U.S., Canada, the Commonwealth countries, Latin America, Japan, etc.

The result was a new conflict with Paris. De Gaulle reacted by initiating his current move. He threatened to leave the Common Market unless West Germany gives up its tariff barriers to the entry of French wheat by mid December.

Under the Common Market Treaty, tariffs are to be abolished between the six countries not only for industrial but also agricultural goods. Industrially, West Germany stands to gain from this, but agriculturally it can lose somewhat since the cost of producing wheat in France is lower than in Germany. Consequently, the Erhard government procrastinated in lowering tariff barriers in this field. This is a concession to the farmers of West Germany, who have great electoral weight in the ruling Christian-Democratic Union. Erhard fears defeat in next year's general elections should he precipitate an agricultural crisis by authorizing free entry of French wheat.

In addition, free entry of French wheat would cut into imports of wheat from the U.S., Canada, Australia and Argentina. These countries are heavy buyers of West German manufactured goods. They are thus in position to retaliate if wheat sales to West Germany go down because of a shift to French sources.

It is possible that de Gaulle's threat to leave the Common Market is nothing but blackmail aimed at easing his own difficulties with French farmers. They are pressing him rather vigorously

and he no doubt would like to appease them with an attractive gain in the West German market as compensation for the steady decline in their real income.

In line with all this is an evident threat to move closer to Moscow. De Gaulle has broken the agreement between the NATO powers not to extend commercial credits to the Soviet Union for longer than five years; he has increased the volume of trade with the Soviet Union; and has even broached the Soviet government on supplying engines for the supersonic Concord airplane project in view of the British Labour government's decision to end collaboration on this.

A bluff, however, can always be called and the bluffer then has to make an "agonizing" decision. Should he "go for broke"? Given the peculiar character of the bonapartist regime in France today and the French bourgeoisie's great dependence on their "savior, who appears politically irreplaceable to them under present circumstances, it cannot be excluded that de Gaulle will go through with his threat if the Wall Street and Düsseldorf poker players decide to sit it out.

The possibility of such a desperate action could be strengthened by the conviction that French industry faces shrinking outlets in the Common Market due to stiffer German competition and to the import restrictions recently decreed in Italy (this may occur in Holland, too, before long) because of increasing payment deficits. The action would correspond with efforts to find "substitute" markets in Latin America (hence de Gaulle's recent junket there), in Africa (hence his effort to maintain cordial relations with some of the more radical African governments in countries like Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Egypt) and in the workers states (hence his recognition of the Chinese People's Republic).

However, a close look at current trade figures and the nature of French exports shows that such an act would be a truly desperate one, making sense only for those sectors of French capitalism intimately related to the state sector and marketing a large part of their products to the government (electronics, shipbuilding, aircraft, public works, armaments, coal mining, gas, electricity, etc.). To break from the Common Market would be utterly irrational for the major sectors producing durable consumer goods and industrial equipment. Their exports largely go to European countries.

What makes the present phase in the development of Common Market relations especially delicate is the fact that de Gaulle's maneuvers happen to coincide with an incipient recession in some basic sectors of industry in the Common Market (automobile, steel, coal, chemical, textiles) due to overexpansion in the previous phase and the protectionist measures undertaken by the Italian capitalists to safeguard their own "internal market" in the face of declining industrial production and real income for the past six months in Italy.

This explains why some leaders in the Common Market are seeking a dramatic step further in the direction of economic integration in order to counteract the impression that the whole delicate, elaborately knotted fabric has suddenly begun to unravel.

PEKING RESPONDS TO MOSCOW'S OVERTURES

Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow, the first visit there by a major Chinese Communist figure in three years, is Peking's response to the olive branch held out by the Kremlin after the ouster of Khrushchev. Although Chou En-lai went to Moscow formally to represent the Chinese Communist party at the November 7 celebration of the Russian Revolution, the evident real reason is to open negotiations with the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Mikoyan group now at the head of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The last time Chou En-lai was in Moscow, he attended the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union where the Sino-Soviet conflict broke into the open, Khrushchev publicly attacking the Albanians and Chou En-lai publicly stating that he disagreed with such public attacks.

One of the aims of the leaders of the Communist parties now assembled in Moscow will be to end the public dispute. The Soviet press has already stopped the worst slanders, no longer calling Mao Tse-tung a "disciple of Genghis Khan and Hitler." The Chinese press has just as suddenly stopped referring to a "revisionist clique which is restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union."

Putting an end to the vituperative public dispute would facilitate preparation of an international conference of Communist parties in which the Chinese would participate but with the concession that all decisions must be unanimous.

Easing of Sino-Soviet tension would make possible immediate resumption of normal state relations between the two countries despite the deep differences over policies and ideology now dividing the two leaderships. A public call to resume friendly relations on the state level has been made by the Polish CP leader Gomulka, who, since the death of Togliatti, might be called the "elder statesman" of the international Communist movement and certainly the government chief enjoying greatest personal prestige outside the Chinese CP leaders. He will no doubt do his utmost to get quick results in this area during Chou En-lai's stay in Moscow.

Various significant statements have also been made by Khrushchev's sudden heirs. In the October 26 Izvestia, official journal of the Soviet government, an article states that "the Communist party of the Soviet Union fights with all its energy for the consolidation

of the Communist ranks on the basis of the principles of proletarian internationalism and the historical documents which have been collectively elaborated by the fraternal parties -- the declarations of 1957 and 1960." Such a statement could be signed by the Chinese, as they have often declared that these documents should constitute the basis for "unity of the world Communist movement."

In his speech commemorating the forty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev, the new first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, reiterated the need to take "urgent concrete steps" to consolidate the unity of the world Communist movement. This has been taken to mean that the Soviet leaders intend to go ahead with the plans for a world conference of Communist parties. However, the context in which the preparatory meeting for the conference would be held, has drastically altered. The original author has been removed from the political scene.

The changed context was stressed by the East German CP leader Ulbricht. The November 4 issue of Neues Deutschland, the party paper, quotes him as saying: "We are convinced that the meeting of the editorial commission [preparatory meeting of twenty-six parties] is in the interest of preparing the great gathering of representatives of Communist and workers parties. The editorial commission could, however, evidently fulfill a fruitful job only if previously an atmosphere of mutual understanding, an atmosphere of sober approach to problems, has been created."

Ulbricht, who is undoubtedly well aware of opinion in top Kremlin circles, thus seems to confirm the interpretation that while preparations will continue on the preparatory conference, the new Soviet leaders will at all cost avoid getting entangled in a dog fight, working instead for a compromise. Khrushchev's incapacity to veer toward at least a formal compromise was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for his downfall.

It is significant in this respect that various Communist party leaders -- from both the former pro-Khrushchev camp and the pro-Chinese -- have now stated that Khrushchev's removal was a "good thing" in paving the way for re-establishment of some kind of public "unity" in the world Communist movement.

At a press conference, Paul De Groot, general secretary of the Dutch CP, said: "I believe that Khrushchev's removal from office will prove helpful to ending the differences in views [between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China]."

