

# WORLD OUTLOOK

## PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

*Un service de presse ouvrier*

Vol. 3, No. 24

July 9, 1965

21, rue d'Aboukir - PARIS-2

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The existence of a guerrilla front in Cuzco headed by Luis de

la Puente, a leader of the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria], has been publicized in the Lima newspapers for some time. [See World Outlook April 16.] Since then two other fronts have been reported, one in Junín headed by Guillermo Lobatón, another leader of the MIR, and one in Huancavelica led by Ismael Paredes, whose political affiliation is not certain. The three fronts have been named "Pachacutec," "Túpac Amaru" and "Pumacahua."

When the formation of the front headed by Lobatón was announced, the MIR said it stood on a program of "a real agrarian reform, the expulsion of imperialism, an urban reform, the nationalization of commerce, the banks and all the credit institutions, the liquidation of all the monopolies."

The distribution of this "declaration of war" was followed by attacks on two mines at Santa Rosa and Samaniego, where forty cases of dynamite were seized. Two big holdings at Runatullo and Punto were attacked and two bridges on the Concepción-Satipo road were blown up. The civil guards were then attacked at Santo Domingo de Acobamba and at Andamarca, numerous arms being taken. A property at Cotovilla was burned. The guerrilla fighters reported that they had met with sympathy among the miners and the peasants and that many young Indians were joining them.

Although the government denied the existence of any guerrillas in Peru, it sent the elite "Rangers," who have received counter-guerrilla training in the United States, into action. On June 27 the government forces ran into an ambush. Twelve of them were killed. The government claimed that on the other side, out of a force of twenty-eight men, sixteen were wounded and the leader was killed.

On July 4, the government decided to suspend the constitution for thirty days, enabling it to arbitrarily arrest and jail people and impose a censorship. In taking this grave action, the government admitted that seven police had been killed and another twelve wounded in another battle. In addition two bombs had been exploded in Lima, one in a big hotel, breaking windows in the area, the other at the National Club where a reception had been scheduled for the debutantes of high Peruvian society. The police broke up a demonstration organized by Christian Democratic youth protesting against the infamous display of luxury at the reception in face of the poverty of Peru's masses.

The leaders of the MIR issued a communiqué stating that two more guerrilla centers were being organized, one in Cajamarca and one in Puno close to the Bolivian border.

The government announced that it was mobilizing the armed forces "with the aim of ending once and for all the extremist subversion." The air force was ordered to bomb Pucata, a base controlled by the guerrilla fighters. And the troops sent out by Belaunde Terry

were given orders "not to give any quarter and not to take any prisoners."

According to a Reuters dispatch from Lima July 6, troops and policemen, backed by planes, were building up for a final push in the mountains, while in Lima and throughout the country the police "were rounding up suspected Communists and extremists."

No figures were issued by the police on the number of arrests, "but one report put the number at 700."

Through the tight censorship it was impossible to ascertain what the reaction was among the workers, among the one third of Lima's population living in the infamous slum districts, and among the bitterly poor peasantry, the majority of the population, who began occupying the land under the leadership of Hugo Blanco several years ago.

#### JOHNSON'S DIRTY WAR IN VIETNAM

Johnson took his escalation of the war in Vietnam up another notch July 7 with the announcement that another 8,000 troops are to be landed, bringing the total to around 80,000.

Of the horror stories pouring out of Vietnam, a particularly chilling admission came from Jack Langguth July 6 in a Saigon dispatch to the New York Times:

"One American helicopter crewman returned to his base in the central highlands last week without a fierce young prisoner entrusted to him.

"He told friends that he had become infuriated by the youth and had pushed him out of the helicopter at about 1,000 feet.

"When a superior warned him that he would be courtmartialed, the crewman changed his story. He said that the prisoner had attacked him and had fallen accidentally."

Of more concern to American commanders than such "isolated" incidents, continues Langguth, has been the decision to bomb heavily in South Vietnam:

"'I don't like to hit a village,' one American pilot who had flown more than 100 missions said recently. 'You know you're hitting women and children too. But you've got to decide that your cause is noble and that the work has to be done.'"

"NOT WITHOUT CYNICISM"

"The Americans, after having pounded everything that seemed to them worth destroying in the southern part of the country, are now turning to the delta of the Red river. The question arises whether Hanoi will be spared much longer, and particularly whether the levees protecting the population and the crops will not constitute the next target of the bombers of the Seventh Fleet. The Americans dropped leaflets Friday informing the north Vietnamese population, not without cynicism, that the raids carried out by 2,788 planes over their territory between February 7 and April 3 had dropped 1,388 tons of bombs as well as hundreds of tons of rockets. The population was warned that the 'violent attacks' will be continued ...." -- From a dispatch in the July 4 Le Monde reporting the escalation of American attacks to the first "economic" targets.

CP LEADERS WORRIED OVER KREMLIN'S PASSIVITY IN VIETNAM

[The following paragraphs have been extracted from an article by Philippe Ben in the July 2 issue of the Paris daily Le Monde. Philippe Ben is one of the more conscientious reporters specializing in Soviet and East European affairs. The first part of his article deals with various political currents that have appeared in ruling circles in Poland. The section translated below carries a subheading, "Anxiety over Soviet passivity in Vietnam."]

\* \* \*

"The confusion existing in Poland is reinforced by the very grave fears aroused among the Polish leaders as well as among the Czechoslovaks, East Germans and Hungarians by the war in Vietnam and by the evident incapacity of the Soviet Union to react against the American raids against North Vietnam. According to accurate information, the leaders in Warsaw, Prague, and perhaps likewise in certain other Communist countries of Eastern Europe took steps in Moscow quite recently to request that the Soviet leaders find some possibility of countering the American attacks against North Vietnam by taking the initiative somewhere on the globe. They motivated their request by the catastrophic decline, throughout Eastern Europe, in Soviet prestige due to Moscow's passivity in face of the American action in Vietnam. Thus, for example, in Warsaw the party functionaries recently proclaimed that "the Russians make a lot of noise about their guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse line, but in Vietnam the Americans are bombing and the Russians are doing nothing." The Communist leaders have likewise told Moscow that the erosion of Soviet prestige has been accompanied in their countries by the development of a certain admiration for China. These feelings have become so evident that

the Polish politbureau issued a secret decree banning all party organizations from discussing the Sino-Soviet conflict. In some countries of Eastern Europe, neither China nor Albania are criticized any longer. Quite the contrary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are now negotiating with Tirana for the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations, and the reopening of embassies by these countries in the Albanian capital is expected soon.

"However, this request for a Soviet initiative against the United States was reportedly qualified by one condition -- a new crisis in West Berlin would only halt the disintegration of NATO and reestablish solidarity between Washington and Paris as well as between Paris and Bonn. Moreover it would cut us off from de Gaulle, the man on whom we now base our hopes.

"It nevertheless seems that the Soviet leaders were not convinced by these arguments and that they stressed in their reply that in the present situation the United States is especially vulnerable in Vietnam and nowhere else. This reply was considered to be extremely disappointing because the Communist leaders of Eastern Europe are very well aware that Soviet aid to Hanoi has been relatively modest and that it hinges entirely on the good will of Peking, since the Soviet government does not dare, despite reports to the contrary, to send arms and specialists by sea because of fear of an American blockade like the one imposed during the crisis in the Caribbean."

#### CANADIAN POLITICAL LEADER SCORES JOHNSON

Widespread opposition in Canada to Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam and his sending American troops to occupy the Dominican Republic has been reflected in a stiffening of attitude among heads of the New Democratic party, Canada's version of a Labor party. The June issue of the Workers Vanguard quotes extensively from a speech made in the House of Commons by NDP leader T.C. Douglas raking the Liberal government for "supine subservience" to the Johnson administration. Douglas warned that "what is now a local war could escalate into a world holocaust which would devastate the greater part of the earth."

Douglas also disavowed Harold Wilson, head of the British Labour party, who has been crawling on his belly in support of Johnson's war policies.

The position taken by Douglas comes much closer to liberalism than to anything like revolutionary socialism. For example, he places faith in the completely discredited United Nations, he appeals for "negotiations" in Vietnam, and he makes the completely impermissible concession of granting that an imperialist power like the

United States has the "right" to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries "to defend its nationals and property." And he is, of course, "against Communism." That such a procapitalist politician should find it necessary to attack the foreign policies of both the American and Canadian governments testifies to the anxiety of the Canadian people over the course of events since Johnson won election last November.

Among the points scored by Douglas, the following are of interest:

"This revolution of the coloured races of the world demanding the right of self-determination is going to go on. It has nothing to do with Communism. Communists, of course, fish in troubled water as they always do, and they ally themselves with any protest movement. But if we took all the Communist countries and all the Communists out of the world this afternoon, the problem of the struggle for the right to self-determination by the coloured peoples of the earth in Asia, Africa and South America would continue and we would still have to face that problem."

\* \* \*

"And when in 1953 the United States could see that the French were no longer going to be able to hold on in Viet Nam, they brought in Diem, who was set up in South Viet Nam as the head of a government, a government that was dictatorial and repressive, a government which began by abolishing land reform, land reform in a country where 80 per cent of the land is owned by absentee landlords, abolished local elections, and jailed without trial not only Communists but thousands of non-Communists who had belonged to democratic political parties up until that time. It is hardly to be wondered then that the National Liberation Front was able to gather to itself a great bulk of the support of the people of South Viet Nam in revolt against the dictatorial government of Diem.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs continues to tell the House the same myth that the China lobby and the American propagandists have been peddling all over the North American continent, that the United States intervention in South Viet Nam is at the request of a sovereign power under attack from the outside.

"In the first place one questions South Viet Nam as being a sovereign power. From the very beginning it has been a puppet government supported militarily and financially by the United States, and to say that the United States was invited in by South Viet Nam is like saying that Edgar Bergen was invited to dinner by Charlie McCarthy. The fact of course is that the reason the United States had to intervene is because the puppet government it had set up did not have the support of its own people, and that today two thirds of Viet Nam is occupied by the National Liberation Front who collect

the taxes, who run the villages, and who operate the greater part of the country. The government has never been able to hold on to anything but the cities, and this with a succession of governments because it does not enjoy the support of the people."

\* \* \*

"...the situation in the Dominican Republic raises some very serious problems for Canada, located as we are in the Western Hemisphere and affected by anything that is done by the United States. No one can deny the right of the United States to go into a country to defend its nationals and property. But within 24 hours of going into the Dominican Republic the President of the United States said that they were there primarily to prevent another Cuba.

"This raises the whole question whether or not the Johnson doctrine has replaced the Monroe doctrine, namely that the United States reserves the right at any time to intervene unilaterally wherever a country has a government the ideology of which is unacceptable to the United States. I was glad to hear the statement made by the Minister this morning to the effect that we do not accept this doctrine. I think we should also make it clear that any peace keeping force set up by the Organization of American States should have the approval of the United Nations. Otherwise the world is embarking upon a very dangerous precedent which will allow any group of nations, under the guise of setting up a peace force, carrying on military and political intervention in the affairs of other countries."

\* \* \*

"But I doubt very much whether the intervention in South Viet Nam, or in the Dominican Republic was because the United States was concerned about individual freedom. If they were, I do not know how they put up with Diem for so long in South Viet Nam, or Batista in Cuba, or Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.

"I think that the United States has been much more concerned with the fear that these countries will have Governments that will want to exercise their right to manage their own economic affairs....

"I think that sums up the whole question very clearly. We in this party are prepared to support collective security to resist aggression, but we do not believe that any country has the right to use military power to force dictatorial and discredited regimes upon people who are seeking the right to self-determination. We do not want some new form of colonialism masquerading as an anti-Communist crusade."



BOUMEDIENNE UNVEILS HIS "COUNCIL"

By Pierre Frank

JULY 6 -- From June 19, the day Boumedienne pulled his coup d'état, it was necessary to wait until July 5 -- more than two weeks -- to learn over Radio-Algiers the composition of the "National Council of the Revolution" that carried out the operation, and the program which Boumedienne intends to follow as head of the government.

Two weeks for their names! The list reveals a combination of military chiefs under Boumedienne's command and some former military ministers belonging to Boumedienne's clan. This leads to the conclusion that the coup d'état was organized solely by the army and that the later attempt to give a certain political coloration to the "National Council of the Revolution" came to nothing after two weeks of discussions in the corridors.

