
Extract of the Testimony of Jay Lovestone, Secretary of the Independent Labor League of America, Before the House Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities, December 2, 1939.

Published in *Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Hearings Before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, 76th Congress, 1st Session, on H. Res. 282...: Volume 11: October 28, 30, 31, November 1, 2, 3, 27, 29, and 30, and December 1, 2, and 3, 1939 at Washington, DC.* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 7095-7188.

Saturday, December 2, 1939.

House of Representatives,
Special Committee to Investigate
Un-American Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10 am in the caucus room, House Office Building, Hon. Joe Starnes presiding.

Present: Messrs. Starnes (AL), [Jerry] Voorhis (CA), and [Noah M.] Mason (IL).

Also present: Mr. Rhea Whitley, counsel to the committee and Mr. J.B. Matthews, chief committee investigator.

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(The witness was duly sworn by Mr. Starnes.)

Mr. Starnes: You may proceed with the examination, Mr. Matthews.

Mr. Matthews: Please state your full name for the record.

Mr. Lovestone: My name is Jay Lovestone.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask if it would be permissible, in view of the time consideration today, for us to have the routine questions and answers concerning the personal affairs of the witness submitted in writing.

Mr. Starnes: He may file that information with the committee.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, are you appearing here this morning under subpoena?

Mr. Lovestone: I have a subpoena in my pocket.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Browder, Mr. Foster, and other leaders of the Communist Party appeared here and volunteered their testimony. Perhaps you have some explanation of why you have not volunteered to supply this committee with the voluminous information which your experience has provided you with reference to the Communist Party or Communist movement.

Mr. Lovestone: Frankly, I was almost shocked to hear the Messrs. Browder, Bedacht, Foster, and other recognized paid official spokesmen of Stalinism in this country appeared before you voluntarily, or that they volunteered to testify. I have refused to volunteer for the following reasons: First of all, I did not associate myself with a great deal of the procedure of the committee. I think that a good deal of the labor problem which the committee handles can be best handled by the labor movement. Secondly, I would like for the committee and everyone else to know that it is the last thing in the world I would want to do, in the light of my present political position, to be found in the neighborhood, the area, or district where even the dust of the Stalinist machine in this country would fall on me, or where in the slightest way somebody might connect me up with them politically. I hesitated, and did not want to come before the committee for those reasons I have given.

Mr. Matthews: What are your business connections?

Mr. Lovestone: I am at present Secretary of the Independent Labor League of America, with headquarters in New York, and with branches in the principal other industrial sections throughout the country.

Mr. Matthews: I would like to ask you something more about the program of your organization later. Will you please state what is the salary of your present position?

Mr. Lovestone: Statistically, my salary is \$35 per week. That is, I am supposed to get \$35 per week when I get it. Sometimes we do and sometimes we do not.

Mr. Matthews: How long have you been active in the trade union and socialist movement in the United States?

Mr. Lovestone: In one form or another, I have been an organizer politically, as we say, since 1912. I have been giving my full time to the labor movement for more than 20 years.

Mr. Matthews: Will you tell us briefly what you have done during that period of time in the terms of the activities in which you have been engaged?

Mr. Lovestone: I was in the Socialist Party, and very active, and then became active with the organizers of the Left Wing of the Socialist Party back in 1916.† Later on, I was one of the organizers of the Communist Party. It was apparent, as a result of the split of the Socialist Party in 1916, that we were to have a Communist Party. I have held every office, from Branch Secretary to General Secretary, of that party. I might say that I have received or been subjected to the highest honors of the Communist Party in my time save one, and that is liquidation by a firing squad.‡

Mr. Matthews: Were you one of the founders of the Communist International?

Mr. Lovestone: I was one of the founders of the Communist International, and of the American section, which was among the first to be organized in the Comintern.§

Mr. Matthews: Were you the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States before or approximately immediately before the assumption of that office by Earl Browder?

Mr. Lovestone: I was the last General Secretary of the Communist Party before Earl Browder was appointed General Secretary.

Mr. Matthews: Are there any other offices that you have held that you think are proper to introduce into the record at this time?

Mr. Lovestone: I have been a member of every Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party as long as I was active in the Communist Party.Δ I have been a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International for a number of years, and was a member of the confidential committees. I was also a member of the committee of elders at the 6th World Congress of the Communist International.

Mr. Matthews: Did you attend the 6th World Congress?

Mr. Lovestone: I attended and reported on this Congress.

Mr. Matthews: Was that held in the summer of 1928?

Mr. Lovestone: That was held for a good part of the summer of 1928 [July 17-Sept. 1] at Moscow.

Mr. Matthews: Have you made other trips to Moscow?

Mr. Lovestone: I reckon I made quite a number of trips to Moscow?

Mr. Matthews: Do you have an approximate idea of how many trips you have made?

Mr. Lovestone: I would have to estimate it. Approximately, I would say that I must have gone over there 8 or 10 times.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, what are your principal writings?

Mr. Lovestone: I have written some books, I have written a lot of pamphlets, and I have been the editor of a paper at one time — that is, of a Communist

†- While the first formal organization of the Left Wing did emerge in the Boston area in 1916, there is no evidence that New Yorker Jay Lovestone was part of this group; nor was there any major Left/Right split of the Socialist Party in that year. It seems that Lovestone actually means 1919 rather than 1916. Bear in mind that this testimony took place some 20 years after the fact.

‡- Soviet secret police executioners actually killed with a single shot delivered point blank from behind to the base of the skull.

§- Jay Lovestone was not a delegate to the founding Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow from March 2-6, 1919. He was at that time a member of the Socialist Party of America, which was not a member organization. Nor was he a delegate to the 2nd (1920) or 3rd (1921) World Congresses, nor the 1st Enlarged Plenum of ECCI (1922), nor did he invent the Internet.