D.N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian CP, who in contrast to Paul De Groot used to follow the Moscow line in servile fashion until internal party pressures forced him to line up with Peking, was quoted in the October 17 issue of Harian Rakjat, the Indonesian CP paper, as saying: "N.S. Khrushchev's resignation from office as first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of the Soviet Union and chairman

of the council of ministers was a good thing for the Communist party of the Soviet Union and for the international Communist movement, and could not be interpreted in any other way."

Outside of the cheers of the Albanians, these two statements are the most outspoken to date in the world Communist movement. They indicate the thinking going on among CP leaders about the possibility that has opened of putting a stop to the Soviet and Chinese leaders engaging in a public slanging match.

Besides sending Chou En-lai to Moscow, the Chinese leaders sent an appeal to Moscow to re-establish unity in face of the common imperialist foe. This appeal will find wide echo among the Communist ranks, especially after the disgraceful way in which the rift between the workers' states permitted U.S. imperialism to get away with an open act of aggression against the People's Republic of North Vietnam last summer.

Nevertheless, through an editorial in the November 6 People's Daily, Peking has announced that it retains all the basic political positions developed during the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In the same way, Brezhnev, in his speech November 7, held to the basic points in Soviet policy which have been under attack from the Chinese.

Thus the two sides, as they move toward negotiations, state publicly that neither will change anything in principle. It remains to be seen what will be whittled down and who will give way in private. But it would at least seem possible that the two sides could agree to stop making a public spectacle of themselves and to re-establish friendly relations on the state level.

It would seem that Khrushchev's successors, who are greatly concerned about winning popularity with the Soviet people, will be little inclined to relinquish the basic "de-Stalinization" line of the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses. Brezhnev indicated this rather forcefully in his November 7 speech.

It is to be noted that the editorial in the People's Daily, which restates the Chinese case in the ideological conflict, while hailing "the memory of Stalin," said nothing about the line of the Twentieth Congress in the Soviet Union. It concentrates instead on the incorrectness of "peaceful coexistence" as the basic line for the world Communist movement. (The Chinese make a distinction between "peaceful coexistence" in defining the attitude of workers states toward bourgeois states, and "peaceful coexistence" as a strategic line for Communist parties and the toiling masses, where it signifies class collaboration. The distinction is fundamentally correct.) Also stressed in the editorial is the issue of an alleged "peaceful road to socialism."

In the same way a long official statement by the Japanese (pro-Chinese) Communist party enumerates the reasons for opposing "Khrushchevite revisionism" but says nothing about Stalin or the Twentieth congress. (In the October 17 Akahata.)

The Albanians, on the contrary, continue to demand the complete elimination "of the revisionist and capitulationist line worked out by the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the CPSU." (Speech made by Spiro Koleka, reported in the November 3 Hsinhua News Agency.)

Chou En-lai's presence in Moscow, combined with the absence of the Albanians -- the only Communist party not to be invited -- may indicate that the Chinese leaders find it advisable to move away from the "extremist" pro-Stalinist position of the Albanian bureaucrats in opening negotiations with Khrushchev's heirs.

Another significant move by the Chinese has been the publication in their press of all the statements by CP leaders in the world on Khrushchev's ouster -- those favorable to him as well as those openly hostile. Italian CP General Secretary Luigi Longo's statement as well as Alicata's editorial in the Italian CP's daily paper L'Unità were quoted in full, although they contain references both to Khrushchev's "positive contributions" and to the "defects in democracy" in the Soviet Union. This contrasts with the attitude of the Soviet press which more than three weeks after Khrushchev's "resignation," has still not published a single line on the reaction in the world Communist movement or given the Soviet workers and peasants a rational explanation of the turnover in regime.

Among the statements printed in the Chinese press, Gomulka's [see World Outlook November 6] was given top billings. Besides those already mentioned, statements by the British CP were published. These noted "the big positive part played by Comrade Khrushchev in initiating and developing the policies of the 20th Congress of the USSR" and stated that "the explanation of the changes so far given does not remove the natural concern felt by Communists abroad about this development."

The article by British CP Secretary John Gollan in the London Daily Worker of October 24 was printed. Others included the resolution of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP and the statement by the presidium of the Czechoslovak Central Committee (which, while approving the Kremlin's decision, states that "our party and our people have appreciated Comrade Khrushchev's activities in implementing the general line of the CPSU in the struggle for the application of the policy of peaceful coexistence and in exposing the wrong methods used in the period of the personality cult").

A speech by Janos Kadar, first secretary of the Hungarian CP, was published as was the statement of Hermansson, chairman of the Swedish CP. ("It is difficult for us to accept that a person is one

day the country's leading politician and the next day has disappeared. An open discussion would help form better understanding.")

Also statements and answers at a press conference by leaders of the Japanese CP, the French CP's communiqué on Khrushchev's removal, the Moroccan Communist leader Ali Yata's statement. ("We understand the anxiety which has arisen in numerous circles. But we do not share this feeling. . . We remain. . . convinced that the most tenacious efforts will be made for overcoming divergences splitting the international Communist movement. . . ")

Also an article by the general secretary of the New Zealand CP, the (East German) SED Political Bureau's statement; the statement of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian CP; the resolution of the Hungarian CP's Central Committee; the speech made in Warsaw by Tsedenbal, first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Outer Mongolia, etc., etc.

THE FRENCH CP DELEGATION REPORTS BACK

By Pierre Frank

It has been widely reported in the world press that the leadership of the French Communist party [PCF] decided to send a delegation to the Communist party of the Soviet Union in order to obtain "more complete information and the necessary explanations concerning the circumstances and methods by which the changes decided on by the CC of the CPSU were carried out"; i.e., how Khrushchev happened to be removed from his posts in the party and the government.

The delegation gave its report to the Central Committee of the PCF Friday November 6. It was unanimously accepted with thanks for the explanation offered. However, on reading the report made by Georges Marchais, who headed the delegation (or rather on reading the long extracts published in the November 9 issue of l'Humanité), it appears that things weren't quite as cordial in Moscow as was made out. While we are informed that "the discussion was ardent and always marked by a great spirit of understanding, of fraternity and friendship," the whole report is marked by an embarrassment which the total absence of warmth does not help to hide.

Also a few slaps are aimed at the Italians. The leadership of the PCF told the Soviet representatives that they preferred "to have a frank discussion. . . rather than begin with public criticism." They did not approve, they say, giving "untimely replies to the journalists" who questioned the delegation.

Let's turn now to Marchais' report to see what can be learned from it. First of all, the representatives of the CPSU told them

right off: "The decision which we just took was on our own responsibility. What is essential for our brother parties is the assurance that there will be no change in our policy." [Emphasis added.]

For all the fine talk about fraternity, the brother parties could not have been more flatly invited to keep their noses out of what goes on in the Soviet Union.

The Tass news agency and the Italian CP paper L'Unità both denied the authenticity of a text which the Soviet censorship had permitted the bourgeois journalists in Moscow to send out, containing charges levelled at Khrushchev to justify ousting him.* The Marchais report repeats a great many of these criticisms. Let us therefore take a look at the revelations, since it will be accepted as a "genuine" text among the Communist parties, representing the "genuine" views of the Soviet leadership.

