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Paris, Breslau, Scarborough'

I. A Series of Congresses.

AT the end of August and the beginning of September there was a succession of trade union congresses, which mark an important stage in the struggle for the unity of the world Trade Union Movement. Between August 26th and 31st the Unity and reformist French Confederations of Labour held their congresses in Paris. At the end of August the German trade unions had their congress in Breslau. This congress synchronised with the Norwegian Trade Union Congress and the Congress of the British Minority Movement, whilst the beginning of September signalled the opening of the British Trades Union Congress in Scarborough. These congresses deserve serious attention and careful study, for they voiced all the ideological divergencies of opinion and all the tendencies which exist in the world Trade Union Movement.

The most characteristic feature of all these congresses was the prominence given to the unity problem, not only where the leaders are very much opposed to the establishment of national and international trade union unity. These congresses reflected the stage of development of the Labour Movement in the said countries. The two fundamental and mutually destructive world conceptions—the revolutionary and the reformist—came into collision on every question, both appertaining to general policy and also to present immediate tasks. Whatever the question under discussion at any of these congresses, the speakers inevitably steered for the fundamental question agitating the masses, the question of the establishment of unity in the national and world Trade Union Movements.

To be able to render account to ourselves on the work of all these congresses, to demonstrate the ideological tendencies which were contending there and the correlation of forces between the revolutionary and reformist wings and also the prospects of the struggle for unity—we must deal in full detail with all these congresses.

The Amsterdam International and the R.I.L.U. alike

set definite hopes on all these congresses. When we have investigated their work we shall see which of the two Internationals has come out victorious from the series of congresses and which was vanquished. Let us begin our review with France.

II. With Briand against Monmousseau.

France is to-day the classical country of splits. There are in France two Confederations of Labour of approximately the same strength and, therefore, the problem of unity has here its own peculiarities and difficulties. Without going fully into the history of the split we will merely point out that each of these Confederations of Labour is in close contact ideologically and politically with a political party. The Unity Confederation—with the Communist; the reformist—with the Socialist Parties. The anarchists made an attempt to create a basis in the federation of autonomous French unions, but nothing came of this attempt. This federation fell through. In France only two trade union organisations come into consideration. But the split has been the cause of a number of trade unions, especially the civil servants' unions, remaining outside both Confederations; they are amalgamated in the Federation of Civil Servants which is also playing a certain role.

This was the position which became more firmly established in the middle of 1925. The campaign for the re-union of both confederations is of long standing in France. It became very acute especially after the Fifth Congress of the Comintern and the Third Congress of the R.I.L.U., the leaders of the reformist Confederation of Labour offering determined, nay, fierce opposition to the establishment of unity. All their "arguments" resolved themselves into not wanting to come under the influence of Moscow (!), of being opposed to Communist nuclei in trade unions and against factory and workshop committees; they do not want Communist domination, but want to be independent and to work on the lines laid down in the Charter of Amiens.

Despite the existing split the desire for unity is very strong among the workers. This desire gained in magnitude when the financial-economic position became worse and when military operations were initiated in Morocco. The Unity Confederation of Labour endeavoured to establish a united front but the reformists would not have anything to do with it. When, in the beginning of 1924, the reformists convened their congress for the end of September in Paris, the followers of the R.I.L.U. decided to transfer their congress

also to Paris and to hold it simultaneously in order to be able to establish contact between the two congresses. As soon as the reformists got wind of this decision of the Unity Confederation of Labour they decided to hold their congress a month sooner in order to avoid a compromising neighbour, but the Unity Confederation of Labour, which was bent on placing the problem of unity before the reformist congress, also decided to hold its congress one month sooner; thus both congresses opened on the same day in Paris and by this very fact made the problem of unity loom big in the eyes of the workers.

In order to make a bigger impression on the forthcoming congresses, the Socialist Party and the reformist Confederation of Labour brought pressure to bear on civil servant elements under their influence to induce the latter to affiliate to the reformist Confederation of Labour. Several weeks before the opening of the congresses, the National Union of Teachers, which has about 70,000 members, affiliated to the reformist Confederation of Labour and added thereby to its specific gravity.

As soon as the congress of the Unity Trade Unions opened, a decision was adopted to propose to the reformist congress to discuss jointly the question of unity at a joint session or a parity commission. At the reformist congress unity was not a separate item on the agenda, but the discussion thereon nevertheless occupied several days. At the Unity Congress this question did not meet with any divergence of opinion. The proposal of a joint congress with the reformist unions was adopted unanimously, whilst at the reformist congress this point was the main cause of the divergencies of opinion. The struggle centred around the question of unity and opposition. Owing to the fact of the protracted duration of the split, all the revolutionary elements had grouped themselves in the Unity Confederation of Labour; a certain number of workers remained under the full and sole control of the reformist leaders. Only during the past 12 months an opposition has begun to take shape within the reformist unions. This opposition actually took definite shape and form only after the agreement between the British and Soviet unions, which played an important role in moulding the opposition, not only in France, but also in other countries. Why did the leaders of the reformist Confederation of Labour refuse to have anything to do with unity? To hear their chief leaders, their arguments against unity consist of:

1. The Unity unions are subject to the Communist Party and cannot carry on an independent policy of their own, whilst reformist unions do not depend on any Party and adopt independent lines on all questions.

2. The reformist Confederation of Labour is an old establishment, an old trade union organisation and all who have left it will be welcomed back.

3. Unity must not come from above, but from below, namely the Unity unions must enter the corresponding reformist unions and thereby a united trade union movement will be established.

4. No Communist nuclei, no ukase from Moscow, no domination by political parties, but full independence without any reservations whatever.

5. International unity can be established in the same way. There is no occasion whatever for an International Unity Congress. The Russian unions must enter the Amsterdam International on a common basis. All that is asked of them is submission to the statutes and renouncement of any privileges whatever.

Such are the official arguments which the leaders of the reformist Confederation of Labour brought forward at this congress against unity.

We are not going to waste any time here discussing the hypocrisy of Citizen Jouhaux who shouts about independence whilst himself a delegate of the French Government in the League of Nations. It is a well-established fact that the more these gentlemen shout about independence, the greater is their dependence on bourgeois governments. The speakers at the reformist congress, especially Jouhaux, spoke at great length on the subject that their reformist Confederation is the ideological and political heir of the pre-war Confederation of Labour. It would be difficult to imagine a greater distortion of facts and a greater caricature of commonsense. The pre-war Confederation of Labour, notwithstanding its shortcomings, was founded on the principle of the class struggle. It carried on anti-militarist work, it was anti-parliamentarian in tendency, it dealt with the problem of the destruction of the State, it fought against war, laying stress on the predatory character of so-called defensive war. In a word it carried on a real revolutionary class struggle. Not a vestige of all this is to be found in the reformist Confederation of Labour. The term itself "class struggle" has long ago disappeared from the vocabulary of

reformist orators and from the pages of their papers. Class co-operation and the class truce are the official symbols of the creed of the reformist Confederation of Labour—and to parade after this in the role of the ideological-political heir to the pre-war Confederation of Labour requires courage bordering on impudence.

The main reason for the reformist Confederation of Labour being the most dangerous and determined opponent of unity was known to everyone, but it was not mooted. This reason is the intimate connection between the leading reformist stratum and the Left bloc. The Left bloc in France finds support in the Socialist Party and on the reformist Confederation of Labour. Of what use is trade union unity to Messrs. Herriot, Briand, Caillaux and the other Left creatures of the French moneybags? Jouhaux merely carries out the instructions of his masters and that is all. Of course, such things are not spoken of; they are merely done under cover of the Charter of Amiens and the desire for 100 per cent. independence.

The intimate connection between the Left bloc and the reformist Confederation of Labour has prejudiced the question of unity.

All the attempts of the Unity Confederation to bring about a joint session of both congresses, or to form a parity commission for the discussion of the unity question, met with strong and categorical resistance on the part of the reformists at which the entire bourgeois press was jubilant. In view of such a governmental bias it was self-evident that the reformist Congress would reject the invitation of the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council to send a delegation to the U.S.S.R. "Is it worth while," asked Jouhaux, "to send a delegation to extract from there (from the U.S.S.R.), an impression of impotence to confirm that free existence for organisations is more difficult there than under a bourgeois order? I understand and excuse (!) the Russian Revolution and its development and difficulties with which it has to cope, but what I do not accept (!) is the interference of the Russian Government in the affairs of other peoples and in those of our workers." It is a good thing that Jouhaux after all "excuses," the October Revolution, for I do not know what we should do if he did not, but a thing which he cannot digest is interference in the affairs of other peoples. When the French bourgeoisie lays down the law in Morocco, Syria and in Germany, going to the length of occupying the Ruhr, he was not very aggrieved, but when the Soviet Government gives support to all the oppressed

peoples, this arouses the wrath of Citizen Jouhaux and he cannot excuse it! This would be terrible if it were not so ridiculous.

But this fierce opposition to unity could not but evoke protests within the reformist Confederation of Labour itself. Although it was a packed congress, and although the delegates had been carefully primed, there were 118 trade unions which voted against the official resolution and for unity. At the congress 10 per cent. of the votes were for unity, but this does not mean that only 10 per cent. of the membership of the reformist unions hold this view. The workers' congresses held throughout France attracted a considerable number of workers belonging to reformist unions. The opposition at the congress was badly organised and not sufficiently shaped ideologically; nevertheless it caused many heartburnings among the reformist bosses of the congress. The most prominent representatives of the Right-wing of the Amsterdam International had been invited to the congress with a view to exercising the maximum pressure on the delegates and stressing the correctness of the reformist policy. Here the flower of everything that is most reactionary in the Amsterdam International assembled and the peroration of all the representatives was, of course, in the spirit of those of Jouhaux and Co. That this was a manifestation of the Right Amsterdam tendency was shown by the absence from this Congress of representatives from Great Britain. One must be very naive to imagine that it was only by chance that the General Council of the British Trade Unions did not send a representative to the Congress of the reformist Confederation of Labour. No, this was a political demonstration, directed against the Right-wing of the Amsterdam International of which Jouhaux is the most prominent representative. The Right-wing of the Amsterdam International was very fully represented at the reformist congress and the reason for this was certainly not only the desire to welcome the congress, but mainly the desire to discuss jointly ways and means for coping with the growing demand for unity which is undermining the very foundations of the reformist organisations.

The two congresses could not, of course, ignore the colonial wars in Syria and Morocco; but whilst the Unity Confederation of Labour expressed itself strongly and categorically against war, issuing the slogan for the immediate evacuation of Morocco, at the reformist congress all the speeches resolved themselves into attacks not on the government for the Moroccan adventure, but on the Communists and the Unity Confederation of Labour for their "dema-

gogic” slogans. The demagogy of the Communist Party and the Unity Confederation of Labour consists in demanding the immediate evacuation of Morocco. One of the speakers proved to the satisfaction of the entire reformist congress that the evacuation of Morocco would be a signal for the assassination of all Europeans. From this it was not very difficult to make a deduction of the “demagogy” of the Communists and the Unity Confederation of Labour. . . The reformist congress adopted the viewpoint that in this war France is defending herself (poor France which was attacked by the Riffis!), and that, therefore, the working class cannot and must not protest actively against the war.

This viewpoint of the reformist Confederation of Labour concerning the war, in other words, the Confederation’s support of the Moroccan war, had a rather peculiar influence on the Amsterdam International. It is a well-known fact that the latter has not yet found time to express an opinion of the war in Morocco. Why? This question was asked by the Social-Democratic “Berne Tagewacht” in an article entitled : “Why is Amsterdam Silent?”

The “Berne Tagewacht” writes: “The working class has a right to know if this silence is connected with the personal views of the second President of the Amsterdam International (Jouhaux), or if other reasons have compelled the Amsterdam International to remain passive. It would be intolerable to think that for the action or inaction of the Amsterdam International the opinion of one of its Presidents carries greater weight than the interests of the working class and the resolutions of International Trade Union Congresses.”

If a Social-Democratic paper puts the question thus it is evident that the conduct of the leaders of the General Confederation of Labour is fairly clear. We should like to remind you that on the eve of the Congress, Jouhaux wrote as follows in an article entitled : “Moroccan Affairs.” “The Government was faced by an accomplished fact and there could be no doubt whatever that the position was dangerous. Let us trust the government. In the Moroccan war ambitious aims and influences must not exceed that which is necessary in the interests of the nation.”

Let us trust the Government—such is the “independent” philosophy of this “independent” agent of the bourgeoisie.

With such close contact with the bourgeois government it was evident that the reformist congress would turn out

to be against unity. But this must not be taken as a sign that the workers in the reformist unions have no desire for unity. This is certainly not the case. The desire for unity in France is at present stronger than ever. This is shown particularly clearly by the series of Workers' and Peasants' Congresses at which hundreds of thousands of workers from all the districts of France are represented. These congresses, to which workers of all tendencies are invited, are also attended by a considerable number of members of Socialist Parties and by local leaders of reformist trade unions. Together with the Communists and leaders of the Unity unions, they discuss and elaborate measures for struggle against war.

The categorical rejection of the reformist congress by a considerable majority of votes resulted in the failure to convene the inter-confederal congress proposed by the Unity Confederation of Labour. But nevertheless 56 unions attended this Unity Congress including 19 affiliated to the reformist Confederation of Labour. The others were autonomous unions which expressed the wish to discuss the question of unity jointly with the representatives of the Unity trade unions. The Unity Congress elected 50 delegates, who, together with the representatives of the reformist and autonomous unions, discussed ways and means for the further struggle for trade union unity in France. At this conference the anarchists made an attempt to bring forward the Charter of Amiens as a platform, but they met with such determined opposition that they withdrew their proposal. The Conference carried unanimously a resolution proclaiming the necessity of struggle for the fusion of all parallel organisations, local, district, national and international. This Conference was attended by several powerful autonomous unions of Civil Servants who desire unity only on the basis of the class struggle. This Unity Conference showed that there is in France within the reformist Confederation of Labour an earnest tendency intent on putting an end to the split, in spite of machinations and manœuvres on the part of supporters of the French Government of the type of Jouhaux.

If one compares both these congresses which have taken place, the extent to which reformism is weakening the Labour Movement becomes patent. Complimentary reports on the reformist congress appeared in the entire reactionary press which emphasised the good intentions, the common sense, the statesmenlike mind and other virtues of the leaders of the reformist Confederation of Labour. In quite another strain were the reports of the Congress of the Unity Trade Unions.

The divergence of opinion between the two congresses was not only with respect to questions of unity and war. Even with respect to the practical questions now confronting the Labour Movement in France there was a gulf between the reformist and the revolutionary Confederations. The Unity Unions brought forward the idea of the payment of wages in gold francs. This demand met not only with the fierce resistance of the bourgeoisie, but also with a strictly negative attitude on the part of the reformist congress. And yet it would seem that the wages question is a question on which it should be possible to come to an agreement. The Unity Congress discussed the question of strike strategy. The discussion concentrated on the strategy of the struggle, with mass actions, whilst the reformist congress spent its time in elaborating resolutions which the advanced elements of the people were called upon to execute. No mention was made about the struggle at the reformist congress. The centre of all discussion was the system of negotiations, the personal pleasure of those in power, hopes in the League of Nations, etc. It was no mere chance that the bourgeoisie and the Black Hundred press, who scent any signs of decay immediately, sang the praises of Citizen Jouhaux, for he well deserved all the nice things which were said by his self-denying, if not disinterested advocacy of trifles and Real Politik.

These two congresses threw a vivid light on the main tendencies, not only in the French, but in the world Labour Movement. On the one hand reformism has reached the logical limit—support for colonial wars, whilst on the other hand Communism has unfolded its programme not only concerning general, but also practical questions of everyday life. In spite of the refusal of the reformist Confederation of Labour to amalgamate, the French Labour Movement has nevertheless made a stride forward. The unity question is now before the masses. It is discussed among workers in the factories and workshops, and the more it circulates amongst the masses, the more sympathy it evokes, for the consistent and determined adherents of unity—the Communist Party and the Unity Confederation of Labour.

III. From Bebel to Gompers.

If the reactionaries of French trade unionism found it necessary to carry on their class-truce policy under cover of revolutionary phraseology, the German Amsterdammers did not consider it necessary to make use of fig-leaves. It may be truly said that the Breslau Congress was the most re-

actionary of all congresses ever held on German territory. Almost seven years have passed since the German Revolution, when power was in the hand of Social-Democracy and of the trade unions. During these seven years the German Social-Democrats and trade union bureaucrats have manoeuvred so skilfully that the German Republic is as indistinguishable from a monarchy as two peas from one another and the German proletariat has become the European coolie. I remember the conversation which I had in 1920 with Legien in capacity of delegate of the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council. Legien said: "The trade unions could assume power at any moment, but we don't want it." In answer to my question "Why?" he replied that the proletariat must make use of everything that is healthy and progressive in the present social order. He said: "The German proletariat is not yet capable of controlling the economy of the country—therefore, we are not assuming power but are compelling the State to serve the working class." These tactics have produced brilliant results in the last few years. What has become of all the talk about Socialisation which filled the pages of the Social-Democratic and Trade Union press during the first years of the revolution? What has become of the boasting statements with respect to the organisation of the economy of the country? And finally what has become of the eight-hour day which seemed to be the inalienable possession of the German proletariat? All this has vanished and on the surface there has remained the most prosaic Hindenburg rule to which the German Social-Democrats and trade union bureaucrats are adapting themselves exceedingly well.

The congress was held under the slogan of Real Politik and the abandonment of all utopia and senseless hopes and dreams. With an outspokenness, for which we can only be grateful, one of the leaders of the German Trade Union Movement, Herman Mueller, declared:

"We trade unionists always recognise our responsibility to society. It is we who erected the dam against the Bolshevik flood. It is we who saved Germany from Bolshevism."

Has the German proletariat profited by this? This is what Herman Mueller and his colleagues forgot to tell the congress. On the whole the German trade union bureaucrats, together with their Party, are all the time saving the Fatherland, but their manner of salvation plunges the workers of Germany and Germany herself deeper and deeper into the abyss.

We will only take four examples from the brilliant, wise and patriotic activity of these loyal subjects of their Kaiser and their Hindenburg.

1. The German Social-Democracy and trade unions came out strong for the war in 1914. Owing to this policy the war was protracted for several years. This resulted in hundreds of thousands of killed and millions of invalids for the German people. Even from the viewpoint of national interests, opposition to the war by the German Social-Democrats would have been more advantageous for their fatherland. This would have saved Germany from the famous Versailles Treaty.

2. During the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the German Social-Democrats and trade union bureaucrats supported their Kaiser. If these leaders of the Labour Movement had even twopenny-worth of political acumen they would have vigorously opposed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; they would have insisted on the conclusion of a democratic peace with the Russian Revolution. This would have led to the disintegration of the Allied front and would have thereby made the Versailles Treaty impossible.

3. After the Versailles Treaty the German Social-Democrats and trade union bureaucrats became the most obedient and faithful servants of the Entente. Instead of putting their hopes on the international proletariat and doing everything towards bringing about, with their help, the abrogation of the Versailles Peace and of the burden of reparations connected with it, they become the most ardent supporters of reparations and of the Dawes Plan, sabotaging thereby the struggle of the international proletariat against the enslavement of the German workers. The action of the British proletariat against the Dawes Plan is neutralised by the fact that the German trade unions have given their blessing to this Plan, considering it the last word in political wisdom.

4. It would seem that in the position in which Germany and the German proletariat find themselves, it would be only natural for the German trade unions to do their utmost towards establishing a united front with the working class of the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, for it is only the proletariat of these countries which will be able to break, in the further process of the struggle, the shackles of the German masses imposed by the Versailles Treaty and the system of reparations. But instead of promoting closer contact between the trade unions of both countries, the policy of the trade union bureaucracy of Germany consists of bringing discord into

the mutual relations between the German workers and the workers of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. There are no fiercer enemies of unity than the German trade unions. And yet from the viewpoint of the most elementary everyday interests of the working class of Germany, agreement between the German, the British and Soviet unions could be of gigantic importance. If the leaders of the German trade union movement had the least notion of these simple elementary things, they would perforce follow a different path. In the meantime we see that the German trade unions offer categorical resistance to the least attempt to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet unions on the question of unity. They carry proudly their yellow patriotic banner. One can truly say that there are no greater enemies of the Fatherland than the so-called patriots. This also applies to the Social-Democrats.

Much was said in Breslau about Real Politik, economic democracy and immediate achievements. But the German Social-Democrats and trade union bureaucrats show that there was nothing real in all the talk about Real Politik. We have already seen whence "Real" Politik of the German Social-Democrats has led the working class of Germany. Just one more example. It is well-known that Germany is at present a republic. But the ex-Emperor Wilhelm demands that the German State should return all "his" property (castles, land, valuables, etc.). After several years of legal proceedings the Supreme Court of the German Republic has irrevocably decided to return to Wilhelm II. all that "belonged" to him., And do you know at what this property is estimated? At 800 million gold marks. Thus the ex-Kaiser will receive for his services to the Fatherland 800 million gold marks. Such are the results of the Real Politik of the German Social-Democrats and of the trade unions under their control with respect to saving Germany from Bolshevism. But the trade union bureaucrats could not rest content with Real Politik alone. One had after all to say something about the future, about ideals. With this object in view the item "economic democracy" was placed on the agenda of the Congress. But no one gave a clear explanation of what this really means.

Economic democracy was presented to the Congress in order to provide the disillusioned workers with an ideal, as stated by Tarnov, one of the most reactionary leaders of the German Trade Union Movement. But what is in fact this economic democracy? The meaning of the resolutions adopted with respect to it is that the congress demands, or rather aspires to, the establishment locally in the districts

and in the centre of economic councils on which employers and workers are to be equally represented. This reformist utopia is for some reason or other called Real Politik. This has been already a long time the dream of the German Trade Union Congresses, but up to the present nothing has come of it.