It is to be noted likewise that on July 5, the third anniversary of Algeria's independence, the new regime, which claims to represent the will of the masses, did not dare call them out for demonstrations in the streets. The new leaders did not even appear at a sports festival organized for the holiday.

What are the claims made in the June 19 proclamation and in the speeches of the spokesmen of the new regime?

According to them, everything was going badly, above all on the economic level. The situation in Algeria is certainly far from brilliant. But instead of proposing a new policy, the organizers of the coup d'état claim that they are holding to the policy followed previously -- to the Algiers Charter, to self-management, etc. All the bad things were due to Ben Bella personally, to his personal power. The personal accusations are topped with "financial" charges.

During past months we have criticized many aspects of the political situation in Algeria, particularly the Bonapartist character of Ben Bella's power, the recourse to combinations at the top which the masses could not understand, the equivocations, particularly in carrying out the agrarian reform, the absence of a real party functioning democratically. But Boumedienne is not entitled to the least confidence if he voices similar criticisms, or a part of them, today. Quite the contrary.

In place of Ben Bella's personal power, Boumedienne is not offering democracy but a still narrower personal power, without links with the masses, resting solely on the army or on a part of it. What kind of democracy is this in which these men, even after their names have been revealed, remain anonymous politicians afraid to stand up

publicly before the masses! As for the lessons in morality which these men claim to offer, one cannot overlook that among the "Council" are a Mohammed Said, a Colonel Mohand Ou El Hadj, whose outlooks are known to everyone.

It is true that Boumedienne's asceticism can be pointed to. But operations like that of June 19 do not occur in a political vacuum and do not follow the logic of the views of a single individual. What happened after June 19, the positions taken, the confrontations, had considerable significance. Social forces, groupings, individuals do not interpret such an event arbitrarily. On this level, things could not be clearer.

The first to support the coup d'état were the Ulemas [Muslim theologians], and with them all those oriented toward the past. They were followed almost immediately by a series of ambassadors -- including some with a leftist past which they promptly forgot -- who sought to reassure the conservative powers throughout the world. Immediately behind them trooped the opportunists, those who had shined Ben Bella's shoes and who are prepared to do as much for his successors. Behind them, with more or less prudence -- for completely tactical reasons -- came those who believe that "Algeria needs them"; the Rabah Bitats, the Boussoufs, the Khiders, the Fehrat Abbas's, who hope that their turn will come but who don't want to show too much eagerness about it.\*

The coup d'état saw the youth, the students, in immediate opposition. In Algiers itself, demonstrations broke out in the following days. Elsewhere -- in Oran, Annaba, Philippeville, Tlemcen, the demonstrations were more powerful and the repression very severe. Outside of Algeria, the Algerian students of the Amicale des Algériens en France strongly condemned the coup d'état.

But perhaps nothing illustrates the situation in Algeria after the coup d'état better than the attitude of the Algerian trade unions. It was not until a week after the coup d'état that the leadership of the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens] adopted a resolution which has not yet been published in Algeria and of which only extracts have been published abroad. [In Le Monde June 29.]

This resolution does not mention the name of Ben Bella at all. It notes "the extreme weakness of the party in organizational structure," the "failure to apply democratic centralism and the absence of a collective leadership" which permitted "the reinforcement of personal power, the practice of antidemocratic methods," but it also

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\*A clown was required in the tragedy. Messali Hadj undertook to fill the bill: "The PPA [Parti du Peuple Algérien] refuses to choose...When the French were still in Algeria, there was a certain freedom of expression..."

observed that "despite the obstacles consisting of the negative aspects of the former regime, the workers gained victories, represented in particular by the decrees on self-management, the Algiers Charter, and the trade-union charter," that "only the workers and the disinherited masses of the towns and countryside have borne the weight of the pretended policy of austerity."

The resolution refers to the coup d'état in ambiguous terms: "The opening provided by the event that occurred on June 19 would be put in question by the return to the political scene of careerist and opportunist elements, who are also responsible for the lack of respect for our institutions...For June 19 to become a genuine opening, it is necessary to also permit the emergence of tested militants, clear about their options, courageous in the expression of their opinions, and who have proved their genuine attachment to socialism."

And the resolution declares that "the flawless attachment of the workers to the gains of their ten years of struggle; namely, national independence, self-management and the construction of democratic socialism within the framework of self-management," demands that "the FLN [Front de Liberation Nationale], party of the vanguard, be composed mainly of workers, of poor peasants and revolutionary intellectuals. Today the demystification has been carried out. The period of individuals has been ended; that of principles must begin."

It is true that a week later, the national secretariat of the UGTA released a communiqué that retreated from the above resolution that had been adopted by the national executive commission. This communiqué approved "the analysis contained in the June 19 proclamation" of the Council of the Revolution, and, while referring to the preceding resolution, only mentioned the Algiers Charter and the defense of the gains of the revolution without explicitly referring to self-management.

Doesn't this demonstrate that the officials of the trade-union movement are looking with one eye at the regime and the force at its disposal and with the other at the reactions of the masses? (It should be remembered that this leadership was restored to office at a recent congress of the UGTA under pressure from the rank and file against the old leadership that had been put at the head of the unions by main force.)

They stated that there were figures they do not want to see again, and conquests of the revolution which they think it best not to touch. The leadership of the unions displayed a big streak of opportunism, but it is not necessary to read between the lines to see the limits beyond which Boumedienne cannot go at present in wheeling and dealing. The Khiders, Boussoufs, Ferhat Abbas's and Co. should not be moved into the foreground. Boumedienne should also come out for self-management (of which he stands in holy horror).

After the demonstrations of the first days, the situation became "calm." This is certainly due primarily to the absence of an organization of the vanguard. In the case of Algeria, the single party means in the final analysis that there is no party. And the left wing was an aspiration among many militants but not an organization struggling within the FLN, still less an organization capable of directly addressing the masses. But the calm in the streets does not mean that minds are apathetic. Boumedienne has crossed a bridge over which there is no return. On the one hand, the bourgeois neocolonialist tendencies and the bureaucratic tendencies will await the erosion of Boumedienne, as he awaited that of Ben Bella, in order to seek to force back the revolution still more and even to smother it completely. On the other hand, the militants will seek to draw the lessons in order to start up the revolution again, the forces for which are far from exhausted.

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Coming a few days before the scheduled opening of the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers, various demonstrations of a diplomatic order were inevitable, revealing the motives of many governments.

Most of the neocolonialist countries of Africa (former French or British colonies) displayed reservations with regard to Boumedienne's regime, not out of sympathy for Ben Bella or for the Algerian revolution, but because, as they have shown on other occasions, these weak and unstable powers are hostile to anything that could even indirectly encourage a coup d'état at home.

Bourguiba declared that he did not appreciate coups d'état in general, but in this particular case he saw more advantages than disadvantages. For his own neocolonialist regime naturally.

Nasser was caught in an embarrassing situation. In many respects, Boumedienne has more affinity with his regime than Ben Bella. But Nasser is not without political judgment and it has not failed to occur to him that Boumedienne is playing the role of sorcerer's apprentice. Thus, with the future in mind, he has sought to make the best of Boumedienne while showing concern over Ben Bella's fate.

As for Moscow and Peking, they were both operating not on the level of parties facing developments temporarily unfavorable to a revolution but on the level of states preoccupied particularly with the scheduled conference. The Soviet government, fearing that the new regime might take a hostile position on including the USSR in the conference, maintained its reserve while giving encouragement in the corridors to those favoring Ben Bella. On the other hand, the Chinese government, which did not have any other international tribune than the Afro-Asian conference at which it could express its views at present, thought that in rushing recognition it would gain

Boumedienne's support during the conference. It only succeeded in taking a stupid step that revealed the ignorance of Chinese diplomacy in affairs outside the countries bordering China.

The only intervention on a government level that had a revolutionary character came once again from Fidel Castro. Brushing aside diplomatic fictions, he characterized the business as a "military pronunciamento" and, recalling that Cuba had sent arms to Algeria, he said. "We regret that these arms might be used today in a fratricidal combat against the Algerian people." He likewise expressed his confidence in the Algerian masses.

This is a conclusion in which we can concur, all the more so since the Algerian revolution has undergone very difficult times in the past, extremely grave situations and bad jolts. Each time it has vigorously recovered. The Algerian revolution, we are sure, will not be long in resuming its forward march.

WASHINGTON "RATHER SATISFIED" WITH BOUMEDIENNE

The State Department announced July 6 that it was recognizing the new regime of Colonel Houari Boumedienne. The move was not exactly unexpected, as the following items, culled from the daily press in Paris, indicate rather eloquently:

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"Since the military 'clan' came to power, the key words of self-management and even socialism have hardly appeared in the official jargon. They wish to appear 'realistic' and they do not hesitate to condemn the 'adventurism' of Ben Bella, who discouraged foreign investors. It is still difficult to offer an opinion on the new tone of the 'irreversible options' of the Algeria of Year Three. One could cite Thermidor or the Eighteenth Brumaire. But in the final analysis the same ones are still there. With very rare exceptions, the high 'technical' functionaries have remained at their posts; it would, moreover, be difficult to replace them." -- Yves Cuau, writing from Algiers three days after the coup d'état, in Le Figaro June 23.

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"ALGIERS, June 22 -- Last night on the terrace of the nationalized Hotel S. George, an East European ambassador named the mastermind of last Saturday's coup: That old imperialist meddler, the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Similar assertions were spread by Ahmed Ben Bella's sympa-

thizers and feverishly discussed, among other rumors, by newly arrived Paris journalists. Helping the rumor along were reports of poorly concealed satisfaction by members of the United States Embassy over the downfall of Mr. Ben Bella's Marxist polemicists."  
-- Special to the New York Times [International edition] June 23.

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"Meanwhile, Col. Houari Boumedienne's five-day-old Revolutionary Council has quietly sought assurance of new aid for Algeria's depressed economy from both France and the United States.

"Although the State Department has yet to take an official stand on the new regime, its attitude toward the Algerian feelers was 'not negative,' a well-placed source said.

"President Ahmed Ben Bella, who was deposed and arrested by the army-backed Council last Saturday, long encouraged the official Marxist-run press and radio in violent anti-American polemics. In recent months he had harshly condemned the United States' 'imperialist' policy in the Congo and South Vietnam.

"The United States had limited its aid to 200,000 tons of relief food and a 30-technician, \$1 million rural renovation program." -- Hedrick Smith in a dispatch from Algiers to the New York Times [International edition] June 25.

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"The new regime put out feelers to the U.S. for continued economic aid, and American diplomats were pleased by a sudden toning down of anti-American Marxist polemics on the government radio.

"Algiers also promised to work for closer economic cooperation with France, on which the Algerian economy basically depends. The sincerity of that promise, in the French view, will be tested when the new regime takes up current negotiations on sharing the profits of the French-built Saharan oil industry." -- "The News of the Week in Review," New York Times [International edition] June 28.

\* \* \*

"The coup d'état appears nationalist, anti-Communist and even more, perhaps, 'antiprogressive'; if by progressivism is meant the groups of leftist strangers who rallied to Ben Bella....

"The Americans who perhaps had nothing much to complain about with regard to Ben Bella, but likewise had nothing to praise him for, are showing that they are rather satisfied. Their ambassador, Mr. Porter, is meeting Boumedienne or one of the members of the Council of the Revolution every day." -- Eugène Mannoni in a dispatch from Algiers in France-Soir June 29.

AIDIT THANKS BOUMEDIENNE -- KY APPROVES, TOO

Whether he got his tip from Sukarno or from Mao, is not clear, but D.N.Aidit, the head of the Indonesian Communist party, declared that the coup d'état in Algeria came as no surprise to any who had kept up to date on the situation in Algeria.

Aidit made this statement to the press on June 22, two days after Peking recognized Boumedienne and assured the colonel that he could count on China's support, and one day after Sukarno's government similarly recognized the new military regime.

Aidit denounced Ben Bella for having allegedly conducted a policy "contrary to the aspirations of the Algerian people."