The "positive role" of Khrushchev is recognized "in the elaboration and application by the CC of its political line, including the struggle against the cult of the personality of Stalin." This political line, we are told, is "correct, unchanged, untouchable."

But, it is added, Khrushchev "had a tendency to make important decisions concerning the leadership of the party by himself"; he "began to lose his sense of modesty." His "boasting" is denounced, "a tendency to limitless boasting" about his merits as a leader. He invited to the sessions of the Central Committee "some hundreds of guests," thus making the "work of elaboration" by members of this body very difficult. He is also charged with having made at the CC "an unscheduled speech on economic problems without a preliminary discussion" in the Presidium; and he confided "more and more important missions to members of his personal entourage." He is likewise charged with having intervened "in questions where he had no business" on "the occasion of certain trips in the socialist countries." In his "personal attitude" he was given to "ill-considered utterances." Finally, concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute, which in the vocabulary of these bureaucrats is called "the struggle for the unity of the Communist movement," he is charged with "some extravagances" which, however, "did not alter the correct application of the right line." All the documents in this question, whether public or not, retain their worth because "all of them were always approved by the Presidium."

We learn finally that after the discussion in the Presidium, "Comrade Khrushchev admitted the main criticisms made of him. He referred to his state of health, to his age, and declared that he

*Not so long ago, a journalist who sent out a false report of Khrushchev's death was expelled from the Soviet Union. In the current instance the bourgeois journalists have not even been reprovved.

could no longer carry out his tasks. He offered his resignation" in a letter to the full members and alternates of the Central Committee.

The Marchais delegation even learned that the elimination of Khrushchev received "the unanimous approval of the [Soviet] party, as well as the Soviet people, who did not fail to perceive the negative consequences of the faults that appeared in the recent period."

We will put down these criticisms. The future will show whether the list is to grow longer. In any case it can be noted that there is a "line" that is both "correct" and "untouchable" whether it involves the past, present or -- why not? -- the future. At the same time there is a kind of fate which causes a person raised to the highest summit, "democratically" it seems, to begin to cultivate the cult of his personality as he grows older, to indulge in "extravagances" (which in the case of Stalin cost the lives of many revolutionists).

Another peculiarity that has become manifest since the death of Stalin should also be noted. After Malenkov, after Bulganin, it became Khrushchev's turn to recognize that he had lost the capacities needed to hold a post in the leadership. One hears an echo of the "confessions" of the Moscow frame-up trials, this time, fortunately, as a farce and not a tragedy. No political differences, seemingly, are involved; in the one case it concerns "criminals," in the other incompetents.

The decisions, the Marchais delegation declared, "were adopted in accordance with democratic rules."

The Waldeck Rochets, the Duclos, Leroy and other Marchais are genuine authorities on the question of democracy. At this very Central Committee meeting, Waldeck Rochet referred on this point to . . . Thorez! It would be interesting to know whether Marchais and Co. tried to see Khrushchev. According to rumor they asked permission from the representatives of the CPSU to do so, but the request was not granted. If this was so, why don't they mention it? Since Khrushchev, we are told, remains a member of the Central Committee of his party, is it necessary to seek a higher authority for permission for members of the central committees of other Communist parties to meet him? If the rumors are not true, this means that the champions of "internal democracy" in the party cross off an opposing opinion and trust the statements of a single side. We learned long ago from Lenin: "In politics, those who take people at their word are hopeless idiots."

The leaders of the PCF claim that the measures are the responsibility of the CPSU alone and that it is not up to them to either approve or disapprove. Nonintervention is a doctrine belonging in general to the fictions of diplomacy. On the strictly organizational level, it is not up to the leaders of the PCF to designate the top leaders in the Soviet Union, but isn't it their duty to pass

judgment on what has just occurred, on the how as well as the why? They did not vote to kill the Old Bolsheviks, Tukhachevsky and the other Soviet marshals, the many revolutionary victims of Stalin, but at the time they didn't say that this was an internal affair, that it was not up to them to either approve or disapprove, they howled for their deaths like jackals.

Today they feel ill at ease. They would like to move a bit away from their fellow bureaucrats in the Soviet Union. However, they are afraid to speak like the Italians. They prefer to attack the Communist students who are not joining them in fishing for time, and who will not be fobbed off by the quibbles of pettifogging hacks. They have been caught up in the death throes of Stalinism. The Communist militants who have been hoodwinked so long are not buying this one. The appeals for increased practical work appear for what they actually are -- a diversionary effort by a powerless, bankrupt leadership.

LET NUCLEAR SUBMARINES STAY OUT OF JAPAN!

As Japan's new premier Eisaku Sato was taking the oath of office before Emperor Hirohito November 9, thousands of demonstrators in the streets, marching to the parliament building, shouted, "Yankee, go home!" The demonstrators, estimated by the authorities to number 10,000, gathered in a park before fanning into the streets. They were protesting calls by United States nuclear submarines at Japanese ports.

Leaflets were distributed by the participants demanding that the government reverse its decision to let the nuclear pig boats come to Japan so that the crews can find recreation ashore there.

On November 8 more than 20,000 persons took part in demonstrations. In southern Japan they sought to march on the U.S. naval base at Sasebo. Six persons were arrested. The day before in Yokosuka some 84 students, including six girls, were injured and 32 others were arrested. Forty-five policemen were reported injured. Among demonstrators' placards appeared such slogans as "We oppose the port calls by the nuclear submarines"; "Don't make Japan a nuclear base"; and "We want peace."

Both the Socialist and Communist parties are sponsoring the demonstrations. In Peking the People's Daily declared in an editorial that the visits of nuclear submarines in Japanese ports constitute "a serious provocation on the part of American imperialism with regard to the independence and security of this country and peace in Asia."

INDIAN CP FINDS IT A HARD ONE TO SWALLOW

By Kailas Chandra

BOMBAY -- Long accustomed to endorsing everything that came from Moscow, the Communist party of India (pro-Moscow wing) reacted initially to the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in its characteristic manner. The Central Secretariat of the CPI, which met October 17, said that "any changes in the leadership are entirely the internal affair of the Soviet people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

But the Secretariat could not suppress its dismay at the sudden removal of Khrushchev and, therefore, noted that "the anxiety which is today being expressed by peace-loving men and women everywhere at the resignation for reasons of health of Nikita Khrushchev is completely understandable."

It went on to "warmly welcome the clear-cut and emphatic declaration made by the new leadership" that the policy enunciated by the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the CPSU would be "continued and carried forward."

As the mystery around Khrushchev's downfall deepened, and critical statements about the "method" by which he was ousted began to appear in the press, the CPI leadership began to give second thoughts to its earlier "complacent declaration."

An "editorial article" published in the CPI weekly New Age (October 25) promised its readers that the National Council of the CPI, meeting at Trivandrum (from November 2), would discuss the full meaning of the change in the Soviet leadership. Party chairman S.A.Dange, who was in Moscow recently, has arrived in time "to report to the meeting."