Δ- While there remain a small number of unsolved pseudonyms of the underground United Communist Party, the claim is dubious.

paper.

Mr. Matthews: Do you mean *The Daily Worker*?

Mr. Lovestone: I was editing that for a while, and I edited monthly magazines.† It would be quite a job to tabulate them from memory, giving the names of my writings. Of course, you know that better than I do.

Mr. Matthews: I have a number of your writings that I would like to have introduced later on. Were you the author of any special party documents of importance?

Mr. Lovestone: I was one of the authors of the first program of the Communist movement in this country, and for a number of years I reckon I was the author of most of the political documents that the Communist Party issued.

Mr. Matthews: Did you know Lenin personally?

Mr. Lovestone: I never met him in the sense of knowing him.‡

Mr. Matthews: Have you ever met Stalin?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews: Have you had private conferences with Stalin?

Mr. Lovestone: Many, many of them.§

Mr. Matthews: Have you ever met Molotov?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews: Have you been personally acquainted with other top leaders of the Communist International or the Russian Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: I have been, without question, but most of those I have been acquainted with are dead now.

Mr. Matthews: How did they come to their deaths?

Mr. Lovestone: Through liquidation by firing squads.

Mr. Matthews: That is what you referred to when you said you had had every other honor conferred on you except liquidation by a firing squad?

Mr. Lovestone: That is what I underscored —

not what I referred to.

Mr. Matthews: When did you break with Moscow?

Mr. Lovestone: Officially in 1929 — in July or June 1929; but in my mind I have been doing a lot of thinking, which is a difficult job. Officially, the conditions in the Communist movement culminated in an open break in 1929.

Mr. Matthews: In enumerating the reasons for your break with Moscow, what, in your mind, was the principal issue at stake?

Mr. Lovestone: It would be hard to say that one issue was the principal one. There were quite a number of very important questions over which we were developing quite serious differences. If I may be permitted to enumerate some of them as they come to me after 10 years' time, and attempt to forget a great deal of it, I would say they were the following: First of all, we had a very violent conflict over the question of how the party's International should be run, managed, or led. We advocated what was known as party democracy, and Stalin and his puppets, while they did not outright reject it, did actually vitiate every concept of party democracy that we once thought had to be in the International.

Secondly, we had a vigorous clash with the Russian Communist Party leaders as to the type of leadership for the International organization as such — that is, in the Communist International. Our position was that the Communist International should have a collective and genuinely international leadership, in which Russia could be first, but the first among equals. We were against a monopoly of leadership by the Russian Communist Party.

In the third place, we differed with the Communist International, which, in actuality, meant the Stalin-led Russian Communist Party, over a series of questions involving the American institution. For example, we were denounced as exceptionalists, and that was, by the way, a high crime in the church. That was because we had stressed that there were certain his-

†- *The Daily Worker* was established as a daily version of *The Worker* in 1924. Lovestone was definitely not the editor of the paper in that year and it is additionally doubtful whether he was the editor during the period 1925-1929. While it is possible that he may have been the editor of the (approximately) monthly official organ of the underground Communist Party for a brief period in the 1920-1922 period, that is not what he claimed here. It is not known of which magazines Lovestone is speaking.

‡- The editor is not at all sure that Lovestone was ever in Soviet Russia prior to Lenin's death in early 1924.

§- A dubious assertion.

torical peculiarities and industrial conditions in the United States distinct from those in other lands. We denied their claim that in the United States there was as much radicalism or as much of a radical labor movement as there was in a number of European countries. We differed with the Stalin leadership every time on the entire American economic and political trends. The position of Herr Stalin was that the American economic system was going to pieces, and that this was the last and final crisis for capitalism in the United States. We said that the Communist Party was headed for a big job in creating a crisis of very grave consequence to capitalism in the United States; that it was far from finished, and that the beast still had a lot of kick in it. For that we were roundly denounced. The theory of Stalin was that the revolution was pretty much round the corner in the United States. We would have liked to believe that theory, but our mental processes would not allow ourselves to be distorted by wish thinking.

Then we differed with the Stalinites over the question of dual unionism. The Stalinites developed a theory that in the United States it was necessary to split the American Federation of labor and smash it to smithereens, and organize a new revolutionary union that would simply be an appendage of the Communist Party. That was resisted, rejected, and resented. We resented that conception or principle, although, in fairness to the facts, I must say that as a disciplined Communist I did go along with those obnoxious principles for a number of months.

We also differed with the Stalinites over the theory of Social Fascism. At that time the Stalinites had a notion that everybody who did not fully agree with them was at best what they call a Social Fascist. I felt myself or ourselves a little more mature and wouldn't take that. I am not going into any detail. There may be other reasons, but I reckon they are about the principal issues over which we broke at that time.

* * *

Mr. Lovestone: ...[I]t was not until sometime in 1936 that we gave up our desire for unity with the Communist Party. Sometime in 1936 we changed our minds and said we not only did not want unity, but we didn't want to have anything to do with it.

Mr. Matthews: You mean for a period of approximately 7 years there were discussions as to unification of the groups?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes; it took us about 7 years to learn the lesson we know now.

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: You see, Mr. Matthews, it is pretty hard for people who haven't literally been brought up in the Communist movement to understand the type of devotion and loyalty we developed through our ideal and through the organization under whose banners the ideal is supposed to be enrolled. For a number of years many of us gave everything we had toward making the Communist movement a clean, effective, vigorous movement in this country, a movement which would overthrow capitalism and establish a socialist society. We saw mistakes inside, we went along with a lot of things which in a specific sense we were not in accord with, but out of loyalty to the organization we worked inside in the hope that we could change it from within.