Already at the Congress of German trade unions in Nuremberg in 1919 an attempt was made to define this famous economic democracy. At that time it was a question of workers' participation in the administration of the economic life of the country on a parity basis, with the retention of the entire capitalist system with its banks, trusts, etc. The whole matter resolved itself into the system of so-called business, namely the class truce. These Real Politicians indulged in utopian plans as shown by the further trend of events in Germany. In circles where Socialism only exists in name one is prone to speak pompously of the equality of rights in industry, of economic democracy, etc. Such pompous advocates of economic democracy can also be found in Belgium, France, Great Britain and other countries. But nothing has come of these pompous declarations for the simple reason that the problem of administering industry is not solved by legislative, parliamentary means or by voluntary agreement of both sides. The problem of administering industry is solved by means of struggle; it is only as a result of victory over the bourgeoisie that the proletariat will get an opportunity to administer industry and only after that will one be able to speak about economic democracy.

The Breslau Congress, which was attended by the majority of the most reactionary trade unionists, could not but take up a hostile attitude towards unity. The General Federation of German Trade Unions constituted last year the extreme Right of the Amsterdam trade unions. The congress endorsed this policy and the reactionary bureaucracy issued from this congress stronger than before. It is a well-known fact that the German General Federation of Trade Unions is the ideological leader of the entire Right-wing of the Amsterdam International. Supported by millions of members, the German trade union bureaucrats were continually bringing pressure to bear on Amsterdam so that the latter should not swerve from its anti-Communist policy. The problem of unity with all its complications was not even raised in Breslau. A few commonplace declarations by Leipart to the effect that Amsterdam has always been and is now for unity, that the R.I.L.U. and the Russian trade

unions do not want unity and that the Communists are responsible for the split, etc., and that was all. This is an old story which we already heard at the French Congress and it is not of any particular interest. It is significant that these self-satisfied and narrow bureaucrats never troubled about the question how to unite the trade union movement of all parts of the world and how a truly united international is to be created. This is beyond their ken and beyond the limits of their narrow trade union German interests.

To show how low was the level of the Congress one need only say that no one attempted to explain why the trade unions have lost their former influence. And yet it is obvious that the trade unions are playing a much less important role than before. Only a few years ago the bourgeoisie courted the General Federation of Trade Unions and took into consideration its declarations and demands, whilst now in 1925 the ruling classes do not even think it necessary to observe the most ordinary decorum towards it. The stupid leaders of the General Federation of German Trade Unions have not yet grasped that the bourgeoisie appreciated them only while they were the big stick against Bolshevism and enabled the bourgeoisie to occupy again its former positions. Now that the Moor has done his duty, the bourgeoisie hopes to be able to fight successfully against Communism without the help of the trade union bureaucrats—the Moor can go. Hence the decline of the influence of the trade unions. No one thought of analysing this phenomenon, just as not one of the bureaucrats attempted to explain why the German proletariat has lost everything which it achieved in the first years of the revolution and why it has become the European coolie. Nothing was said about this because this would have implied stating the truth about the actual situation, which naturally is not in the interests of Leipart and Co.

But the management, or rather mismanagement, of these gentlemen did not only lower the level of existence of the German proletariat, but robbed also the latter of its elementary achievements and brought about the catastrophic deterioration of the German trade unions; of the eight million trade union members in 1922 only four million are left. What has become of the others? They left because they had given up all hope of getting anything through the unions. I do not mean to say that the best elements left. Certainly not. There are passive elements among those who left, but also active workers who got tired of being in an organisation which does not justify its existence. The

majority of those who left the unions are rank and file workers who have not enough stamina, courage, energy and class-consciousness to put up a fight for the transformation of the unions from organs of reaction into organs of social-revolution. An incentive to this wholesale desertion of the unions was also provided by the fact that tens of thousands of Communists left the trade unions, making room for Social-Democrats. At the Congress in Leipzig the Communist fraction had 88 delegates whereas at this Congress only two. This does not mean that there has been a corresponding diminution of Communist influence on the masses. But nevertheless our influence has dwindled considerably. The reason for this is that until quite recently the Party did not consider work in the trade unions its foremost task; it considered this a secondary question and distributed its forces and means accordingly. The second reason is that the Party showed itself incapable of breaking down the wall separating the Social-Democratic and Communist workers. There was much talk in Germany about Bolshevisation, but it remained talk. In the disputes in the German Communist Party with respect to the trade unions' loss of influence the following argument is used: as the trade unions have become weaker, so the influence of the Communists within them has also become weaker. This argument is futile. If the Communists had remained in the trade unions and had carried on their policy energetically, the fact that the membership dwindled to one-half of its former numbers should have increased our influence considerably. This did not happen because the German Communist Party did not carry out systematically and energetically enough the policy laid down by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern and the Third Congress of the R.I.L.U. The Comintern Executive could no longer tolerate such a state of affairs. Therefore, it expressed itself openly on this question and pointed out the mistakes of the German Communist Party with respect to trade union tactics.

In view of the negligible opposition, the Breslau block-heads felt themselves free to act as they liked. The congress accordingly was of a trite and colourless character. All the great questions of politics and economics were beyond the limits of this congress. The "Real" Politicians of the German Social-Democracy destroyed the soul of the trade unions and converted the Congress into a kind of dance macabre in the reformist graveyard, from which a putrid odour of corpses is exhaled.

But we would be mistaken if we assumed that this grave-

yard character of the Breslau Congress is a testimony that German reformists have lost influence over the masses. This is not the case. There are still millions of German workers who are under their influence and we must reckon with this. Although German Social-Democracy has suffered numerical losses during the last year, it has nevertheless still 844,000 members and this is a gigantic army which with good organisation can work wonders.

From the national and international viewpoint alike, the Congress of the General Federation of German Trade Unions is a serious retrograde step. The congress was not willing to send a delegation to the U.S.S.R., but it decided on the other hand to send a delegation to the U.S.A., the trade union movement of that country having become the ideal of the German trade union bureaucrats. The German trade unions, whose position was all the time in the extreme Right-wing, have confirmed this position by the decision of the congress and there is every reason to believe that they will carry on with the utmost energy the struggle against our unity tactics, for these gentry stand only to lose by unity. Thus the trade union movement of Germany in its backward development has travelled from Bebel to Gompers.

IV. The Veering to the Left Continues. (Scarborough.)

The British Trades Union Congress in Scarborough is another step to the Left of the entire British Labour Movement. This congress was anxiously looked forward to, both by the friends and enemies of the Labour Movement. The Right-wing of the Amsterdam International placed great hopes on this congress. Among the Amsterdammers there was the widespread opinion that last year's policy of the General Trades Union Council was purely the result of chance. The idea was that while the most prominent leaders were in the MacDonald Government, their places had been taken by young and inexperienced people who initiated a new policy. The congress had only to meet and the old traditional order would be re-established.

These were the hopes from which the reformists of all countries gained solace. They expected the access to power at this congress of worthy supporters of the class truce, such as Thomas, Clynes, etc. International reformism was setting its hopes on a retrograde movement, because the Right elements within the British Trade Union Movement

had been carrying on feverish organisational work during the last few months. To people like Thomas, who had repeatedly stated that he did not know to what class he belonged and that he is against the damnable class struggle, the veering to the Left is something monstrous and irrational. As the veering to the Left is a menace to their policy of class truce, they energetically took in hand the organisation of the Right-wing, the ideological amalgamation of all the elements dissatisfied with the policy of the General Council, etc. The Scarborough Congress was to put into power these aspirants to leadership and then the British General Council would, of course, revoke everything decided upon previously and would become a worthy member of the Amsterdam International. But in spite of the hopes of the Right-wing, the congress acted quite differently. This finds its explanation first and foremost in the fact that the economic situation in Great Britain has become worse during this year and that very energetic work is carried on in Great Britain by the National Minority Movement, which ideologically adheres to the R.I.L.U.

The Conference of the Minority Movement, held on the eve of the Scarborough Congress and attended by over 600 delegates, representing about 750,000 people, came to a decision on all the most important questions agitating the British Trade Union Movement. This conference, ignoring traditions, spoke without reservation and called a spade a spade, thus causing a storm of indignation in the entire bourgeois press. This press began to talk about Communism as a national disaster and yet only a couple of years ago prominent politicians had asserted that Communism could not possibly grow on British soil.

The Scarborough Congress could not help reckoning with decisions which had met with much sympathy among the British workers. The Minority Conference was the inevitable prelude to the Trades Union Congress, as it formulated in an unequivocal manner the aspirations and hopes of the most advanced section of the British Trade Union Movement. Thus, the extreme Left-wing came to the congress well-armed ideologically and politically.

The Right-wing also came to the congress well organised. What was the task of the Right-wing? To set back as far as possible the British trade unions, to prevent the congress making any decisions dangerous to the bourgeoisie and to do its utmost to render futile all decisions which were

directed against the class struggle. The retrograde tactics of the Right-wing had some results. Whenever there was the least opportunity, this reactionary wing endeavoured to restrain the congress, fearing it might go too far.

On four important questions the Right-wing suffered defeat. The congress veered mightily to the Left with respect to a very delicate question in the Labour Movement—the Colonial question. It is a well-known fact that for a long time the British proletariat was not only the actual but also the ideological participant in the exploitation of the Colonies. To the average British trade union leader the existence of the Colonies was a matter of course and at the congresses of the British trade unions and of the Labour Party, decisions were based on the assumption that the existence of the British Empire and the enslavement of the Colonies are an unchangeable fact. There had not been a single decision in the history of the British trade union movement touching upon the question of the independence of Colonial countries. It was necessary for the British Labour Movement to experience the war, the Versailles Peace, the Dawes Plan, permanent unemployment and the beginning of the disintegration of the British Empire, to come to the recognition of the right of the enslaved Colonies to separation. The leader of the reactionary Right-wing of the British Trade Union Movement, Thomas, dared not unfold his Colonial philosophy at this Congress. What he used to say in his capacity of Colonial Secretary he was afraid to say from the platform of a workers' congress. It is one thing to give an interview in the capacity of Cabinet Minister, to speak at bourgeois banquets and to sing the praises of the great British Empire, promising to protect the goods grabbed by the British bourgeoisie, and another thing to come to a workers' congress and to prove that the enslavement of hundreds of millions of Colonial workers is profitable to British workers.

The decision of the Scarborough Congress to support the Colonial peoples in their struggle, even for separation from the Empire, represents a turning point in the British Labour Movement. It means that considerable sections of the British proletariat begin to understand that the freedom of the workers of the mother country cannot be built up on the enslavement of Colonial workers. If one compares the decision of this congress with the decisions of the Amsterdam International on this question, one will realise how much to the Left of the official policy of the Amsterdam is the British Trade Union Movement.

The second important question on which the Congress disappointed the leading nucleus of Amsterdam is the question of unity. As I have already stated there were great hopes among the leaders of the Amsterdam International that it would be possible to abrogate in Scarborough the decision of the Hull Congress and to shelve the agreement of the General Council and the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council on the formation of an Anglo-Russian Unity Committee. The congress sorely disappointed the Right Amsterdammers. It not only endorsed the agreement between the British and Soviet trade unions, but also adopted a decision which is certainly a step forward compared with Hull.

A year ago most of the British trade union leaders thought international trade union unity possible only through Amsterdam. They held the view that the Russian trade unions must enter Amsterdam and that this would solve the problem of unity. But as they fathomed more and more this very complicated problem, as they became familiar with the world Trade Union Movement and watched the awakening of the Labour Movement in the East and the work of the R.I.L.U., they became more and more convinced that unity cannot be achieved within the framework of Amsterdam and that the slogan of the entry of the Russian unions into the latter is not by any means a solution of the task before the Labour Movement. Hence the decision of the Scarborough Congress.

This decision proclaims the necessity of establishing an all-embracing world federation of trade unions, but says nothing concerning Amsterdam. Cramp, the representative of the Right-wing raised at once the question of the interpretation of this decision. He wanted to know if this decision does not imply agreement between Amsterdam and the R.I.L.U. and received the answer: "The General Council will explain the meaning of this decision." Cramp's apprehensions are well-founded. In fact, what does the establishment of an all-embracing world federation of trade unions mean? How is this to be achieved? Can it be achieved without a world unity congress? Evidently not. The speakers at the congress, in dissecting the resolution, emphasised that this involved the convocation of a congress at which trade unions adhering to Amsterdam and to the R.I.L.U. and also unions outside these two Internationals would be represented. We are convinced that, when the General Council begins to interpret the decision adopted, it will be compelled to follow these lines—otherwise no all-embracing world federation of trade unions can be established.

On one more question the Scarborough Congress took up a fighting attitude, namely on the question of factory and workshop committees. It is a well-known fact that the reactionary trade union bureaucrats fear these committees more than anything else, as they do not want direct organisation of the lower strata. To have to deal with organised factories and works is a much more difficult affair than to have to do with individual delegates. That is why the Right-wing of the Amsterdam International is so against factory and workshop committees, considering this a Communist slogan. The Scarborough Congress declared itself in favour of the organisation of factory and workshop committees. This means an enormous step forward on the road to the establishment of a truly revolutionary and strongly welded-together trade union movement. This decision caused consternation among the reactionary leaders. Factory and workshop committees are the things they want least of all. They know the revolutionary nature of factory and workshop committees and their role in times of acute social crisis. They will, of course, do their utmost to counteract the decision which was adopted and to bring it to nought if not throughout the country, at least in their own industries. Will the Right-wing succeed in sabotaging this decision? To judge by the mood of rank and file trade unionists, the Right leaders will meet with stubborn resistance from below. Did not the railwaymen's delegation at the Scarborough Congress compel Thomas not to speak against factory and workshop committees? Thomas had to keep silent if he did not want to cut himself irretrievably adrift from his own union.

Finally, a very significant fact was the hostile attitude of the Scarborough Congress to the Dawes Plan. It is well-known that the Dawes Plan is the child of MacDonald, the same MacDonald who came into power with the support of the British trade unions. Did not MacDonald work for the Dawes Plan under cover of the interests of the working class of Great Britain? And lo and behold the first congress after the introduction of this Plan takes up a decidedly negative attitude to this child of Labour treachery. This decision is of great political importance. First of all it throws a vivid light on the differences between the interests of the working class of Great Britain and the policy of the so-called Labour Government. A bigger smack in the face MacDonald could not have received. It is true MacDonald's name is not mentioned in the resolution, but everyone knows very well what is the matter. It was certainly not mere chance that MacDonald did not meet at the Congress with

the reception which was always vouchsafed him on such occasions. Usually, when MacDonalld put in an appearance at Trades Union Congresses, he was asked to speak. This time only one section of the Congress met him with applause, the majority of the Congress remained silent; he did not receive an invitation to speak and left disconcerted. The decision against the Dawes Plan must be looked upon as a serious rift in the Labour Party, which is built up on the trade unions.

Apart from its significance at home, this decision will also find an echo abroad. Everyone knows that the Amsterdam International and the Second International have given their blessing to reparations and the Dawes Plan. The Executive Committee of the Amsterdam International officially defended the Dawes Plan as the "only way out." Suddenly, the strongest organisation of the Amsterdam International opposes this plan, which brings forcibly into collision the various tendencies within the Amsterdam International. The French and Belgian reformists, who carried on an Entente policy in the Amsterdam International, will be the first to feel the blow. The leading nucleus of the Amsterdam International finds it increasingly difficult to agree with the conduct of the British Trade Union Movement. This decision brings the British and the German trade unions into a particularly acute collision. Do not German trade unionists in all consciousness defend the Dawes Plan? And all of a sudden the British express themselves, in spite of their German colleagues, against the enslavement of the German proletariat by means of the Dawes Plan. Thus it has come to pass that the Germans support the enslavement of the German proletariat whilst the British protest against this. A more piquant situation for the Germans it would be difficult to find. But, not the least abashed, the latter continue to dance attendance and grovel in submission. The relations between the German and British trade unions are bound to become more strained and they are strained enough already. To what extent they are strained became evident by the attitude taken up by the leader of the British miners, Cook, in Berlin and Essen. Cook said quite openly to the German workers what the British think of the Dawes Plan, of class truce, of the tactics of the General Federation of German Trade Unions, of the conduct of the German miners' union, etc. The official organ of the German Miners' Union "*Bergarbeiterzeitung*" said that "Cook's shameless speech was a conglomeration of platitudes, stupidities and impudence. We trust that Cook, who abused in a downright low manner his position

in the trade unions when he said that he is speaking on behalf of the British Miners' Federation, has set foot on German territory for the last time." If we bear in mind that these compliments were addressed to a colleague in the Amsterdam International and in the Miners' International, we will be able to gauge the degree of mutual animosity.

If with respect to these four fundamental questions the congress has made an important stride forward it did not budge on a number of other questions because of the traditions and conservatism which are still very strong in the leading circles of the British Trade Union Movement. This was particularly noticeable on the question of industrial unions, of the competence of the General Council and of the attitude to the seamen's strike which was then proceeding, etc.

We are witnessing an extremely curious phenomenon. The British Trade Union Movement is veering more and more to the Left whilst its ideology is lagging behind its practice. In practice, the British Trade Union Movement has already entered the class struggle—in theory this has not yet been sufficiently substantiated and crystallised in the resolutions and decisions of the congress. The clash of class interests is particularly visible now in Great Britain. The working class feels that bourgeois society, welded together and armed to the teeth, is against it. In view of restricted markets and the determination of the bourgeoisie to reduce the standard of living of the working class at all costs, the internal differences are becoming more acute and compel the disjointed British Trade Union Movement to weld itself together to offer resistance to the enemy's offensive. This necessity of collecting all the forces under one control is felt much more strongly below than above, for the upper stratum of the Trade Union Movement, especially as represented by the Right-wing, hopes that by means of negotiations and persuasion to succeed in avoiding serious struggle, whilst the rank and file and the more sensitive leaders feel the coming of a social collision and are, therefore, endeavouring to establish as strong and united a front as possible.

The attempts of the miners to form a quadruple alliance of metal workers, transport workers, railwaymen and miners, did not lead to any practical results in spite of the formal consent of the Executives of all these organisations. The agreement exists only on paper, whilst in reality it has been sabotaged, thanks to Thomas and Co., who cannot

imagine any possibility of action when interests are at stake which are not those of their union. Such an attitude is quite natural for people like Thomas. They are against action when the interests of those sections of Labour are at stake at the head of which they are; why then should they act in defence of the workers of other branches of industry?

The Scarborough Congress did not go any further than what actually exists and it did not do so because many big trade unions were categorically against the adoption of new tactics called forth by the growing acuteness of the class struggle. They were particularly afraid to extend the powers of the General Council, for under existing conditions this would mean centralised leadership of the coming struggle. In the case of many trade unionists the interests of their union predominate over class interests; there is a lurking hope in their minds—"Perhaps the coming storm will not affect my union."

In spite of this the Scarborough Congress is an important landmark in the development of the British Labour Movement. In spite of the relics of the old, the progress noticeable within the masses of the British proletariat found an echo in it. It reflected the solemn dissatisfaction, the ferment and the indecision of the masses in search of new methods and forms of struggle. No matter how vague and indistinct some of the formulæ may be—this determines the state of affairs. Life itself will introduce the necessary alteration into the vague formulæ, practical struggle will do what has been left undone by the congress. To understand the trend of development of the British Labour Movement one must first of all turn to the real struggle of the British proletariat and then only after that to the resolutions of its congresses. The situation in Great Britain is perfectly clear: the veering to the Left is proceeding steadily

V. Between Moscow and Amsterdam.

We have seen that the British Trade Union Movement has made one step forward, the German two steps backwards and the French, owing to the balance of power between the Unity and reformist trade unions, only half a step forward, as far as unity is concerned.

To gauge correctly the mood which exists at present in the Trade Union Movement attention should be directed to the congress of the Norwegian trade unions, which was

held at the end of last August. The Norwegian Trade Union Movement, just as the entire Scandinavian Trade Union Movement, has its peculiarities. It did not have to go through a war and post-war crisis and had the benefit of several years in which to develop normally. From among the unions in the Amsterdam International, the Norwegian Trade Union Movement was the first to take up a Left attitude by participating in the foundation of the R.I.L.U. The Norwegian trade unions always kept up a connection with the R.I.L.U. although they were affiliated to the Amsterdam International. In 1923, the Norwegian Trade Union Federation decided to leave the Amsterdam International, but stopped half-way, postponing the question of affiliation to the R.I.L.U. for an indefinite period. And thus it remains up till now floating, so to speak, between Amsterdam and Moscow. In 1924, at the Scandinavian Conference in Copenhagen, an attempt was made to draw the Norwegian Federation into the Amsterdam International, but this met with stubborn resistance on the part of the Norwegian trade union members.

Although the correlation of forces within the Norwegian Trade Union Movement is not in our favour (Communists are in the minority), nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the Right-wing manœuvred all the time towards Amsterdam, the congress of Norwegian trade unions adopted a decision deserving of serious consideration.

The congress decided to give energetic support to the Anglo-Russian Committee and to all its measures directed towards unity by the establishment of an organisational connection with this Committee. The congress expressed itself in favour of an international unity congress and of the establishment of an all-embracing world federation of trade unions and resolved not to affiliate either to the Amsterdam International or to the R.I.L.U. before the establishment of a united International.

This policy of the Norwegian Trade Union Congress is very characteristic. It deserves attention because it reflects the present frame of mind of a considerable number of trade union organisations. A number of trade unions not affiliated at present either to Amsterdam or to Moscow have adopted a waiting attitude, refusing to affiliate to either of the Internationals in the hope of compelling thereby the establishment of one united International. As the struggle for unity gains in strength and as more and more sections of workers

favour the establishment of a united International, the fusion of organisations maintaining a waiting attitude will go on. One should bear in mind that such a situation is frequently called forth by the endeavour to preserve national unity. Frequently our supporters have been advised not to affiliate to the R.I.L.U. if this should be instrumental in causing a split, but to work for the fusion of the R.I.L.U. and the Amsterdam International into one united International.

What is our attitude to this kind of decision? We consider that the Norwegian Trade Union Congress, which up to quite recently occupied an indefinite position, is promoting the cause of unity by a decision of this kind. The Anglo-Russian Committee cannot but pay attention to organisations which, while outside both the Internationals, are offering it support and help. It must get into close contact with them and as the connection between the Anglo-Russian Committee and all the organisations in sympathy with the cause of unity gains in strength, the cause will progress in spite of the Right-wing of the Amsterdam International.