The "editorial article" in the New Age, however, stressed that "the latest change in the leadership of the Communist Party and government of the Soviet Union once again underlines the urgent need to make a searching and deep-going analysis of this problem [personality cult under Stalin], to devise safeguards and guarantees against the recrudescence of such a phenomenon by devising forms for further democratising the functioning of the Party and the socialist state, so as to enhance their leading and guiding role."

There is still this reference to the "leading and guiding role" of the CPSU in the world Communist movement but the CPI has been compelled to abandon its habitual display of complete servility. "It must, however, be emphasised," says the New Age article, "here and now, that whatever the mistakes made by Khrushchev, whatever the reasons from leadership. . . it would be a serious error to underline ONLY these mistakes and keep silent about his achievements. Any tendency to wipe out or obliterate the immense positive contri-

butions made by Khrushchev personally in the last decade must be avoided, and it is hoped that the reports put out by bourgeois newspapers [!] of the removal of all Khrushchev's books and writings are false."

The half-hearted demand for a "deeper analysis" of the growth of the "personality cult" in the Soviet Union reflects the questioning in the CPI. This ferment so far is restricted only to the ranks of the official Dangeite wing of the CPI. The left wing, which commenced its seventh national congress at Calcutta October 31, has kept silent over the Khrushchev ouster. Evidently they are waiting for a cue from Peking, although the hard-core group has welcomed the change as vindication of the Chinese struggle against Khrushchev's "revisionism."

Mohan Kumaramangalam, one of the prominent leaders of the CPI (right wing) has gone beyond the official party stand and has called for "an authoritative assessment of the roles of all Soviet leaders and in particular the two most important leaders, Comrades Kosygin and Brezhnev, during the period of Stalin's rule."

Kumaramangalam is one of the CPI leaders who has been demanding publicly (even before Khrushchev's ouster) for a complete re-assessment of the world Communist movement in the post-Lenin period.

Writing in the New Delhi left weekly Mainstream (October 31), Kumaramangalam provides a more fundamental criticism of the bureaucratisation of the Soviet state under Stalin though couched in the language of a "loyalist." Kumaramangalam recalls that Khrushchev was one of Stalin's closest colleagues during Stalin's rule and quotes also what Khrushchev said "at the time, referring to the verdict in the trial of Trotsky's followers":

"These infamous nonentities wanted to break up the unity of the Party and the Soviet power. . . They raised their murderous hands against Comrade Stalin. Stalin -- our hope, Stalin -- our expectation, Stalin -- the beacon of progressive mankind, Stalin -- our banner, Stalin -- our will, Stalin -- our victory."

"Comrades like myself," continues Kumaramangalam, "did not forget that Khrushchev also was a party to the excessive adulation of Stalin and therefore necessarily also has to bear a share of the responsibility for the crimes committed in the latter period of Stalin's rule."

The author appears to have been greatly influenced by the "testament" of Togliatti which criticised the Soviet leadership for not speeding up the "overcoming of the regime of restricting and suppressing the democratic and personal freedom introduced by Stalin."

Referring to the "charge-sheet" prepared against Khrushchev

by his successors, Kumaramangalam asks: "If Khrushchev had been guilty of all these mistakes then what was the collective leadership including the Central Committee doing when he was doing these mistakes? What attempts were made to correct him. . . If adequate answers were given to these questions, then perhaps there would not be this disturbing phenomenon of praising highly the merits of a leader of the Party one day and then immediately criticising him for committing serious mistakes -- so characteristic of the Stalinist method of dealing with individuals."

The CPI leader has demanded that the proceedings of the Presidium and the Central Committee of the CPSU be placed before the people of the Soviet Union and the world "so that all of us can judge what exactly were the mistakes of Comrade Khrushchev. . . ." The "secret Stalinist manner" in which Khrushchev was removed, according to him, has greatly "impaired the prestige of the Soviet Union."

"It is the duty of all Communists," he says, "to raise their voice of protest against the method adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU. . . and demand that this method be abandoned, never to be resorted to again."

Like a considerable wing of former Stalinists, Kumaramangalam has had the illusion that the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union would be automatically democratised without a political revolution.

He also makes only casual reference to Trotsky and his followers. But says he: "One should not look upon this matter in an isolated way, as though it is a problem of an individual, Khrushchev, his rise and fall. It is a far deeper problem."

He raises several pertinent questions for the Soviet leaders who claim that they oppose the practice of the personality cult:

"Have you Soviet Communists taken steps to uncover and tear up the roots of this personality cult? Have you brought to life again the Leninist institutions and practices destroyed by Stalin and his colleagues? Have you established the collective leadership of Lenin's days about which you write so much but of which little evidence is seen in the Khrushchev affair? Otherwise how could the cult of Khrushchev's personality rise in these short nine years?"

"If these questions are not answered," warns Kumaramangalam, "then can we be sure that five or ten years hence, we shall not be faced with the cult of Kosygin's personality and his removal and denunciation by Pravda? For we must remember that Comrade Kosygin was a member of the Stalin leadership (prior to 1953), a member of Stalin's Politburo! Hence also the question arises of the need for an authoritative assessment of the roles of all Soviet leaders and in particular the two most important leaders, Comrades Kosygin and Brezhnev during the period of Stalin's rule."

"EACH DAY WE RISK IMMINENT DESTRUCTION"

[In an article entitled "Africa Can Stop This Nuclear Madness!" published in the October issue of Africa and the World, Bertrand Russell offers the following graphic description of the peril facing humanity.]

* * *

The Great Powers had stock-piled by 1963 the equivalent in T.N.T. of 320 thousand million tons of explosives. To exhaust this nuclear stock pile would involve the use of all the explosive power of the entire Second World War every day for 146 years.

This nuclear stock pile doubles each year. The United States has also stock-piled 130,000 Aerosol nerve gas bombs. Each one of these biochemical bombs kills all life in an area of 3,500 square miles.

The total stock pile would kill all life in an area of 455 million square miles. This is eight times the land surface of the earth and 151 times that of the United States.

The missiles which will carry these weapons are scattered over the planet and depend on warning margins as short as 30 seconds. These missile systems are connected to giant computers which take their information from radar, which is not capable of distinguishing natural phenomena from missiles.

It is quite clear, therefore, that with each day that passes, the danger of accidental nuclear war increases to a point of near certainty.

An insurance company would say that there will be a mean number of accidents on the road each year and a certain number of air crashes involving civilian transport. We do not know which particular automobile or aeroplane will crash. We do know that if a certain number are in use, then an average number of crashes will ensue.

Similarly, there are a mean number of accidents involving nuclear technology each year. These are owing to electrical failures, false radar signals, mis-calculations and personal breakdown.

During each period of international crisis, the variables multiply and the probability of disaster becomes quite high. It is no exaggeration to say that every moment of each day we risk the imminent destruction of life on our planet.

ZANZIBAR NEWS SERVICE HAILS CHINA'S NUCLEAR TEST

"The Chinese people's successful manufacture of the atom bomb testifies to the correctness of the policy of self-reliance which they have been following with energy in all fields in national reconstruction. This has won the sincere admiration of the peoples of other countries and is a source of inspiration and encouragement to them."

These statements represent the views of the Zanzibar News Service as expressed in an article October 26 entitled "A Blow to Nuclear Monopolists."