A little later we were sort of crowded away from this concept, and, I might say, with the very able and very effective assistance of Stalin, thanks to his expulsion of us. If it had not been for that assistance we would still be floundering in the swamps. But we were expelled with the assistance of Stalin, and, as I have said, for a number of years we were struggling to reform the Communist Party from without, to make it a bona fide, socialist, working class organization, and we learned from experience, much more than from books, that the Communist Party cannot be reformed from without. So we arrived at the decision that the Communist Party not only could not be reformed from within or without, but that the first job of the American working class is to do entirely without the type of political organization that is now parading as the Communist Party of the United States.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: It is your understanding that the Comintern has become a branch of the Foreign Commissariat of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Lovestone: It is not only my understanding; it is my understanding based on experience that the Communist International today reflects nothing

but the foreign policies of the Soviet government.

Mr. Matthews: There were factional breaks which developed to a very sharp point in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the course of the development of these factional struggles was there maneuvering for the use of the Communist International as a factional weapon?

Mr. Lovestone: May I be permitted to go back a bit?

Mr. Matthews: Certainly.

Mr. Lovestone: I would say the Communist International, in relation to the Russian Communist Party, went through the following stages: In the first days of the October Revolution — that is the Bolshevik Revolution — the Russians were leaders through prestige, through achievement, through the fact that they conquered one-sixth of the world for socialism. We had an attitude of almost religious veneration toward them, the Russian leaders.

Mr. Matthews: Was it almost or was it complete?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, the line of demarcation would be very thin. Speaking for myself I would say it was quite complete, and if you want to take the word “quite” out, I would say it was complete. But I must say in fairness to the Russian leaders at that time they did not advocate this; they did not nurture this. Later on, with the death of Lenin and the development of factionalism, sharp unprincipled factionalism — I would say suicidal factionalism — in the Russian party, the Comintern policies began to be involved in and determined by the factional struggles inside the Russian party, with the result that each faction played for control of the Communist International as a weapon against another faction. We were hesitant to adopt resolutions endorsed by one faction or the other.

Mr. Matthews: You mean in the United States, Mr. Lovestone?

Mr. Lovestone: In the American organization, or the French organization, or any other organization.

For a while the Communist International policies in the respective sections reflected very much the factional struggles in the Communist International, but from that we came to the third phase of our relations, and that is the present one, and that present one did not begin with our expulsion. It set in a little before. That was the moment when the Communist International had been reduced actually to a puppet organization, and its policies reflected through the mechanical transference of tactics from Russia to other countries, and strictly speaking, to be solely Russian foreign policy.

It is necessary to differentiate the stages, because it would be unfair to Stalin and those who follow him today to give the impression that what I once called a running sore in the Communist International, and later a cancer in the Comintern, began with him. It had begun even before.

Mr. Matthews: The headquarters of the Communist Party of the United States were once in Chicago, I believe?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: They were originally in Chicago?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, at one time they were in New York and then I moved it to Chicago.†

Mr. Matthews: Who moved the headquarters from Chicago to New York, where they are at the present time? Was that done by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. Lovestone: Formally, yes; the Central Committee decides where the headquarters are to be.

Mr. Matthews: Did the Central Committee have to get permission from Moscow to make the move?

Mr. Lovestone: May I answer this question not by a “yes” or a “no”?

Mr. Lovestone: We have had for a number of years in the American Communist Party a factional struggle, financed indirectly, propagated, and perpetrated by factions inside the Russian Communist Party.‡ When the Central Committee, at that time led by Ruthenberg, now dead — he died a natural

†- The first headquarters of the old Communist Party of America was located in Chicago. When the party was forced into underground operations late in 1919 due to government repression, headquarters moved to New York City, where they remained until being moved to Chicago in 1924 as by-product of the factional struggle between the Chicago-based Foster-Cannon-Bittelman faction and the New York-based Pepper-Ruthenberg-Lovestone faction. The center of operations returned to New York in 1927 under Lovestone’s watch as Executive Secretary of the Workers (Communist) Party.

‡- While not to discount some connection between the American factional struggle between Ruthenberg-Lovestone and Foster and the Russian factional situation, it should be noted that American factionalism existed throughout the history of the American radical movement, dating back to the earliest days of the First International in America. It is historically false to say American factionalism in

death in this country — proposed to move the headquarters to New York, the opposition, at that time led by Foster, was against it, and appealed to Moscow, to the International, and for 2 years we could not move our headquarters until Moscow gave us their approval for the move. Then Moscow decided it would be all right to move the headquarters from Chicago to New York, and that was the end and the settlement of the question.†

Mr. Matthews: I take it, then, your answer is “yes,” with embellishments?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, with emphasis, not embellishments.

Mr. Matthews: Did the Communist Party or its Central Committee, in this country, have to obtain permission of the Comintern to hold annual conventions in this country?

Mr. Lovestone: To hold them annually or at any time. No convention could be held without permission of the executives of the Communist International.

Mr. Matthews: When Mr. Foster was on the stand here he said that was simply a polite gesture and had not substance to it. Would you say that this was the character of this permission?

Mr. Lovestone: We don’t have much politeness, even in these days, within the Communist International, so that it was neither a gesture nor politeness. It was a matter of painful fact to us.

Mr. Matthews: In *The Communist*, a monthly publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, issue of January 1929, you had an article, Mr. Lovestone. On examining the article I find that you speak very highly of Bukharin. Do you recall that article?

Mr. Lovestone: I don’t recall the article, but I recall the speech on which this article was based. I recall that speech very well, because that speech was the occasion for quite a campaign against me in Moscow.

Mr. Matthews: What was the nature and result of that campaign?