Aidit said that he approved the recognition of Boumedienne accorded by the Indonesian government, adding that Ben Bella had followed a rightist policy.

"The situation in Algiers is now better than it was under the regime of Ben Bella," Aidit said. "We should thank Colonel Boumedienne for his efforts to create a better atmosphere in the final days preceding the Afro-Asian conference."

Another expert in Algerian affairs for whom the coup d'état apparently came as no surprise was General Nguyen Cao Ky, the puppet dictator of South Vietnam. He recognized Boumedienne on June 20 even before Sukarno and Aidit, making it almost as fast as Peking.

The Reuter news agency reported that General Ky was planning to head a delegation of thirty members that counted on going to Algiers for the Afro-Asian conference even though they had not been invited.

In contrast to this, the delegation of the Front for National Liberation, the organization of the South Vietnamese freedom fighters, which had been scheduled to leave June 19 for the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers, postponed their trip pending clarification of the situation.

THE CUBAN STAND ON BOUMEDIENNE'S COUP D'ETAT

The reaction of the Cuban revolutionists to Boumedienne's coup d'état is of special significance in view of the close ties of sympathy between the vanguard in Algeria and Cuba.

The Algerian revolution began some sixteen months after the defeat of Castro's forces at the Moncada barracks in July 1953. During the most difficult years of the Cuban struggle, the heroic per-

sistence of the Algerian revolutionists inspired the Cubans. The refusal of the freedom fighters in Algeria's underground to bow to French imperialism became legendary among the Cuban guerrilla forces. Algeria was taken as an almost perfect example of the capacity of a determined people to hold out against the powerful forces of an occupying imperialist army. When Castro's forces finally marched victoriously into Havana they gave full credit to the inspiration provided by the Algerian example. Revolutionary Cuba's stand on Boumedienne's coup d'état was thus awaited with keen interest.

On June 27 Fidel Castro stated the position of the Cuban revolutionists. In a radio speech in which it was quite clear that the Cuban prime minister knew he was risking a rupture in diplomatic relations with Algiers, Castro came to the defense of Ben Bella. He singled out Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Boumedienne's minister of foreign affairs, who is widely regarded as the main architect of the coup d'état, as "a man of the right, an enemy of socialism and the Algerian revolution, a reactionary."

Castro was less severe with Boumedienne. "He is a very secretive man," he said. "History will judge him for what he has done."

The Cuban prime minister revealed that Cuba had sent men and arms to help Algeria when it was attacked in 1963 by Morocco. "We regret," he said, "that these arms might be used today in a fratricidal combat against the Algerian people."

The full text of Castro's speech is not yet available in Paris. However, the press reported him as exhorting the Algerian military leaders to resume their posts. "Our attitude will be determined by the facts and we hope that they will realize the mistake they have committed.

"The military pronunciamento of Algiers is not a revolutionary movement and no one can characterize it as revolutionary. It is a question of a sad conflict within the Algerian revolution.

"If Ben Bella had been more wily and less kind, he would not have been driven from power...

"But political repression cannot succeed against a people that has just gained independence. Against the French, thousands of Algerians learned to handle arms and to fight against an army stronger and better equipped than that of Colonel Boumedienne...

"Military despotism and counterrevolution cannot be installed in Algeria, a country that gained its freedom arms in hand..."

As for a possible rupture in diplomatic relations, Castro said: "If the organizers of the coup d'état show through their policies their attachment to the Algerian revolution, then we will not



refuse them our support. But if the new Algerian leaders want to break with Cuba, they will not be the first..."

Castro's forthright speech evidently touched some raw nerves. On June 30 Boumedienne's men ordered Prensa Latina, the Cuban press service, to close its doors in Algiers and to hand the key to the police.

The Algerian government information service, by way of excuse, issued a communiqué the same day accusing Prensa Latina of having reproduced in its Bulletin No. 547, "the complete text of a particularly slanderous speech with regard to the Algerian revolution."

The communiqué further accused Prensa Latina of "not having stopped at this unfriendly and hostile gesture," but of having proceeded instead to distribute "this bulletin widely in the public thoroughfares, thus deliberately violating the established rules banning foreign agencies from any direct distributions in the public thoroughfares."

This, said the anonymous author of the communiqué, showed clearly that the services of "this agency sought to sow confusion and to disturb the public order."

Still worse, "the services of this agency printed in their headquarters -- and the proof has been formally established -- subversive leaflets that were distributed in the public thoroughfares."

All this was considered to be "inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of Algeria" of a kind to "disturb the public order" and to "injure the safety of the state."

The communiqué ended with a declaration that "these acts of outright subversion against the Algerian revolution and this hostile and unthinking attitude against socialist and revolutionary Algeria" have nevertheless not affected "the links uniting the Algerian and Cuban people" which remain "solid and fraternal."

The police order, cutting off Cuba's press service in Algiers, was no doubt the theme for a happy telegram from the American embassy to the State Department.

On the other hand, the vigorous stand of the Cubans came as a heartening development for the revolutionary socialists in Algeria, who must now defend the Algerian revolution against one of the most dangerous turns since the struggle for freedom began in 1954.

GEN. KY SAYS HE HAS "ONE HERO" -- HITLER

General Nguyen Cao Ky, Washington's newest puppet ruler of south Vietnam, appears to have passed the anti-Communist tests of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with top honors. At least that is the logical conclusion to be drawn from a copyrighted interview which the general granted to Brian Moynahan and which was published in the July 4 London Sunday Mirror.

"People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one -- Hitler." This is what the "flamboyant little dictator" told Moynahan.

"I admire Hitler," explained Ky, "because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early Thirties.

"But the situation here is so desperate now that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam."

Just as the Nazi dictator had a penchant for paintings, so the south Vietnam "strong man" has an eye for color. "On flying missions, he sports twin, pearl-handled revolvers and purple chokers."

He even pilots a private plane done in purple. "It's my favourite color." And his "big office" reflects his "character," according to Moynahan. "It was splashed with bright blue flags and curtains. Orange and silver flying helmets hung from the walls."

Moynahan was not at all surprised that one of Ky's first acts on getting the nod from Johnson and taking power in Saigon was to order the public execution of a freedom fighter. Last October when a similar execution was carried out in Saigon, Ky told Moynahan: "I want an air force firing squad to do it and I want to be the officer in charge."

The CIA and the FBI are to be congratulated on the efficiency of their investigative techniques. In General Ky they seem to have turned up an almost perfect anti-Communist.

IS JOHNSON'S PERSONALITY AFFECTING HISTORY?

The policies of a government are determined in the final analysis by the interests of the ruling class which it represents. Nevertheless the character of those holding the power of decision can prove to be the final determining link in the flow of major events.

This well-known interrelationship has now become of agonizing concern to hundreds of millions of people in the world as they watch

the actions of the man now in the White House, the man who holds the greatest power in all history -- the power to unleash a nuclear world war.

The reports are now too numerous, and from too many sources, to be dismissed as mere propaganda from biased sources. Is the man now wearing the mantle of the presidency of the United States completely normal?

A good example of the kind of information seeping out of Washington on this question is provided by Joseph Alsop's column of July 6. The well-known columnist was critical of Johnson politically until the president tore up his campaign propaganda about standing for peace and adopted Goldwater's warmongering policies. This converted Alsop into an ardent admirer of Johnson, whom he at once began adulating as having the "potential" for becoming "one of America's great presidents."

Alsop is now worried. He states that "it will surely come as a shock that there are serious reasons to worry about Lyndon Johnson's frame of mind and approach to his heavy task." Not that Alsop has changed his appreciation of Johnson. "Any normally astute person can see that this extraordinary man has the potential of becoming one of the great presidents." Nevertheless there are "reasons for serious worry..."

As an example, Alsop cites Johnson's reaction to a recent article by James Reston, an editorial writer of the New York Times, speculating on what the president would probably say in a projected speech about the United Nations on its twentieth anniversary. There was nothing special about Reston's article. According to Alsop, it was the kind "that all previous presidents have met, at least with equanimity, and at worst with mild peevishness." Not Johnson.

Reston's article provoked "one of those outbursts of Johnsonian anger that sometimes make Washington nowadays, seem like Captain Bligh's Bounty in its premutinous period. The pseudovolcanic explosion continued, according to good evidence, for six solid hours."

What happened after "was even more remarkable." Apparently Reston had guessed right on what Johnson intended to say. But Johnson felt that this made it impossible to deliver the projected speech. It had to be completely changed. "Hence the secretary of state of the United States and one of his chief subordinates were kept at the White House until 2 o'clock one morning, reworking the president's UN anniversary speech to change its thrust."

The speech, of course, was just as empty as the draft forecast by Reston, if not emptier. But "that is not the main point." Alsop notes "that American political history shows no record of any previous president who refused to do what he had been thinking he probably out to do, because someone else was sharp enough to figure out he

might do it."

To call this a "peculiarity" is a "mild term," continues Alsop. But it is now so "notorious" in Washington that minor officials who want Johnson to do something, will pass the word that he intends to do the opposite. When this is published, "the result is then all but automatic."

But this is "only part of the picture." "Another part is the president's habit of constantly ordering ferocious 'security' investigations. This too is without real precedent."

"Another, even graver part of the picture is the 'terrorization, once again without real precedent, of much of the government by these White House explosions and investigations."

It is "sheer melancholy folly" for Johnson to act like this, in Alsop's opinion. What he ought to do is "devote himself wholeheartedly to realizing his own potential." If he would do that, "it is just about a sure bet that he would then fulfill his promise of greatness."

"It is fatal, therefore," says Alsop, "to waste half or more of every day thinking about what has been said or may be said, not to mention seeing plots in it, exploding over it, and investigating it."

All these are grave symptoms, but Alsop leaves out some additional ones that belong to the same syndrome. One of them is the overpowering need displayed by Johnson for praise as having the "potential" for becoming one of America's "great" presidents, if not "the greatest" as the sycophant Thomas C. Mann put it. It is a characteristic sign of megalomania.

This "peculiarity" of Johnson's is seen in his direct generalship of the bombing of north Vietnam. Washington correspondents have described in amazement how Johnson not only follows the battle maps in detail, but actually issues the orders on the bombing missions and the targets to be selected. A real Napoleon would never do this; a **person** who considers himself to-be on the Napoleonic level would do it -- given the power to put his fantasies into action.

One more "peculiarity" missed by Alsop, is Johnson's notorious secretiveness. Just as he lives in constant and probably unbearable suspicion of "plots" directed against him and his claim to being a "great" if not "the greatest" president, so he weaves a constant series of counter plots as a defensive mechanism.

Still another item should be noted -- the streak of sadism in the man. This was one of the characteristics noted about him in the days when he ran the senate. It came to wide public attention when, in front of photographers, Johnson swung one of his dogs aloft by the

ears on the White House lawn. The explosive rages that are now terrorizing the staff of the White House and apparently the entire government apparatus beginning with the head of the state department are tied in with this cruelty, the abnormal satisfaction derived from inflicting pain on others.

Johnson began his own term in office by deliberately taking over the platform of Goldwater and deepening American intervention in Vietnam. This course is but the logical extension of an imperialist policy that goes back to the turn of the century. Johnson's personality, however, is giving the pattern some rather sensational twists. The "Great Society" seems to have found its natural leader.

#### ANOTHER EXPOSURE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRISONS

[The Johannesburg newspaper, the Rand Daily Mail, has published an exposure of jail conditions in South Africa that shocked even racist-minded whites in that fascist-like country. The facts were compiled by Benjamin Pogrund in collaboration with Harold Strachan, a white political prisoner who was recently released from prison after serving a three-year sentence on charges of conspiring to cause explosions.

[Strachan's experiences were published by the Rand Daily Mail in three massive installments. On July 1, after publication of the second in the series, six detectives raided the offices of the Rand Daily Mail. They seized notes and the text of the third article but did not notice that it was already set up in type.

[On July 2, only hours after publication of the third article, police visited Strachan at his Durban home and served him with "banning" orders. These force Strachan to remain at home from 6 p.m. to 7 a.m. daily for the next five years. As a banned person, Strachan cannot be quoted in even the most general way. Thus, writes Pogrund in the London Sunday Times of July 4, "Although the banning has not yet been published in the government Gazette I dare not risk prosecution and jailing by cabling his story."