VI. Conclusions.

What are the conclusions that may be drawn from this brief review of the various congresses which have just concluded? First of all the British and German congresses demand comparison. The German congress embodied the theory and practice of the Amsterdam International in its adulterated form. The British congress deserted the old positions of Amsterdam and in doing so came in opposition to the Amsterdam International.

What is peculiar in this situation is the fact that the German Trade Union Movement is now the most important mouthpiece of Amsterdam, whereas the British, the traditional British Trade Union Movement, in destroying its own traditions, is also destroying the conservatism and reactionary policy of Amsterdam.

The British Trade Union Movement is moving to the Left, not only thanks to objective conditions, but also owing to the schematic and systematic work of the British Communist Party and Minority Movement. In Great Britain an unwavering growth in the influence of the Communist Party and the revolutionary minority within the British Trade Union Movement is in progress. The swing to the

Left is acquiring an ever clearer character due to the steadily increasing efforts on the part of the Communist elements in the Trade Union Movement.

In Germany there is quite a different picture. There the influence of the Communist Party has considerably weakened during the last year and a half. The Communist Party in the Trade Union Movement has been developing backwards.

The influence which it wielded in 1923 is on the wane. The last congress in Breslau was the apotheosis of reactionary blockheads with an almost complete absence of any opposition. We are thus faced with two types, two methods of Communist work in the trade unions. A comparison of these two methods with the example of Great Britain shows us at a glance how work should be carried on in line with the decisions of the Comintern.

The British and German trade unions include approximately 75 per cent. of the Amsterdam International (their forces are now numerically equal). The German trade unions, just as in pre-war days, are now commencing to play an important role in the International, but this role is of a different nature. Before the war they forged ahead of other trade unions and in fact the British trade unions lagged very far behind. Now things have changed to a considerable extent. The German trade unions are at the tail-end of the European Trade Union Movement, while the British trade unions occupy a position which provoked savage attacks on the part of all the conservative and reactionary elements in the world Labour Movement. If we compare the Congresses in Breslau and Scarborough and the trade union and Socialist press of Germany and of Great Britain, we see that the British Trade Union Movement is emerging from the narrow framework of economism, is tearing asunder the old conservative trade union traditions and is setting itself general class tasks. On the other hand we see that the German Social-Democratic Trade Union Movement is sinking deeper and deeper into the mire of the class truce and is donning the old cast-off trade union garments. Whereas the Britishers are deciding questions as to factory and workshop committees and are seeking forms and methods for increasing the fighting power of the trade unions, are organising themselves for the coming struggle and are discussing in the Socialist press the problem as to whether the workers should arm for the struggle against reaction—the German trade unions are busy with workers' banks, are

idolising Building Guilds, jabbering about economic democracy, are bowing lower and lower before the bourgeoisie and are persistently persuading it to adopt the united front with the trade unions. The British Trade Union Movement has faced round towards the U.S.S.R. and taken up a firm anti-militarist position, while the German Trade Union Movement is further consolidating its anti-Soviet and anti-Communist positions.

What is the position of Amsterdam after all these congresses? Can it count on the British trade unions any longer? The most optimistic leader of the Amsterdam International was compelled to say no. The conflict between the British trade unions and the Right-wing of the Amsterdam International after Scarborough is growing to considerable dimensions. Morally speaking, the British trade unions are no longer within the Amsterdam International, although they still remain there organisationally. This does not prevent Oudegeest and the rest beating the drum and shouting about unheard of successes of the Amsterdam International and its would-be numerous legions. Scarborough signifies an ideological estrangement from the Amsterdam International and an ideological rapprochement with the revolutionary Trade Union Movement. And this is of exclusive importance for the world Labour Movement.

An analysis of the work of these congresses bears witness to the fact that revolutionary ideas have penetrated so far into the Amsterdam International that entire national organisations are becoming "infected." These congresses have brilliantly confirmed the correctness of the Comintern and R.I.L.U. tactics and the question of International Trade Union Unity. There is no more popular idea and slogan than unity. That is why even the bitterest enemies of unity have been compelled to struggle against us, not with open visors, but by means of all kinds of underhand backbiting. But this does not worry us in the least. The united front has passed from the propaganda and agitational stage and entered the organisational stage. The ratification of the Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee by the Scarborough Congress, the commencement of work of this committee signify the practical realisation of the united front. The fact of an agreement between the British and Soviet trade unions refutes everything the Second and Amsterdam Internationals have written and spoken concerning the united front and unity. **The United Front and unity have been realised—**such is the conclusion that millions of workers will arrive at after Scarborough. If there were the slightest doubt as

to this, the declaration of the Joint Advisory Council should disperse these doubts. Indeed what did the Anglo-Russian Committee say? Here is the essence of their findings:

“The industrial and economic situation, aggravated by the Dawes Plan in most of the countries, has become worse since the beginning of this year.

“Unemployment is world-wide in its effects and is steadily increasing. The attacks of the employing class on the workers’ hours and wages become more and more definite and deliberate.

“Parallel with the growth of economic reaction, the political situation had become more and more reactionary and obstructive to working class interests. In the various parts of Europe reactionary groups of capitalists are obtaining more and more power and leadership in the policy of the State. The danger of war is becoming nearer and more evident. . . .

“War is being waged upon the Riffi in Morocco and upon the Arabs in Syria, while the Chinese workers and peasants, revolting against exploitation and usurpation, are held down by armed force. This is making clear to all workers of the world the insincerity of the lofty professions of peace made by capitalist statesmen.

“The Guarantee Pact places upon Germany the duty of using sanctions (military and economic penalties) against the States unwilling to submit to the League of Nations. The object of this is to include Germany in a military alliance directed against the U.S.S.R. (Soviet Russia).

“This would make Germany a constant menace to Soviet Russia and at the same time would create in Germany a strategical base for any projected attack upon the Soviet Republics.

“The establishment of an all-inclusive world-wide Trade Union International has, therefore, become more necessary than ever.

“The Joint Advisory Council appeals to the workers of every country, to their organisations and leaders, to join their efforts with the British and Russian Trade Union Movements in order to secure the removal of all ob-

stacles and difficulties in the way of national and international working class unity, and to help them to bring into existence one all-inclusive world-wide federation of trade unions."

Is it possible to dispute these findings if they arise from the interests of the working class? Can one say that the Joint Advisory Council has laid on the colours too thick or over-estimated the danger of growing reaction? It would be difficult to find a single worker who could assert this. Every honest proletarian must acknowledge that without unity there is no salvation. The Scarborough Congress and the declaration of the Anglo-Russian Committee bring the Amsterdam International face to face with the question of unity. Now their Jesuits, formulæ, lawyers and chicanery are of no use. A clear and definite answer must be given—for or against Scarborough, for or against the Russian Committee—for or against unity; we on our part answer clearly and without any prevarication—**for Scarborough, for the declaration of the Anglo-Russian Committee.**

Thus the cause of unity has entered on a new phase, but this does not mean that we are already on the eve of the solution of this complicated problem. By no means. Now, the results of the ratification of the Anglo-Russian Agreement are beginning to sprout throughout the entire world Labour Movement. In the reformist unions the question will arise as to whether to follow the Britishers or the Germans, i.e., for or against unity. The German trade union bureaucrats have placed themselves in such a position whereby they have become the centre of ideological reaction in the world Trade Union Movement. It was their desire and now they will receive their deserts.

A. LOZOVSKY.

Congress of the Second International

AN appendage to various Continental capitalist governments"—this is how Purcell described in the September number of the "Labour Monthly" the Socialist Parties which held their Congress in Marseilles. This definition finds confirmation not only in the trend of the discussions and the substance of the resolutions of the Marseilles Congress; it is repeated in every possible form in almost all the Social-Democratic organs which reported the Congress and it is repeated with pride and satisfaction even in a considerable number of speeches made there.

The ex-Minister, Henderson, according to the "Daily Herald" correspondent, at the opening of the Congress spoke to the following effect :

"They had reached the stage, both nationally and internationally, when the agitation and propaganda of the affiliated parties must be conducted with strict regard to the possibility—and even the probability—that the national leaders would be placed in the position of having to act as responsible Ministers." ("Daily Herald," August 24).

"Vorwärts" (September 2), divides the Parties of the Second International into three groups :

"These are parties which participated in governments based on the principle of coalition, or parties who governed the State as a minority government with the benevolent neutrality of part of the bourgeoisie, or parties which by systematic support made the existence of Left-bourgeois governments possible and which influenced and controlled them. There is at present in Europe hardly any Socialist Party which does not belong to one of these three categories."*

* The Central organ of German Social Democracy, by welcoming this "tactical veering round" with relation to the pre-war period, creates rather late in the day a very curious historiosophy. "For consideration of principle, the International deprived itself by the Amsterdam decision of 1904 of the only practical possibility to counteract successfully the growing peril of war, namely, by means of Socialist participation in governmental power. The world war would probably not have broken

“Before the war,” wrote Diamant, one of the P.P.S. leaders, on September 4, “Socialist parties did not participate in the political decisions of their countries. In this respect the position has utterly changed. The Congress hall is full of ex-Chancellors, ex-Premiers, ex-Ministers of Foreign Affairs, etc. Among the chairmen of the Congress we see the present Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgium, comrade Vandervelde and among the participants—active Ministers of various countries. **Therefore** the decisions of the Congress must reckon with the demands of the policy of to-morrow; they must be in agreement with the requirements of the policy of countries where Socialists participate in the Governments or influence the Government by their strength.”

“The whole treatment of the question (on averting the war peril—the most important question of the Congress)” wrote with a tinge of criticism the “Left” Vienna “Arbeiter Zeitung,” “was determined by the **nearness to the State**, or if you prefer it, to the **Government**, of many Parties of the International.”

And Vandervelde himself, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on active service, who was called by telegraph to Marseilles to settle the conflict with the British and who occupied the chair (together with the Swedish Minister, Meller), made the following statement under the tremendous applause of the Congress (see the Brussels “Le Peuple” of August 30th): “Soon one will be able to realise what a remarkable coincidence there is between the views expressed by the Marseilles Congress and the attitude of Government circles to the fundamental decisions of the future Guarantee Pact—especially in respect to the rôle which the League of Nations is to play.” The mechanism of this “remarkable coincidence,” this pre-disposed wonderful harmony is very simple indeed: Vandervelde was dispatched by the Belgian Government (not without previous agreement with the French on whose territory the Congress was held) to Marseilles in order to co-ordinate beforehand the resolutions of the Congress with the proposed tactics of the Government at the forthcoming Session of the League of Nations in Geneva.

out if Socialists had been able to influence the trend of events in one of the main interested countries. It was just in the spring of 1904 that such an opportunity presented itself in France: Jaures in the Viviani-Malvy Cabinet. And mankind would have probably been spared the terrible slaughter.” This can be read in print in the form of a leader under the title “International Realpolitik” in the correspondence from Marseilles in the aforesaid number of “Vorwärts.”

On a little closer examination of the discussions at the Marseilles Congress (especially in the Commissions) and of the groupings which were formed there, one is struck by the fact that these groupings were determined first of all by the **national** (or State) interests of the various Parties. It was only the consideration of the Left tendency in a number of countries among the workers following the Social-Democrats which was treated as of secondary importance

The first conflict burst out rather suddenly in the commission for struggle against unemployment in which the Belgian de Brouquère was reporter and boss. The British demanded that together with other causes of unemployment a prominent place should be given to the peace treaties and especially to reparations in kind paid by the Germans to France and Belgium. As a means of struggle against unemployment they proposed struggle for the revision of the Versailles Treaty and reduction of reparation payments to the amounts needed for the reconstruction of the regions actually destroyed. It is significant that after de Brouquère's threat to resign, the Germans, who were at first inclined to support the British, immediately turned round in order not break up the bloc with the French and Belgians formed on the basis of support for the Guarantee Pact. On the occasion of the discussion of the question at the Plenum of the Congress, Vandervelde, who was in the chair, thrust back another attack of the British, proposing to hand over the question to the Political Commission which had already prejudged the case.

The foremost big political question discussed in a special Commission and subsequently at the Congress, was the question of the peril of new wars. From beginning to end the resolution on this question is based on faith in the miraculous power of the League of Nations. After high-sounding phrases about the capitalist system being the main cause of the war peril, about this system leading to the Balkanisation of the whole world the outward signs of which are unemployment, high prices, valuta chaos, and economic financial crisis, about Socialism alone being able to put an end to all this, etc., the resolution goes on to deal in the second paragraph with the League of Nations. It must be re-organised into an "all-embracing and truly Democratic League," and it must be enlarged by the formation of an International Economic Council which must "study international problems of production and consumption, watch over valuta relations, facilitate international connections with transport, guarantee a just distribution of raw material among all nations, fight against the system of import duties and economic nationalism and

must also contribute to the adaptation and equalisation of economic legislation." Then follow a number of other demands as real as the others to the convocation by the League of Nations of a Conference which would make a decision on ways and means terminating ultimately in general disarmament. All this is to be achieved by "untiring systematic struggle" (the last paragraph deals with the action of the Labour and Socialist International—see below). Finally, the resolution came to the paragraph on "The International and separate agreements" which constitutes the framework and ornamentation for all the rest.

The question was whether one should include in this paragraph—after the complimentary remarks about the Geneva Protocol—as the best guarantee of peace (which was unfortunately rejected by the British Government) the point about support for the Guarantee Pact between Germany, France, Belgium and Great Britain. The French-Belgian-German bloc, standing shoulder to shoulder (to use Vandervelde's expression) was passionately **for**; the British were against, but not quite so passionately.

The opposition of the British was not a testimony of their radicalism; at the head of the British Delegation was Henderson, the most conservative of the Labour Party leaders, and Buxton—between whom there is not much to choose. But they have to reckon with the present moods of the British proletariat and must manoeuvre accordingly; hence their pacifism. Moreover, their opposition in Parliament does not compel them like their Continental friends to be ahead of the policy of their Government.

Buxton's speech at the Plenum of the Congress reflected their contradictions. Statements to this effect were made there: "We workers must do **everything** to prevent the outbreak of new wars. We must use **every means** which we may consider suitable to fight against war. Let us follow the example of our **Dutch** comrades, an example which has shown what can be done for disarmament. Let us follow the example of our comrades in **Holland** and **Sweden**."

"We depend on the Social-Democratic Ministers in Brussels and Prague to do the same. . . . We must prevent a repetition of 1914. What are the means which we must bring into play now in the struggle for peace? On the one hand, we must organise **parliamentary action** on an international scale and on the other hand we must declare a **general strike** with the help of the International

Trade Union Federation in the event of another war threatening us.”

After preaching this traditional general strike “in the event of, etc., etc.,” there came idiotic polemics with the Communists who, it was alleged, preach “desertion” from the army and wish to make use of “colonial wars to establish on their basis a better peace.” Buxton thereupon praised the Geneva Protocol and criticised the Guarantee Pact in which he saw lurking the danger of the division of Europe into two camps, one of them turning its shafts against the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, Buxton proposed to the Congress to leave the question of the Guarantee Pact open and to leave it to every Party to vote as it should think proper.

Hilferding was the co-reporter. In an artificial, pompous and insincere speech he tried to prove a number of extraneous matters, in order to find a snug little place for the Guarantee Pact as the inevitable immediate stage in the **real** fight for peace.

“It is bad enough that we still live under capitalism and that our life is only worth living because we are fighting against capitalism. But that we should once more lay down our lives for capitalism is an intolerable and revolting idea. Therefore the problem confronting us appears to-day in a different guise. The Labour Movement has grown, its influence on politics is stronger, we have become in all countries a more important, a more direct factor than we ever were.” And then Hilferding propounded an original theory: “The power of capitalism and imperialism has immeasurably grown, but the political superstructure is liable to change. If the workers are still dependent economically, if they, to quote Henderson, are still slaves, politically they can and must become freer and freer, adding eventually economic freedom to their political freedom.”

“One must accomplish a **great ideological revolution**; in lieu of the bourgeois principle of nationality one must put forward the proletarian principle of nationality, the principle of solidarity and collaboration. Germany must enter the League of Nations unconditionally and without reservations. Russia must enter the League of Nations. The U.S.A. must enter the League of Nations. Our triple slogan must be: Guarantees, arbitration, disarmament. All this can be achieved by the Geneva Protocol. But as long as we have not got it, the Guarantee Pact can be a step towards its realisation. We shall have made the first step

towards the most realistic pacifism when from this Congress the proletarian principle of nationality will permeate the consciousness of the whole world. This will be the historical merit of this Congress. . . . then the sacrifices of the last decade will not have been in vain." (The minutes of the Congress place on record: thunderous and prolonged applause).

Blum was the third reporter on the question of the struggle against war. He began by pointing out the enormous successes since Hamburg. Then there was the occupation of the Ruhr. "The Dawes Plan which I hope has finally settled the question of reparations has been signed. Do you imagine that the Dawes Plan would have been historically possible without our Frankfurt work in 1922 and without the resolution of five countries which placed the problem of reparations on an entirely new economic and financial basis? The same applies to the Guarantee Pact. When I read for the first time the text of the German Memorandum of February 9, I said to myself: 'This text seems familiar to me, I must have read it somewhere. . . .' This was the protocol signed at Easter, 1922, by the representatives of German Social-Democracy and by our French comrades. . . . This is what the International has accomplished. The idea of the Guarantee Pact is imbued with the same spirit as the Geneva Protocol. The British cannot say no, if the Germans and French say yes. Hilferding spoke here like a good German, and I, I believe, like a good Frenchman. And yet it would seem that our speeches were imbued with the same spirit and the same inner conviction."

As a result of the work in the Commission a compromise was arrived at between the British and the "Continental Bloc"; it is said in the resolution about the Guarantee Pact that it can be supported, provided it corresponds with the definite demands. When the text of the Pact is known a special conference of the interested countries will be convened. In reality this result was a victory of the Franco-Belgian-German Bloc, the resistance of the British had been overcome. Vandervelde returned to Brussels and then came a busy time for the Socialist advisors of the Paris and Berlin Governments.

When the time comes to place the Guarantee Pact before the British Parliament for ratification, the Right Wing of the Labour fraction will probably support it. It is also probable that the Left Wing, whose opposition does not emanate from specifically national but rather social and revolutionary con-

victions, will oppose the Pact, which is directed against the Soviet Union.

“Vorwärts,” in its issue of September 2nd, expresses great satisfaction with this victory: “One of the most important results of the Marseilles Congress was that the British Labour Party, although only after the German, French and Belgian Socialists brought their pressure to bear, recognised its position and promised to support the Guarantee Pact on the supposition that this Pact will only be a stage on the road to the revival of the Geneva Protocol.”

The last paragraph of the adopted resolution speaks of “The action of the Labour and Socialist International” against the peril of war. Apart from **parliamentary** action no other forms of action are, of course, contemplated. But the resolution contains also the following paragraph:

“Side by side with this, the representatives of the International will emphasise quite as much this attitude of theirs in the struggle against the doctrine of Bolshevism which sets against the constructive will of Socialism its idea of blind destruction, only delaying thereby the hour when the proletariat will become the master of its destinies and will achieve its complete liberation by the establishment of freedom and well-being for all.”

In his explanation of the German Delegation’s vote Breitscheid remarked: “There is also another reason why parties adhering to the International were and are inclined to take upon themselves political responsibility for the State in which they live.

“Some but yesterday formed part of the Government, others are to-day part of the Government and there are among us but very few parties which do not always conform their policy with the supposition that there will again come a time when they will take upon themselves government responsibility.”

A very curious incident was Filippo Turatti’s manifestation on behalf of the “Left” section of the Congress. In his explanation of the vote the old reformist and revisionist, who already previous to the war was on the extreme Right of the Second International, brought forward a series of reservations of the Italian “Unitarians” on behalf of the Austrian Party, the Russian Mensheviks, the German Party of Czechoslovakia, the Polish “Independents,” the German Party of Poland, the Lithuanians, Roumanians and Greeks.

He said that the resolution for which all these parties voted should have been, in their opinion, more Socialist and Marxist; it should appeal only and clearly to the proletarian forces and systematic struggle; it should disperse the sentimental illusions of bourgeois pacifism, be less diplomatic and abstract, whereas there was not a word in it against militarism, no condemnation of the peace treaties, etc."

An analogous and also "Left" declaration was made in the Commission by Karl Renner on behalf of the Austrian Right, the most extreme Right in existence. He found fault with the resolution because it is not critical enough and too optimistic with respect to the League of Nations, and also because it does not take up a critical attitude to the peace treaties. However, in view of de Brouquère's statement that the "Austrian question, namely, the question of the self-determination of the Austro-German people, is to remain on the agenda!" Renner decided not to bring forward his motion with respect to this.

In the large hall of the Marseilles Town Hall, under the big painting depicting the arrival of the Tsarist fleet in the Marseilles Court in 1892 (presented by Nicholas II.), the Commission for eastern questions held its session during the last two evenings of the Congress. The centre of discussion was, of course, the Soviet Union and the Communist International. Bauer's introductory report was, of course, drawn up on the time-honoured plan of "on the one side and on the other side." After the discussion, in which Dan was moderate, supported Bauer and drew attention to the peril of war emanating from the Border States, Tchernov, on the contrary, was immoderate and waxed indignant at the rôle of the Bolsheviks in the Chinese revolution. The Polish "Independents" and the Roumanians made a fierce attack on their Governments, the P.P.S. representative defended his Government, vouching for its boundless pacifism. A Commission was elected consisting of Bauer, Nedzialkovsky (P.P.S.), Sukhomlin, Dan and Tseretelli, for the purpose of elaborating the resolution. The "medium" text concocted in this manner did not find any sympathy among the British who considered it, in spite of the "complete detachment" of the clever acrobat Bauer, too aggressive in respect of the Soviet Union, or among the French and the Belgians who, supported by the Germans, accused him of an excess of moderation. After a fight of many hours, many British amendments supported by Margaret Bondfield, were adopted by 164 votes against 11 votes, with 84 abstentions.