Mr. Lovestone: Let me say this: I was Secretary

of the Communist Party. I reported to the meeting of its National Committee in December 1928. The factional fight in the Russian Communist Party had gone to extremes. Everybody was rallying to endorse Stalin. I was not only a personal friend of Bukharin, but I had fundamental agreement with him on international questions, though on Russian questions I had agreement with Stalin and not with him. In that meeting I objected to the American Communist Party lining up. I said, “We will wear no Stalin buttons, and we will wear no Bukharin buttons, and we will not engage in gangsterism against Stalin or Bukharin.” I said that Stalin was my leader as leader of the Communist Party; that I respected him, had high regard for his opinion and caliber of thinking.

Mr. Matthews: He was at that time the official head of the Comintern?

Mr. Lovestone: He was at that time the official leader of the Communist International. Saying that, a cable was sent to Moscow. That cable was passed around throughout the International, and that pretty much served as the blot on my political death certificate in my relations with the Stalin leadership.

Mr. Matthews: What has happened to Bukharin?

Mr. Lovestone: I guess Bukharin went the way of all Bolshevik flesh in Russia — execution.

Mr. Matthews: At least that is the official report, is it not?

Mr. Lovestone: I think Stalin is telling the truth in this case.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, you mentioned the question of Social Fascism as one of the reasons for your break with Moscow. Will you please explain briefly what was meant by Social Fascism?

Mr. Lovestone: It is a form of lunacy that defies explanation. It was a theory which said in substance that precisely those who stood for advanced social legislation or Socialism, as advocated by the Socialist Parties of the world, that these were the most dangerous people; that actually they were Fascists, but they were

the American Communist Party of the 1920s was “propagated and perpetrated” by Russian factions.

†- The implication here is a bit misleading. The Comintern in this period did not preoccupy itself with the micromanagement of headquarters real estate but rather served, rather grudgingly, as the arbitrator of factional strife. The faction fight in the American CP between Foster’s Chicago faction and the New York-based faction of Pepper, Ruthenberg, and Lovestone was a veritable war. The location of party headquarters was not a superficial issue, but rather related directly to the factional struggle. That the Comintern should have been appealed to by both sides and have made the ultimate decision on this divisive factional issue is no surprise.

using Socialist phrases to hide their pernicious objectives. That meant, for example, that in these days President Roosevelt might qualify, in moments of extreme generosity, as a Social Communist, but Norman Thomas was a Social Fascist. In these days I can't qualify even as a Social Fascist.

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Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, can you throw some light on the question whether your break with Moscow became a *cause celebre* in the Communist International.

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I never called it such, but it has been called that, and I can only say that in my opinion there was justification for its being called that, and that the following very probably would be the reasons for that appellation being given to our break with Moscow. First of all this was an attack by the Stalin group on the entire party and an entire section of the Communist International. We had had a convention; we had an overwhelming majority of delegates; we had had decisions, and these were all overruled and thrown out. Secondly, the size of the majority attained by our leadership under the democratic processes in the Communist Party was such as you generally get in plebiscites and not in elections; it was so one-sided.

Mr. Matthews: In other works, in the category of 90 percent?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, yes; and it was genuine. It was not gotten by airplanes. Then the leadership of the American Communist Party, myself amongst them, had the longest period of confidence of the dominant Russian leaders, a longer period than any other leadership of any national section, and when the war came on us it was quite a surprise. Beside that, in the fight against us there were introduced a certain number of methods and weapons of struggle which you are reading about in the papers now. I might say I was invited to Moscow 10 years before Estonia was, and I went, and came back with less than Estonia has at present. We stayed there a long time. The character of the struggle we waged right inside of Moscow as of the most stubborn and the most courageous fight that the Russians ever had on their hands.

Mr. Matthews: Did Stalin himself speak of your fight as a stubborn and courageous fight?

Mr. Lovestone: I recall at the moment the words of Stalin. If we had a bear by they tail, they had something tougher than a bear by the tail, except we didn't realize they could swing from the tail to our throats. That made it quite a *cause celebre*.

Then there was the way the American party was "enlightened" at that time. The word was not "liquidated" but "enlightened." They enlightened you, and when you were enlightened, you were through.

That also gave a lot of emphasis to the significance of the struggle. But more than that it was a battle which we continued in the Communist International (that is, the American party) which was the signal for a revolt — to my regret an unsuccessful revolt against the entire regime and policies of the Communist International as dominated by the Stalin clique in the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. Matthews: How long were you in Moscow during that episode?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I would say—

Mr. Matthews: Did you go over in March 1929?

Mr. Lovestone: I left in March, and I—that is, I left the United States in March, and I left Moscow or fled from Moscow in June, I think, sometime in June, the end of June or the beginning of July. My dates would not be accurate on that. I have tried to forget them, and therefore I don't remember them in a calendar sense with any mathematical precision.

Mr. Matthews: When you speak of your flight from Moscow, do you mean you left by airplane?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I mean a little more. I mean I left by airplane and I had to do some good high flying. I left with formal permission, because as one of the executives of the Communist International I was entitled to go back to my country and to my own party for a period of 2 months to rearrange my personal affairs before I assumed work elsewhere. But though I had formal permission, I did not have real permission.

I managed with the assistance of a number of friends and comrades of mine, most of whom are now executed, to leave Moscow quite successfully, I think because Stalin did not know that I was out until 4 days after I had been out of Moscow, which I consider a major achievement, for myself anyway.

Mr. Voorhis: I would like to go back just a little bit. Mr. Lovestone, I wonder if you would go into a little more detail about the majority that your group

had in the party, and whether you can give us any details about that. I mean any elections that might have been held or anything like that; what the figures were on them and things of that sort.

Mr. Lovestone: May I answer that question in two parts?

Mr. Voorhis: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: First of all, the method of our securing the majority and its size; and secondly the method employed here in the destruction of the majority. May I?