[The Rand Daily Mail may also be in trouble. Under the Prisons Act of 1959, publication of information about jail conditions is restricted and the onus of proving the truth of statements is on the publisher. The state only has to allege that false information has been published. Nevertheless the Rand Daily Mail is standing firm. It has called for appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry.

[The London Daily Mail apparently received clippings of the three articles that caused the furor. It quoted extensively from

them in two installments July 5 and 6. The following is an extract that gives a good indication of what the explosive articles contain.]

\* \* \*

All prisoners when they came into prison went to the hospital to get examined and so forth. Non-European prisoners who had to see the doctors were brought out at about 6:15 in the morning, and it could be freezing cold in Pretoria.

They stood naked; 60, 70, 80 of them at a time.

Huddled up like birds trying to keep warm. Like poultry. Stark naked.

They had to stand with frost thick on the ground, barefoot, clutching each other to try to keep warm. Shivering.

And they would stand there until the doctor came at nine o'clock, sometimes later. Now and then one of the poyisas [Zulu word for policemen] would allow them to pick up a garment to drape over their shoulders.

Otherwise they just stood naked until the doctor came....

I saw one man, who was apparently suspected of smuggling [the drug] dagga, dragged out of the hospital by a warder, Kruger, whom we called "Florence Nightingale."

This warder was a burly man with a deformed face. He dragged out this prisoner who was wearing the hospital grey robe and forced him to kneel down on all fours, stripped naked, in front of all the other patients who were allowed to sit around in the sun during the day.

(He) forced him to kneel while the African prisoner who acted as hospital orderly stood with an enema can of soap and water. The enema was administered.

The prisoner stood up. Blood was dripping down his legs. He was not allowed to get rid of this soapy water...He had to stand with his buttocks clenched together with his hands.

He was then forced to jump around from leg to leg, doing a sort of quick march, a sort of knees up to a horizontal position but still clutching his buttocks....

The burly warder kicked him as he jumped in this way, kicked him on his arms, his back, his hips and his belly. Until finally a pot was brought out by one of the African prisoners.

The man then sat on the pot and got rid of all this water in the presence of the warder and everyone else. And while he was doing it he was being beaten over the head.

Where the man had been standing and jumping there was a puddle of blood....

On another occasion I saw a prisoner carried into the prison yard on a blanket, the corners held by other African prisoners.... Two of the warders had a consultation and apparently decided the man was shamming.

One of the warders took his wooden truncheon and, sitting down, let it fall on the forehead of this man on the ground -- I suppose about 20 or 30 times.

Bong, bong, bong -- as you might do with a pencil on a table, letting it fall with its own weight.

But this was a truncheon falling from six inches. As it turned out, the man was unconscious, fortunately, for he didn't feel this lot going on.

#### BOMBAY CONVENTION DEMANDS END TO "EMERGENCY" RULE

Resolutions demanding the end of "emergency" rule and release of all political prisoners held without trial were passed by the two-day Civil Liberties Convention held at the Sunderabai Hall in Bombay on June 12 and 13. Shri N.C.Chatterji, M.P., president of the All-India Civil Liberties Union, presided over the convention. More than 1,000 delegates representing various parties participated.

Other resolutions passed at the convention included demands for amendments of clauses in the Indian Constitution which infringe on the fundamental rights of citizens, protest against the undemocratic act of the Kerala governor in dissolving the state legislature even before it had occasion to meet, opposition to the recurrent use of firearms by the police, insistence on judicial enquiry in firings and the ill-treatment of political prisoners, against infringements on trade-union rights, against curtailment of freedom of the press, etc. The convention demanded that the central government call for immediate general elections in Kerala.

The convention was inaugurated on June 12 by S.A.Dange, chairman of the right-wing Communist party. George Fernandes, a prominent trade-union leader of the Samyukta Socialist party [SSP], welcomed the delegates as chairman of the preparatory committee. S.B.Kolpe, secretary of the preparatory committee, made a report

explaining the objectives of the convention.

Prominent leaders who participated at the delegates session held on June 13 included George Fernandes (SSP), S.G.Patkar (right-wing Communist), Dr.A.R.Desai (a Marxist professor), Madan Phadnis (left-wing Communist), N.J.Karunakaran (Revolutionary Socialist party), and S.B.Kolpe (Trotskyist).

There was a heated debate on a resolution demanding the withdrawal of emergency rule with a minority of the delegates representing the Hindu Mahasabha opposing it. An alternate resolution justifying the emergency but criticising its "improper use" was rejected by the convention by an overwhelming majority of votes.

A Bombay Civil Liberties Union to be a part of All-India Civil Liberties Union was formed at the convention with George Fernandes as chairman, S.B.Kolpe and M.N.V.Nair as secretaries, and Prof. Aravindan Nair (left-wing Communist) as treasurer. A committee consisting of 25 members representing various political tendencies was also elected.

The convention concluded with an open session on June 13. Leaders of various political parties including S.M.Joshi, chairman of the All-India SSP, addressed the rally. The convention, first of its kind to be held in Bombay in twelve years, received a great deal of attention in the local press with some newspapers criticising it as a "left-communist-sponsored show." Among the political parties that openly boycotted it were: the Swatantra party, Praja Socialist party and the Jan Sangh. The initiative in organising the convention was taken by a Trotskyist group in collaboration with the local units of the left-wing Communists and the SSP.

#### FRENCH STUDENT HELD IN SPAIN

Christiane Etchalus, a 23-year-old French girl, has been held in the Pampelune prison for four and a half months. She is charged with having collaborated with young Basque nationalists opposed to the Franco regime. The police claim that a stick of dynamite was found in her automobile.

Miss Etchalus has stated that she knows nothing about the charges. She left her car in a Spanish garage for a number of days and did not search it when she took it out. The dynamite was discovered when she crossed the border into France. She was attending school at the University of Pampelune.

Besides Miss Etchalus, three others have been charged in the case.

One of the gravest aspects is that it comes under military



jurisdiction. Infractions of this kind, characterized as "military rebellion, terrorism and banditry," carry specially severe penalties and the court of career officers is much harsher than the ordinary courts. The military court can in fact condemn the defendants without formally proving their guilt.

It is also felt that in view of the present political mood of the students in Spain, the military court may decide to make an example of the case in order to terrorize others.

The defense is seeking to have the case transferred to the ordinary courts where it is easier to insist on the normal observance of legal rules, particularly in establishing evidence.

The transfer is not likely to be won, however, without substantial expressions of solidarity and the filing of protests at Spanish embassies and consulates.

#### EMINENT CANADIANS BACK VICTIMS OF SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID

The Canadian Alexander Defence Committee, established to aid the victims of apartheid persecution in South Africa, announced June 25 that a number of distinguished Canadians have added their names to the list of eminent men and women in the United States, Britain and West Germany who are sponsors of the Alexander Defence Committees in those countries.

Among the Canadian sponsors are Northrop Frye, internationally known literary critic and author; Abraham Feinberg, rabbi emeritus of Holy Blossom Temple, lecturer and vice-president of the Association for Civil Liberties; Professor Blumenfeld, an internationally known town planner; Professor Robin S. Harris, principal of Innis College, University of Toronto; Austin Clarke, author of the novel, The Survivors at the Crossing; Al Purdy, whose recent book of poems, Cariboo Horses, has been highly praised; and Fred Stinson, Q.C. and ex-M.P., a founder of Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO).

The secretary of the Canadian committee, Regula Modlich, who made the announcement, said that many other prominent Canadians will be adding their voices in support of those men and women in South Africa, whose only crime is their claim to liberty and human dignity. For the Alexander Defence Committees have become the active symbol of men's hatred of racist tyranny and injustice.

The aim of the committees is to publicise such gross victimization as surrounds the case of Dr. Neville Alexander and his ten associates, and thus "to focus public opinion on the inhuman apartheid

policies of South Africa and on the destruction of civil and political liberties." They stress the urgency, also, to provide funds for the political prisoners and their dependents. In Britain, public-spirited men such as Bertrand Russell, Frank Allaun, M.P., S. Silverman, M.P., and Prof. E.A. Thomson, immediately pledged their support. Among the fifty sponsors of the U.S. committee are eminent scientists, economists, writers, such as: Linus Pauling, Prof. Reinhold Niebur, John O. Killens, Carlton Beals, Rev. A.J. Muste, Pete Seeger and James Forman.

In 1963, when Dr. Alexander and ten young Coloured men and women were arrested and, after five months of solitary confinement, tried under the savage "Sabotage Act," over 5,500 people in West Germany sent a petition to UN Secretary U Thant "to bring this terror trial to the attention of the UN and the public of the whole world."

Dr. Alexander had won high academic honours in Tübingen before returning to teach in South Africa. Thousands of dollars were collected to meet the heavy legal costs and provide aid for the dependents.

All eleven were condemned to long terms of imprisonment, though no act of sabotage was proven against them. The seven men are in Robben Island jail, notorious for its brutalities. An appeal has been dismissed.

Those interested in further information on the committee and its work can write to: Miss R. Modlich, Secretary, Alexander Defence Committee, Box 824, Station F, Toronto, Ont., Canada.

#### DEMONSTRATION AT MAYAKOVSKY'S MONUMENT

The new ruling group of the Soviet bureaucracy must face, as did Khrushchev, a radical opposition among the intellectuals who are bringing forward very advanced antibureaucratic demands, the political trend of which is at bottom quite clear. A notable demonstration was staged by this opposition last March on the anniversary of the death of Mayakovsky.

In 1961 and 1962, it will be recalled, thousands of youth in Moscow gathered around the monument to the poet to listen to the recitation of poems branded as "subversive," that is, antibureaucratic. Some of the most representative figures involved in the gatherings were arrested and the demonstrations were banned by the political police.

This year several hundred youth gathered again. Most of them belonged to an unofficial (and semiclandestine) group known as SMOG.

(Samoe Molodoe Obschestvo Geniev), a society of young engineers.

They began by reading poems dedicated to the memory of Mayakovsky, who is considered by all to have been an enemy of the bureaucrats who were the true cause of his death. At a certain point, one of the youth read a list of demands, addressed to the Writers Union, calling for the expulsion of certain members, those most compromised with Stalinism, who today head the most conservative circles in this organization, in particular Kotchetov, Gribatchov and Sofronov. The demand was also made (and this was most certainly the most interesting one) for the right to organize a literary tendency of the left like the LEF of Mayakovsky in the twenties.

The youth assembled at the monument gave this long applause and decided to present these demands to the local of the Writers Union. When they went along the wide sidewalk of the Sadovoe Kiltzo in the direction of the local, their ranks grew considerably. At the same time, plainclothesmen of the political police mixed in with the crowd.

Near the Writers Union they ran into numerous squads of police, including a general of the militia, a rare occurrence. When they stopped to read the list of demands once more before going into the union local, a number of plainclothesmen seized the youth with the document and shoved him into a police car. A short scuffle occurred in which two more were arrested.

It is hardly necessary to stress the political significance and importance of the demand for the right to form a tendency. It is quite clear that the right to form a literary tendency in a situation like the one now existing in the Soviet Union would inevitably be immediately transformed into a demand for the right to form a political tendency. This, together with the fact itself of the demonstration, which was not officially organized, explains the repression ordered by the bureaucrats who understand very well that such things can expand very rapidly and bring into question their privileges, their power, even their existence. They followed Khrushchev's way of reacting in similar situations.

Among other things, the courage of the groups of vanguard youth should be noted. They know very well what the consequences of such actions can be. That is why, even in relation to 1961-62, the demands and the forms of struggle are more advanced. Before, action was limited to the reading of poems; the criticism of the bureaucracy was contained in the poems and was not made explicit in a document.

The passive opposition to the bureaucracy, which is very widespread among the youth, often takes the form of a rejection of politics. This is what the bureaucrats call "cynicism," and they are waging a fierce and desperate struggle against this "cynicism."

But some of the means used in the struggle have proved rather dangerous at times to the bureaucrats -- this is particularly the case with the discussions organized against cynicism.