The resolution points out that of late the differences be-

tween the capitalist imperialist powers have become very acute, especially between Great Britain on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other side. The elements which are frightened at the nationalist revolutionary movements in China, India, and the Mohammedan countries are urging an aggressive policy with relation to the Soviet Union. "The Communist International is labouring under the illusion that the liberation of the workers will be presented to it on the bayonet points of the victorious Red Armies and that for victory of the world revolution a new war is essential. It encourages revolutionary movements in Asia and Africa, hoping to deal capitalism a deadly blow with their support." The peril of a new world war as an outcome of these differences is causing great anxiety to the States adjoining Russia and also to the Balkan States. This anxiety is accentuated by the fact that the frontiers of many of the newly-created States are contrary to the principle of national self-determination. Moreover, on the one hand, revolutionary outbreaks are organised in these countries under the influence of the Communist International in order to reduce them to the fate of Georgia and Armenia, and on the other hand, the capitalist imperialist powers want to use them as a weapon against the Soviet Union. In view of this :

1. The Labour and Socialist International recognises the right to self-determination of the newly-formed States ; it is against aggressive policy with respect to the Soviet Union and it welcomes the recognition of the Soviet Union by a number of countries due to a considerable extent to the action of the Labour and Socialist International. The latter circumstance entitles the L.S.I. to urge the Russian people to aim at complete political freedom.

2. The L.S.I. welcomes the awakening of the Chinese, Indian and Mohammedan masses. As the only means to prevent a world war the L.S.I. enjoins all the Parties to carry on an energetic struggle for the right of self-determination of all the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa.

The L.S.I. expresses solidarity with the Chinese workers and demands expressly for China the removal of foreign pressure (!), the abrogation of capitulations and the immediate introduction (by whom?) of up-to-date labour protective legislation for the exploited Chinese workers.

3. The L.S.I. demands the right to self-determination especially for Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and other peoples who won State independence during the revolution.

For this purpose it invites the Soviet Union to enter the League of Nations under whose control arbitration and a plebiscite will take place. As to the other States with national minorities, the L.S.I. recommends the bestowal on them of autonomy, equality of rights and freedom of cultural development.

4. The L.S.I. condemns terrorism in the various countries and especially in Bulgaria.

It is this masterpiece of a resolution which the Vienna "Arbeiter Zeitung" calls "purely Marxist." Claiming it proudly as an Austrian production, it sets it against the not-sufficiently-Marxist resolution on the Guarantee Pact, supported by Bauer in his report and extolled at the Congress as the height of eloquence and smartness, causing him to be characterised as probably "the biggest man in the International."

Speaking of the difficulties which had to be overcome in the Commission, Bauer found "disinterested" reasons for all differences; he "understood" all and excused all. Speaking of the Georgian Menshevik emigrés and of the Armenian Dashnaks (who, by the by, demand in a special memorandum the right to self-determination for the Kurds under the protection of British imperialists), Bauer declared with the applause of the Congress: "It would be superhuman to demand from these comrades the detachment of a sane historian with respect to the oppressors of their peoples. The representatives of the Border States are possessed by the justifiable fear that the national freedom of these countries, which has been won in innumerable battles throughout centuries, at the price of heavy sacrifices, could be destroyed by the policy of the Soviet Union."

Bauer also understands and excuses the hatred of the Bolsheviks which animates the Blums, Renaudels, Hilferdings and Breitscheids because the Bolsheviks have "destroyed" the unity of "their" proletariat. Therefore, said Bauer, "we" were "frequently uneasy" concerning the failure of some members of the British Labour Party to adopt a sufficiently critical attitude when dealing with the Bolshevik problem.

He, the disinterested, impartial, sane and well-balanced Bauer, demands on the one hand that the imperialist powers should cease their hostile policy to the Soviet Union and threatens them "with stubborn, relentless resistance" (Where? How? By what means?), and on the other hand he demands in the same breath "most emphatically that Bol-

shevism should democratise its regime in Russia, declaring his solidarity with the struggle of the Russian comrades (namely, the friends of Tchernov and Dan) for this democratisation, etc."

Thereupon Bauer described with great enthusiasm "the process of the awakening of the peoples of the East, the beginning of the glorious revolt of the last big reserve army of capitalism." He declared that what was happening there was "our own cause" and in conclusion he sent, under the thunderous applause of the audience, "greetings" to the struggling Chinese workers. (Literally "Unser Gruss.")

And at the same time he foresaw, with eyes dilated with fear, that "this movement in the East, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, will infringe the equilibrium of forces there (yes!); that it will undermine the domination of the great Powers, generate the peril of war and be a menace for the European proletariat; that it will cause a world conflagration IF the European and American proletariat does not prove strong enough to bestow by its own strength the freedom for which the peoples are fighting, so that this freedom need not be achieved by means of wars."

"Bestow freedom"—how, by what means? Maybe by sending greetings? Maybe in the League of Nations? Perhaps through the influence of the Vanderveldes?

Having reached this culminating point in the description of the prospects of struggle in the Far East, Bauer made a jump to the Near East, to the Balkans, and perorated on national autonomy and freedom of cultural development, emphasising that this national programme was taken by him from the noble P.P.S., after which he shed a few not very salty tears on the fate of the victims of terrorism in Italy, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and on the fate of the S.R., Gotz.

At the close of his report, Bauer felt it necessary to connect it with what was said and decided upon in relation to the preceding item on the agenda. "I know," said he "why you struggle, with such infinite care and assiduity, with the complicated problems of the Guarantee Pact and the League of Nations in order to get rid of the barbed wire—a relic of the trenches to be found everywhere. You endeavour to do this by the methods of international law, you put all your knowledge, your assiduity and your forces into this. . . . What results can you expect from your work? Undoubtedly only a hard-won compromise between our will to peace, which

after all rests only on imposed agreements, tantamount to the refusal of freedom to whole nations, and our will to freedom restricted by the fact that we are bent on preserving peace.

"I will reiterate; this work of everyday compromise is essential; it is important; the barbed wire must be got rid of. . . . [What an amount of sanity, cleverness and self-denial!] Yes, it is essential to get rid of the barbed wire. But it is the **other**, the recognition of the great world revolution and our revolutionary tasks in it, the great historical perspective towards which all eyes are turned—it is this which is essential to us, for it is only this which is capable of filling the young growing generation, the entire working class, with that enthusiasm which alone is capable of gaining the world for Socialism."

The Hall, in which **this** Congress was held, was still resounding with the applause with which the grateful audience of the Removers of Barbed Wire rewarded Bauer's rhetorical achievement, when de Brouquère was already ascending the platform, in order to give expression on behalf of at least a dozen delegations to a reservation to the great historical perspective and the enthusiasm evoked by it.

"On behalf of the following Parties: France, Poland, Esthonia, Latvia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Yugo-Slavia, Georgia, Hungary, Finland, Belgium and Sweden, I make the following declaration: "We vote for the resolution in spite of a number of reservations which we are compelled to make. The first reservation is that unfortunately the French amendment drawing attention to the menace of **East European** (namely Soviet) imperialism was not accepted. In it we pointed out clearly what the attitude should be with relation to the Russian bayonet methods. Secondly, there is a consensus of opinion that Soviet Russia must be recognised. We agree with it, but we want this re-inclusion of Russia into the comity of nations to be effected through its entry in the League of Nations. Thirdly, we think it a bad method that the resolution touches also upon the Colonial question when we have just decided to deal with this question **only two years hence at the next Congress.**"

"Why then after all do we vote for this resolution? Because it proclaims the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination and not only (!) of peoples oppressed by Western Imperialism. I have in mind Armenia and when my eyes are drawn in this assembly to the Georgian comrades I am agitated not by feelings of commiseration but by feelings of shame that at this time of the day there can be no exiles. . . .

As all this is expressed unequivocally in the resolution we will vote for it in spite of its shortcomings."

By a special decision the question of Morocco—during the whole Congress held in Marseilles, from where troops were despatched every day to the Riff front, the speakers managed very cleverly to avoid almost entirely mentioning Morocco in their perorations—was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Eastern Commission and transferred to the General Commission, whose business it was to remove the barbed wire by means of international law.

The Commission elaborated a resolution which was in substance and even in its wording a replica of the resolution carried at the end of July at the Conference of the French, British and Spanish Parties in Paris, a resolution which has been entirely ignored by the interested Governments during the months which have elapsed since then.

(This resolution was moved on the last day of the Congress without a report and without discussion and was, of course, adopted unanimously).

The resolution "demands" the publication of the conditions of peace decided upon by Spain and France and demands at the same time that Abd-el-Krim should give a clear answer to these conditions which are to be published.

The resolution also proposes to Spain (and France) to recognise the independence of the Riffi and a certain rectification of the frontier on economic considerations. The resolution also expresses conviction that the Moroccan question is one of the questions in which the League of Nations must intervene. The Riff State is to be allowed the right to enter the League of Nations.

And finally: "The League of Nations must establish a regime in harmony with the mandates already introduced by it."

Allow me to remind you, Mr. Bauer, that you voted for this resolution.

After this, what price your rhetorical exercises, your great historical perspectives and your enthusiasm?

Yet another important decision was adopted at the Congress with respect to the development of the Second International in the near future: the decision to transfer the seat of the Secretariat of the Executive Committee to Switzerland. Although this decision was explained at the Congress by the personal interests of the secretary, Friedrich Adler, who could not possibly be replaced (the latter confided to the Congress from the platform his family affairs and had the doubt-

ful taste to remind the audience of a one-time terrorist act committed by him to the detriment of his personal interests), it is evident that the transference of the Secretariat from Great Britain to the Continent is entirely due to political considerations.

The rapid veering to the Left of the British Labour Movement created an intolerable position for an organisation which is going full steam ahead towards becoming an auxiliary weapon of the League of Nations and of the Big Powers within it. It was essential to withdraw the leaders of the Second International from a possible influence of this suspect. Switzerland was chosen—the only country on the Continent where there is no Party adhering to the Second International (the Swiss Social-Democratic Party does not form part of any International).

As far as possible from the workers, from the masses, as far as possible from whatever influences and temptations from “below.”

If the French Socialist, Paul Faure, closed the Marseilles Congress with the slogan “**neither Moscow nor Geneva**” the second part of this slogan was simply the manifestation of a bad conscience.

The Congress itself proceeded in Marseilles without any contact with the masses.

Only one-third of the enormous hall was occupied by delegates. The galleries were empty even on the day of opening, on Sunday and even during the evening sessions.

Contrary to the time-honoured custom, no public international meeting was arranged.

Parallel with the Congress of the Vanderveldes and Bauers, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Congress met in Marseilles convened by the Committee of Action against the war in Morocco. About one thousand delegates, working men and women, non-party people, Socialists, Reformists, Revolutionists and Communists, adopted unanimous simple fighting decisions on all the everyday questions agitating the masses and, in spite of the prohibition of the authorities, came out in full numbers into the streets to demonstrate in unison with the masses under revolutionary slogans.

The demonstration was dispersed by force of arms and many demonstrators were beaten and wounded.

Two Congresses—two worlds.

G. VALETZKY.

Zinoviev's Discussions with German Workers' Delegation

Two discussions took place on August 20th and 28th, 1925, between comrade Zinoviev, the chairman of the Communist International, and the German Workers' Delegation to the U.S.S.R., which was composed of Social-Democratic and non-Party workers.

The first discussion took place in the Moscow Kremlin. Comrade Bukharin was also present. The German Social-Democrat, comrade Freiburger, was in the chair. The second discussion took place in the Leningrad Soviet in the presence of hundreds of delegates from the Leningrad workers.

We publish the speeches made by Zinoviev and the workers of the German Delegation as they dealt openly and sincerely with the most pressing problems of the international Labour Movement.

But no matter what may ensue, the German Workers' Delegation in the U.S.S.R. will figure as a new chapter in the history of the German and the international Labour Movements. It marks a step forward in the organisation of the struggle against war, a step forwards towards international trade union unity and it must be a turning point—and this is what lends it such historical importance—in the relations between the Social-Democratic and the Communist workers of Germany.

Freiburger, Builder (S.P.G.)—We were invited to come here. During our tour of investigation throughout Russia we have all become more or less convinced that the unity movement of the trade unions must be realised at all costs. This evening we are to discuss what obstacles there have been hitherto in Germany, or what has prevented or is preventing Social-Democratic comrades—to put it plainly—from becoming **Communists**.

This is to be an informal discussion. Everyone is to say what he thinks. Since we have given our support here in Russia to the unity movement we are, of course, in duty bound to do so also in Germany. To-day we are to discuss the various ideas as to the best methods for promoting the trade union unity movement in Germany. We may all speak quite freely. We are all workers. The Russian Government is also composed of workers. The united front has, so to speak, already become a reality here. This is not a German Government office where certain formalities have to be observed. Here everyone can have his say. Here we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the German Delegation. This has been demonstrated during our stay in Russia.

Beer, Munich. Bookbinder (S.P.G.)—I had quite another idea about this matter. The trade union question was explained sufficiently last night. We gather from yesterday's discussion and from comrade Tomsky's statement that the trade union question is to be understood somewhat as follows: the united front of the trade unions is a task which the German workers must tackle. We thought that comrade Zinoviev would give us his views about the opinion which prevails here as to the relationship of Russia to the West European Powers.

Zinoviev.—Comrades, I should like to make a proposal.

In my opinion too, the pivot of to-day's discussion should be the trade union question because it is the pivot of the entire international Labour Movement. This does not mean that no other questions are to be discussed. All manner of questions may be put to us and we will answer them all. Therefore, please put to us also such questions as comrade Freiberger touched on in his opening remarks. He only formulated them too strictly. I want to be more modest. We Russians have not had the pleasure of having personal discussions with Social-Democratic workers, especially during the past few years. This is a regular feast day for us. A feast day in the sense that we can discuss matters with comrades from the German Social-Democracy, comrades who are sincerely in sympathy with the Russian Revolution. I do not want to ask you why you are not Communists, but what prevents the best Social-Democratic workers from collaborating with Communists, both with us as well as with German Communists. It is highly interesting to us to get to know the psychology of an honest German Social-Democratic worker who, in spite of everything that has happened in Germany since 1918-19, cannot find a common language with us; what is really the obstacle? What I mean is not party polemics in the usual sense; this would be useless. On the contrary, we are to find out what obstacles there are and how they can be overcome. I think the best plan would be for you to ask questions which I will answer. The first question, though, has been already put by me.

Tonn, Hamburg. Metal Worker (S.P.G.)—Someone must make a beginning. Comrade Zinoviev raised the question: what prevents the German workers and especially the Social-Democrats from collaborating with the Communists? He further said that this is not the place for Party polemics. I must say it will be probably impossible to eschew Party

polemics altogether, for everyone of us is a Party person and cannot shed his skin but must look upon everything from a Party standpoint. I will certainly not shed my skin, but must consider the matter from my **Social-Democratic Party standpoint**, if I may be allowed to say so. Neither will the Communist comrades be able to shed their skin, but will look at everything through Party spectacles.

There is first of all a question of principle. Communist policy is based on a different principle from that of Social-Democratic policy. We Social-Democrats take our stand, of course, on Social-Democracy. We say that relations and conditions must first develop, that the way to Socialism lies through Democracy, whilst the Communists say: to Socialism through the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. This is the difference in principle, but it is not so much this which prevents our collaboration with the Communists, **but the method of the propagation of their conception by the German Communists.** These methods are certainly not conducive from a workers' standpoint to close collaboration.

I cannot, of course, dilate on other towns and localities but must limit myself to the conditions in my locality. I must bring forward all my objections to the Communist methods there. To what extent this applies to other parts of Germany I do not know, but will, therefore, leave that to others.

This is what I want to say: the Communists had a slogan: Get rid of all Social-Democratic representatives in the factories and workshops regardless of their being active or not. This was, of course, to a certain extent possible and has happened. The consequence was that a considerable number of old capable colleagues were not openly accused of anything, but were attacked from behind and pushed aside. This was detrimental to the entire organisational life, for the comrades said: "If these are the tactics used against us, very well then, do everything yourselves." Where they were not got rid of they dissociated themselves from the organisational life of the workers. It came to such a pass that it was impossible to agree and that on the contrary disruption was brought into the ranks of the workers. The same was done from the Social-Democratic side. The Social-Democrats said: "Now **the others** are at work, you watch and see what **they** will do."

And now I will deal with the so-called nuclei. They were essential in Russia, because formerly it was not possible there to criticise conditions openly and the entire agita-

tion had to be transferred to the factories. But how does it stand with the nuclei in Germany? If the Russian comrades would peruse all the German nucleus newspapers—there are, of course, exceptions—they would see illustrations representing a broken down man with a newspaper in his hand and under it: “A Social-Democratic Factory Council and the nucleus newspaper.” This is to show how he trembles before the nucleus newspaper.

This cartoon is followed up by a whole page about the badness of the Social-Democratic Factory Council members and maybe by some accusation or other against a foreman who is supposed to have committed something or other. He is denounced. Then comes perhaps a small dose of high politics—and this is the way in which the Communists of my district carry on their work. That this kind of thing cannot lead to an understanding with Social-Democratic workers goes without saying. I did not know that we would enjoy here such freedom of discussion, otherwise I should have brought a few copies to show to the Russian workers how their colleagues in Germany carry on their work. Armed with this paper I went to my colleagues and said to them: “Formerly it was not necessary to criticise conditions in the factory in this manner and to-day this is all the more uncalled-for. If to-day we have something to criticise—whatever it may be—we must demand a session with the management at which everything can be arranged as it should be. If we have something to criticise in an official of the factory we call him before the Factory Council and say: In this or that you were wrong and you must change your attitude to the workers. It is hardly fair play not to say a word in the Factory Council and to put such things into the nucleus newspaper.” As I have said this is only a cloak for the cowardice of some of the Factory Council members. That collaboration cannot be brought about in this manner, goes without saying.

There is also another matter: Communist agitation takes the form of accusing Social-Democratic leaders of treachery. I think that if one is out to talk over Social-Democratic workers, one should not begin by saying: “Your leaders are traitors.” “The Eberts, Noskes and Scheidemanns” is the favourite jargon of the Communists. It is obvious that every worker who says to himself: “I belong to this Party, I have helped to elect these leaders”—although perhaps not exactly Ebert, Scheidemann and Noske—will defend these leaders just as the Communists defend theirs. We would be worthless fellows indeed if we were to foul our own nest. I think that one will never be able to

bring about collaboration with such methods. I want to go further and would like to say that at the meetings of trusted representatives of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, particularly in Hamburg, there is every inclination to deal gently with the Communists. But it is just the trusted representatives of the factories who demand that the Hamburg Party newspaper should proceed more energetically against the intrigues of the Communists. It is just these representatives who say: "You must act more energetically against the Communists." This shows that collaboration between the colleagues cannot be furthered that way. There were also the movements of March, 1921 and of October, 1923 when the Communist colleagues had their other colleagues ejected from the factory under false pretences.

I will give you a few examples of this: this is for instance what happened in March, 1921. The unemployed were told: "We are going to the shipyards to demand that you should be taken on." Among those who spoke was our colleague, Zoellner, a friend of mine whom I have met in the Volga district and a few others who recognise to-day that this was not right, but make the excuse that mistakes will happen. The Communist colleagues wanted something quite different. They did not want to have the unemployed reinstated in the shipyard. You will all say that it is nonsense to come along with a couple of hundred men and to demand their reinstatement. It was exactly the same in October. Again nothing was said about what really was the matter. The comrades were fetched out under the pretext that they must have higher wages. Then came on the following day the street fights of which you know and the storming of a few police stations. This was certainly not conducive to encouraging collaboration between the colleagues and to inspire them with confidence for one another. Moreover, it is self-evident that the only people who profit by this are the employers. I can maintain about us, the Factory Council of the firm Blom and Foss, that we carry on Party politics most of the time—one Party is incited against the other. I should like to give another example; in August, 1923, when inflation was at its highest, people were fetched out of the shipyards. An agreement was arrived at for a 300 per cent. rise. We were to vote on it. I am convinced that the result of the voting would have been "No." The Communists sabotaged the ballot. The ballot papers were scattered and no one was able to ascertain the result. After this had happened the same people who had manœuvred came and said: "Now it is your business to get the people back to work." The general strike had been called off. The

consequence was that the employers, far from paying the 300 per cent. rise, dealt out disciplinary punishment far beyond their first intentions.

That this, too, is not conducive to the establishment of the united front is certainly obvious.

There is one more thing which I would like to say: there is the idea among German Social-Democratic workers—I am going to say something which concerns particularly comrade Zinoviev—that **this attitude and these tactics are the orders received by the German Communists from Russia.** This idea is very prevalent among German Social-Democratic workers. I do not think that anyone will gain-say this. This is probably the reason that the Social-Democratic workers in Germany have not a good word to say about the Russian workers and leaders. It would be interesting to have the true state of affairs from a competent authority. In any case it would be in the interests of the movement and especially in Hamburg if I could say a few reassuring words to comrades on this matter. This is mainly what I had to say. On the strength of my experiences I wanted to tell the Russian comrades what in my opinion prevents agreement with the Communist colleagues.

Pennewitz, Chemnitz. Railwayman (S.P.G.)—In view of the composition of the delegation I have my doubts that to-day's discussion can have a satisfactory result. I can see already that our Communist comrades are beginning to fidget.

We are to investigate why there is to-day such an abyss between Social-Democrats and Communists, and I think that the main reason is the difference in the basic principles of the two parties. The Social-Democratic workers want to work on the basis of Democracy. The Communists maintain the standpoint of Proletarian Dictatorship. Moreover it should be borne in mind that the education of the Social-Democratic workers before the war was of a democratic nature. We had only to listen to the "Socialist March" to know the destination of the journey. It so happened that both these fundamental conceptions strove for power in 1918, with the result that the Communist conception did not assert itself but that the majority of the workers—perhaps under the influence of our leaders—decided to follow the democratic way.