Mr. Voorhis: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: We had about 10 weeks of discussion in the Communist Party press and Communist Party meetings, general membership meetings, city meetings, branch meetings. There were presented at these discussions what we called theses. That means two statements of policy. Delegates were ten elected on a pro rata basis and the delegates were chosen on the basis of which thesis they voted for, the one presented by myself or the one presented at that time by Foster. The Communist International was operating behind the scenes, not yet fully in the open, to support the Foster faction. It was generally known at that time in the American Communist Party that Stalin was manipulating in behalf of Foster. Despite that, when it came to the election of delegates I think we had more than 90 out of a little more than 100 delegates to the convention.

Mr. Voorhis: To the party convention.

Mr. Lovestone: To the [6th] Communist Party Convention, which was held in March 1929 in New York City.

Mr. Voorhis: Who elected these delegates? Were they elected by the locals?

Mr. Lovestone: They were elected by branches, which chose delegates to district conventions, and the district conventions elected delegates to the national convention.

Mr. Voorhis: In the branches all members voted?

Mr. Lovestone: All members in good standing, which means those members who had paid their dues.

Mr. Voorhis: What I am after, the election was entirely democratic, everybody participated who was in good standing?

Mr. Lovestone: The basis of the election was extremely democratic, because any time anybody was in

opposition, he would raise a question and we were ready enough to yield, because we did not want to have issues. More than that, we had complete control of the party apparatus, but we gave the minority at that time equal time and equal space in the party press and at party meetings. It was a bona fide democratic party election, as we know it in this country.

Mr. Voorhis: After the branches had elected delegates, those delegates met in each district, is that right?

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Voorhis: Out of that meeting were chosen the delegates to the national convention?

Mr. Lovestone: On a pro rata basis of membership strength in the districts.

Mr. Voorhis: What section of the country did the 10 percent of delegates that you did not control come from?

Mr. Lovestone: It would be hard to say. Some came from California, some came from New York. As a matter of fact, I might state very frankly if we at that time were to take all the delegates on the basis of majority versus minority we could have had the entire convention ourselves, but we thought that would be unsound, that it would tend to crush the minority whom we wanted to absorb and work with as comrades in one organization.

Mr. Matthews: Was this minority under the leadership of Foster and Bittelman?

Mr. Lovestone: Officially the leaders of the minority were Foster and Bittelman; actually the leader of the minority was Stalin.

Mr. Matthews: The opposition or the minority has been designated in party publications frequently as the Foster-Bittelman?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, yes — or the Bittelman-Foster, because Bittelman can read Russian and that qualified him more for the leadership.

Mr. Matthews: I would like to ask you if there was ever any dispute on the part of Stalin or the Russian leaders concerning the fact of a majority of the party in this country supporting the policies which you represented?

Mr. Lovestone: Never at all.

Mr. Matthews: In Stalin's own speeches before the American Commission [of ECCI] in Moscow he made frequent reference, did he not, to your group as the majority group in the party?

Mr. Lovestone: Stalin admitted this consistently.

Mr. Matthews: And I see here before me in his speech that he even referred to your support as that of 99 percent of the American party.

Mr. Lovestone: Well, he tried to challenge it a bit by bringing it up to 99 percent.

Mr. Matthews: Yes—

Mr. Lovestone: Actually we didn't have 99 percent of the membership, but we could have taken, as I said, 100 percent of the delegates. WE had, I think, about 85 percent of the rank and file with us in the average voting.

Mr. Matthews: How were you treated in Moscow during your dispute with the Stalin leadership of the Comintern?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, when we came in, we had a sort of mixed treatment at the start. We were hailed, and also we were suspected a bit, and in general we were treated like calves being fattened for the slaughter; treated very well, fed very well. I might say we began our sessions with black caviar, and by the time the issue got hotter we were served only red caviar. But we were treated all right in the beginning in a general way. Later on the temperature went down considerably below the freezing point.

Mr. Matthews: Did Stalin and Molotov personally intervene in these discussions in Moscow?

Mr. Lovestone: I might say that it is my opinion that both Stalin and Molotov spoke more often and talked more at length in the American Commission handling the American party crisis at that time than they had done at — I wouldn't say at any time — all the time in their lives in the International up to that time, plus all the time in their lives in the International since that time. In other words, they spent more words and more time and more energy on our American question in that commission than they have done in it in their entire lives as leaders of the Communist International.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: Were you and Mr. Gitlow considered the leaders of this group, acting in defiance of the collected wills in the hands of Stalin?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews: I see there are references through

here [in the transcript of Stalin's speeches to the American Commission] to yourself and to Gitlow as the leaders of this defiance.

Mr. Lovestone: That is correct.

Mr. Matthews: On page 14 of the second speech — no, this is the May 6 [1929] speech — Stalin said:

The Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the American Communist Party must be altered and people added to it who are capable of recognizing the class struggle of the workers against the capitalist class and not only the factional struggle....

Do you know, Mr. Lovestone, how Stalin proposed to alter the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party in any manner other than through the processes which you have described in answer to Congressman Voorhis' question?

Mr. Lovestone: I think Stalin's arithmetic is slightly inaccurate here. Before he added, he subtracted. I was subtracted and Browder was added. The Secretariat, if I recall correctly, was then given a new majority. That is, the minority of yesterday by a process of Stalinist political alchemy was transformed into a majority since then, and continues now.

Mr. Matthews: What did Stalin propose, at least formally, to do with you, Mr. Lovestone, after subtracting you from the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. Lovestone: That is an embarrassing question, but it is not as embarrassing to answer as it would have been if carried out. Well, I was first of all, not to go back to the United States.

Mr. Matthews: By the way, before you answer that, I think perhaps the words of Stalin himself on this point might serve as a basis for your answer. Stalin said:

Comrades Lovestone and Bittelman must be recalled and placed at the disposal of the Comintern.