The article approves the appeal of the Chinese government for a world-wide disarmament conference: "The proposal put forth by the government of the People's Republic of China for the convocation of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons reflects the sincere desire of the Chinese people to struggle, together with all other peace-loving nations and peoples, to put an end to the war threats of the imperialists and their followers, for the defence of world peace."

The commentary declared that the balance of forces in the world had turned steadily against imperialism since the end of World War II and that the shift against imperialism has now been strengthened by China's success in testing a nuclear weapon.

ITALIAN CP DEEPENS COURSE TOWARD "AUTONOMY"

By Sirio Di Giuliomaria

ROME -- The downfall of Khrushchev has had the effect of accelerating the "autonomous" course decided on by the leadership of the Italian Communist party [PCI] after the publication of Togliatti's "testament." The assumption that the death of the late PCI leader had given impetus to the long-visible tendency has been confirmed by the latest developments in the Italian organization.

It is widely held that Togliatti himself would have blocked publication of the document he wrote. He intended it as a memorandum for internal use and it was never his habit to publish any confidential documents such as this immediately after being written. This view is based on the idea that Togliatti played the roll of a "moderator," especially in slowing down the majority of the Political Bureau -- above all, the right wing -- from putting the party on record against certain aspects of Khrushchev's policies.

Togliatti's disappearance from the scene changed this, pro-

viding an opening for the PCI leadership to attack Khrushchev while at the same time shielding themselves behind Togliatti's document.

In line with this interpretation is the fact that while Togliatti did not give prominent place in his "testament" to criticism of the political regime in the USSR, nor ever voice such opinions publicly, the criticisms levelled by the PCI at present concern the "limits" of Soviet democracy.

At the October 13-14 session of the Central Committee, the reporter, Enrico Berlinguer, a member of the Secretariat, advanced the ideas in Togliatti's "testament," but placed emphasis on the need for party "autonomy." "Unity in the differences; unity in autonomy," was the central slogan of the session.

Berlinguer then headed the delegation that was sent to Moscow to seek an explanation for Khrushchev's ouster. At the airport on his return November 3 when he was interviewed by the press, he indicated a critical attitude toward the new Soviet regime. His first statement was as follows:

"As regards the forms and means of development of the exercise of democracy and political debate in a socialist society, it was already clear from some of our previous assessments and from Togliatti's memorandum that in various ways our positions do not coincide with those of the Soviet comrades. The discussions we had in Moscow confirmed the existence of these differences."

His curt answers to questions fired at him by reporters likewise indicated his critical attitude. Here is a typical exchange:

"Was Suslov's report read to you?"

"No."

"Did you see the minutes of the Central Committee?"

"No."

"Did you ask for them?"

"No."

"Why?"

"We were not interested in getting 'restricted' information. We did not go to Moscow for that. We were only interested in stressing, among other things, the need to provide information for world public opinion. We did not want 'secret' information."

Berlinguer did not claim that his delegation had met with success, as can be judged from the following:

"Will Suslov's report be published?"

"We do not know."

Other items are also indicative of the deepening of the PCI's autonomous course. For instance, the Moscow correspondent of L'Unità, the official party newspaper, neither attempts to justify anything or to cover up anything that might be embarrassing to the Soviet leadership. His articles, in fact, indicate irritation over a Communist correspondent being kept in the dark and placed on the same level as bourgeois correspondents. Thus L'Unità, in offering explanations for the downfall of Khrushchev, openly used the same sources as the bourgeois papers -- hypothesis, deduction, bits of information, etc.

While the official PCI attitude is one of sharper criticism, the debate inside the party has gone further. In Rome, a discussion attended by some two hundred members of the Communist party, was opened to the public. The reporter (the secretary of Rome province) and particularly those who took the floor were very severe in their criticisms of Soviet "democracy."

A Trotskyist, who took the floor as a member of the Fourth International, was even applauded by the audience. The reporter responded on a political level and in a comradely tone.

At the moment, especially in certain cities, the most searching criticisms can be made of the situation in the Soviet Union.

What does the CPI leadership hope to gain politically by this critical course? In his report to the October 13-14 session of the Central Committee, Berlinguer argued that PCI autonomy meant among other things "a condition for guaranteeing the national and patriotic character of our party and of the other Communist parties."

In his airport press interview on returning from Moscow, Berlinguer declared: "The appreciation of the positive and negative experiences made in the socialist countries, along with the analysis of our national reality and of its traditions and peculiarities, has been an essential element in elaborating and struggling for our own road to socialism, which makes allowance not only for the defense but also for the full development of all the values of democracy."

Taking the "peaceful road to socialism" as the axis of their political line; i.e., the perspective of winning the vote of the majority of the population, including the middle class, the PCI is aware that if it grants blind support to all the political blunders of the Soviet leadership, it cannot forge the "alliances" that go with such a policy. Hence the critical attitude. Hence the leadership of the right-wing leaders in this.

However, it would be embarrassing to criticize the "limits"

of Soviet "democracy" while at the same time restricting internal democracy in the PCI. The immediate consequence of the new course has been to loosen up the party. The increased liberalization offers more freedom for left-wing cadres.

Independently of their own intentions, the PCI bureaucrats have set in motion something that will be difficult to control if it gains momentum. The coming municipal elections will, of course, ease the internal debate, since the cadres are busy campaigning. After that some stirring things can happen in the PCI as the debate deepens.

DANES PROTEST MADRID TRIAL OF SPANISH POET

COPENHAGEN, Nov. 4 -- The authorities announced here yesterday that the organizers of an anti-Franco demonstration in which an effigy of the Spanish fascist dictator was burned will be placed on trial. The charge is "insulting" Franco.

The demonstration was staged in front of the Spanish Embassy to protest the trial of Carlos Alvarez in Madrid. The Spanish poet was charged with issuing "illegal propaganda" because he wrote a letter of protest May 10, 1963, against the trial of Communist leader Julian Grimau who was later sentenced to death and executed. The prosecution demanded a fine of 50,000 pesetas [about \$800] and three years in prison for the poet when he summed up October 13.

[It was reported from Madrid November 9 that in addition to a sentence of "three years and two months in prison" for having published a letter abroad calling the trial of Julian Grimau a "masquerade," a military court will now try him for "insulting the army."]

The Copenhagen protest demonstration was sponsored by the Young Communist League and the Young Socialist Forum. Some 500 turned out.

In Madrid the Spanish Foreign Minister lodged a protest with Danish Ambassador Sigurd Christensen and in Copenhagen the Spanish chargé d'affaires protested to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Danish Ministry followed up by demanding that the Ministry of the Interior investigate the matter, particularly the inability of the Danish police to prevent the crowd from burning an effigy of Franco.

The latest demonstration follows last summer's campaign here for a boycott on tourist travel to Spain. This was sponsored by the Komiteen Spanien Frit [Committee for a Free Spain].

Around 10,000 posters were put up in all parts of Copenhagen

and some provincial towns. The slogan was "Boycott Trips to Franco's Spain."