Neither side wanted to give in and this is how the discord arose which led to splits among the workers. For instance Social-Democratic workers fail to understand why, during the discussion of the Factory Council Bill in the Reich-

stag, Communist members spoke to no purpose and why Communists did not take part in the discussions as they should have done when it was a case of making the best possible use of everything that democracy can offer.

Moreover, Communists frequently changed their slogan. At one time a struggle against the Factory Council legislation was organised, it being asserted that this legislation was a wretched and clumsy expedient. A few years later workers were urged to do their utmost for the utilisation of this legislation.

The attitude to the Reichstag is also a case in point which cannot please democratically-minded Social-Democrats. First of all it is asserted that one should not vote at all. Having come to the conclusion that one cannot capture the masses by such tactics, the following manœuvre was adopted: We take part in elections now, but only to show that the Reichstag is a talking shop.

And then there is the attitude to the trade unions. There was a time when, perhaps not officially, the Communist Party of Germany issued the slogan: Come out of the reformist trade unions! Form new trade unions! After that came the establishment of an independent railwaymen's union under the pretext that one cannot allow the expelled workers to run about uncared for.

In Saxony there was support for the union. People were encouraged to join it because it was the freest organisation for the class-conscious worker. When it became evident that although many workers left the trade unions they did not join this organisation, tactics were again changed and it was said that one must get into the trade unions. Although it was easy to get a section of the workers out of the trade unions, it was a thousand times more difficult to bring them back again.

Just one more point which has lately widened the gulf between us. Two years ago the tactics of the Communists amounted to not allowing any trade union meeting to arrive at positive results. The consequence was that Social-Democrats and Communists alike began to form their own defence forces. The Social-Democratic Party of Germany founded a "Reichsbanner Frontkaempferbund" and the Communists a "Red Frontkaempferbund." They had nothing better to do than to inflict injuries on one another which did not contribute to the progress of the working class but to the gaiety of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, no attempts are made in the C.P. to distinguish between the errors of the Social-Democratic leaders and the errors of the rank and file. When Social-Democratic leaders have made mistakes they are

thrown into the same pot with the rank and file and the latter are accused of being just such traitors. It is only lately that in this respect a change has taken place, because the C.P. realised that such tactics were no good. It is nothing but logic that if a comrade runs me down I have no inclination whatever to come to an understanding with him. I don't say that these tactics were not also used by the Social-Democrats. One thing leads to another.

One more item which was naturally made use of by the Social-Democratic press: Party disputes. I do not scruple to say that they were exaggerated. With respect to this there appeared in the "Rote Fahne," when the question of the united front was the order of the day, a letter to the Social-Democratic leaders—this was about the month of October—with the request to state what they thought of a common front against capitalism. The reply was to be sent within five days—this was, so to speak, an ultimatum—but one did not wait for the five days to elapse, but initiated on the following day an unprecedented baiting of the Social-Democratic leaders. It was clear to me that with such methods one could not expect a satisfactory answer for them. If the Social-Democratic leaders were not in favour of a united front, one should have waited the allotted time for the reply which could then have been at least better utilised by the Communists. This kind of aimlessness in the tactics of the C.P. has encouraged in Germany the belief (and this has been confirmed by the non-participation of the Communist comrades in official posts, municipal bodies, etc.), that the Communists do not want to participate in the work and that consequently the Social-Democrats are left to their own devices and have to look for other support if headway is to be made.

And then there is another matter that tactics have been adopted which Social-Democratic workers fail to understand, namely that in Parliaments where the Social-Democrats and the Communists together had the majority, the Communists made common cause with the bourgeois representatives in order to overthrow the Social-Democratic Cabinet, which resulted that instead of the Social-Democratic and Communist majority, there was a purely bourgeois majority. The brain of an average Social-Democrat cannot understand such tactics.

Marre, Dortmund. Clerk (S.P.G.)—In Dortmund we had something similar. At first there were satisfactory relations between the Communists and Social-Democrats, who collaborated harmoniously. The Communists polled 44,000 votes at the Municipal election, an increase of 200 per cent. The Social-Democrats elected a Communist to the municipal-

ity. After a workers' majority had been brought about for the first time, instead of working, the farce began. All proposals moved by the Social-Democrats were outvoted. At the next session they were moved again in a somewhat different form, to make it appear as if they came from the Communists. This led gradually to disruption. The Municipal Council was again dissolved and the re-election resulted in a slightly bigger poll for the Social-Democrats whilst the votes given to the Communists fell from 44,000 to 19,000, a loss of 50 per cent. The other votes were not cast for the Social-Democrats, but were either withheld or given to members of the bourgeoisie, with the result that the old reactionary situation exists to-day.

As to the factories I must say that in economic respects the collaboration is, generally speaking, harmonious. In 1924 we succeeded in having a head manager dismissed through Social-Democratic and Communist collaboration. But this is not the case everywhere. For instance, there are many ugly bickerings among the railwaymen, although these people do not go in much for politics and only carry on trade union work. The result is that there is not much love for the Communists who are at the bottom of these bickerings. And when similar scenes are enacted publicly in the municipal parliament to the great delight of the bourgeoisie, one can hardly speak of harmonious collaboration.

Mehnert, Dresden. Metal Worker (S.P.G.)—When comrade Zinoviev asks why we are not Communistically-minded or why we Social-Democratic workers cannot veer over to the Communist Party, I would like to ask him to examine Party relations in Germany. Why is the Communist Party of Germany on the decline? Because by its policy it has frightened away the masses. One has only to look at recent happenings to understand that there has been too much catastrophic policy. The present is not the time for barricade policy. Revolutions are not made, but come from the masses. Germany is not Russia. If German workers had been Russian workers and had been for centuries under the Tsarist yoke, we would be to-day just such Bolsheviks. As Social-Democratic workers who have come to Russia on a journey of investigation, we can say that we rejoice at the progress you have made, but we must see at the same time that more consideration must be shown on the part of Russia to German conditions and that German workers should not be expected to achieve more than they can achieve. Comrade Tonn said that he had a feeling that there is too much ordering about from Moscow. I have read much on this matter including some of comrade Zinoviev's writings. I

am not at all against it. If this ordering about be in the right direction we would all of us rejoice at it and would still more rejoice if the Communist Party of Germany would receive directions conducive for the unity of the German working class. This is not a question only of the Social-Democratic workers. I am the last person to oppose the Communist comrades, but I feel instinctively that more blunders are made on the Communist side than on the Social-Democratic side. The articles in the Communist press are nothing but attacks; they challenge the Social-Democratic press. Their effect is felt even in the factories. If comrades Zinoviev and Bukharin would themselves hear the rejoinder of the Social-Democratic workers, they would understand how it is that the Communist Party of Germany repulses instead of attracts the working class. In certain instances the Social-Democratic Party carries on a purely Labour policy. This must be firmly established and every one should understand that on such questions both Parties have to support each other.

I am glad to be able to say that recently collaboration in the Reichstag has been more satisfactory. Perhaps the time will come when it will be possible for the Social-Democrats to sever connection with the black-red-gold policy when the Centrum will retire. In Saxony we have had an instance of Social-Democrats and Communists forming a Cabinet. This collaboration was not allowed to last. I will not probe into the reasons. I went through it myself. I should like to say to comrades Zinoviev and Bukharin: concentrate your attention on the German workers. Then perhaps the Communist Party will be induced to carry on a healthier policy than hitherto. On our return we will, of course, endeavour to influence our leading comrades. We have not an easy task before us. We are "deserters" because we have run to Moscow. But nevertheless we will pay to truth the tribute due to it.

Lange, Remscheid. Metal Worker (Non-Party).—I do not belong to any party. Comrade Tonn was about right when he said that there are really no non-party people. I agree that it is absurd: one backs up either one tendency or the other. There are sometimes personal reasons for not being organised. As a non-Party person I can only be a Communist, for the Communist Party is the Party which carries on the class struggle in a revolutionary manner. Conditions in 1918 were such that, provided there had been the leaders, it would have been possible to conduct the revolution in a different manner. But the best leaders were assassinated. And who caused these assassinations? Scheide-

mann and Co. This has been proved to the hilt. I admit that Communists have committed mistakes. When it is said that the orders for the German Party came from Moscow, I say: the slogans for the right conduct of the class struggle of the workers must come from some central organisation. If Russia is to-day the vanguard of the class-conscious workers and intends to steer the ship of these class-conscious workers, it is entitled to it, for it is the first State in the world which has carried out a social revolution. The German Labour Movement set the tone throughout the world before the war. To-day this can no longer be, because at the outbreak of the war in 1914 it concluded a class truce with the bourgeoisie. The Social-Democratic leaders in Germany have forfeited their right to hold the leadership in the Labour Movement of the world in their hands. Russia must lead because revolution has already been carried out here on a territory which represents one-sixth of the globe. This is the centre and the source from which liberation will come to the workers of the world.

I am not a great theorist, neither do I consider every member who has a membership card in his pocket beyond reproach. Mistakes are made, but I must say—and this is incontrovertible—that mistakes are made everywhere, by the Communists as well as by the Social-Democratic Party. During the occupation of the Ruhr the workers of the Rhine-Ruhr district carried on the struggle unanimously, especially in the coal basin, in order to make this occupation illusory by a mass strike and mass demonstrations. But the bourgeoisie betrayed this movement in the interests of the Entente.

The workers wanted to fight but the leaders did not. In 1923, too, the proletariat was revolutionary, but the mass suggestion of the Social-Democratic leaders was able to defeat the struggle every time. This cannot be denied. To-day the Communist Party is on the way to crystallisation. I am firmly convinced that in the event of another war—and the present war preparations are leading to it—at least three-quarters of the Social-Democratic workers will make revolution together with us, the class-conscious workers of Germany.

Zinoviev.—The trade union question must, of course, take first place in our discussions. We will have to deal with this question next time we meet. Just now I would like to give a general outline of our standpoint.

Without any further ado we admit, as we have done before, that Communists have also made great mistakes, not only in Germany, but also in Russia and elsewhere. But

there are mistakes and mistakes. Let us take a very bad case: the German Communists made a mistake with the rising in March, 1921. This mistake was severely criticised in Moscow during the Third World Congress of the Comintern by Lenin and others. We did not wait for others to do so. But what was this mistake? It was the mistake of a comparatively small section of workers. A few hundred people imagined that with their own bodies they would be able to protect the working class, to make a breach in the front of the bourgeoisie and thereby to accelerate victory. Their sacrifices were many but did not attain their aim. This must be criticised from the standpoint of the necessity to economise proletarian forces. In this case one must say: your action was premature, we cannot achieve victory in this manner, we must have more patience and must be more systematic, etc. This mistake belongs to one of the groups of mistakes. Mistakes of this kind have been made several times by the Communists, but as I said before, there are "mistakes" and mistakes. Let us take, for instance, the mistakes made by the Social-Democratic leaders. I do not want to speak of the present situation, it is too fresh in our minds and could not be judged in a detached way. We will take questions which are more in the nature of history; they can be dealt with more disinterestedly. It will suffice to bring forward three facts.

Social-Democracy and the Imperialist War.

The first question is that of the war of 1914 to 1918 during which thirteen millions of people were slaughtered. Comrades, you will ask yourselves, why we should bring this question so much to the fore. Not because we want to say that you made a mistake, but because the next war is getting nearer and nearer. I think that every class-conscious worker feels this and, to be quite sincere, what would your answer be to the question: If another war were to break out to-morrow what would be the attitude of the leaders of German Social-Democracy and of the International Social-Democracy in general? (Interjection: It will have profited by the mistakes of 1914.) It would be exactly the same as in 1914. (Interjection: No.)

Comrades, do you really think that the French Social-Democrats are worse than the German? They are very much alike. There are, of course, differences as there are differences between German and French Communists, but on the whole they are alike. Well, we have just now an example before our eyes. France is conducting a new war. This war is no mere trifle; a quarter of the French army

is engaged in it and soon this quarter will be increased to one-half. It is a regular colonial war. The world war was a complicated affair. Many powers were engaged in it and it was quite possible to say: "We fight against Russian Tsarism" or "We want to destroy Prussian militarism." For the present Moroccan war, carried on by France, all such excuses cannot be put forward. It is a bona fide imperialist war. And what is the attitude of the French Social-Democrats? Have they really profited by the mistakes of 1914? Facts speak for themselves: they are supporting the war. To-day we have received a telegram on the Party Congress of the French Social-Democrats, according to which the latter expressed themselves against the evacuation of the French Army from Morocco. Is it possible that such a lesson as the world war has been in vain? Well, you have the proof before your eyes. The only difference is that the Social-Democratic workers are at present more rebellious against their leaders and the support of war than in 1914.

And what about the occupation of the Ruhr? Did the French Social-Democrats oppose the occupation? The opposition did not go beyond the parliamentary platform. I advisedly do not take as examples insignificant facts which are as yet contentious, but facts of truly world historical importance which are responsible for the dividing line which separates Communists from Social-Democrats. The split of the two Parties is an outcome of the war. What has the war shown us? What was the attitude of the upper strata of Social-Democracy and of the trade unions? They were for the war! Did they not go to Ludendorff? Have not their various leaders stated in writing: I will go to Ludendorff? Have not they thrown sand into the eyes of the workers? It is impossible to deny all this. We all of us feel that they will attempt to do the same in the event of a new war. Just look at the bourgeoisie. It carries on a real policy. Does it find the Social-Democratic leaders an obstacle in its way? Certainly not; it knows that it will have these people on its side. At the Party Congress of the French Social-Democratic Party there is a talk of entering the government, which is tantamount to open support of a belligerent government. If the Party Congress finally turned down the idea of entry into the government, this is not due to the leaders but to the pressure brought to bear by the masses.

The question of war is not pure imagination. It is a question of our generation and, maybe, even of our decade. It is not our grandchildren who will be confronted by the peril of a new war, but ourselves. In the event of this what

will be the attitude of the leading stratum of the Social-Democratic parliamentarians? That they will support the war is obvious. They will repeat the mistake of 1914. And you will admit that this is an utterly different mistake from that committed by the Communists in 1921.

Return of Power to the Bourgeoisie.

I am coming now to the second question, the question of the German revolution. You told me that you had a different regime in Germany, that the education of the German workers, their culture and the bourgeoisie of their country were different from that of Russia. You said that if you had had Tsarism you would also already be Bolsheviks. We Russians know perfectly well that Germany is not Russia, although the Hohenzollern regime was not much better than the Tsarist regime. We have never imagined that everything would happen as in Russia.

After the war you had a revolution. There was once a Socialist Republic in Germany, a Government of six representatives of the people—three Social-Democrats and three independents—and the whole of Germany was covered with a network of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. Then came a conference of the Workers' Councils in Berlin when the Social-Democratic leaders insisted on the Workers' Councils being dissolved. This, too, is a mistake, but a very different one from that of the Communists in March, 1921.

We are not telling you to form Russian Soviets, but form German Soviets. The people of Germany roused to a pitch of indignation overthrew the monarchy, the working class had power in its hands. And at this juncture the leading stratum of Social-Democracy prepared a conference of Workers' Councils at which they dissolved themselves. This was the biggest trump card in the hands of the bourgeoisie. This was a greater defeat than the Paris Commune. The latter had fought and had been conquered. The French bourgeoisie returned to power but only over catacombs of proletarian dead. In Germany it was different. It was something monstrous. The Social-Democratic leaders had drawn up the decision that the Workers' Councils, born in the blood of the German workers, were to dissolve themselves, that a "Democracy" was to be created; in other words: the power was taken out of the hands of the working class and put back into the hands of the bourgeoisie. Do you think that the Workers' Councils were created by order from Moscow? Certainly not; they were created by the order of the people. The people had vanquished the bourgeoisie and had made a revolution. Revolutions are made

by the people, when it has no other way out. The organisation of the revolution emanated from the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. German Social-Democracy insisted on the dissolution of the Workers' Councils. It has retarded the progress of the German working class for decades. Seven years have passed since then and it will take many more years to give back to the German working class the position it held in 1918. This was also a mistake, but a very different mistake from that of the German Communists in 1921.

The Lessons of Saxony.

I am coming now to the third example. Saxony was mentioned here. I am not going to probe who was at fault, the Social-Democrats or the Communists. The Communists made one mistake, they believed that the difficulties had been already overcome, that the cause of the proletariat was secure. This was a mistake which we have criticised throughout the Party.

Let us now consider what mistakes were committed by the Social-Democratic leaders. Their mistake consisted in sending Reichswehr troops from Berlin to Saxony. This is also a mistake. Under the Presidency of Ebert, Social-Democratic leaders sent the Reichswehr to Saxony.

(Interjection: But not the Saxon leaders.)

The Saxon leaders very soon became reconciled to it. At a time when a Socialist-Communist Saxony was in embryo—many people even thought that it might come to a peaceful revolution—the Social-Democratic leaders sent troops to Saxony, acting as all Tsarist governments would have acted. This is also a mistake. But if you throw the two groups of mistakes on to the scales the result will be as follows: one group makes mistakes: we will not enter reformist trade unions, we will have an isolated rising, we insult the Social-Democratic Factory Councils. This is wrong, such mistakes should be avoided, one should get into touch with the Social-Democratic workers. But what about the other group of mistakes? How far-reaching are these? It is as though we had lead and feathers on the scales. The mistakes of the Social-Democrats during the war were decisive for the destiny of the German people and of mankind as a whole. And then again the throttling of the German revolution decided the destiny of Germany and the whole world, for if the revolution had been victorious the development of Europe would have already made mighty steps forward. Had the re-organisation of Saxony not been destroyed the entire position of Germany would now be utterly different.

I think that these three examples suffice to remind you of the historic mistakes which have been made. And the worst of it is that no one can be certain if Social-Democrats will act differently under the same circumstances. I am convinced that when you are among yourselves most of you will have to admit that there is the danger that under similar circumstances the Social-Democrats will commit the same crimes. The war in Morocco is again a proof of this.

Was the Split Necessary?

Now I will deal with the accusations you have made against the Communists. We, too, criticise these mistakes very severely. In times when barricade fighting is going on one cannot indulge in long discussions, but must seize the bourgeoisie by the throat. But we have no barricade fighting to-day. We are living in an epoch of preparation for new struggles. The Communist comrades must realise now even more than ever that any mistakes would be fatal.

What is at the root of your bitter attitude to the Communists? This attitude has been brought about by the fact that the Communists have split off. There was an old united Social-Democracy; for many decades it added glorious chapters to its history; I wish to remind you of the time when Bebel lived and worked. Then a new Party comes suddenly into being and is fighting against the old Party. This has led to a certain amount of bitterness, not only in Germany but on an international scale. In the eyes of many workers Communists are the culprits, simply because they were the initiators of the split. We Russian Bolsheviks also split off from the Mensheviks. We said that it was impossible for us to remain in such a Party. For a time we were a minority. The working class wants unity and many workers think and say: "If one were to add two Mensheviks to one Bolshevik there would be three and things would get along better." We, too, for a considerable time were subjected to the accusation: Why did you commit such a crime, why did you split off? But it is a common occurrence for the historically new force, which wants to fight against the old force, to be attacked from all sides. The saying is: Why did you break up the old glorious tradition? What was the historic position in Germany? The split was brought about in 1916 and 1917. But in reality—if not formally—it existed already in July, 1914. The entire leadership of the German Social-Democracy was for the war. At that time this was as much as saying that they were for the bourgeoisie. In reality already that day brought the split into Social-Democracy and it was left to Liebknecht and

Luxemburg to proclaim openly the split which had already taken place. It could not be otherwise; was that due to bad intentions, was it a mistake? I think that anyone who admits that the tactics of the Social-Democrats during the war were not correct, that they were a crime against the working class, must also admit that the birth of a new Party was a historic necessity. Hence pioneers, who want to show the way to the working class, must put up with the accusation: why have you made a breach in the common front? At that moment the breach in the front was a dictate of necessity, without it the working class would have been lost. Isolated mistakes and stupidities, which were committed and which were occasionally serious, will be forgotten by history but what will not be forgotten is the crystallisation of a new shock troop which says: We will fight against war, we will show the working class a new way, we will swim against the stream and will make our bodies the shield of the working class, as Liebknecht actually has done. We can understand that a Social-Democrat who has been 20 years in the movement, who works in the midst of his colleagues in the factory, who are after all the same as our Communist workers—we can understand when such a Social-Democrat says: "I want unity, the fault is not mine." We understand this psychology. We understand but we do not approve of it. It is a conservative psychology—one does not want to admit one's fault, one does not want to say the truth, that the working class was thrown into the burning cauldron in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Was the situation not such that even people like Crispin resigned? What they wanted was a mild protest against the war and had to resign, whilst those who were intent on fighting really and truly against the war had to form an independent Party. This is the whole story in a nutshell. I, therefore, think that this feeling of annoyance on the part of the Social-Democratic workers must disappear. Comrades, we here in Russia went through a similar development. We, too, made a breach in the Menshevik front, to a certain extent, before and finally after the war. In such times there is an end to all comfortable resting on one's laurels. In such times one must point the way. It is impossible to say that one will remain in the old party regardless of the destiny of mankind. And thus we separated. We were a minority. We acted many a time foolishly, but our foolishness was kept within bounds because we had a man like Lenin. But we had one fault—we wanted to get along too quickly, we did not always exercise enough patience to capture the masses. Historically, however, we are justified also in the eyes of every Social-Democratic worker and this is not mere chance. Likewise

there is historic justification for the idea of Communism and of an independent revolutionary Party in Germany. The more imminent war becomes, the more seriously must every worker consider the question, what will be the attitude of my leaders at the critical moment, which is more important than ten years of peaceful development, at the ordeal by fire? This is the question you must ask yourselves. Comrade Tonn says that he does not think it nice when leaders are attacked. We have formed our opinion of Noske, but we are not going to attack people here whom we do not know personally. But we must raise the question: where will Noske, Scheidemann and Muller be when a new war breaks out? Are you still in doubt if they will again be with the bourgeoisie? Is any doubt possible on this matter, is it not as clear as daylight? What should be the term for this? You do not like the term traitors. Please suggest some other term for it.

Relations between Social-Democrats and Communism in Everyday Work.