During May, the club of the physics students at the University of Moscow organized a discussion on the subject of "Cynicism and the Social Ideal." During the discussion, a young painter of the Novosti Agency took the floor to declare that the source of cynicism was primarily the politics of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union with all its zigzags carried out in the dark and without the least participation by the Soviet people. "And is there a worse cynicism," he said, "than that of protesting against putting a time limitation on the crimes of the Nazis while those responsible for the Stalinist crimes are not only free but enjoying very high state pensions?"

The young painter, warmly applauded by the audience, was soon arrested by the political police. He was later freed, it appears through the intervention of the central committee of the party. But a few days later in a canteen, a dozen people surrounded him and engaged in a fight with him. When the militia arrived, they claimed that they had been provoked and displayed as "proof" a long knife which they claimed they had taken away from the painter. He was thus condemned, not for a political crime, but for fighting and for carrying an illegal weapon. As Khrushchev said, there are no political prisoners in the USSR.

#### OPPOSITION CONTINUES AGAINST JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA TREATY

On June 22 the Japanese and South Korean governments signed a treaty and twenty related documents establishing full diplomatic relations.

The action was taken in the face of widespread opposition in both countries among workers, students and intellectuals. In Tokyo an estimated 10,000 unionists and students marched in protest. In Seoul policemen used clubs and teargas to break up a sitdown protest demonstration involving some 5,000 students. The demonstration, which lasted more than seven hours, saw barricades erected in various parts of the city. Police arrested 872 participants.

The mass demonstrations have, in fact, been going on for a long time, rising to a crescendo as the talks neared completion. They have been continuing since. On June 24, for instance, nearly 3,000 students at the Sook Myung Women's University in Seoul held a campus rally against the treaty. They demanded that it be nullified. The parliaments of the two countries must ratify the treaty to make

it valid.

After the rally, the coeds tried to march in the streets, but the school administration locked the main gate to block them. They then launched a sit-in on the campus.

An economic agreement accompanying the treaty calls for grants from the Japanese government of \$300,000,000 to South Korea over the next ten years. Japan is also to loan some \$200,000,000 for twenty years at 3.5% interest, repayment to begin in seven years. The government also agrees to facilitate private credits amounting to more than \$300,000,000. The over-all sum involved is thus \$800,000,000.

Among the main objections to the treaty is the recognition of the South Korean government. This tends to further freeze the unnatural division of Korea into two countries. Japan has not recognized the People's Democratic Republic of Korea with the capital at Pyongyang.

The vanguard in both countries also fear that the treaty will facilitate the use of South Korean troops in Vietnam, making it easier for Washington to drag South Korea deeper into that conflict. These moves may well pave the way for bringing Japan into the dirty war in Vietnam.

All this has, of course, been denied by the authors of the treaty. But this is to be expected. Often the secret clauses of such agreements do not come to light for many years.

In Washington there was elation over the signing of the treaty, which the State Department has been seeking to put over for many years. According to a June 25 Associated Press dispatch, William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, told Congress in secret testimony, made public June 23, that the Korea-Japan treaty will begin the flow of \$500,000,000 in Japanese grants and concessional funds to the South Korean government. The treaty will serve to increase "foreign investment by both Japanese and Western Europeans."

#### AMERICAN OFFICER WITH A CONSCIENCE

Lt. Richard R. Steinke, 27, a U.S. Army Special Forces officer who graduated from West Point in 1962, was courtmartialed and dismissed from the service June 26 for refusing a duty assignment in Vietnam on moral grounds. According to his superior, he said, "The Vietnamese war is not worth a single life." He could have been given five years in prison. Placard-carrying pickets staged a sympathy demonstration for him in front of the main post office in his home town of Milwaukee.

Against the American Imperialist Escalation

EXTEND THE FIELD OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

[The following is the text of a declaration issued June 22 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

For some five months the armed forces of American imperialism have been carrying on round-the-clock attacks on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam without any effective reply being made to them. Men, women and children are being killed in north Vietnam, the achievements of ten years of reconstruction are being destroyed, without hindrance to the escalation of the American imperialist aggression.

The Fourth International calls the attention of the workers and revolutionary militants in all countries to the immeasurably grave consequences that can result from this shameful passivity, or insufficient reaction of the workers states and masses of workers.

Far from drawing imperialism into the quicksands of a long war of attrition in which it would gradually become exhausted while the anticapitalist camp retained its strength, passivity or insufficient reaction can bring about increasing escalation of the aggression, its extension to other countries, a rising direct threat to the security of the People's Republic of China, socialist Cuba, and even the Soviet Union, and the danger of placing humanity immediately at the brink of a nuclear world war.

The first imperialist aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 was not answered. American imperialism thus felt encouraged to step up its acts of aggression on an increasingly wider scale. It began to bomb north Vietnam, first under pretext of reprisals, then continually without any pretext, starting with purely military objectives, then attacking industrial targets and communication routes. It is now preparing to dump its deadly bombs on the big cities, coming closer and closer to the Chinese border.

In the same period it has brought the number of its troops in south Vietnam up from 21,000 to more than 70,000. The fiction that American troops were serving in the role of mere "advisers" has now been abandoned and they are to be plunged into direct combat with the heroic partisans of south Vietnam. It is only a question of time until the American planes that have been bombing north Vietnam will be followed by American ground troops and artillery.

While this was going on, American imperialism intervened in

the Dominican Republic the instant it saw the people arming themselves and moving toward a popular revolution. It has multiplied its counterrevolutionary moves in the Congo and the rest of Africa, clearly letting it be known that it is determined to play the role from now on of world gendarme in an energetic way, resorting to military force wherever revolutions appear to be making fresh headway.

This increased determination, this more pronounced aggressiveness of American imperialism, cannot be explained by any essential modification in the world relation of military forces. It is possible that in going into mass production of intercontinental rockets, American imperialism rapidly closed the technical gap it ran into at the end of the fifties in this field of armaments. But this did not fundamentally alter a military situation in which both the USA and the USSR are capable of dealing each other annihilating nuclear blows.

What has changed is the political situation, particularly the tacit abandonment by the bureaucratic Soviet leaders of the threat of a nuclear reply to any imperialist aggression. What has changed is the level of the Sino-Soviet conflict, shifting from a dispute between parties to one between states. From this, imperialism drew the conclusion that the Sino-Soviet military alliance had been ruptured and that these two states were incapable of common and rapid replies. What has changed is the impression given the Soviet bureaucracy, the new leadership appearing lamentably weak and lacking in resolution.

The Soviet and Chinese replies to the escalation of American aggression in Southeast Asia amount to very little.

The Soviet bureaucracy has sent anti-aircraft rockets to north Vietnam, but with great delay and in insufficient quantities to influence the daily outcome of hostilities. As for the People's Republic of China, despite the most firm verbal declarations, it too in reality has granted only negligible aid to the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The apologists of the two bureaucracies offer all kinds of arguments and reasons to justify this scandalous passivity in face of the ever-mounting aggression of American imperialism. Some claim that energetic intervention by the Soviet bureaucracy would have "provoked" nuclear aggression, would even have led American imperialism to unleash a nuclear world war. This argument is false to the core. A nuclear world war would signify the certain suicide of the American bourgeoisie, a fact that is fully understood among the ruling circles. To believe that American imperialism is ready to commit suicide while it is enjoying economic prosperity and unparalleled military power -- merely to save face in Southeast Asia -- means to truly lose sight of the very wide margin for maneuver still possessed by American imperialism.

Others claim that what is required is to react in a limited way in order to permit imperialism to find an "honorable way out," otherwise the war can last "indefinitely." To believe this is to accept for good coin the theory spread by American imperialism itself, according to which the only aim of the aggression is to bring about negotiations that can end the war in Vietnam. This disregards the aim of American imperialism; i.e., to crush the revolution in south Vietnam, to crush any revolution anywhere in the world.

Again it is alleged that the situation in Southeast Asia is "evolving excellently," that American imperialism is "becoming more and more isolated in the world," that the south Vietnamese guerrilla fighters are winning one success after another, that the imperialist alliance itself is being "shaken to its foundations" by the aggression against north Vietnam.

This disregards the fact that the revolution in south Vietnam was on the verge of winning last February when American intervention began on a big scale, that this victory has now been considerably delayed, that it is not easy to see how the partisans can ever drive out the imperialist forces from some of the beachheads covered by the powerful Seventh Fleet, that the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are paying for this "excellent political situation" with heavier and heavier sacrifices, while at the same time a most dangerous precedent has been set -- that of permitting imperialism to attack the territory of a workers state, a state that is part of the anticapitalist camp, with impunity.

The Chinese hold in particular that their situation is delicate and that they must avoid giving imperialism any pretexts that would facilitate sweeping aggression against the People's Republic of China, especially the nuclear bombing of the Chinese center producing nuclear arms. It is true that American imperialism is greatly tempted to undertake such an aggression, and that it has repeatedly given "public warning" to the People's Republic of China. But it is clear that the only effective response in face of such a threat does not consist in abstaining in practice from aiding north Vietnam; what is called for is the energetic reconfirmation of the Sino-Soviet military alliance. The Chinese government must demand that the Kremlin publicly and solemnly declare that it will consider any nuclear attack against China as an attack on its own territory that would bring about automatic nuclear reprisals against the territory of the United States. That is the only way to make American imperialism draw back at a time when it has not at all decided to risk everything and to commit suicide.

In general, the only way to stop American imperialism from proceeding with its calculated course of escalating its aggression, is to reply energetically and powerfully -- with deeds. The only thing that this imperialist power respects is force. Political



argument, the irritation of international public opinion, trouble with its allies, Moscow's and Peking's verbal protests -- all these are tenth-rate factors that scarcely influence it and most certainly will not stop it.

The immediate and massive intervention of the Soviet air force was the only measure that could have stopped the aggression against north Vietnam. Similarly only an instant Soviet response, as at the time of the imperialist intervention against Egypt, could have stopped the counterrevolutionary intervention against the Congo and the Dominican Republic.

Far from increasing the danger of a nuclear conflagration, intervention of this kind would have crushed it in the egg. Far from reducing the danger of a nuclear conflagration, the passivity or insufficient reaction of the workers states in face of imperialist aggression encourages imperialism to continually amplify its aggression, to widen the range of action, bringing it directly within touch of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Thus a situation tends to be created in which the response of the workers states must be increased symmetrically to the imperialist escalation. A situation thereby tends to be created in which imperialism has become so deeply involved that it risks seeing no way out except to plunge ahead, employing "tactical" nuclear arms.

That is why the Fourth International, conscious of its responsibilities, appeals to the workers throughout the world to struggle for the parallel development of the three most effective responses to the counterrevolutionary imperialist aggression that is being continually extended.

Without muffling or shifting the ideological discussion on the orientation of the international Communist movement from the public arena to the level of secret meetings, for this discussion should and must be continued, the governments of the workers states, especially the USSR and the People's Republic of China, must form an unbreakable united front against imperialism, publicly reaffirming the Sino-Soviet alliance and the inviolability of the territory of all the workers states, and at once granting full aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the South Vietnamese National Front of Liberation, particularly in aircraft and in modern and effective anti-aircraft weapons.

In all countries, the labor movement, the workers organizations, the masses of workers, must go into permanent mobilization in order to unleash wide protest actions against the imperialist aggression and in solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution, the target of counterrevolutionary repression. Following the shining example of the Australian dockers, the maritime and railway workers, the highway transport workers must refuse to handle goods or to transport men being sent to reinforce the armies of intervention in

Vietnam. Demonstrations, vigils in front of embassies and consulates of the United States, student actions and strikes, must constantly stir up public opinion and keep it alert, not under such slogans as "peace" or "negotiation," but "Get American Troops Out of Vietnam"; "Full and Complete Solidarity with the Heroic South Vietnam Guerrilla Fighters -- Help Them Win an Early Victory."

Wherever conditions permit, it is necessary to launch revolutionary struggles of wide anti-imperialist and anticapitalist scope, or armed guerrilla struggles that can touch off revolutionary combats. The situation in a number of countries in the world today favors big revolutionary mobilizations of the masses or audacious guerrilla action. As Fidel Castro declared in his May 1 speech, the development of the revolution in more and more countries constitutes the best means of weakening imperialism, of compelling it to disperse its armed counterrevolutionary forces, of outflanking it and bringing it into inextricable difficulties. To the counterrevolutionary strategy of imperialism, only a global revolutionary strategy can offer an effective response today, creating conditions favoring the revival and building of revolutionary forces within the imperialist fortresses themselves. These alone are capable of disarming the enemy in time, when, feeling death drawing near, he moves to plunge humanity into a nuclear holocaust.