DEMOCRATS TOUR KING, POWELL AGAINST FREEDOM NOW PARTY

DETROIT, Michigan -- In fear that votes won by candidates of the Freedom Now and Socialist Workers parties might prove decisive in a close election, the Democratic machine brought in some big wheels in the final stage of the election campaign.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., recent winner of the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize, was toured around Michigan in a widely publicized "voter registration drive." The real aim was to give the Democrats a psychological boost.

King bitterly assailed the Freedom Now party which is articulating the real feelings of the ghetto inhabitants of Michigan and of all the black ghettos in America.

The well-known New York Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was also imported to buoy up Democratic candidacies in districts where the Freedom Now and Socialist Workers campaigns were being felt.

In Detroit, the Freedom Now candidates centered their fire on Wayne County Prosecutor Olsen, who is notorious for whitewashing police brutality against Negroes. "Olsen Must Go!" posters, stickers and literature were widely circulated throughout the Negro community.

Attorney Milton R. Henry, candidate of the Freedom Now party for U.S. Congress from the First District challenged his Democratic opponent (also a Negro) to a debate. Said the FNP candidate:

"It is easy for you to denounce the Republican Golderwaterites. But where do you stand on the Democratic Goldwaterites? You are running on the same ticket as Samuel B. Olsen, Democratic candidate for prosecutor. Olsen is a stench in the nostrils of the Negro community. He is a defender and protector of police brutality. He has the blood of Cynthia Scott on his hands. [Cynthia Scott, a Negro woman, was killed by a white police officer during the summer of 1963. Olsen cleared the officer and he is still employed by the police department.] . . . How do you stand on Olsen? Do you endorse Olsen and seek his election? Do you repudiate Olsen and call for his defeat? . . . Speak up, Mr. Conyers! Or will you be guilty of both opportunism and hypocrisy? Which do you consider most important -- the interests of the Democratic party, or the interests of the Negro community?"

The Freedom Now party has campaigned hard on a program of

independent political action, of alignment with "all liberation movements throughout the world," and for a "fundamental change" in society, not a mere "reform."

The vote remains to be seen. All new parties face difficulties in rolling up a big electoral response until they become stabilized and widely known. This year the Democratic stance of presenting themselves as the "lesser evil" was much facilitated by the candidacy of Goldwater. But whatever the vote, the cause of independent political action and the struggle for freedom and equality were given a boost by the Michigan campaign of the Freedom Now party.

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MURDERS THREE MORE

Despite anguished cries of protest from all over the world, the hangman at Pretoria slipped nooses over the heads of three men and sprang the trap on them. Thus on November 6 died Vuysile Mini, Wilson Khayinga and Zinakel Okabu.

They had been charged with murdering an African state witness allegedly to block him from giving away the names of members of a secret political organization alleged to have sought the overthrow of the fascist-like Verwoerd government of South Africa.

Pleas for mercy had poured into South Africa from all over the world. United Nations Secretary-General U Thant sent an appeal. The African beast government paid no attention. Shortly after the executions, the UN General Assembly Committee on Apartheid met and formally condemned the South African murders.

Meanwhile other "sabotage" trials ground on. On November 2 in Cape Town the Supreme Court began the trial of Anthony Andrew Trew, 23, Alan Keith Brooks, 24, and Stephanie Kemp, 23, all of whom pleaded guilty to furthering the aims of communism by membership in the National Liberal Movement, later known as the African Resistance Movement. The trial of these students was held separately from two others who pleaded not guilty. These were Edward Joseph Daniels, 30, and David Guy de Keller, 24.

In still another trial Sedick Isaacs, 24, a school teacher, and two of his pupils, Achmed Cassiem, 18, and James Marsh, 18, and a stores clerk, Abdurrahman Abrahams, 18, were charged with "sabotage." They denied allegations they had sought to blow up a post office, an electricity sub-station and planned to blow up the Coloured university.

In the trial of Daniels and de Keller, a state witness broke down November 4 and, between sobs, shouted: "Oh, God, how I loathe apartheid and all that it means -- this tragedy I place at the door of that system."

CHILEAN GOVERNMENT PETITIONED TO RELEASE LUIS VITALE

SANTIAGO DE CHILE -- Chile's new government has been petitioned to end the exile of Luis Vitale, the well-known Trotskyist and former leader of the CUT [Central Unica de Trabajadores]. The government has also been asked to restore his citizenship.

Vitale was found guilty of organizing demonstrations in support of Cuba at the time of the crisis in the Caribbean in 1962. Leaflets that were pasted up were held by the Alessandri government to be of an inflammatory character because they advocated Marxist-Leninist positions. Vitale was sentenced to 541 days in exile at the small town of Curepto in the south of Chile. The government also revoked the citizenship of the Argentine-born socialist.

Clotario Blest, the former head of the Chilean labor movement, who has been called the "John L. Lewis" of Chile, is in the forefront of the petition movement. He was arrested at the same time as Vitale, but was released by the government.

Blest sent a letter to Bernardo Leighton, the new Minister of the Interior. The November 5 Clarín quoted Blest as saying in his letter that Vitale is a "valiant fighter in the cause of the poor and humble of this earth, with whom I have worked on innumerable occasions in the trade unions."

The November 4 Clarín published an open letter to Leighton from Oscar Waiss, the well-known Socialist leader. A personal friend of Leighton for more than thirty years, Waiss appealed for "immediate amnesty" for Luis Vitale. He cited Vitale as an "adversary of the Christian Democracy" [which won the elections in Chile and is now in power].

"Vitale," continued Waiss, "is a workers' leader, born in Argentina, with a Chilean wife and children. . . and he is the author of a book called Esencia y Apariencia de la Democracia Cristiana in which he criticizes your party firmly and implacably."

Vitale's book, mentioned by Oscar Waiss, was published last December. The first edition sold out in three months. [See World Outlook April 10.]

U.S. NOT SO GENEROUS

The New York Herald Tribune reports that U.S. foreign "aid" in both gifts and loans in 1963 amounted to only 0.66 of 1% of the country's gross national product. In "generosity" it thus ties in third place with Belgium and is outdone by France and Portugal. Recipients will be surprised to learn that Uncle Sam rated even this high.

AN UNFOUNDED CRITICISM OF A CUBAN LEADER

By Ernest Germain

The July-August number of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme* contains an article in praise of René Dumont's recent book Cuba, Socialisme et Développement, a work that has merit in some respects but is bad in others. The real purpose of the article, however, appears to be to single out Che Guevara for some remarks which, in our opinion, are unjustified. Since Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme takes the liberty of representing itself as an official publication of the Fourth International, we consider it necessary to publicly dissociate ourselves from its views; and to indicate where we think the criticism of Che Guevara is unfair and mistaken.

We are, of course, not against criticizing the regime of any workers state, whether led by Lenin and Trotsky in the first period of the Russian Revolution, or by a Khrushchev, Brezhnev-Kosygin, Tito or Fidel Castro. But we believe that criticism should be responsible, based on verified information and with alternatives clearly posed.