I am coming now to the relations between Communists and Social-Democrats in practical everyday work. I will cite an example from the Youth Movement. A meeting of the Social-Democratic youth took place a couple of weeks ago in Neukölln, a stronghold of Communism. Two Communists were rather noisy at this meeting. They got a beating. This became known immediately to the Communists in the street. They collected 500 people. The meeting was dispersed and it came to fisticuffs. Then the Social-Democrats collected 2,000 people and organised a procession to Neukölln. The Communists lay in ambush waiting for the bulk of the procession to pass. They started the attack when the last 500 people remained. This story is enough to make one cry. One could have done something much better and more sensible. It would be foolish to try to establish who attacked and who defended. In any case it is an untenable position. Unfortunately similar scenes occur at the meetings of the adults. We are strongly opposed to this and hold that German Communists must on their part do everything to put a stop to such a state of affairs. But there must be inclination on both sides to do so. We will not tender the advice: if they smite you on the right cheek, offer the left cheek. We are no Tolstoyans. When it comes to fisticuffs we say: two and a half blows to one blow. These rows can only be terminated by mutual consent. We are sincere in our desire for a united front with the Social-Democratic workers. One comrade here pointed out that the mistake of the Communists consisted in not differentiating between

Social-Democratic leaders and workers. I think that this is to a great extent correct. We do want a united front with the Social Democratic workers. In what sense? These workers are told that we are tricksters intent on winning them for Communism. This is what we do want. But we are not so stupid as to think that this can be done by a trick. One needs time for it. It is evident that a working class like that of Germany with a 60 years' political past cannot be captured by a trick or so. They are as clever as we are. History shows this. We want to propagate Communism and we are entitled to do so. But in spite of all differences of opinion we want to establish at the present stage a united front—unity in the Trade Union Movement, unity in the economic struggle. What is the attitude of the Social-Democrats to this question? Are they not doing their utmost to prevent a united front? Social-Democratic leaders are against such a simple matter as a journey of investigation to another country. This is certainly not new tactics or a new Party. Because you have come here they call you, as a comrade here remarked, "deserters." But, comrades, this is all of a piece with the entire policy of the leaders. Is it by chance that they are against your journey here? Does this question stand alone? Certainly not. It is part of their programme. Why are they against it? Because they think that the fact of our sitting together in one room and breathing the same air constitutes a menace to them. This is a fact. Well, if you sit here together in this hall and breathe comparatively bad air this does not signify that you will become Communists. But we will endeavour to work harmoniously together and to get to know each other better. This is what your leaders do not want. This is certainly a proof that they want to prevent the establishment of a united front. I know that there are raw elements in Communist ranks. If we establish a united front does it really mean that we capture millions of Social-Democratic workers in the twinkling of an eye? It is not done as quickly as all that; such transformations are slow processes. Comrades, you say that it is true that there is a strong desire for unity among the workers, but they do not want to become Bolsheviks. Do you really think that the Russian workers were always Bolsheviks? There is naturally a difference between Germany and Russia, but if one looks for two opposite poles, one should not take Russia and Germany, which after all have a good many things in common, but rather Great Britain and Russia. English workers have really lived under other economic conditions. In Great Britain there is a well-paid workers' aristocracy. You know the psychology of this section of the British working class

which has already been described by Marx and Engels. They say about the British workers' aristocracy that when they sit at the same table with someone possessing a certain amount of power, with so-called "respectable" people, they forget that they come themselves from the working class. This workers' aristocracy has for decades been demoralising the British working class by reformism. But we know that in spite of this, these British workers have united in the trade union field and to a certain extent also on a common political ground with Russia. Do you think that we fooled them, that we played tricks with them? This is not so! The change has come about because our revolution is something international, it has come about because the British working class has found the right way. Not that British workers will become Bolsheviks—the British revolution will certainly bear another aspect from that of the Russian; it will follow a different path; it will probably even have at first different organisational forms and a different ideology. But it will eschew reformism and will enter upon a new path. This is what we would like to achieve also with the German workers. It is not a question of manœuvring in order to make you give up your conceptions. No, this is certainly not the case, but in spite of the difference of our conceptions there is something which brings us together. What path do you intend to pursue? You say: through democracy to Socialism. Ten years ago one could say this, but now? By what way do you in Germany intend to reach Socialism? We know you do not want dictatorship, you want democracy. But cannot you see the actual trend of the development? Were the great events of the last decade only a small episode? The war of 1914, the revolution of 1918, Hindenburg in 1925, was not the path to all this the path of "pure democracy"? It is democracy which has brought you to such a pass. Hindenburg was elected democratically and the throttling of the German revolution was also done in a purely democratic manner. Do you really want to extricate yourselves from this by such worn-out phraseology? Can we not carry on a common struggle in Germany on the economic field? Is it not possible to put a stop to the unpleasant rows and to initiate a struggle with the British workers, for working class unity? What stands in the way? The Communist Party? Certainly not. This is not so and the majority of the Communist workers have realised this. The C.P.G. imagined that one could do away with the Social-Democratic Party, capturing the workers after seizure of power. This idea no longer prevails. The Social-Democratic workers want to see the mote in the neighbour's eye but are inclined to ignore the beam in their own eye, such

as the war of 1914, the throttling of the revolution of 1918 and the Saxony affair. The Social-Democrats themselves have disrupted the workers. They have probably participated in the Workers' Councils, that is to say they have taken a hatchet into their hands and have felled the tree on which they sat. This cannot and must not be forgotten.

The Question of the Russian Ukase.

I am coming now to the question of the ukase from Russia. Is it true that the policy of the German Communists is inspired by Moscow? The newspapers have certainly a great deal to say, about "slaves of Moscow." But are not the same papers telling you that we drive the Moscow workers to the demonstrations with machine guns and that there is cannibalism in Moscow? Will you tell me, now that you have had an opportunity to look round, if cases of cannibalism have come to your notice, or if the workers are against the Communist Party? I am not going to disclaim that we are a world Party. Is it a bad thing that the best brains and the most self-sacrificing workers of all countries have banded themselves together? We say: if we cannot get the best of the bourgeoisie single-handed we must do so combined. The destinies of mankind are interwoven. It became obvious after the war that the fate of the German revolution would not be decided in Germany alone nor that of the French revolution in France alone. The war has brought much that is evil, but it has also brought one good thing, it has brought mankind together. Therefore, the workers of the various countries decided to establish a world Party. We have not yet succeeded in this to the full 100 per cent. Great reverses are possible, but we can say without exaggeration that our success is at least equal to 25 per cent. In a few years we will probably succeed to the full 100 per cent. in our effort to establish a workers' world Party. Is this a bad thing? Are we to be stoned and insulted because a cohort has come into being which is determined to do something for the workers? Old women do this kind of thing; they say; I did not hear my grandmother say so.

(Interjection by comrade Bukharin: But I heard my grandfather Marx say so!)

Well, we will succeed in creating such a world Party.

It is also said that the Russian Party tries to influence the entire Communist International. What is the true state of affairs? We have an Executive which consists of 45 comrades including five Russian comrades. When a French bourgeois correspondent was told this he said: "Is it true, 40 foreigners? We were not aware of it, please make it

public." Our answer was that it was already a matter of publicity. This is excusable for bourgeois publicists, but earnest class fighters, even if they belong to a Social-Democratic Party, should know this. The Russian Party carries, of course, great political weight. Why? Because it has a wealth of experiences. It has carried out a revolution; the fact that we have won the fight carries great moral weight. It is true that the Communist International gives support to its sections including financial support. From the bourgeois standpoint this is bad. The bourgeoisie, however, takes upon itself the right to give millions to Russian Tsarism, but we have not the right to give a few miserable pence to the French or German workers. And what about the Second International, does not the British Party influence the German Party and vice versa? It is justified in so doing. If one turns it the other way round and says: this is a ukase of the Russian Government—as it is politely asserted—or of individuals, that is nothing but a bourgeois objection. Was not the same accusation made in the past against the German workers? Have not members of the bourgeoisie in Bebel's time said in the papers that the German workers were supporting the Russian Revolution? Some of you will remember these times. There was a revolutionary movement in Russia and the German Social-Democratic Party had politically a great influence on this movement and also helped it financially. We Russian Bolsheviks were for a long time in love with German Social-Democracy. If you want proof of this read the articles which we wrote at the time of Bebel's death. We looked upon him as our teacher. As I have said we were all of us in love with the German Party, the first great mass Party formed by the European proletariat which produced such men as Bebel. All this changed after 1914. The new leaders of Social-Democracy trifled with this love. At present the centre of gravity of the Labour Movement is with us here in Russia. But Lenin has said that a time will come when the centre of gravity of the Labour Movement will be again shifted to another country. We do not conceal the fact that the Communist International is a world Party, that it exercises influence over the German and also other brother Parties, occasionally giving them financial support, and that we Russian Bolsheviks have a great influence on the Communist International. We are proud of the fact that we are fulfilling our duty of solidarity within the Communist International.

We are a world Party, but what we disclaim most emphatically is that we act frivolously, that we do everything on the Moscow model, that we do not understand that conditions are different in Germany where many of us have lived.

We are an International just as the Second International is an International, only with the difference that we are for the working class and that the Second International is against it. The Congress of the Second International is going to take place. Have you read the agenda? The Geneva Protocol will be endorsed there and Kautsky's resolutions concerning the advisability or non-advisability of an armed rising against Soviet Russia are to be discussed. This is a fact. Do you think that Kautsky wrote his pamphlet against Soviet Russia for Bukharin, to give him an opportunity to write a reply? This pamphlet is such a pogrom incitement against Soviet Russia that even the Russian Mensheviks say that it goes too far. Some of you will say: Kautsky is old. But he is the spiritual father of the party though he is not the worst amongst the leaders.

Revolution is Not a Holiday.

We are aware that we are shaping a world Party and we are patient. This Party will not reach the full hundred per cent. perfection until we do away with the two fronts and become one united Party. The comrade who said that at the decisive moment 75 per cent. of the workers will be for revolution was quite right. We know full well that the masses will be with us when they have no other way out. Revolution is not a holiday. The Russian workers understood this. It is not an amusement but a very serious affair. There is a grain of truth in the saying of the Russian Mensheviks: "When there was hunger in Russia you rallied the people around the working class, but now when Russia is no longer hungry you will not be able to hold Russia in your hands." The grain of truth in this is that if we attempted now in 1925 to make the Social revolution, we could not do so. It is our luck that we carried it out at a time when the bourgeoisie was weak. Now the well-fed Russia is already a factor of Socialist and not capitalist construction. We are not so stupid as to say that you are to make your revolution now in August, 1925, within a fortnight. We have experience and we know how revolution comes, how slowly the masses develop into a force. We have gone through three revolutions in 20 years. We have watched the masses in different stages, how they disintegrate, how they seek rest and how they by the force of circumstances are again whipped into a revolutionary attitude. We are not so stupid as to think that one can make a revolution whenever one chooses. Revolution is not a holiday. The working class, millions of people, join in a revolution because there is no other way out for them. But in what does the task of the

brain of the working class consist? It consists in a systematic preparation of the revolution, in taking care not to miss the opportune moment. The Social-Democratic leaders are systematically preparing just the opposite. When the situation was so acute that the masses came out in the streets, seized power, took it out of the hands of the bourgeoisie and placed it into the hands of the people's representatives—they could not do more—then was the time for the vanguard to act. At such a moment it is the vanguard, the leading stratum, which has a decisive voice and at this moment the Social-Democratic leaders decided against the revolution.

Preparation for the Anti-War Campaign.

Our accusation is not why you have not made a revolution, but why there was counter-revolution at a moment when the masses were carrying out the revolution. Why is there no systematic work in times of peace through propaganda, organisation and recruiting work in preparation for the coming struggles, for instance for an anti-war campaign? In 1922 an International Anti-War Congress was held in Holland. We, too, sent a delegation to this congress and Lenin wrote an instruction for it in which he stated in what manner one can make preparations against war. Some said we will prepare a general strike. Lenin said that once war has broken out, this will not be possible. War means summary justice, courts-martial, censorship, torture. As soon as war breaks out one is helpless. Therefore, if one is really for a struggle against war, one must prepare it in times of peace. In what consists or should consist such preparation? In propaganda, in speaking our mind truly, in trying to unite all the forces of the working class against the war peril. Are Social-Democratic leaders doing this? They are doing just the opposite. There are sometimes hotheads among the Communists who make serious blunders. This is a mistake. But if the opposite is done, is that a mistake? It is not a mistake but a crime. The war question is not a question for our grandchildren, but a question which concerns us. This summer we had already a state of war. We had two wars, one in China and one in Morocco. If the world war burst out because of Serbia, is there any reason why war should not break out because of Morocco? Are there not forces at work which are busily engaged in preparing a new world war? I think that the instinct innate in every worker must tell him that war will come again and that it is not far distant. We must prevent this. Who stands in the way of our doing something? There is a powerful German Social-Democracy. Everyone understands

that one cannot by a sleight of hand convert to Communism a Party with a sixty years' tradition. But we are not asking this, we merely ask that preparations be made for an anti-war campaign. In the event of a new war breaking out, not 13 but 30 million human lives will have to be sacrificed to this Moloch. Thus our proposal for a united front is not an attempt to over-reach you—we know that there are good diplomats in your ranks—but rather an attempt to find out what united us—and what unites us is the peril of war.

The Trade Union Question Unites Us.

We will not deny that there was once a slogan: Leave the trade unions. This was stupid and in fact a crime against which we have fought. Then came a less definite slogan: Return to the unions but contrive to be expelled as quickly as possible. The right slogan is: Go into the unions and do not allow yourselves to be thrown out but endeavour to obtain a majority there by means of your everyday work. This is how we won over the trade unions here in Russia. It was the Communists who knew how to advise the workers in all economic questions, who asserted themselves in the small questions of everyday life. The Communist Party in Germany is still young and will have to learn this. A stop must be put now to all the baiting and the rows; bygones must be really bygones. I have already said that once we begin to stir up old memories we will always revert to the war. Therefore, comrades, it is better to let bygones be bygones and to concentrate on the future. We have here an iron Communist Party carrying on the struggle relentlessly. But it is in such close contact with the masses that it fully understands that Social-Democratic workers are also workers. All one has to do is to persuade them. Thousands and ten thousands in our ranks, many members of our Central Committee and many members of our army are former Social-Democrats. Some joined us only in 1917 and some only in 1919, whole sections of the population and they were not of the worst. There were among them even clever brains capable of criticism. They recognised their mistakes and are now full-fledged members of our Party and fill important posts in the service of the proletariat.

Comrades, this must be repeated on an International scale. This is our idea of the united front. This is all I had to say. I listened with great interest to your report on the everyday life in the factories, on that which repulses the workers—the stupidities which we make. We promise you that everything will be done to make our Communists re-

move all the obstacles in the way of truly Communist work in Germany. But you must also do your share towards this. We consider your visit as a historic event. In what sense? The first, the Marxian International, originated in a casual meeting of workers of different nations. Delegations of workers went to a bourgeois exhibition in London. There they met and formed the First International at the head of which was Marx. On a higher level this is now repeated here. You have not come to a bourgeois exhibition, but to a proletarian State. You see the strong and the weak sides of the latter. This must have an effect not only in the question of Soviet Russia, but also in the International Labour Movement. The effect of your visit can be that we come to a common agreement and remove the obstacles in the way of the establishment of a certain amount of unity between Social-Democrats and Communists. Well, remain in the Social-Democratic Party and we in the Communist Party. The Party is not an aim in itself, but a key to the liberation of mankind. But let us try to find a common language with respect to those questions, where this is absolutely possible.

A Communist Delegate:—In the course of his statement comrade Zinoviev remarked that the Party made a mistake when it said "Leave the trade unions." I have endeavoured to find this among the various decisions. It is not there. Maybe there are certain individuals who were guilty of this error.

Zinoviev:—As to the question "Leave the trade unions," I cannot say that this came from individuals; it was rather a fairly general tendency in the German Communist Party. But I must say that it was also a very great tendency among the rank and file workers themselves. In 1923-24 millions of workers left the trade unions, not only Communists. It was a period of low tide and this must be understood. Our comrades do not fall from the skies, they are connected with the various sections of the working class. The workers left the unions because they were disappointed, partly by the policy and partly by the passivity of the trade unions. Between three and four millions left the unions. It would be wrong to put this entirely at the door of the Communists. We criticise the German Communists because as the vanguard of the working class they should know better than to commit all the mistakes of the rank and file. Whenever necessary they should go against the stream. A tendency carried away the masses, but it is too complicated a matter to investigate the source of this tendency. The most important feature was the disillusionment of the masses, not only

in Germany but also in various other countries. The Communist Party had not decided this separation from the masses, but it was also not energetic enough in its opposition to it. We must admit this, not because of the Social-Democrats but because of the Communists, in order that this mistake may be remedied.

The German Delegation Pledge to Put up a Fight.

Freiberger :—Will you allow me to say a few more words. I said already at the beginning of our discussion that the delegation as a whole—I am sure that you in the Caucasus and in the Crimea had similar experiences to ours in the Urals—has expressed its approval of the policy of the Russian comrades with which all of us are in agreement. We declared that we will tell the truth in Germany and that we will fight for trade union unity. Having made this declaration, more than once, we as honourable men must act up to it. What form our action is to take will be discussed in a special session. I do not think that we have among us people who think that all they have to do on their return to Germany is to present a report. The Russian comrades know that the struggle for trade union unity is so difficult and so important that it cannot be settled by merely having resolutions adopted in favour of trade union unity. On the contrary, this struggle must be carried on systematically until success is achieved. Comrades with a wider outlook—and they are in the majority—will see that the trend of events is such as to make the united front inevitable. This is so not only because of economic advantages to be gained, but also because the war peril is much more serious than many people imagine. We have already emphasised that what we have seen—and especially the holiday homes which were formerly palaces of the bourgeoisie and where proletarians are now housed—makes us understand the hatred of the bourgeoisie.

There is no doubt whatever that the bourgeoisie is looking for a war slogan against Russia and is bound to find one. Maybe the workers of all countries will adopt the "defence of the fatherland" standpoint. In that case there would be a repetition of the situation of 1914. We must take heed of the apprehensions of the Russian comrades and we must endeavour to prevent this sort of thing. We are all of us honest men and we must not always take it for granted that there is some trickery here for the sake of winning us over to the Communist Party. No, the war peril is a fact and as Social-Democratic workers we must recognise this. We must also recognise that there is the danger of our Social-

Democratic leaders repeating their action of 1914. Having recognised this we must take up a definite attitude towards it.

We are all convinced that we must support this movement for unity with all the means at our disposal, regardless whether it is conducted by Communist or Social-Democratic workers. We will not put obstacles in the way of Communist organisational work within the trade unions, even if trade union leaders be against it. A way leading to unity must be found. If we can do away with the causes of friction in the factories we will have made a great stride forward in the unity movement. We are all of us factory workers. We are ready to admit that many assertions made in the bourgeois and also in our Social-Democratic press are not correct. Everyone of us must see this. I am convinced that having heard our report thousands of workers will change their views. I have no doubt whatever that this unity movement signifies a great step forward.

Comrade Zinoviev said that our visit to Russia is of historical importance. We think that our reports, in which we will tell the truth and nothing but the truth, will find an echo among the workers of all countries. We are justified in assuming that by the very fact of our visit to Russia the war peril has already somewhat receded and if we do our duty I am convinced that the bourgeoisie will think twice before it attacks Russia, for the simple reason that it will have to reckon with the resistance of the workers of its respective countries. This resistance will gain in strength if we as the workers' delegation do our duty. Once in Germany we will use whatever personal influence we have to further the unity movement also in our country. You know and all of us who are active in the trade unions know the power of resistance of the upper strata. But if the pressure from below increases and if the attempts at rapprochement on the part of Great Britain and unity aspirations gain in strength, the establishment of trade union unity will become only a matter of time. It will depend on the masses and on the pressure they will bring to bear on leaders who are opposing the unity movement. That this is so will, I am sure, be admitted here and also by everyone who can gauge the future. There is no need for long explanations. We as the German Workers' Delegation—and we are all trade union officials—will do our duty, of this you may be sure. That this cannot be done in a hurry everyone must recognise, but we can tell you that our journey will not have been made in vain. Our work in Germany will give an impetus to the unity movement of the masses. (Loud applause.)

Is Soviet Economic System Becoming Socialised?

THE control figures published by the State Planning Commission ("Gosplan") for 1925-26 and which illustrate the scale and tempo of our economic development during recent years, also contain extremely interesting material on the question of the degree of socialisation our national economy has attained.

It is true that all calculations in this field must be considered as very approximate, or as we are accustomed to say are "orientation" figures. Nevertheless, their exponential significance is very great.

What do these figures tell us?

On the basis of the indicated totals in the sphere of socialisation of the means and processes of production and distribution in our national economy, the following achievements may be observed:

First of all, let us deal with the distribution of the means of production existing in our country. According to very incomplete data of the General Statistical Bureau, with certain corrections and additions provided by the "Gosplan" Commission, these achievements up to October 24th are expressed in the appended figures. (See Table 1).

Out of the material means of production existing in the country—not including funds for dwelling houses—at the beginning of the year 1924-25 the State possessed capital funds which, at the most modest and very incomplete estimate, amounted to not less than 11.7 milliard chervontzi roubles, co-operation 0.5 milliard and private (mainly peasant) undertakings, 7.5. In this manner more than 62 per cent. of the total means of production has been socialised. Meanwhile, in the countryside, only 4 per cent. of our capital funds has become socialised up to the present, while in the towns, if we include heavy industry and railway transport, socialisation reaches 97 per cent.

Table No. 1.

 CAPITAL FUNDS OF THE U.S.S.R. on
 October 1st., 1924.

(In millions of chervontzi roubles).