#### UNIFICATION CONGRESS IN ARGENTINA

[The following report of a unification congress held in Argentina in March will prove of interest, we believe, to all those who follow the development of the radical movement in Latin America. The two organizations involved were the FRIP (Frente Revolucionario Indoamericanista Popular) and Palabra Obrera (the organization built around the newspaper of that name). The report has been translated from the June 1 issue of Palabra Obrera (Worker's Word); subheadings appear in the original.]

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An old working-class comrade who could not attend the first congress of the PRT [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores -- Revolutionary Party of the Workers], which was just held and which we are going to report, asked us what its political and party-building significance was. The comrade, it appeared, had in mind the congresses of Palabra Obrera in 1959 and 1961.

He recalled perfectly that the 1959 congress culminated all our activity in the Agrupaciones Sindicales Peronistas [Peronist trade-union groupings] and the struggle against the Liberation [the rightist reaction that claimed to have freed Argentina from Perón's

rule]. That congress, where Comrade Alicia Eguren de Cook was present as an observer, crowned three or four years of struggle against the worst reaction and efforts to unite a vanguard that had met its first tests confronting Rojas and Aramburu and the tanks and "gorillas" [reactionary top officer caste] in the streets. Unfortunately, the year 1959, which saw the culmination of the big upsurge that began in 1956, opened a period of retreat for the labor movement as a whole from which we have not yet recovered. Nevertheless, in 1959 Palabra Obrera brought together many of the best activists of that period. Mario Serra, General Secretary of the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo -- General Confederation of Labor] in Bahía Blanca, an outstanding member of the metallurgical union in the same city and an assiduous delegate at the plenums of the 62 [Peronist unions], is the outstanding representative of this heroic period of the labor movement and our party.

The 1961 Palabra Obrera congress also reflected a new stage in the development of the class struggle. The impact of the Cuban Revolution had been felt in our country, fundamentally among the middle class and the activists of the vanguard of the working class. That congress likewise had a central slogan -- the need to develop the Castroist current on a national and Latin-American scale. The Castroist front, a synthesis of the working class and the middle class, was an expression of this need. The elections in Santa Fe at the end of 1961 and in the rest of the provinces on March 18, 1962, were experimental fields for this effort. It did not prosper due to the weakness of the labor vanguard and the sectarianism of the petty bourgeoisie, fundamentally the Communist party, which, instead of seeking a common front with Peronism, ran its own candidates like Alejandro Gómez in Santa Fe, blocking a wider agreement for March 18. This was one of the reasons why the Castroist front opened the way, although in a distorted and bureaucratic form, to Framini's triumph in Buenos Aires. The keynote for party activities at that time was provided in particular by the presence of fraternal delegates from Peru.

Finally, the first congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores in March 1965, in which Palabra Obrera and the FRIP united, also holds deep significance. It was not merely a congress held in accordance with statutes; it symbolized something bigger than the two united organizations. This first congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores sums up several years of efforts to bring together a new vanguard that has appeared in the struggle against the bosses and the capitulationist bureaucracy and among comrades coming from student circles, disillusioned with the policies of the Communist party and the centrist sects operating in the university milieu. The composition of the congress unquestionably reflected this new polarization in our party: Comrades who recently initiated the explosive method of sit-down strikes in which hostages are taken, like the comrades of Acero Sima, of Buenos Aires, of the San José mill, Bella Vista and Concepción de Tucumán; the leaders and activists

in recent conflicts on a factory level or of wider scope; the comrades of the Mar del Plata quarries; the comrades of the fish industry who just ended a bitter struggle with the bosses; the activists of the metallurgical union, who participated in one way or another in the struggle against the Vandorista fraudulent elections; the comrades in textiles; in the chemical plants; and especially the comrades of Berisso, who organized the Lista Rosa de Unidad movement that defeated the Cardosista camarilla of Reche; and together with them, the comrades of the Pharmaceutical Faculty of Buenos Aires, organizers of the Unidad Programática Estudiantil; the comrades of the Exact Sciences who organized the Agrupación FELNA; the student leaders of the universities in Bahía Blanca, Rosario, Santa Fe, Córdoba and Tucumán; and all the other comrades representing various areas of work and organization in Salta, Santiago, Tucumán, Santa Fe, Provincia de Buenos Aires -- all are the positive results of months of consistent work which this first congress reflected in a clear way.

Possibly if we had waited two or three more months, new comrades who have joined in recent months could have attended. But if this was not possible because the congress could not be postponed, the significance of the congress was nonetheless immense. It was the congress of the new vanguard of workers and students which became consolidated in the struggle against the bosses and the bureaucracy in the labor movement, and against the restrictions and pretensions of the bureaucratic and centrist leaderships in student circles.

All the comrades believe that the new activists were strengthened by their work at the congress. For the majority it was the first time they had attended a congress of a revolutionary organization. The democracy shown in the discussions, the absence of any bureaucratic resistance to free expression, the seriousness with which all the national and Latin-American tasks were approached, could not but impress all the comrades and help to make them conscious of the enormous perspectives before us if we can succeed in forging the necessary instruments in our daily activities.

We hope that the correctness of this view will soon be confirmed through application of the resolutions approved at this first congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores.

#### Four Fundamental Activities

Whenever it becomes necessary to speak about what we are doing or have done, we run the risk of being taken for pedants; but even at the risk of falling into this danger, we must indicate the successes in our activities, where we failed to achieve our goals, also our errors. This report was centered around four fundamental facts: (a) The unification of the two organizations whose work in a united front culminated in the formation of a single organization under the name of Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores. (b) Our work in the North, basically in Tucumán, which was capped with one of the

most notable happenings of the recent period -- the rise of a labor bloc within the Partido Acción Provincialiana which recognizes the discipline of the FOTIA [Federación Obrera Tucumana de la Industria Azucarera -- Tucumán Workers Federation of the Sugar Industry].

(c) The strengthening on a national scale of an oppositionist current against the Vandorista leadership in the metallurgical union, a reflection of the maturing of the new vanguard that has arisen in the labor movement, of which another indication was the defeat of Cardoso in the last elections of the meat packers in Berisso.

(d) The strengthening, likewise on a national scale, of a revolutionary student tendency.

These were the basic, fundamental facts with regard to the organization's activities, which does not mean that we were not present in many other fronts of the working class and popular sectors -- struggles in the construction industry as in Sima, Aván, Astarsa; over-all struggles like the campaign to cast a blank ballot in the elections of July 7 and March 14; taking a position with regard to the problem of the return of General Perón, etc., etc. But if we confine ourselves to the four preceding activities it is because they reflect better than any of the others the accuracy of an analysis and the correctness of activity with long-range aims.

#### Tucumán -- A Working-Class Victory

In the oral report the observation was made that there are groups that call themselves revolutionary and who present themselves as "prophets" or "diviners of the future" -- after things have happened. That is, after the success in getting the FOTIA to present a majority of labor candidates and organizing the bloc, these people came forward with recipes for what should be done. This is real pedantry, a revolutionary pose and nothing more. Against attitudes like that stands the activity of our organization, which after analyzing the situation in the North came to the conclusion that the best possibilities for the labor movement in an organized form were in Tucumán. And from that followed the slogan: "Labor candidates of FOTIA on an anticapitalist program." Six months after this analysis, not only did we have a bloc of nine comrades but our own organization had a candidate elected as deputy as a result of this correct policy and action. Our Comrade Fote, present at the congress, offered proof of the correctness of this analysis and action.

#### Metallurgical Union -- Correct Activity

The metallurgical elections were another axis of our activity. We said constantly that there should be no illusions about the elections resulting in elimination of the Vandorista bureaucracy, but we also said that we must utilize the elections to weaken this leadership and to strengthen the new vanguard that was rising, extending it on an over-all scale, or at least on a district level. This objective was fully realized. In Vicente López, Morón, Quilmes, Bahía Blanca

and Rosario, we were one of the basic driving forces for the unification of the vanguard of the union on common slates against the bureaucracy.

Fraud at the ballot box was the unanimous response of the bureaucracy to counter its growing decline in prestige. Even in the federal district, where the bureaucracy presented virtually a single slate due to the absence of a united opposition, Vandor's people resorted to fraud. In Vicente López the existence of fraud was proved with cases of dual membership. In Morón the process was brought to a climax -- when the final count indicated the defeat of Gutiérrez (Vandor's man) all the ballots were scrambled and they did not bring the motion to adjourn the meeting to a vote.

Our analysis of how we must utilize these elections was confirmed once again, and not only was our analysis confirmed, but our organization was strengthened with the recruitment of new comrades who had done everything possible to unite the vanguard of one of the basic unions in our country.

At this point in the report, a comrade might say that it didn't require any genius to develop this kind of activity. The possible objection could be correct, but if we bring out this aspect of our activities, it is because no other organization sought to raise the activity of the vanguard higher than the plant level and to combine it with the struggle against the Vandorista bureaucracy. Not even the Communist party which could have done it, due to the size of its apparatus, took the initiative along these lines. On the contrary, in many districts they supported the bureaucracy. Vicente López is an example and the federal district is another, since there the slate made up with the support of the Communist militants, did nothing in the way of seeking unification with the other oppositionist currents; and in Vicente López they directly supported the bureaucracy, in this way carrying out the general line of supporting the official Peronist leadership in accordance with the CP's latest shift in tactics. Turning from this party to the other currents, we did not see a single one in any district participating in an over-all sense. Hence, without magnifying it, the importance of our activity.

#### Student Work -- A Full Success

And what we said about the metallurgical workers also goes for the students. As an organization we were the first current that boldly came out in the university against all the restrictive efforts, against the subsidies from imperialist outfits like Ford and Rockefeller for research that has nothing to do with the needs of the country, and against the theory that the university is an island of democracy in our country, and against the myth that the students, as a whole, constitute the vanguard of the popular sectors. Our comrades did outstanding work in the struggle against Ford "aid" in Bahía Blanca. Our comrades are at the head of the student mobilizations

in Santa Fe against the "restrictive professorial caste" who in Chemical Engineering want to impose ten-year courses and cloistered studies on poor students who in more than one case have to work their way through school. In a meeting in defense of Santo Domingo one of the speakers recognized by the organizers was Comrade Amato, who had previously been ostracized precisely because he belonged to our organization and who is now accepted because of the general recognition that we are a force on the campus.

Our position that the old formula of for or against reforms is outmoded today, it has given way to a new antinomy -- with our country or against our country, and the necessity to unite all those who are with our country and with the working class through the new activists who are appearing in the struggle against the bosses and the bureaucracy, is what sets us apart on a national scale.

### The FRIP-PO Unification

And if this quick résumé reflects only the central axes of our activity, we must insist on the fact, likewise notable, that two organizations like the FRIP and Palabra Obrera, have united.

When we see in the national scene nothing but divisions and atomization among the various parties and organizations, the FRIP and Palabra Obrera provide an example of constructing a single revolutionary organization, the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores -- one more indication that only those who undertake serious work in the working class and its vanguard, in accordance with a correct analysis and program, are growing stronger.

### Discussion on Palabra Obrera

The written document and the oral report were approved unanimously. The discussion centered particularly on three important points: the party's publications, the financial apparatus and the defense of the organization.

Some comrades held the position that Palabra Obrera, especially in articles on international topics, used a too advanced terminology, which made it difficult to read and understand. During the discussion and in the final voting, this was clarified and it was agreed that the publications of the organization should use language corresponding to the vanguard to which they are addressed. That if there is a problem, it is in the contents. That is, comrades may believe that it is necessary to lower the political level of the articles. And this was likewise clarified -- by no means should we stop saying what we are saying. In the course of the discussion, an article was read in which it was shown that the terminology, the language, was what is in current usage, and that the line, the position, was correct. From this the final conclusion was drawn that Palabra Obrera cannot replace either lectures or pamphlets or other

special educational work, or the theoretical magazine. And this being so, it is a gap which we must try to fill in the immediate future. This was the meaning of a motion that the organization must prepare a series of pamphlets on the most urgent problems of the day for the benefit of the comrades of the new vanguard that is appearing.