Our first difference with the article printed by Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme is that it places too much confidence in the assertions of René Dumont. This left Social-Democratic agronomist and economist has written many useful things, popularizing important economic concepts, but he has displayed two weaknesses which should cause revolutionary Marxists to approach what he says with some caution. He often leaps to unwarranted conclusions; and he is not a Marxist. He defends many positions which can only be described as reformist, which is not unexpected since he is not a revolutionist.

A couple of examples of mistakes made by Dumont will indicate why some of his reportage must be approached with eyes open. On visiting China during the "great leap forward," he published a dithyrambic account of the successes in grain production, picturing it as "the greatest revolution in the history of mankind." Since Dumont's specialty is agriculture, his statements made a considerable impression. A few months later, the Chinese leaders themselves admitted that the figures on grain production had been grossly in-

*This is the public faction organ of a small minority in the Fourth International headed by Michel Pablo. The editors list the magazine as the "Bimonthly review of the African Commission of the Fourth International." However, it is not the organ of the regularly elected African Commission and does not represent the views of the Fourth International. The editors have now begun an English edition called Under the Banner of Socialism in which the article in question also appears. The English translation happens to be virtually unreadable, and so where necessary we have made our own translation from the French.

flated and that grain production had actually increased only in a modest way. (Later they explained a drop in production as due to a series of natural catastrophes.)

In giving his impressions of the Cuban scene, after a trip there, Dumont criticized the revolutionary leadership for having converted the sugar-cane co-operatives, set up on former U.S.-owned plantations, into people's farms. He forgot something about Cuba's class structure underlined by Fidel Castro. The plantations were worked by agricultural laborers, not peasants. From the Marxist point of view, the establishment of co-operatives represents a step forward for peasants; but in the case of big plantations worked by wage labor this is not true. The correct step is nationalization and the establishment of collective farms.

Again, Dumont is critical of the "Stalinist" concept of a "NEP crisis" in the late twenties in the Soviet Union. The view that the NEP, under Stalin, was headed toward crisis was not "Stalinist." The Left Opposition, founded by Leon Trotsky, held this view, pointing to the deepening contradictions, including the growing concentration of the food surplus in the hands of the rich peasants, which could signify starvation for the cities, etc., etc.

Unfortunately, Dumont as a source of information and opinion on the economic policies of the Cuban Revolution is not superior to Dumont as a source of information and opinion on the Russian Revolution in the early twenties. By their uncritical acceptance of Dumont's views, the editors of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme let themselves in for some serious errors.

First of all, they are wrong in lodging responsibility for certain errors in Cuban agriculture with Che Guevara. Guevara's responsibility is industry.

As for the concepts operative in the two fields, it is precisely the cadres responsible for agriculture who are pressing most strongly for "autonomy of enterprises," for "self-financing" and "self-investment." It is thus strange, to say the least, to point to Guevara's alleged "statist" concepts as the explanation for the difficulties in agriculture. The unfairness of such a criticism stands out all the more in view of the fact that those responsible for agriculture happen to be the strongest opponents of Guevara's views. They have had every opportunity to display how much substance there is to their antibureaucratic inclinations by the way they manage agriculture.

The editors of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme take the side of Guevara's opponents. This is done under the slogan of advancing "self-management." But Guevara's opponents favor "autonomy of enterprises" without workers self-management. In the process, the editors get many things mixed up of vital concern to backward countries trying to begin construction of a socialist economy.

In Cuba, where a very ardent discussion has been going on about these problems, the line of demarcation is not between a tendency favoring workers self-management and a different one favoring "centralized management." The true situation is as follows: one group favors bureaucratic decentralization; i.e., more autonomy for managers of factories and farms and without workers control or workers self-management. The same group favors increased "material stimulants" for the bureaucrats. The other group, of which Guevara is an outstanding spokesman, is opposed to granting individual managers greater freedom from central planning and financing.

Why Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme should consider the former tendency as more representative of "socialist democracy" is a mystery. Cuba's main leaders have demonstrated that they are conscious of the danger of bureaucratization, they have been fighting it, and one of the means they have applied is stronger state controls against bureaucratism. In such a situation, to call for greater "independence" for individual plant managers plays into the hands of the bureaucratic tendency.

Relying wholly on Dumont, the editors of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme repeat the claim that Che Guevara is opposed to "material incentives" for workers. To our knowledge this does not conform to the facts. It is true that Guevara strongly opposes the system of granting material incentives to the bureaucrats, the system now in force in the Soviet Union (premiums for overfulfilling the plan). But in this Guevara shares the revolutionary Marxist position. Such incentives have a logic of their own, the managers becoming interested in systematically underestimating the productive capacity of "their" plant in order to keep the assigned goals as low as possible. The system favors the bureaucratic privileges against which Trotsky and his followers to this day have waged an intransigent struggle.

In addition to this, Guevara is opposed to any type of "material incentive" that might tend to divide the working class and destroy its organic unity. For instance, he is against the piece-work system and against inter-factory competition. This, too, happens to be the traditional position of revolutionary Marxists.

Guevara does favor forms of "material incentives" that heighten the socialist consciousness of workers. That, as Lenin long ago stressed, remains the correct key to this problem as well as to all the others in the transition period following the replacement of capitalism.

Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme waxes ironic over Guevara's position favoring centralized financial control. (This is Guevara's actual view, not "centralized management" as Dumont puts it, or rather as Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme interprets Dumont.) "Even in highly developed countries such as the USA or the USSR," the article declares, "it is impossible even with electronic calculating machines to guide each enterprise from above like that."

Leaving aside the imputation as to the capacities of electronic calculating machines, the fact is that "even in highly developed countries" the banks exercise quite strict control over the factories, particularly if they have loaned them money. In the Soviet Union this is done as a matter of principle. The only difference on this is that Guevara wants control to remain in the hands of the Ministry of Industry; his opponents want it in the hands of the Central Bank the way it is in the Soviet Union. Does the issue really involve socialist democracy and workers self-management?

As for the argument that "even in highly developed countries" centralized financial control is difficult "even with electronic calculating machines" and therefore it would be much more difficult in a small country, this is obviously absurd. It is easier to centralize the finances of a thousand factories than it is of two hundred thousand, with or without electronic calculating machines.

We come to a position which we think does a disservice to the slogan of workers self-management. This is to present it as necessarily linked with such an extreme form of economic decentralization and experimenting with market economy as is to be found in Yugoslavia. It is precisely this kind of association that raises doubts about workers self-management among many honest revolutionists, not because they are opposed in principle to workers self-management, but because they correctly understand the dangerous potential in loosening the controls over a market economy in backward countries.

The editors of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme contend that under workers self-management, "Prices will flow from real production costs." This is a dangerous concept which, if actually applied, could rapidly doom any attempt at establishing planned economy in a backward country. As Trotsky pointed out more than once in the case of the Soviet Union, to let prices flow from real production costs would have blocked industrialization. This applies to Cuba today as well as any other underdeveloped country. A country becomes "backward" in the epoch of imperialism; i.e., when market economy is pushed to its extreme logic, because in competing on the world market it can produce and export only raw materials. One of the major possibilities opened up by a socialist revolution in a backward country is just this: economic growth can be assured by opposing the logic of market economy.