1. Description of Fund.	2. State.	3. Co-op.	4. Total.	5. Private	6. Total.
1. Agriculture :					
(a) Working Cattle, etc. ...	45	5	50	4,891	4,941
(b) Equipment ...	13	2	15	1,571	1,586
Total ...	58	7	65	6,462	6,527
2. Transport ...	6,050	—	6,050	—	6,050
3. Heavy Industry ...	4,572	87	4,659	33	4,692
4. Light Industry ...	14	86	100	544	644
5. Buildings, Parks, etc., for the Public ...	338	—	338	—	338
6. Housing Funds ...	6,422	153	6,575	13,017	19,592
7. Trade ...	669	384	1,053	419	1,472
Total to July 1st ...	18,123	717	18,840	20,475	39,315
In Percentages ...	46.1	1.8	47.9	52.1	100
Total, minus Housing Fund ...	11,701	564	12,265	7,458	19,723
In Percentages ...	59.3	2.9	62.2	3.78	100
Including :					
1. COUNTRYSIDE :					
Agricultural means of Production ...	58	7	65	6,462	6,527
Light Industry ...	—	—	—	430	430
Town Structures etc., for the Population ...	38	—	—	—	38
Housing ...	258	28	286	9,720	10,006
Trade ...	66	142	208	209	417
Total ...	420	177	597	16,821	17,418
Minus Housing Fund ...	162	149	311	7,101	7,412
2 TOWNS :					
Heavy Industry ...	4,572	87	4,659	33	4,692
Light Industry ...	14	86	100	114	214
Transport ...	6,050	—	6,050	—	6,050
Housing ...	6,164	125	6,289	3,297	9,586
Structural work for the population ...	300	—	—	—	300
Trade ...	603	242	845	210	1,055
Total ...	17,703	540	18,243	3,654	21,897
Minus Housing Fund ...	11,539	415	11,954	357	12,311

In the field of industry in particular, 89 per cent. of the means of production has been socialised and 99 per cent. of heavy industry. As far as the total production of heavy and light industry is concerned, the control figures give the following dynamic comparison :

Table No. 2.
GROSS PRODUCTION OF ENTIRE INDUSTRY
OF U.S.S.R.*

(In millions of chervontzi roubles).

A.—HEAVY INDUSTRY.	State.	Co-op.	Total	Private		Total.
				absol.	p.c.	
1923-24	5,407	255	5,302	238	4.3	5,540
1924-25	—	—	7,249	271	3.6	7,520
1925-26	—	—	8,828	322	3.5	9,150
B.—LIGHT INDUSTRY.						
1923-24	37	233	260	1,490	84.6	1,750
1924-25	—	—	301	1,699	84.4	2,000
1925-26	—	—	358	2,012	84.8	2,370
ENTIRE INDUSTRY.						
1923-24	5,084	478	5,562	1,728	23.7	7,290
1924-25	—	—	7,550	1,970	20.7	9,520
1925-26	—	—	9,186	2,334	20.3	11,520

* Definite data for 1923-4, report figure for 1924-25, preliminary estimate for 1925-26 according to schematic proposals.

As we may observe, the production of socialised enterprises not only promises us a tremendous absolute growth—65 per cent. in two years—but is evidently increasing in its percentage of the entire production from year to year.

The calculations presented in Table No. 2 are very cautious. If we base our deductions on the data from patent statistics concerning the number of enterprises in the light handicraft industries, the chances of socialisation during coming years would appear to be considerably higher than those calculated in the plan of "Gosplan."

Indeed, this will be seen from the following record data on the selection of patents for enterprises with not more than 30 workers (first to fourth category) for the first and second half year 1923-24. (See Table 3).

Table No. 3.

The degree of socialisation of the handicraft industry in the U.S.S.R. (not including the Caucasus) in 1923-24, according to data of patent statistics.

	Exploiter of Enterprise.		No. of Enterprises.				No. of persons Employed.			
			1st.		2nd		1st.		2nd	
	half-yr.		half-yr.		half-yr.		half-yr.			
	in	p.c.	in	p.c.	in	p.c.	in	p.c.		
1. State	4.3	1.5	4.0	1.5	47.8	4.6	42.0	4.5		
2. Co-operation	7.3	2.5	9.0	3.4	51.4	4.9	62.4	6.7		
Total	11.6	4.0	13.0	4.9	99.2	9.5	104.4	11.2		
3. Private Persons	280.6	96.0	252.2	95.1	939.7	90.5	830.5	88.8		
GRAND TOTAL	292.2	100	265.2	100	1038.8	100	934.9	100		

As may be seen, even in the very light handicraft industries we may actually observe not a stationary equalisa-

tion, but a definite growth in the specific gravity of co-operative enterprises. It is true that in 1923-24 only 4.5 per cent. of the enterprises in this field were socialised, but for these which are undoubtedly the largest and soundest undertakings, as far as the number of workers is concerned, socialisation at that time already reached 10 to 11 per cent. and production 15.16 per cent. On the basis of the dynamics of the first six months 1923-24, we can also expect a not inconsiderable growth of the socialised section of production during the years 1924-25 and 1925-26. However, the Gosplan Commission, taking into consideration the tremendous tax exemptions granted to artisans and handicraftsmen instituted during the year 1924-25, deemed it more prudent to maintain the calculations given in Table No. 2.

The best guarantee for further achievements in this field is the high degree of concentration of industry in the U.S.S.R.

Our State production is concentrated in the largest enterprises and those that are the best equipped technically, whereas the private enterprises, as a general rule, work on the scales of the smallest handicraft enterprises. A particularly significant concentration of production has been achieved in our heavy factory and mining industries **after the Revolution** following the instructions of our planning organs regarding the concentration of production in the largest and best equipped enterprises, our directors of industry have achieved the following results by the commencement of 1925 as compared with pre-war averages. (See Table 4).

In pre-war days in Russia 52 per cent. of the total number of workers in the entire mining and factory industries were concentrated in enterprises employing more than 500 workers in 1901 and 56 per cent. in 1911. By January 1st, 1925, this proportion became 68 per cent.

This concentration is, of course, also explained first of all by the colossal increase in the productivity of labour which during the year 1924-25 alone, rose by 40 per cent. (See the "Gosplan" control figures).

The extent of the concentration of our Soviet industry may also be judged from the fact that even in the United States of America, i.e., in a country of the highest capitalist development, the corresponding enormous concentration for the entire industry during 1919 in the highest group (employing more than 500 workers) does not exceed 44.3 per cent. of the total number of workers of all enterprises employing 21 or more workers. And while on an average the American factory enterprises employ barely 151 workers per enterprise, in Russia we had 239 workers per enterprise in 1925, i.e., one and a half times as many.

TABLE No. 4.

CONCENTRATION OF WORKERS IN HEAVY INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND IN THE U.S.A.

SIZE OF ENTERPRISE. ACCORDING TO NO. OF WORKERS <i>ABSOLUTE QUANTITIES</i>	In the U.S.S.R. (Factory and Mining industries). No. of Enterprises.						In the U.S.A. Manufacturing Industry (over 21 workers) No. of Enterprises.					
	No. of workers in 1,000.			No. of workers in 1,000.			No. of workers in 1,000			No. of workers in 1,000		
	1901.	1911.	1925.	1901.	1911.	1925.	1909.	1919.	1909.	1919.	1909.	1919.
1. Up to 50 workers ...	14,354	11,754	3,723	287	270	92	23,544	25,879	764	829	764	829
2. 51 to 500 „ ...	5,667	5,553	2,971	803	848	459	21,985	26,072	3,047	3,721	3,047	3,721
3. More than 500 „ ...	874	995	681	1,180	1,424	1,219	1,763	2,770	1,851	3,603	1,851	3,603
Total ...	20,895	18,302	7,375	2,270	2,542	1,764	47,292	54,221	5,662	8,153	5,662	8,153
<i>THE SAME IN PERCENTAGES.</i>												
1. Up to 50 workers...	68.7	64.2	50.5	12.7	10.6	5.2	49.8	46.8	13.5	10.1	13.5	10.1
2. 51 to 100 „ ...	27.1	30.3	40.3	35.3	33.4	26.0	46.5	48.1	53.8	45.6	46.5	45.6
3. Over 500 „ ...	4.2	5.5	9.2	52.0	56.0	68.8	3.7	5.1	32.7	44.3	3.7	44.3
Total ...	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average number of workers per Enterprise ...	—	—	—	108.7	139	239	—	—	120	151	—	—

In the sphere of trade, according to very approximate calculations, socialised capital by 1924-25 comprised about 75 per cent. of entire capital engaged in trading operations. As far as this latter is concerned, the dynamics of its distribution will be observed in the following figures.

Table No. 5.

TRADE TURNOVER OF TRADE VALUES IN THE U.S.S.R. FOR THE PERIOD 1923-24 to 1925-26.*

PERIOD.	Trade Turnover in Millions of Chervontzi Roubles.					GRAND TOTAL.
	State.	Co-op.	Private		p.c.	
			Total. absol.			
1923-24.						
1st half-yr. ...	1,197	1,039	2,236	2,265	50.3	4,501
2nd half-yr. ...	1,745	1,614	3,359	1,729	34.0	5,088
Total for yr....	2,942	2,653	5,595	3,994	41.6	9,589
In percentages	30.7	27.7	58.4	41.6	—	100
1924-25						
1st half-yr ...	2,520	2,184	4,704	1,809	27.8	6,513
2nd half-yr. ...	2,955	2,569	5,524	1,841	25.0	7,365
Total for yr.	5,475	4,753	10,228	3,650	26.3	13,878
In percentages	39.5	34.2	73.7	26.3	—	100
1925-26. ...	6,342	5,490	11,832	3,728	24.0	15,560
In percentages	40.7	35.3	76.0	24.0	—	100

*According to calculations of the "Gosplan" on the basis of taxation records of the Finance Commissariat and accounts records of State and co-operative institutions. The data for the second half of the year 1924-25 are provisional and those for 1925-26 according to the calculations of the Control Commission of the "Gosplan."

Thus with the trading balance, just as with production, not only a stupendous growth in the absolute dimensions of socialisation is to be observed—more than double in two years—but also a very substantial increase of its relative proportion to the total trading of the country from a half to three-quarters of its size.

It is highly probable that during the year 1925-26 we will also achieve even more considerable successes in the way of socialising the trade turnover. Co-operation itself as represented by the Centrosoyus, for instance, anticipates handling during the year 1925-26 to its own retail turnover from 40 to 50 per cent. of the entire production of products, up to 45 per cent. metal products, nearly 70 per cent. of the entire production of cotton material, 80 per cent. of the salt production, while for the whole year's total production the retail turnover will be increased from 2,254,000 roubles to 3,356,000 roubles i.e., by one and a half times, whereas according to the assumption of the "Gosplan" the entire co-operative turnover—both retail and wholesale—for the same year will only increase by 15 per cent. (see "Economic

Life," September 9, 1925, No. 205). But taking into consideration the palpable lowering of prices, it would be more prudent to draw deductions from less optimistic calculations. In any case, we may count on the attainment of 75 per cent. socialised trade turnover without any exaggeration.

In order to value this achievement according to its worth, we should remember that during the last year of War Communism (1921) when trading was absolutely forbidden in Russia, private trading with agricultural products alone, according to Budget statistics, reached within the confines of the Soviet Republic (not including the Caucasus and Turkestan) more than 644,000,000 pre-war roubles and if we add to this 193 million roubles representing handicraft production, we have more than 837,000,000 roubles. If we allow that the entire agricultural production taken by way of assessment (amounting to a sum of 740,000,000 roubles) and the entire production of State industry that was in operation during the same year (amounting to 366.8 million roubles) went entirely to State distribution **without resorting to trade middlemen**—and this, of course, did not happen—even then the share of the State in distribution showed the maximum of 56 per cent, while the share of private trading capital was a minimum of 44 per cent. of the total turnover of trading values in the country. (See the collection of articles "On New Paths," 3rd Edition; pp. 191-194, Russian Edition). In this manner, if the New Economic Policy at first raised this latter percentage, having legalised private trade, the **formal** retreat on our part towards collectivism has already been **economically** overcome. Socialised trading balance already reached 66 per cent. in the second half of 1923-24, or two-thirds of the entire trading turnover, i.e., exceeded the 1920 figure. And in the approaching economic year 1925-26 we may firmly count on passing beyond the three-quarter line in the socialisation of the trade turnover. And this is without any changes in the new economic system and even with a certain growth of private trade as far as the absolute proportions of its operations are concerned.

If we add to this the fact that in the field of steam transport and bank credits 100 per cent. of all the means of communication and crediting have already been socialised, then it only remains for us to formulate our general task. This task is to maintain firmly the position we have conquered and each year to move consistently forward, if it be only one more pace on the road towards Socialism in all the fields where the favourable economic position permits us.

S. STRUMILIN.

Book Reviews

PARTY AND OPPOSITION*

THE last plenum of the Comintern inaugurated a rather lengthy period in the life of the Western Communist parties, marked by profound assimilation of the spirit of the tactics of Leninism. Hence it is no mere accident that in the European Communist parties, notably in Germany, interest has grown in those works of Lenin which are directed against vulgarisation of the tactics of Communism. Quite recently the German Communist Party republished "Left Wing Communism," with political notes by Maslov. It seems to us that no less attention should be devoted to the first big discussion which occurred in the Russian Communist Party since October, 1917. We have in mind the polemics with the Left-Wing Communists in the beginning of 1918.

Firstly, in the ideology of the latter we find much in common with the views of Left-Wingers in Europe. In both cases dialectical logic has been substituted by metaphysics, concrete reasoning and slogans by abstract conceptions. Both the Russian and the European Left-Wing Communists denied compromises, considering frontal attacks indispensable, and failing to understand the difficulties of the proletarian revolution which urge flexible tactics upon the Party. To both of them the criterion of their activity was not in the real interests of the class-struggle, but rather in the pure, abstract principles of Communism. It is quite natural, therefore, that the Left-Wing Communists in Russia and Europe generally have attached undue importance to "ideology," which they substituted for the real, material motive forces of the class-struggle. Hence they suffered from the disease of revolutionary phrase-mongering.

The practical policies of the Russian and European Left-Wingers were based upon the same wrong premises: **Over-estimation of the pace of the International Proletarian Revolution, and under-estimation of its difficulties.** The Left-Wing Communists, under-estimating the difficulties of the proletarian revolution, preferred the charge of opportunism

* V. L. Sorin.—The History of the Opposition Tendencies, Vol. 1. The Left-wing Communist Faction. With foreword by N. Bukharin. Moscow, 1925, pp. 184.

against those who directed the class struggle of the proletariat rather in accordance with the real correlation of the forces, than in keeping with the subjective desire for the speediest possible consummation of the proletarian revolution. This over-estimation was due in either case to a profound lack of insight into the fundamental difference between the European and Russian revolution. This was pointed out by Lenin to Russian Left-Wingers in 1918, and to Western European Left-Wingers, 1920-21, in his "Left-Wing Communism" (cf. particularly Vol. XVII., p. 153 of the Russian Edition of Lenin's Works*). To the Left-Wing Communists, (particularly to the Horter-Pannekoek Group†) Lenin appeared to be an opportunist, because he refused to stake everything on the single issue of the immediate proletarian revolution. Hence the inclination of the Left-Wingers (notably of the Horter Group) to consider the Soviet Government in Russia as passing through a stage of transformation into a weapon of international imperialism, as degenerating into an instrument of domination over the proletariat. The Russian Left-Wingers predicted, for instance, that the Soviet Government would become the "screen, the weapon, under whose cover there would begin the **complete economic subjugation of Russia to the German bankers**. . . The fulfilment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty would gradually transform the Soviets into the **Executors of the will of world capitalism**." (The black type is ours). This was due to the fact that the Russian and European Left-Wingers under-estimated the antagonism existing among the capitalist countries and within them, thereby under-estimating the possibilities for the contemporaneous existence of bourgeois governments and proletarian states. In view of all this, it would have been more profitable to draw an analogy between Russian and European Communism than between the former and the Williha-Schapper Group, as was done by comrade Sorin. Born of the same historical epoch, in spite of the difference in the individual arguments, they had their common roots and common basic ideas. This analogy would have done away with the "geographical" theories of the European Left-Wing of Communism (cf. Horter's famous letter to Lenin); it would have furnished material for interesting generalisations, and

* It would not be superfluous to recall the following passage from this pamphlet: "For Russia," under the concrete, **historically quite unique** (the black type is ours) situation, it was easy to start the social revolution, whereas to **go on with the revolution and carry it on to the end** will be more difficult in Russia than in European countries. **Already in the beginning of 1918, I had to point out** this fact (the black type is ours), and the experience of the subsequent two years has fully confirmed the correctness of such arguments." (Vol. XVII., p. 153.)

† Remember Horter's famous letter to Lenin.

at the same time would have brought into clearer emphasis the principles which underlay the questions which confronted the Russian Communist Party in 1918, thus contributing to the internationalisation of the Russian discussion. As to the Williha-Schapper faction, it had its analogy in the Recall and Ultimatum faction, because they had the same underlying idea: the monotony of social phenomena—the collapse of the revolution. On the other hand, it requires a good deal of stretching to draw an analogy between the 50's and 1918.

Secondly, Lenin's polemics with the Left-wing Communists in 1917 are of exceptional interest also because we have here **for the first time** a thorough discussion of the basic problems of the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship. For the first time the party of the working class became **concretely** confronted with the difficulties of constructive Socialism. What was the crux of the discussion? Firstly, about the **pace** of Socialistic construction, the **pace** of the development of the International Revolution. The Left-Wingers wanted to skip over the stage of State capitalism, believing that Russia needed no historical "prelude" to Socialism. It is a pity that comrade Sorin did not trace the connection between this discussion and the controversy which occurred in the **autumn** of 1917 between Lenin and the Moscow Bolsheviks, who insisted on **eliminating the Programme Minimum** from the General Party Programme.* Lenin in 1918, as in 1919† considered that the task of the immediate epoch would not be the introduction of Socialism, but the creation of the conditions for its introduction. This basic idea of Leninist strategy formed the central issue in all the discussions, beginning with the year 1918. The question of the **Pace** of Socialist construction was at the bottom of the controversy about the trade unions, and of the economic discussion in 1923-24. Therefore, many of the arguments of 1920 and 1923-24 were merely the concretisation of the basic ideas of 1918.

The difference of opinion as to the pace of Socialist construction in **Russia** were bound up with the differences as to the pace of the development of the **revolution** in Europe. The latter was over-estimated by the Left-Wingers, who based

* cf. "Revision of the Party Programme." Lenin's Works, Vol. XIV., Part II., particularly pp. 165-169. Russian Edition.

† Recall the following passage from his well-known "Letters on Tactics": "Not only do I do count upon the immediate regeneration of our revolution into a **Socialist** revolution, but I distinctly warn against this, and in my thesis, No. 8, I emphatically declare that our **immediate** task is **not** the introduction of Socialism." (The black type is Lenin's. Cf. Vol. XVI., Part I., p. 35, Russian Edition.)

this over-estimation not so much on objective data as on subjective wishes.

It is interesting to note that on this point, too, the dialectical logic of Lenin clashed with the metaphysical logic of the Left-Wingers. While the Left-Wingers put the question thus: **Either immediate** outbreak of the European Revolution at the shortest notice, or the collapse of Soviet Russia,* Lenin developed the idea of the "respite," based on the utilisation of the antagonisms among the capitalist countries and among the classes within them. "Left-Wing Communism" was merely written in order to substantiate these tactics for the European parties. †

Secondly, the discussion centred around the **methods** of construction. Lenin took circumstances as they were: an economically backward country; bourgeois intellectual groups experienced in the art of organisation: a corrupt bureaucracy inherited from Tsarism; lack of culture and organising ability in the ranks of the Russian proletariat. These facts urged the adoption of methods of Socialist construction that would not cause a conflict between the proletariat and the basic class of the population—the peasantry, that would enable the working class to make use of the experience of the old specialists, and enforce rigid proletarian discipline of toil as a counterpoise to the elemental wave of dishonest petty bourgeois mercantilism. By these methods the proletariat was called upon to act in the difficult role of vanguard of society as a whole

* In this connection it is worth while to observe that the Left-wingers, in differing from Lenin, did not consider it possible to consolidate Socialism in an **individual** country, thereby repeating the mistake of the adherents of the theory of permanent revolution. "No Socialist revolution can be victorious," wrote the Left-wingers, "**without transcending beyond** the national boundaries, without being transformed into an international proletarian revolution. In other words, **the consolidation and triumph of Socialism are unthinkable within the boundaries of a given nation and a given country.**" (Quotation from Sorin, p. 41.)

One cannot help observing that this kind of standpoint led to an under-estimation of the role of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship. There is really nothing new in this debate as to the social forces to be relied upon for the maintenance of the dictatorship, whether aid was to be expected from the West or not. It had already occurred in 1905. This we may prove by the following quotations from "Two Tactics": "It stands to reason that the possibility of retaining power in Russia **must depend on the composition of the social forces in Russia proper.** . . . Were we unable to rely on the peasantry in addition to the proletariat, then the business of retaining power would be hopeless indeed." (The black type is ours. Vol. VI., p. 358, Russian Edition.)

† Let us recall, for instance, how in this pamphlet Lenin rebuked the German Left-wingers for their "rigid insistence on the non-recognition of the Treaty of Versailles." (Vol. XVII., p. 163). Characteristic in this respect are the chapters: "No Compromise," and "Left-wing Communism in England."

while at the same time leaving the way open for safe retreat and certain compromise and depending chiefly on the creative genius of the masses.

The Left-wingers advanced their own **methods** of Socialist construction, starting from abstract conceptions about the transition stage and trying, above all, to retain the purity of "proletarian principles" and to eliminate any influence of the old social groups in the organisation of national economy, even if the proletariat had to be saddled with tasks which, a priori, it could not be expected to handle with efficiency (e.g., the administrative functions in factories and workshops, etc.).

Thirdly, there was the question of the mutual relations between the proletariat and the peasantry **after** the proletarian victory. While the Left-wingers advanced only the one method of compulsion, recommending a policy of the least consideration of the sentiments of the peasantry, Lenin already at that time drew a line between the campaign against the petty bourgeois element (the peasant as a proprietor) and the task of building up the workers' and peasants' alliance as the basis for the further development of the proletarian dictatorship,* the task of progressing towards Socialism jointly with the peasantry, which involves a combination of the methods of **persuasion** and compulsion.