### Politics, Revolutionary Morals and Finances

The point that aroused the most discussion dealt with whether it is necessary or not to have a financial apparatus in the organization. Although this problem was not posed explicitly in the document, a reference to the small organizational apparatuses which the zones have set up to carry out their financial obligations touched off a discussion on an old problem in which the two organizations coming together in the fusion have had different experiences.

It was brought out in the discussion that the party, for moral and political reasons, cannot foster or support the formation of commercial enterprises of any kind. The economic needs of the organization must be solved through the efforts of its members, its activists, its sympathizers, through a financial committee, or whatever name might be given to it; but the party cannot be in favor from any point of view of creating a financial apparatus on either a national or district scale. The moral reasons: it is not true that the end justifies the means. The party has its morals. If it is really a revolutionary party and we are against exploitation, no end, no matter how altruistic or humanistic it may be, can justify the party engaging in exploitation. The political reasons: we are against setting up businesses that serve to finance the fundamental activities of the organization, because these apparatuses are a source of bureaucratic perversion and take the comrades away from the everyday struggle, diverting them into discussing economic and financial problems when they are not fighting over the income and the division of the profits, the latter occurring especially if the zones are weak and the leaders are poverty stricken. What we are not against is the organization having members or sympathizers who carry on activities in bourgeois circles, pledging amounts of money set by the organization. This situation is a personal contradiction, a personal sacrifice, but the organization can in no way follow a line of setting up a business in order to gain money on the basis of exploiting other comrades.

One comrade quite aptly cited the example of Engels, who spent many years of his life carrying out bourgeois functions in order to make it possible to maintain Marx.

Since some comrades insisted that party perspectives would be reduced by the lack of funds, it was also brought out that this discussion of principles did not mean that the party must not exert the maximum efforts to solve the economic problems arising from the needs of the party. That the discussion of principles was one thing and



the solution of concrete problems something else again. A motion was passed in the light of the discussion that the national leadership should solve the economic problems arising from the agreed on political tasks through the party itself. In the final discussion unanimous agreement was reached, and although it sounds like a commonplace, the discussion on this point certainly proved illuminating.

### National Political Discussion

The comrade reporting on the national problem said that in his presentation he was not going to repeat the written report but was going to try to explain how this was drawn up, so that the comrades could get an idea of how a national document is "filmed." That is, they were not going to see the film but how it was produced.

In elaborating the document, they began by studying the reality, the general situation in the country, the status of the classes, the government, imperialism. Then it was decided what sectors should be chosen for party work. And once this was determined, the specific places were selected along with the accompanying program.

The comrade said that he was not going to dwell on the characterization of the country, nor on the class structure, nor the government; nor was it necessary to insist on what class is ours and where we work fundamentally. What he intended to do was deal with the program we need in order to carry out our work, and, within this, on a point which he had observed most discussions had been occurring in the party -- the CGT acting as a Labor party.

### Various Kinds of Slogans

In our program it is necessary to distinguish carefully between immediate slogans, transitional slogans, and those relating to power. Immediate slogans are those that at no time place the stability of the regime in danger, or more accurately, the success of which would not place a question mark over the "capitalist order." For example, an emergency wage boost. Or the demand for a minimum wage of 20,000 pesos [\$160]. It can be won or not, but neither reply to this demand compromises the bourgeois, capitalist structures. The slogans relating to power, on the other hand, pose the problem of who holds power or how it can be gained. "All power to the CGT" or "A workers and popular government" are slogans relating to power. Those of a transitional nature, without posing the problem of who is ruling or should rule, hits the basic structures of the regime. For example: Workers control over the banks and the companies. Or organization of a workers militia, or occupation of the factories with taking of hostages, do not directly pose taking power but lead to it. And none of them can be concretized for sure except with the working class and the popular sectors in power. A revolutionary organization must offer an answer to all these problems through a series of immediate and transitional slogans and those relating to power. Our national docu-

ment centers fundamentally on these answers.

### A Timely Slogan or Too Late?

And now we come to the key point. Should the CGT act as a political party or not? The discussion centered almost exclusively on this slogan. The reporter took up some of the objections, which were then deepened. We will try to faithfully indicate the main points made by the principal participants.

The first point was why we must adopt this slogan. The comrade assigned to give the report explained that the organization had recently raised this slogan in a fundamental way. Peronism, as a nationalist movement, had been in a state of crisis for some time, but despite this crisis, despite a leadership that was more and more bureaucratic and linked with the integrationist [policy of trying to buy off the Peronists] interests of Jorge Antonio and [Rogelio] Frigerio, the policies of the governments that succeeded the Liberation had brought Peronism to oppose the regime. Despite the whole capitulation during the Frondizi period, the election of March 18, 1962, without signifying a basic turn, was a form of expression against the regime.

### The Bourgeois Institutionalization of Peronism

The March 14 election showed the opposite. Official Peronism accepted the government's game and joined in forming part of the regime although it played at being "the opposition." Its line is no longer a hard one; on the contrary it seeks to "institutionalize" Peronism. It is becoming weaker and more docile in following a policy that is not that of the labor movement, which in a distorted form it reflected in the past by generally opposing the ruling capitalist regime.

Throughout the previous stage and basically after the coup of September 16, it was the Agrupaciones Sindicales Peronistas that had the fundamental responsibility in this struggle against the regime. The line of our organization in the past was hence completely correct in recognizing this fact and working to the fullest extent in these organizations. Today this phenomenon no longer exists. The crisis of the official Peronist movement is complete although they continue to win elections. It no longer confronts the regime but has gone over to being part of it and with an aggravation already analyzed by our organization -- it is losing the tremendous step forward which the unification of the whole working class around Peronism signified despite the fact that it had a boss methodology and leadership like the methodology of the Leloirs, the Teiseires, etc.

The fact that there are comrades in the labor movement who now vote for the UCRP [Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo] out of dis-

gust with the conduct of official Peronism is symptomatic. The perspective of greater atomization is real, actual. Our old line of working within the Agrupaciones Sindicales Peronistas is no longer good. Clearly the crisis of official Peronism, of the Iturbes, Vандors, Lescanos, does not guarantee avoidance of this atomization.

#### A Vacuum that Only the CGT Can Fill

Although we can lose sight of the axis of our positions because of discreditment of the present leaderships of the trade-union organizations, the vacuum left by official Peronism in institutionalizing itself and becoming another piece in the hands of the regime, can be filled today only by the CGT which, despite everything, is the only organization that the masses consider to be their own. From this we have drawn the conclusion that the experience in the North with the FOTIA holds for the entire country. The FOTIA acted as a political party, although it has not adopted any special name, when it recognized that its bloc of deputies had won appreciation and that they ought to be used in its own service. All the other regional, provincial and national trade-union organizations should act the same way. With this slogan that "the CGT should act like a political party" we are only generalizing the Tucumán experience.

#### Points Debated

As was to be expected, after this explanation by the reporter, all those who participated in the discussion dwelt almost exclusively with this point. The fundamental arguments given in opposition were the following: (1) To favor converting the CGT into a political party would separate us from the vanguard which formed precisely because of its experience with the present bureaucratic leaders. (2) To favor this is to capitulate to the bureaucracy and is a consequence of an opportunist and tail-endist policy. (3) The Tucumán experience is completely different because the leadership of the FOTIA is an anti-boss, class-conscious leadership. (4) To go to the masses with this slogan means diverting them from the fundamental role which our revolutionary party is now playing. (5) The participation of the masses in elections is a tactical problem which can be worked out five or six months before the elections are held. (6) The slogan of a mass labor party based on the CGT is a consequence of the entryist experience of some of the comrades that cannot and must not be applied at the present time.

Almost all the comrades who argued against the CGT acting as a political party agreed with the analysis that had been made of the situation so that the discussion centered on this point from the beginning. In response to the arguments indicated above, some aspects were brought out which, it was insisted, should be taken into account.

### What Do We Do About the Bureaucracy?

In the first place it was maintained that in calling for the CGT to act as a political party, this should not be identified with the present leaders. The problem to be answered is -- how to fill the vacuum left by the incapacity of official Peronism to oppose the regime today? The position that it should be us, as the revolutionary party, as the pole of attraction, is a sectarian position. To say that we are the mass party is to ignore the reality -- we are a revolutionary party of the vanguard and we have no possibility of reaching the masses due to our own weakness and the objective situation itself. In the past our policy of striving to reach the masses was made through the Agrupaciones Sindicales Peronistas. To say that we can fill this vacuum is to fall into sectarianism, is to deny ourselves a broader policy. To refuse to call for the conversion of the CGT into a political party because today this means the Vandors, the Framinis, is the same as refusing to collaborate on the level of struggle for the same reason. Independently of who is in the CGT, it would be tremendously positive if its leaders would decide to act as a political party. If the Vandors would agree that the CGT should be converted into a political party this would be super positive (independently of the fact that Vador would control such a party) and if they refuse it in face of our call, this negative answer would unquestionably contribute to discrediting them. It would be wonderful if Vador and Co. would accept this slogan. For the whole working class to act as a class in an election, even if headed by bureaucrats, would be equally positive.

### Support and Criticism of the Tucumán Example

This does not signify that we would thereby be capitulating to Vador and that we would say that everything Vador does in utilizing the CGT as a party is good. We would adopt the same position that we are now adopting with regard to the plan of struggle; our support does not invalidate our denunciation of them as agents of the regime. Our own party would be strengthened by this policy as it was strengthened in Tucumán by proposing that the FOTIA should run labor candidates. No one in Tucumán was tricked and we did not contribute to any trickery in recommending a vote for the labor candidates of the FOTIA in the last elections although we knew that some of the comrades had not been elected in plant meetings and that some of the comrades were presenting a quite soft line. The process in itself was positive. For the first time in the history of the labor movement a trade-union council was acting as a labor party.

After some of the comrades insisted on some of the arguments we have indicated, giving numerous examples, agreement was reached that the analysis made in the national document on the need for the CGT acting as a political party was correct and it was agreed that in the next meeting of the central committee the slogan would be reformulated, that is, there was no doubt that the CGT must intervene

in the political field, but the slogan would be given a new form, that is, the way in which we should propose that the trade-union council should act like a political party. Perhaps the form will be through the setting up of a front of parties or something similar. In a word, agreement was reached on the content of the document that was presented although the slogan will be reformulated.

### Name of the Party and Election of Officials

Due to the fact that some of the comrades from the North had to return to their jobs the next day, the order of the agenda was changed and the statutes, new name of the organization and election of officials were taken up before the discussion on the North and on Latin America.

With the statutes there was little discussion because these were taken up thoroughly in advance at a meeting of the central committee. The choice of the new name of the party was voted on directly by all the delegates. Among the three names previously selected, Partido de la Revolución Obrera, Partido Unificado de la Revolución and Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, the toss up was between the first and the last name. On the count it was found that the name Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores had won by one vote. The two united organizations stopped calling themselves FRIP and Palabra Obrera respectively to take the single name of PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DE LOS TRABAJADORES. A year of joint activity culminated its formal aspects in this new designation. All the comrades present took the occasion for a big celebration. After this they went on to elect the officials of the new party, all of whom were unanimously approved.

The comrades elected to the leadership are unquestionably the best comrades in the various zones of the country although they were not elected on a federated basis. They have demonstrated in daily activity that they merit being in the top party leadership from one congress to the next. Before being elected, the comrades of the new central committee gave a short biography of each one of the nominees. When this had been completed, the first session of the first congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores was adjourned.

### Our Activity in the North

One of the themes that was awaited most expectantly in the discussion was certainly the North. Throughout the past year, one of our fundamental activities was there, so that it was not strange that this should prove to be one of the richest discussions, filled with contributions that will have to be taken into account in working up a new document on the basis of the fundamental outline contained in two of the documents presented for discussion.