Where did Stalin mean you should be recalled from?

Mr. Lovestone: Recalled from the United States and recalled from my home, and recalled from the American Communist Party.

Mr. Matthews: Recalled to Moscow and there placed at the disposal of the Comintern?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I might give you a little more detail on that. First of all, I was not to go to any

country where the English language was spoken, because if I could get a chance to talk the English language I might do some damage. Secondly, I was to stay an indeterminate period in Moscow, and Stalin said, "I sit there, you sit here. We are both Old Bolsheviks and friends." Even then I was a little suspicious of friendship in the political sense in Moscow. And after I had been sort of politically sterilized I would then be sent to a very exciting place like Afghanistan or Persia to start a revolution in the desert; a sort of foundation of sand.

Mr. Matthews: You mean that was actually proposed to you?

Mr. Lovestone: That was proposed to me, yes. I might say this: I didn't like it. I also must confess I didn't want it.

Mr. Voorhis: Who was going to do this recalling? That is what I would like to know. I mean practically. I understand about it, but I mean what machinery, what was to be gone through in this process of recalling you from your own country?

Mr. Lovestone: You must know, even in those days Russia didn't lack machinery. It didn't always work very well. There was the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and that Executive Committee had a working committee called the Secretariat. In that Secretariat were the representatives of the leading sections or parties of the Communist International. That Secretariat would be the one, formally, to make the decision. But actually the decision would be made for it in the Russian Political Bureau, and then the members of the Russian delegation to the Secretariat of the Comintern would make the proposal, or they would get somebody else to make the proposal, and then they would endorse it. And once that was proposed or endorsed, you could apply addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division — the decision was made.

Mr. Voorhis: What I want more particularly to get at is: You were an American—

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Voorhis: Was it generally accepted practice that if a decision was made in the way you have just described and you received a communication to that effect, that it was then up to you — that you had to go and obey what they said?

Mr. Lovestone: If I wanted to play ball in the

International I did.

Mr. Voorhis: If you didn't, what happened?

Mr. Lovestone: Then in my case concretely, I would be put out of business, which I was.

Mr. Mason: He would have to give up his membership and affiliation and so forth if he didn't obey orders.

Mr. Starnes: To make a long story short, in Communism your first loyalty, of course, was to the International, the International of the Soviet government, and the head of the Soviet government made the policies and therefore the head of the Soviet government could recall you.

Mr. Lovestone: Our first loyalty was to the Communist International, as dominated by the dominating head of the Communist Party.

Mr. Matthews: To make this more concrete, don't you know that on more than one occasion, the Comintern has recalled to Russia citizens of other countries and shot them?

Mr. Lovestone: Well—

Mr. Matthews: Let me ask you specifically about Hans Neimeyer. You knew him, didn't you?

Mr. Lovestone: Very well.

Mr. Matthews: As a matter of fact you once gave me a letter of introduction to him.

Mr. Lovestone: I had forgotten that.

Mr. Matthews: Do you know that Hans Neimeyer was the German leader of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: And that he was recalled to Moscow and shot.

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, he among others.

Mr. Matthews: Do you know that practically the entire leadership of the Polish Communist Party was recalled to Moscow and shot?

Mr. Lovestone: The press reports reveal that.

Mr. Matthews: So that it isn't just a matter of agreeing to go along or getting out of the Comintern and going into some other line of business.

Mr. Lovestone: Well, let me say this: In those days the shooting practice and process was not as extensive as today. What it would have meant for me probably would have been sort of a living tomb, of course created with the tempo of the first Five Year Plan, which was quite some tempo for those who run

up against it. It would have meant being ostracized, it would have meant being isolated from my country and my comrades and friends of the labor movement in which I was brought up. It might have meant that I could take a trip on the Volga and there would be an accident on the boat.

Mr. Matthews: Were threats ever made against you?

Mr. Lovestone: Stalin himself said, "You had better watch out; you know what happened to Trotsky and Zinoviev." In fact, I might say when I was in Moscow, particularly after everybody was allowed to leave and I was not, I had the feeling of being in a locked trunk. You can imagine yourself being put in a trunk, and the last sound of life you hear from the outside is the snapping of the lock.

Mr. Matthews: On page 5 of Stalin's speech of May 12 [1929], I see that he reminds you:

You know, comrades, what happened to Trotsky and Zinoviev.

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, he reminded us a little more crudely than that stenogram would indicate, much more so.

Mr. Matthews: In what way?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, the last talk I had with Stalin before leaving was a sort of attempt to subject me to peasant generosity of a very simple kind. And a very questionable one. Then the shaking of a fist and a threat. A warning that I had better watch out what I did. For example, at the last moment, the very last moment I had with Stalin, it was quite painfully impressed upon me. I told Mr. Stalin that I was determined to leave Russia and go back home, and I was not going to take any responsibility for the new line force on the American Communist Party. Well, he rose to his feet, quite erect, banged his fist on the desk and said, "Well, there is one request I want to make of you. When you go back to America see that your friends don't commit any stupidities," and he looked at me quite strongly.

It took a moment or two to get what he was driving at, and then I answered him, "Comrade Stalin, my friends, even I can prevent their committing stupidities; and your friends, not even you can prevent them."

When he got that answer he banged on the desk,

turned around, and slammed the door. Then I waited until I was escorted to the outside. That was my last and final contact with Mr. Stalin.

Mr. Matthews: You made reference, Mr. Lovestone, to the "enlightenment campaign" as the predecessor of the liquidation technique. Will you please describe what happened after you returned to the United States in this enlightenment campaign?