Fourthly, there was the issue involving the relations between the Soviet State and the working class, and between both of them and the Communist Party. As we shall presently see, the Left-Wingers did not understand the mechanism of these relations, having expounded a theory of pressure by the proletariat upon the Soviet Government to prevent the degeneration of the Party from a proletarian into a national organisation, the degeneration of the Soviet Government from a proletarian dictatorship into a government by indigent peasants.

Fifthly, as to the **role of the Party**, its ability to lead the working class and all the toilers by means of complex manoeuvring. It was in this very campaign against the unwieldy tactics of the Left-wingers that Lenin advanced the idea of the need for certain compromises. "Left-wing Communism" was merely a development of these ideas.

In polemics with Left-wing Communists, Lenin had occasion to outline the main features of the Party's strategy during the transition period. At that time Lenin expounded clearly: (1) the idea of NEP as a method of progressing to-

* Cf. "The Lenin Almanac," Notes on Proletarian Dictatorship.

wards Socialism*: (2) the principles of the workers' and peasants alliance under the proletarian dictatorship; (3) the idea of the need for making use of the organisational experience of the old social groups, and of the need for the proletariat and the Party to learn from that experience (subsequently Lenin repeatedly reverted to this idea, to recall his idea about the need of "building Communism with other people's hands"); (4) the vigorous combat of the idea of "Communist superiority"; (5) his views on proletarian culture, and (6) the first lesson to the Party on the need of complex manœuvring in view of the possible slackening of the pace in the development of the world revolution.

In the history of Bolshevism the factional groups which arose against Lenin had drawn on two sources simultaneously: the dogmatic prejudices of the so-called "European" Marxism of which Menshevism in Russia was the classical mouthpiece, and the ideas of petty bourgeois tendencies extant in Russia proper (chiefly the Social-Revolutionists). The influence of both these sources was clearly felt in the most out-standing anti-Lenin faction of the pre-revolutionary period, the Recall and Ultimatum group. The political methodology of the latter was so much akin to Menshevism that Lenin already then characterised them as "travestied Mensheviks." Moreover, it is a well-known fact that many of their arguments about boycotting the Duma, and their characterisation of that august institution as a mockery of popular representation, were borrowed rather from the Social-Revolutionist press of the time quoted quite sympathetically from the writings,† and one of their scribes had even gone over to the Social-Revolutionists.

The simultaneous influence of these two ideological tendencies could be observed also in the first anti-Lenin tendency during the period of the proletarian dictatorship.

The metaphysical logic of Menshevism and the affinity to that political methodology, may be seen in the following propositions of the Left-wing Communists:

(a) Either pure, immaculate Socialist authority which starts **immediately** the building of the Socialist commonwealth, or refusal to take part in a government that is prepared to compromise with capitalism.

(b) The working class and the Soviet Government are put in **opposition** to each other. The Left-wingers, for in-

* Thus, Lenin started his pamphlet on the "Food Tax" with a quotation from the main article of 1918: "On Infantile Leftism and Petty Bourgeois Mentality."

† e.g., The central organ of the Social Revolutionists: "Labour's Banner," etc.

stance, wrote about the need of "pointing out to the proletariat the danger which threatened the Socialist character of the revolution, of **organising conscious pressure by the proletariat upon the Soviet Government**, of waging a fight for the predominance of the proletariat in the revolution." Such were the statements of the Left-wingers about the followers of Lenin (p. 159). It may readily be recalled that the idea of putting the proletariat in opposition to the Soviet Government had been the **main political idea of Menshevism** from the outbreak of the October revolution up to the present day.*

(c) A further point in common between the Left-wing Communists and the Mensheviks is the appreciation of the Party's policy after the October revolution as being not "**proletarian, but soldierly**." Their thesis was certainly on a par with the arguments of the Mensheviks. In Martov's articles and in the instructions of the Menshevik Central Committee there were precisely similar recommendations for an agitation against the Soviet Government under the pretext of unmasking it as petty bourgeois and soldierly.

(d) The kinship in the political methods of the Left-wingers and the Mensheviks had come to light also in the attitude of the former towards the **peasantry**. The Left-wingers failed to understand the mechanism of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry during the period of proletarian dictatorship; they did not appreciate the need for concessions to the peasantry by the proletariat as the ruling class, **because they had a perverse idea of the very idea of the hegemony of the proletariat, and frequently re-echoed the statements made by Mensheviks**. It may be recalled that the Mensheviks, in their fight against Leninism, had worked out a complete strategy which consisted in the pretended attack against Bolshevism from the ultra-Left standpoint of watching over the purity of the class interests of the proletariat. The beginnings of this "pure class ideology" could be found already in the writings of the "Economists." Later on it blossomed out in the year 1905, when the Mensheviks levelled an attack against the Leninist slogan of a workers' and peasants' provisional government, which they denounced as Jaurèsism. In 1910-12 the Mensheviks (including the Left Mensheviks) had advanced the slogan of the freedom of coalition in opposition to the three main planks of Leninism,† which they alleged to be a side-tracking of the tasks of the proletariat into the channel of common

* Comrade Sorin is, therefore, wrong in ascribing this idea exclusively to the anarcho-syndicalists (cf. p. 134.)

† The democratic republic, the eight-hour day, and the confiscation of the landowner's estates.

democratic slogans. Finally, even after the October revolution the Mensheviks, posing as the "true representatives of the working class," urged the neutrality of the trade unions and the "special" interests of the workers in regard to the Soviet Government. Leninist tactics, viewed from the standpoint of such politicians, aiming to maintain the proletarian dictatorship in a **backward** country, was considered as rank opportunism. These were the Menshevik ideas which met with ready response on the part of the Left-wingers (of course, unconsciously). It was just the ambition to become "hundred per cent. proletarian Communists," which led the Left-wingers to the idea of putting the interests of the proletariat in opposition to those of the peasantry, to the idea that there was (at that moment) a discrepancy between the interests of the Soviet Government and those of the proletariat. This happened because they **had substituted narrow sectarian interests for the tasks of the proletariat as the ruling class**. It is here that we can see the starting point of the mistakes of the Left-wing Communists, and not in the "under-estimation of the role of the peasantry," as comrade Sorin thinks (cf. p. 183). Because this under-estimation of the peasantry (of course, a colossal mistake in itself) was the outcome of the substitution of narrow sectarian interests for the broad tasks of the proletarian hegemony.

(e) Finally, it should be noted that the Left-wingers said little that was new in their criticism of the Leninist **economic** policy. The criticism of State capitalism as being opposed to Socialism, the agitation against the formation of trusts and the utilisation of the old specialists and the introduction of industrial discipline—this agitation, carried on under the banner of fighting in defence of the interests of the working class, had substantially been launched by the Mensheviks, who endeavoured to cause a collision between the Soviet Government and the working class.

There was also noticeable in the ideology of Left-wing Communism the influence of petty bourgeois tendencies. It gramme of the Left-wing, wrote about them as follows: "They manifest their petty bourgeois nature by the very fact that **they do not see** the petty bourgeois element as the chief enemy of Socialism in our country." (The black type is Lenin's. Cf. Vol. XV., p. 263, Russian Edition). The desire to skip over the stage of State Capitalism, as the prelude to Socialism demonstrated the unmistakable influence of the utopian bourgeois Socialists.

Comrade Sorin quotes Lenin's characterisation of Left-wing Communists as "abortive" Left-wing Social-Revolu-

tionists. It is to be regretted that in the pamphlet in question we do not find a **detailed** argumentation of this thesis. Yet a detailed juxtaposition of the assertions of Left-wing Communists and Left-wing Socialist Revolutionists would contribute a great deal towards clearing up the nature of the social pressure in our Party.

Left-wing Communism was thus the product of a complex conglomeration of social phenomena. It reflected the petty bourgeois influence on the proletariat, the sentiments of narrow craft unionism and petty everyday interests, the sense of fatigue in the working class itself,* the fear of the difficulties confronting the proletarian dictatorship in a backward country. Such being the case, there should be even more minuteness in the characterisation of the social roots of Left-wing Communism. Hence comrade Sorin's attempt to characterise Left-wing Communism (in view of its pre-war agitation) as a reflection of the influence of the **patriotic** moods of the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie should be considered as rather beside the mark. Firstly, comrade Sorin himself considers the under-estimation of the role of the peasantry to be the cardinal mistake of the Left-wingers. Secondly, the peasants (even the prosperous elements among them) were not at all inclined to prosecute the war. Thirdly, the desire for continued resistance to Germany was rather characteristic of certain types among the working class.

The majority of the questions outlined above are dealt with in comrade Sorin's interesting book. It is regrettable that the book has been so constructed that important questions of principle are frequently buried under a mass of minute historical facts. In the next edition of the book it will be absolutely necessary to give at least a concise outline of the ideological affinity between the Left-wing Communism of 1918 and the subsequent oppositional tendencies, to draw a parallel between the Russian and the European Left-wing Communists, to trace the ideological routes and kinship between the political methods of Left-wing Communism and the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists, to give a more precise characterisation of the social roots of this Left-wing Communism. But even this edition of comrade Sorin's book displays great experience in the history of Bolshevism, which is of great interest to Communists in Western Europe. The reader will find in this book a detailed and thoroughly studied history of the Left-wing Communism of 1918.

N. LENZNER.

* Strange as it may seem at first sight, the very talk of declaring war with Germany was rather the reflection of fatigue and despair.

“THE OPEN DOOR POLICY,”**By En-Tsung-Yen**

(Stratford Company, Boston).

AT the present moment when the enormous country of China, with its population of 400 millions, together with the rest of the world, is shaken by a tremendous unprecedented struggle, the book under review, written by a Chinese professor now teaching the Chinese language in the American University (Georgetown) deserves special attention.

Judging by his work, the author would seem to belong to that section of Chinese intellectuals which, linked up by cultural-material bonds (in this case—service in a Western university) adopt the position of a moderate half and half opposition towards the imperialists who are enslaving the Chinese people. En-Tsung-Yen, influenced by environment, singles out the Chinese policy of American imperialism as regards China as being most honest—almost amicable. At the commencement of his book he even asserts that “the United States was the only country having considerable interests in the (Far) East which emerged with clean hands.” He even dedicates his book to the memory of John Hay, the American Secretary of State, who in 1899 conducted the so-called “policy of the open door” in China.

But, however, all that does not lessen the interest of the book. It helps one to understand why these feelings towards the American imperialists are shared by considerable Chinese social circles, even at the present moment, a moment of a burning and consecrated hatred for British, Japanese and other oppressors, a hatred which has embraced the whole Chinese nation; this book also gives copious and conscientious documental material concerning the struggle of influences in China from the end of the last century up to the Washington Conference inclusively, in connection with the so-called “Policy of the Open Door.” Moreover, as will be seen later, this book characterises the more interior mistrust for the imperialist West which has struck root deeply even among those strata of the Chinese intellectuals, who partially came under the influence of one or other of the imperialist countries. What is the secret of this “Policy of the Open Door” in China advocated by American imperialism, and which to a certain extent has corrupted certain Chinese circles? In the book under review we find valuable material necessary for the elucidation of this question.

The close of the last century, in intellectual politics, marks the event of extensive annexations in China on the part of the imperialist powers. Czarist Russia seized one position after another in Northern China: Japanese pressure on China eventually took the form of war (1894-5) which deprived China of the Island of Formosa and prepared the ground for a new and still more brazen robbery; the British imperialists after seizing Hong Kong and important positions in Shanghai, Canton, and other ports in the "Opium War" (1835-41) conquered Burma in 1885—a territory to the South of China which was under a Chinese protectorate; the French, after annexing territory in Indo-China (1867), seized Tonkin in 1884 and extended their domination in Indo-China, and Germany, which had only just emerged into the broad path of imperialism on a world scale, prepared the ground for the shameless robbery of 1898 by means of loans and diplomatic interventions. Finally, there came the events of that year when the hungry pack of all European imperialists threw itself upon unhappy China and tore it to pieces: Germany seized large territory around the Kia-Chow Straits, Russia seized Port Arthur and Dalney, France—Kwang Chow, Great Britain—Wei-Hai-Wei, and Italy—Port Sanmun.

What was the policy of the United States during that time? Up to the time of the war with Spain (April-July, 1898), the United States, although having considerable commercial and political interests in China, was still too much occupied in digesting the internal riches of its own tremendous territory to carry on an energetic aggressive colonial policy. But *l'appetit vient en mangeant*. The victory over Spain and its seizure of the Phillipine and Hawaii Islands in the Far East which followed (and Cuba and Porto Rico, in the Carribean Sea) all this was a preparation for the energetic entry of the United States into Chinese affairs under the slogan of "The Open Door." In the circular note that the Secretary of State, Hay, sent to the Powers on September 6th, 1899, the following points were stressed as being essential:

Within the bounds of the so-called "spheres of influence" the States who enjoy privileged influence there—

Must not place obstacles in the way of other (read: American) interests;

Must not take customs matters out of the hands of the Chinese authorities in order to use them for favouring their own citizens to the damage of others;

Must not fix higher railroad and port tariffs for other subjects.

In this manner we see that although the United States post-factum was compelled to recognise the "spheres of influence," that had already been seized, the U.S.A. drafted fairly compact boundaries beyond which the imperialist countries, who had been able to assert their rule there, should not pass.

Such a policy is explained by the fact that in the situation that was forming there at that time **(just as at the present time) it was more advantageous for the United States to adopt the role of a protector and friend of China and curb the competitors who had already managed to make large seizures. It is more advantageous to create the pre-requisites for trade with the whole of China and for exploiting it than seizing one or another "sphere of influence."** (Although certain policies then also were able to seize a piece of Chinese territory).

Such is the real underlying significance of the famous policy of the "Open Door." But our author evidently deeming it inconvenient to hurl the truth in the face of the American imperialists, does not formulate the question so clearly.

But the American policy also in regard to China, although at first appearing rather less brutal than the policy of other imperialist powers, becomes more and more aggressive. In 1901, during the Boxer rising, the United States unlike its tactics during the war of the European Powers with China in 1857, no longer stood aside, but side by side with the Powers took part in the attack on Peking for protecting the legal trade of American citizens. (During the period of 1890-1892 the extent of American-Chinese trade was almost trebled—30.3 million taels as against 11.8 million taels). The United States also took part in foisting predatory contributions on China and reserved for itself 24 million dollars out of the total sum. American "humanitarianism" is only expressed in so far as the States stood out against new territorial annexations which would be more advantageous to the Powers which had previously entered China.

A little later, in 1903, President Roosevelt in a speech at San Francisco, openly declared that the United States should conquer the hegemony over the Far East. During the same year Roosevelt engineered a little "revolution" in Panama, and after 10 years' struggle with the European Powers, seized the key to the gate into the Pacific Ocean.

At the same time the United States struggled assiduously against the penetration of Great Britain and Tsarist Russia into China, and after the Russo-Japanese war struggled against the intoxicated Japanese victors. In Oc-

tober, 1908 the United States compelled Japan once more to recognise the so-called "principle of the Open Door in China" (The Root-Takahara Agreement.) But in this case it was undertaken to "respect the territorial domination" of Japan in China, and "the status quo in the Pacific Ocean regions." In 1917, Washington diplomacy made yet another attempt to restrain the fever for conquest on the part of her intoxicated competitor in China. It is well-known that Japan made use of the war in order to present China, in the form of a secret two-day ultimatum, the famous 21 demands (May 7th, 1915) which, in their substance amount to one impudent pretension—the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over China. America, of course, would not stand for that, although this was naturally not out of sympathy for China. The U.S.A. immediately, (May 16th), made a protest against Japan's infringement of the Open Door Principle, but already on May 25th China, brought to her knees, signed the Japanese conditions.

Later, when in the time of the "great pacifist," Wilson, the United States entered into the World War in order "to make the world safe for democracy" by doing so, it, to a considerable degree, deprived itself of the possibility of bringing pressure on its "valiant" allies, Japan, who, in the noise of this great struggle for "democracy" dug its feet into China in a still more shameless fashion. The compromising "gentlemanlike" agreement of Ishi-Lansing (November 2nd, 1917) was signed. According to this "informal" agreement, Japan, on the one side, once more gives "ponderous" promises to respect the principle of the "Open Door in China," but at the same time, America places one more dangerous weapon into the hands of Japanese diplomacy such as the recognition of the "special interests" of Japan in China.

It is true that afterwards the United States beat a retreat. Lansing said at the meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission of August 11th, 1919: "We certainly recognise that Japan by virtue of her geographical position has peculiar interests in China, but these interests by their very nature are not political. The danger of sanctioning special interests lies in their being misinterpreted, and I therefore refuse to make such a declaration." (Official Treaty).

At the same time Lansing announced in an interview with Ishi that if the "special interests" are interpreted as being "paramount interests," then he will refuse to discuss the question.

This, of course, is not a question of philology of the difference between the variants of "special," "advantageous,"

“political,” etc., but it is a question of the more the United States becomes strengthened as a result of the war, the more aggressive becomes its Chinese policy, if not in form, at least in substance; correspondingly, the United States naturally aspired at snatching away from the hands of Japan the trumps that were given her during a moment of bad play.

The refusal of the American Congress to ratify the Versailles Treaty is by no small degree explained by the discontent at Wilson having retreated before Japanese diplomacy and having agreed to such exclusively important economic, political and strategic conditions being handed over to Japan as Shantung, Kia-Chow (these territories, seized by Germany in China in 1898, were seized by Japan from Germany during the World War with the “ponderous” promise to return them to China).

But the United States got one in on Japan at the Washington Conference. The so-called Treaty of the Nine Powers concerning policy in the Far East prepared the annulment of the Ishi-Lansing agreement (March, 1923).

Here America played the role of a generous and disinterested friend of China. She compelled Japan—under certain conditions—to agree to the evacuation of Shantung, and to renounce certain territorial privileges arising from the 21 demands. She also carried certain resolutions promising concessions to China on the question of the extra-territorial rights of the Powers, on the raising of the customs duties, on a Chinese post instead of foreign post, etc. Under pressure from America, vague and double-sensed declarations of Great Britain and France were read out according to which they “intended” returning to China, correspondingly Wei-Hai-Wei and Kwang-Chow, “if circumstances permit,” etc., etc.

The author of the book under review talks of the results of the Washington Conference for China as being “considerable attainments.” He is quite satisfied that the principle of “The Open Door,” which in his opinion amounts to the real sovereignty of China, triumphed at the Conference, and that China was allowed to enter into the “generous family” of superior diplomats in Washington. (He does not mention, by the way, the exclusion of Soviet Russia, which to a large degree is explained by the fear that China would be supported by the Soviet Delegation).

But it is characteristic that even such a representative of the Chinese intellectuals as our author ends his book with the following arguments :

“Facts, however, do not confirm that the Far Eastern problem was satisfactorily solved by the Washington Conference. How many times in the past have the Powers promised to respect the independence of China, its sovereignty and territorial and administrative entity? But how many times have they really acted in accordance with the triumphantly enunciated principle? These declarations sometimes (not always? M.T.) are scraps of paper. . . .”

And the author finally arrives at the absolutely correct conclusion that the first condition for solving the Chinese question is the “winning of the position of a strong power on the part of China.”

Further, as if he left the game of “superior diplomacy” to the United States, the author proves that he does not think this “great principle” of the “Open Door” which is seemingly based on the recognition of the complete sovereignty of China is genuine :

“To talk about the independence and integrity of a weak nation is but the old policy of balance of power on the part of the strong Powers, and it is by no means new in its application to China. The Powers applied it also to Turkey, Persia and other weak nations. It might be formulated in another way, and one of its formulæ may be termed “the policy of the Open Door.” . . . Fundamentally this weak policy and the fact that we are dealing here with a weak nation which some strong nations wish to rob, while others “in order to hold the first place, and preserve the Balance of Power, wish to protect.”

Here, as we see, there is quite another approach. Here our Chinese publicist already commences, already as they say, to look at the roots. He is also correct when he says :

“In spite of weakness, financial crisis, bad administration, internal disorders, and the pressure of foreign governments, the position in China is by no means without hope. What is more, the future inspires complete optimism. . . .”

“The potential greatness of China—the rich natural resources, the convenient geographical position, and the worthiness of China as a nation . . . having a history of five thousand years, and. . . comprising one-quarter of humanity”—all this gives ground for optimism.

“This modernisation of China is no dream. . . . under pressure of the modern social economic system . . . even the terrible results of the war, the Chinese people will soon be drawn into this complicated capitalist system. . . . The exploitation of the natural wealth of China, the introduction

of machinery, construction of factories, growth of capital and labour, together with their problems, and the change in social economic and political orders. . . all this cannot be put off for very long."

And, indeed, the present really tremendous historical events in China confirm that this development is proceeding, and that it will continue to proceed at a tempo it is even difficult to anticipate. In the process of this development, those forces are being born which will squeeze out the half-and-half hesitant Chinese intellectuals as represented by our author, and with which a strong muscular hand will be steered with the Chinese national-revolutionary social order.

The manifesto recently published by the Chinese Communist Party bears witness to the fact that these forces really exist, and are developing. The vanguard of the Chinese revolutionary forces already nourishes no illusions with regard to the "Mission" of America in China, with its policy of the "Open Door."

"The actions of America,"—we read in this manifesto— "do not signify that it really desires to make concessions: it is only striving to seize a privileged position on the Chinese market with the aid of fine gestures. The Washington Conference which promised so much, but achieved so little, has disappointed the Chinese masses, and they will no longer allow themselves to be deceived by empty chatter."

This manifesto brings forward the demands for annulling the treaties of inequality, for disarming the Chinese generals, who do not want to fight against the foreign robbers, for arming the workers and peasants, democratising the country, legalising the trade unions and strikes, confiscating agricultural holdings, and the creation of a fund for popular education, etc.

These slogans bear witness that the advanced forces of China really desire community with THE NEW West and its new revolutionary ideas. They also want to open the doors of China, and even open them widely, so that before anything else they can kick out the robbers who are plundering the Chinese house, and allow wide access to the great ideas which will bring death to the forces of imperialist oppression.

M.T.

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