In the Soviet Union, the Left Opposition stated quite flatly that the logic of planning must oppose the logic of the market. (This did not at all imply that the plan should ignore the market or that the planners should not watch to what extent managed prices deviated from real production costs.) The editors of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme seem to have forgotten all this.

Workers management of industry is completely compatible with centralized planning and allocation of resources ("centralized investment"). It means that the actual use of plant equipment and the

working up of raw materials is left up to the workers themselves. Theirs is the initiative to see what can be done with a given combination to increase production, to find the optimum and with that to gain the reward of increased income. It means that they are free to determine for themselves such economic factors as the rate and type of renewal of equipment, the pace of work, whether or not to hire supplementary labor, to determine their work week (yearly average) within the limits of the law setting the maximum length of the work week, to determine within the limits of the plan the variety of consumer goods to be produced, and so on.

This concept advances workers self-management as a genuine school of revolutionary Marxism and a real brake on bureaucratism. At the same time, it counters the grave distortions introduced under the Yugoslav model of excessive decentralization and market economy. Not the least of its superiorities over the Yugoslav model is that it increases both democracy and equality.

The sources of bureaucratism are scarcity and inequality. In the last analysis, bureaucratism seeks to secure control of the social surplus product by a privileged minority. To think that this control hinges on the forms of centralized management is quite wrong. "Independent" plant managers (with the help of the market) can often control the social surplus product even more efficiently than a central planning board. This has been demonstrated in Yugoslavia again and again, even the Yugoslav leaders admitting that the bureaucracy yields tremendous power at the plant level notwithstanding fourteen years of workers self-management. Recent experience in Algeria has shown how bureaucrats at the level of the socialized farms can systematically drain the March 1963 decrees on self-management of nearly all content.

We are strongly in favor of workers self-management of socialized factories and farms in Cuba as well as in the other workers states. But we do not consider it to be a panacea. It is certainly not sufficient to counteract the danger of bureaucratism. For this, an approach along three lines is required on the domestic front: (1) a planned economy, democratically centralized (key decisions in allocating scarce resources to be taken by a democratically elected congress of producers' committees, or soviets) to assure rapid industrialization (otherwise a mass of underemployed or unemployed peasants constantly threaten the revolution and offer a social base for the bureaucracy to play the workers and peasants against each other); (2) workers self-management in socialized factories and farms along the lines indicated above; and (3) proletarian democracy; i.e., freedom for the formation of tendencies within the revolutionary Marxist party and freedom for multiple working-class parties loyal to the socialist constitution -- without which no real working-class democracy is possible even at the factory level.

States built upon modern industry, whether workers or bourgeois, cannot escape a certain indispensable amount of centraliza-

tion. This will disappear only after social classes, commodity production and the money economy have given way to the communist society of the future where electronic calculating machines can come into their own. The first step is to replace the centralism of the market by the centralism of the plan. This means in the final analysis to replace blind centralizing forces by conscious ones.

It is a gross illusion to imagine that "workers self-management" can obviate this step. In fact for all its propoganda about the "withering away of the state" and the very real progress along the road of workers self-management, the Yugoslav regime today is much more centralized than Soviet Russia in the twenties, be it only because its economy is more advanced and its leading party much more bureaucratic. Who can honestly deny that this bureaucratized, centralistic party manipulates to a high degree the incipient democratic process at the plant level? The Yugoslav workers can effectively defend themselves against this only by challenging the government party at the state level; i.e., through political working-class democracy.

To isolate workers self-management in the factories from the essential conditions required for it to flower, and to offer it as a panacea (in combination with "socialist" market economy), is a poor way to recommend it to revolutionists in a country like Cuba as a measure to be considered in extending and deepening workers democracy.

Book Review

A DARK CHAPTER IN SOVIET HISTORY

By L. Couturier

[The following review has been translated from the October issue of the Paris Trotskyist publication, l'Internationale. The book is available only in French.]

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Les Procès de Moscou [The Moscow Trials], presented by Pierre Broué. Julliard, collection Archives. Paris. 300 pp. 5.00 French francs.

"The trials revealed that the Trotskyist and Bukharinist monsters, at the behest of their bosses in the capitalist intelligence services, had undertaken the task of destroying the Soviet Party and State. . . No doubt these pygmies of the White Guards, whose strength could be compared only to that of a miserable gnat, considered themselves -- what a laugh! -- in charge of the country. . . The Soviet court condemned the Bukharinist and Trotskyist monsters to be shot."

This amiable prose runs for a number of pages in the first (1938) edition of the History of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the U.S.S.R.

Then a second, post-Stalinist, version was published in which the things attributed to the "pitiful fascist lackeys" are reduced to a few lines, enigmatically alluding to "the massive repression of the ideological enemies of the Party when they were crushed politically."

However, the sensitive reader is immediately reassured by the affirmation that "victims of the unjustified repressions were fully rehabilitated in 1954 and 1955."

Pierre Broué's book is intended for the reader who has not been brain-washed. Since the works of Trotsky, Sedov and Victor Serge on the Moscow trials are now hard to find, Pierre Broué, in 300 packed but readable pages, gives the general public an opportunity to follow the trials as they unfolded and to understand the machinations involved. He does it, moreover, in a very lively way, offering copious extracts from the verbatim court records. Thus we see some of the defendants like Krestinsky or Bukharin at times fiercely denying some apparently minor point -- only in the very next session to apologize. Briefly their rebel spirit, eroded, smothered, cut to pieces by years of compromises, abrupt switches and political opportunism, would unexpectedly reappear, bringing them to deny this or that accusation. These flashes never lasted because they were the dying gasps of broken men. The unbroken got no trial to "legalize" their assassination.

It is impossible to read the defendants' last declarations without feeling deeply moved -- particularly those of Radek and, above all, Bukharin trying to philosophize about the transformation of a Communist into a traitor, and making declarations with double meanings clear enough so that posterity might be able to judge the worth of their confessions. When they attack Trotsky -- some were close to him -- one can feel a kind of despair and admiration for this man who never buckled: "You have to be a Trotsky not to give up your arms," cries Bukharin.

Pierre Broué recalls, very opportunely, that in 1935 Stalin, getting ready to strike, promoted young men who were just becoming known: Malenkov is in Stalin's personal secretariat; Khrushchev and Zhdanov, newly elevated to the Central Committee, are charged with explaining to the public that one of Stalin's oldest friends, the Georgian Yenukidze, had been expelled because he had "degenerated politically."

Khrushchev had not yet dreamed about building his famous Leninist nucleus in the party.

This book should be read by militants in the French Communist

party. Let them transpose, change the names, read "Paris" for "Moscow," and imagine the PCF in power before Stalin's death. On the scene would appear Marty, confessing to have been a stool pigeon since 1939; Prenant, swearing that he had faked his experiments; and Tillon, minutely describing preparations for the assassination of Maurice Thorez. The firing squad would be heard and the militant would see himself drawing up a motion congratulating the Central Committee for having saved the country from these mad dogs.

The only ones who can shrug at this are those who never voted for a "motion of confidence" when a "black sheep" was being expelled. Are there many such in the French Communist party?

NEXT WEEK

A report from Zambia on the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa and the struggle for freedom against the Verwoerd regime.