Mr. Lovestone: I returned to the United States, and in 3 days, without a trial, without a call from the committee for hearing, I read a political decree, my tombstone as an official Communist in the form of a declaration of expulsion, without a trial or a hearing. Then that declaration was taken to every branch of the organization, and if you consult the files of the *Daily Worker*, which in those months contained practically nothing else except Russian Holiday declarations and American party funeral declarations, you will find what the enlightenment campaign was.

* * *

Mr. Voorhis: And did they get control of the new Executive Committee then?

Mr. Lovestone: You mean the National Executive Committee?

Mr. Voorhis: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: First of all, before I was allowed to come back and before others were allowed to come back, there was a vicious campaign of misrepresentation here. Secondly, a number of our second-line people were sort of pushed into the first line for the moment and in this way they changed their political position — that, not their minds. I draw that distinction very heavily. Thirdly, a lot of them were terrorized. Fourthly, I reaped a harvest of my own sowing. I was largely responsible for that mechanical concept of loyalty to the Communist International, and it came home to roost with its claws in my eyes.

Mr. Matthews: Was there discussion in these branch meetings? I mean what actually could be called discussion of these issues?

Mr. Lovestone: I hope I make myself understandable to the committee. There is discussion and discussion. The only type of discussion in the Communist Party that persisted, beginning with our expulsion, and since our expulsion, is the following:

Revelation from above, dissemination of orders from below. It was revealed to the membership meeting that this, and this, is the decision. The only thing debatable was how to get the maximum effectiveness in carrying out that decision — not whether that should be the decision but how to carry out the decision. There was a revelation from the man above and they couldn't change that. It would be easier to get away with violating the Ten Commandments all at once than in violating a party order.

Mr. Matthews: I would like to ask you this question: Didn't you know better than to go to Moscow?

Mr. Lovestone: That is again quite embarrassing and unpleasant question, but I will tell you quite frankly I was not brought up that way. I was brought up in school, college, athletics, sports, to believe that if anybody wanted to fight me, and he wanted to fight on his own ground, I would say, "Sure, let's go fight it out." And I went over there. Besides that, I was so sure that we had such an overwhelming majority, which hitherto had been sacred in the Communist International, that they wouldn't change it.† Besides that, I had an illusion in which I was wrong — that I could change them, or convince them, over there, not to declare war on us; and I had the further illusion that when I came back I could mobilize an organization to beat them — to defeat them. I felt, out of loyalty and out of devotion to the Communist International, that when I got an order to go there I had to go there, and it was in strict obedience that I brought myself over to Moscow.

Mr. Matthews: When Mr. Browder, Mr. Foster, and others still in the leadership of the Communist Party were on the stand they testified that Stalin has never sent instructions to the American Communist Party, instructions to be obeyed implicitly; is that true, Mr. Lovestone?

Mr. Lovestone: That is not true. Stalin, except on two occasions, never sent signed instructions to the American Communist Party, but on two decisive occasions he did send them in writing. The first one was when we had our convention [6th: March 1929]. Stalin, for the first time in his life, intervened personally

and directly and sent a cable to the convention, in which cable he sent us what we call flowers — praise compliments. We were always suspicious of those. We said, "Flowers for those who are about to die." Then there was the heart of that instruction, which was that I was no longer to be General Secretary of the party, that I was to be taken away by the Communist International for very important work. That cable came up for consideration by the delegates, and by a vote of — I don't know, if you have Molotov's speech there, he mentioned it — by a vote of 95 to something, Stalin's cable was tabled.

Mr. Matthews: It was 95 to 9.

Mr. Lovestone: Ninety-five to nine. The cable was tabled, which meant the American way of putting it in the wastebasket. Well, that was an affront which Stalin never got before and for which we had to pay.

The second time the direct intervention was indicated in the speech that you have just introduced in the record.

Except for those two occasions I think Browder and Foster told the truth. But actually it didn't work that way. It wasn't necessary. Suppose somebody had a chat with Stalin, and Stalin said, "I think you ought to do this." Well, not only a thought, but a hint, dropped by Stalin became party dictum, party law. That is the way the machinery worked at that time. And while I can't speak in any detailed sense since my expulsion, the evidence in the sense of results would indicate it has become infinitely worse since 1929.

Mr. Mason: This cablegram to the convention was in 1929?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, March 1929.

Mr. Matthews: When the Executive Committee of the Communist International reached its decision on the American question, were you ordered to endorse that decision?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, sir, do I have to answer yes or no? When the decision was first made official, we were prepared, and when I say we, I mean the majority of the delegation. Mr. Gitlow said he was going back to fight, but all except Mr. Gitlow, in the majority of the delegation, had agreed to make the following statement: "Despite the fact that we disagree with

†- Majority leaderships in national Communist Parties had actually been overturned on more than one occasion by the Communist International, beginning with the French CP in 1923 and including the overthrow of the Foster majority by Lovestone's own minority faction (headed by C.E. Ruthenberg) in 1925.

the decision, we are prepared to submit as disciplined Communists.”

That was not accepted by the Communist International, although officially that was the formal practice and procedure in the International.

For a number of weeks I was kept in Moscow negotiating for a type of statement from me that would satisfy them. They wanted from me especially, since I was Secretary, a type of statement that they could use in this country so that the resistance to the line of the Communist International would be broken.

At one meeting of the Secretariat of the Communist International in early June 1929, there occurred an incident which I have not forgotten, which illustrates the essence of Stalin’s totalitarianism. A delegate, I don’t know his name — he was an Italian — a member of the Secretariat, made a motion that I should be instructed to endorse the new policy of the Comintern in America. I knew I was on the spot, but I had a little experience with being on the spot, and after a few minutes I got up and made a declaration that I was prepared to issue the following statement:

Under instructions of the Secretariat of the Communist International, I hereby endorse the new decision.