The reporter explained that due to the lack of time he had

not been able to present a document spelling out some of the differences with regard to characterization of the area, but that he had nevertheless been able to give some indications on the problem in the document before the delegates. We will see how this characterization of the North became one of the points of greatest debate although at the end there was virtual unanimity. The document which the comrade read was, however, a document on activities, telling what we have done in the North, the broad lines of which were covered by the report on national activities. He pointed out the necessity of intensifying our work in the mills, supporting the strengthening of one tendency throughout the sugar workers union, for which a bulletin or newspaper should be brought out as a polarizing organ, pressing the slogan of the CGT acting as a political party, which could be utilized after reformulation for better utilization of legal forms in extending our political influence, especially in Santiago del Estero where the conditions of work are the most difficult.

The other document that was presented, discussion material for a plenum in Tucumán, led to one of the delegates asking for sufficient time for a counter report. When this was granted, the comrade making the counter report pointed out what he considered to be a very dangerous error -- the absence in the document of a policy on the FOTIA bloc, and on the FOTIA itself as a political party of the Tucumán working class. The comrade said that in his opinion this lack in the document was not accidental, but a consequence of the sectarian position shown in the previous session when the national document was being discussed, especially the point on the CGT as a political party. He explained that this work involved the superstructure, but it was very important. That he had no doubts about the correctness of the work of the comrades in the North, where the daily stress was on the struggles in the mills and on the importance of massive participation in drawing up the new contract which was now being discussed, but he insisted on the need for a policy with regard to the deputies elected by the FOTIA labor bloc in connection with the concrete problems confronting the Tucumán workers and those in the North generally as this could enter into the elections in Jujuy.

He took as an example that Comrade Romano, who has already taken up his duties as a deputy, should present a platform for the FOTIA with the fundamental demands of the workers in the sugar industry, as for example, control of the company books and the need to expropriate mills that cannot guarantee jobs or that condemn the workers of the province to hunger and misery. Along with this he pointed to the lack of a characterization of the North of the country, and although it might be a little venturesome for him to do so, he thought the party should have a characterization of the North so as to settle once and for all the fundamental areas of work. Thus in his opinion, in the North there are three provinces having relatively advanced capitalist development, Tucumán, Salta and Jujuy. The first one is in decline, the others on the rise. The rest of the provinces surrounding these three are subsidiary to them, that

is they furnish the army of unemployed necessary for cheap labor for heavy exploitation during the harvest. The Tucumán workers have no way out if they don't unite their fate with that of the workers of Salta and Jujuy. Not to have a perspective along these lines means shipwreck in the near future, and if we are really a revolutionary political party we must, on the basis of this characterization, set precise objectives and distribute our forces in accordance with these characterizations.

Many comrades, on reading this, may feel surprised that without any embarrassment we publicize discussions that appear to be of an internal nature. It is precisely this method that has served to strengthen our organization. We believe that hiding differences, or trying to cover them up, does not help us advance -- on the contrary. Since we hold that discussions are intended not to win points in a debating club but to forge the tools needed to interpret reality and then go into action, we bring our differences into the light of day. In the discussion on the North, we did no more than apply this method. To make our differences clear helped to single out the points in the discussion.

With regard to the question of the North, the following shadings were to be noted: (1) That the lack of activity in respect to FOTIA mentioned above was due basically to the enormous number of tasks facing us out of which we had to concentrate on the most important. (2) That it is already an old project to turn to Jujuy and Salta. (3) That we must gather more exhaustive information in order to completely characterize the North.

Nevertheless it was agreed that we would have to work up another document correctly characterizing the North, utilizing the generalizations and material contained in the other documents. The reservation was made that in coming to a vote the importance of the characterization of the North still remained unclarified and consequently it would be necessary to have a basic discussion on the conclusions sketched out in one of the documents.

One sentence, apparently a harmless one, was shown to carry very big implications: "The process of antibureaucratic struggle by the sugar worker or the lumber worker, which is based on the worst economic and organizational conditions..." In placing the sugar worker and the worker in the Santiago workshops on the same plane, the characterization is made that both have been playing the same role in sharpening the struggle against the bureaucrats and the bosses. Some comrades pointed out that today they do not play the same role and that without the least doubt the proletariat of Tucumán stand in the vanguard in this struggle against the bureaucrats and the bosses. This means that they agree with the characterization that the bastions of the struggle must go through Tucumán, Salta and Jujuy. Finally, they agreed that in establishing this characterization it was necessary to complete it, to deepen it, but that it

was basic, because, despite its schematic nature, it would permit us to work correctly; not to accept it would mean wandering from the axis and putting an equals sign in all work offering possibilities in the North. And that it was out of the question that all fields merited our attention at the present moment.

Three points were finally put to the vote for working up a new document: (a) The characterization which the organization should take in these three provinces as the basis of our work and especially our work among the sugar workers. (b) To approve taking the struggle for the contract and the present struggles in the mills as the basis of our activity. (c) That the FOTIA should act as a political party with regard to all the happenings in the North and that it is necessary to organize a whole trade-union tendency with a journal as the polarizing axis. On the first point, there was only one abstention, all the rest voting for it. The other two points were passed unanimously. Thus one of the most important discussions in the party came to a close, a discussion which we do not doubt will prove of fundamental importance in daily application of the line. Because of this, the discussion was long and extensive.

### Latin-American Discussion

The report and discussion on Latin America closed the final session of the Congress. Partly because the documents concerned had already been amply debated (our Latin-American Theses have been circulated and discussed in detail for more than a year by the two united organizations) and also because of the lateness of the hour, the discussion did not go into such detail as it did on the other points. The reporter then made a brief summary and reply to questions and clarifications and there was unanimous approval of the report made by Comrade Alejandro Martell and the document previously presented as a draft resolution. The outstanding points of the document are as follows:

### The Course of the Latin-American Revolution

The Latin-American Revolution has entered its fourth period of ascendancy since the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. The first period, as considered by the PRT, extended from the triumph of the Cuban masses to the defeat of the Paraguayan guerrilla fighters. This cycle began with great triumphs and advances and closed with some defeats. The characteristic of this first period was the consolidation of the Cuban workers state; the development of Castroism as a continental movement; the development of the armed struggle advocated by vanguard groups of the middle classes of Latin America which, becoming radicalized, broke with the old nationalist boss parties and movements that had channelized them; and, as a consequence of this, the upsurge of new political tendencies marked by Castroism and guerrillaism in program and methodology.



The second period, inaugurated in our opinion by the defeat of the Paraguayan guerrilla fighters, was marked by two facts: the defeat was tragic proof of the incorrectness of the guerrilla methodology and program; and, while the Castroist vanguard and organizations moved into a process of crisis and reevaluation, another fact characterizing this stage developed simultaneously -- an upsurge in the Latin-American mass movement.

The third period began when the mass upsurge became general and along with the continuing subjective revolution of its vanguard, the following events occurred: offensive of the proletariat and the peasantry (and not of the urban petty bourgeoisie as in the preceding stages); "nationalization" of the revolutionary process on the basis of conditions in each country, overcoming abstract Latin-Americanism; rise of a new vanguard in labor and revolutionary positions; development of Trotskyist cadres in the leadership of the revolutionary processes. The best example is provided by the Peruvian Revolution, epicenter of an upsurge with the Trotskyist leader Hugo Blanco at the head. Nevertheless the gap between the upsurge of the masses and the weaknesses of its leaderships (in slow evolution toward revolutionary positions and with marked organizational and political deficiencies was the reason for this third period of upsurge of the masses likewise ending in momentary defeats.) (Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, etc.)

But the fourth period of upsurge was not long in coming -- at the end of 1964 -- since the counterrevolution did not succeed in becoming consolidated in any country: with the outstanding victory of the Bolivian miners over the army and the subsequent downfall of Paz Estenssoro and the continuation of the process of occupying the land in Peru, the continental offensive of the masses began again. But this now has new specific characteristics -- the complete crisis of petty-bourgeois Castroism, of the Communist parties and the bankruptcy of putschism, and the new advances and the rise of consistent revolutionary leaderships (Trotskyist unification in Peru, strengthening of the POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario] and rise of the Frente de Partidos Obreros in Bolivia, unification of the guerrilla groups in Colombia, Trotskyist unification in Chile, unification of the FRIP and Palabra Obrera into the Argentine PRT, etc.). The present relationship between the development of the new revolutionary leaderships of the masses and the crisis of the old reformist, bureaucratic and putschist leaderships is without question marked by the fact that the former have not succeeded as yet in filling the vacuum left by the latter. Nevertheless its presence is giving new tone and content to the present stage of the Latin-American revolution. This contradiction is so decisive for the revolution that the masses have been able to win victories only where the new leaderships have crystallized out.

## The Great Need -- Revolutionary Parties

We can state that the big defeats of the masses have been caused exclusively by the social, organizational, political and methodological incapacities of their leaderships. No mobilization can be victorious without a revolutionary leadership. Thus it was that the big upsurge in the peasantry, the proletariat, the students and lower officers of the army ranks that occurred in Brazil, ended in the present semifascist dictatorship; and in Venezuela, after the downfall of Pérez Jiménez, the great democratic revolutionary process was brought by the leaderships of the CP and the MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria] into dragging behind Rómulo Betancourt and then, in face of his "betrayal," into a policy of adventurism that tremendously reduced the trade-union and urban forces of both parties, which, after successive self-criticisms, confined their action to unpopulated zones in the mountains in an essentially urban country. Likewise in Chile, where the opportunist policy of the leaderships of the FRAP [Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular] blocked the outstanding upsurge of the masses and paved the way for Frei's victory.

Contrariwise, in the countries where genuinely revolutionary leaderships developed even on a regional or local scale, if only episodically, the masses won big victories. This is the reason for the invincibility of the agrarian revolution in Peru which is utilizing the methods and the organization derived from Hugo Blanco and the FIR [Frente de Izquierda Revolucionario] -- agrarian unions and occupation of the land. And in Bolivia, where the presence of the organization and methodology of the POR, which backed the workers' militia against government attempts to disarm them and which led the miners to victory at Sora Sora, enabled the workers to save their revolution despite the thousand betrayals of the Lechinist bureaucracy. And in Colombia, where the agrarian revolution continues to advance despite the massacres of peasants, the firing squads, the napalm bombings and semigangster deviations, because the vanguard there were able, through self-sacrifice, to unleash the social class and the method of struggle proper to their country -- the peasantry and guerrilla warfare.

These facts demonstrate the imperious necessity of building a revolutionary leadership but likewise bare two fundamental problems -- that up to now the revolutionary leaderships have been only regional (Peru), embryonic (Bolivia, Argentina) or have not yet reached the level of Leninism-Trotskyism (Colombia); and that in order to prevent further developments along this line, we revolutionists must be very careful not to provoke adventures which, leading inevitably to defeats, can cause serious setbacks to the revolutionary process on a regional, national and even continental scale.

## From a United Front to a Revolutionary Party

The crisis in the leadership of the people, which has developed in crescendo during the periods analyzed above, has brought consider-

able sectors of the vanguard and the activists to search for a new organization and a program that could lead to victory. These are the honest comrades disillusioned with the failure of petty-bourgeois Castroism, of the stumbling around of the Communist parties and the holocaust and defeat of guerrillaism.

With complete earnestness we must say that our organization believes that the program and the organization sought by these comrades are to be found in Trotskyism. In view of this, we consider it to be the duty of all the Latin-American Trotskyist organizations to make a fraternal appeal for a revolutionary united front of all the revolutionary tendencies that have appeared as a result of the crisis among the reformist, bureaucratic or empiricist currents and which have reached programs resembling in general outline our own program and activities.

This policy should be applied on a national and continental scale. In our countries, we believe that the Peruvian FIR (Trotskyist unification), the Bolivian POR, the Argentine PRT, the Chilean Trotskyist unification, are the pivots for winning the necessary revolutionary unity. And on a continental scale, the Cuban leadership, which in recent months has taken stupendous steps (just as in the previous period it smashed the Stalinist camarilla of Escalante, today it is defeating the rightist wing of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, supported by Moscow, and in another field is giving a lesson to revolutionists throughout the world with its policy of solidarity with Vietnam), along with the Frente de Partidos Obreros in Bolivia, the Colombian revolutionists, the Peruvian FIR and all the organizations that agree on struggling for a common program and organization, we must pose the construction of a Revolutionary Latin-American International, and convert into reality the aim advocated by Leon Trotsky -- demolish the bourgeois governments and found a great Federation of Latin-American Socialist and Workers States.