My proposal was almost accepted. Then Molotov intervened and said, “No, we can’t accept that, because the first part of it would indict us for resorting to questionable practices,” and that proposal was rejected. When they tried to get me to endorse it in their own official, formal way, I refused. That was the end.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: Now, Mr. Lovestone, you have already stated that there were three stages in your relationship to these issues which arose at the Comintern. Will you reiterate those?

Mr. Lovestone: The first stage was the period when the Russians were able to lead through the prestige gained for them—

Mr. Matthews: I am referring to your own attitude. You spoke of first attempting to fight.

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, I see what you mean. I am

sorry, I misunderstood you. Well, we had for several years before the split in 1929 entertained doubts as to our relations with Moscow. We were trying to become much more independent at that time — politically, financially, every way. By 1925 we had entertained some doubts, but they were not very vigorous on my part. But they were much more vigorous on the part of Mr. Ruthenberg, who was then General Secretary.† I was at that time much more pro-Moscow. For example, while we were with the Communist Party inside, we went along for a while with the spirit of dual unionism, and we participated in the attempt to wreck the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union — that is, to capture it. As I said, we failed at that time primarily because of the ability of the leadership of the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union, headed by people like [Sidney] Hillman, [David] Dubinsky, and others.

We went along with the spirit of dual unionism for a while, helping to build the National Miners’ Union, Textile Union, and so on. We tried to play the game and see how it worked. On the basis of a few months’ experience with it we became convinced opponents of this new line. Then we were expelled and we still had hopes for the Communist Party and the Communist International, and we tried to reform it from the outside.

Mr. Matthews: That was for a period of about 7 years, as you have stated?

Mr. Lovestone: That was from 1929 to 1936, about 7 years, yes. In that time we criticized the Communist Party very vigorously. I might say we have not criticized it with rancor or filth or bitterness comparable to what was heaped upon us, but we always criticized it saying if the Communist Party would reestablish the democratic system of leadership and if the International would establish a genuine collective leadership, we would be prepared to come back and be disciplined people. But by 1936 the Communist International had become so obviously and crassly the agent of the Russian foreign policy, and the leadership had become so sterile and the puppet system had become so hopelessly universal, that we felt there was no possibility of reforming it from within or without, and we came to the natural evolution of the Communist

†- Use of the title “General Secretary” for 1925 is anachronistic. Ruthenberg’s title was “Executive Secretary.”

International and Stalin, an evolution which we have emphasized in our press time and time again.

Mr. Voorhis: That was by what year?

Mr. Lovestone: That was 1936.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, I have read in the press here was a raid on your home, in which certain papers were taken. Will you please give an account, as you know it, of that raid — when it occurred and who was responsible for it, and who participated in it, if you know?

Mr. Lovestone: In July 1938, in the height of the fight against Communist Party domination of the United Automobile Workers, CIO, an attempt was made to get me. The attempt was made on a Sunday, because generally I would be staying home on Sundays to work, but that Sunday I happened not to be at home. I was not gotten, but my home was rifled and confidential documents of all sorts and sundry were stolen. I immediately knew that that could be performed by only one of two agencies, either the Gestapo, because of my vigorous fight against the Nazis, and because of my visiting Germany and organizing the underground revolutionary movements in Germany after Hitler took power, or by the GPU.†

I must confess I was wrong in thinking it more likely the Gestapo, because a couple of weeks after that *The Daily Worker* came out with full photostatic copies of quite a number of documents rifled from my home — documents pertaining to the struggle against Communist Party manipulation and domination of the United Automobile Workers. When I saw that I knew it was a GPU job. Through our own channels we began to investigate and we learned that it was a GPU job, directed by a GPU agent in this country by the name of Mr. Leon Josephson. I issued a statement to the press, and notified the New York police authorities and tried to press the case, but since the GPU robbers were not caught on the spot, nothing very much was done by the New York authorities, and at this time, while I am not minus my life, I am minus my papers.

Mr. Voorhis: This took place in New York?

Mr. Lovestone: In New York City, in my home, which was not known to more than 4 or 5 people — absolutely confidential. And I might say I had to live in this manner because I had received, particularly in

1937 and 1938 when the Russian purges became frequent, quite a number of threats against my life — that I would be gotten, that I would be bumped off. I took care at least to live so that the Stalinists would not know where, but apparently I was more careless than careful and they got what they wanted, at least in part.

Mr. Matthews: Did you have substantial reasons for thinking Mr. Leon Josephson had something to do with this?

Mr. Lovestone: Our information was that it was organized by a GPU group, headed by a certain Mr. Leon Josephson. I have never met him; I don't know who he is.

Mr. Matthews: I was just wondering how you—

Mr. Lovestone: It was just through our connection with friends and people inside the Communist Party that we got this information. In fact, my attorneys received telephonic information along the same lines.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, I would like to ask you some questions about money from Moscow, which is a subject which has been testified to by numerous witnesses before this committee. I would like to ask you if you personally ever received any money in or from Moscow for the use of the Communist Party in the United States. Can you answer that “yes” or “no”?

Mr. Lovestone: No. I would like to answer this not by a “yes” or “no.”

Mr. Matthews: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: I have received in my capacity as Secretary of the Communist Party in this country contributions from the Communist International, money contributions. What is more, I would like the committee to know our attitude toward receiving contributions. We had a general theory at that time — and, by the way, I think it is quite sound on that issue today — that it is not wrong for the stronger organization to help the weaker one. As a matter of fact, I can refer you to authoritative, competent histories of the American Revolution, which indicate that the American revolutionists had received from France, Spain, Holland, close to 26 million francs in order to help put over the revolution against King George. We

†- GPU (*Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie* — State Political Administration) was an old acronym of the Soviet Secret Police. It is quite likely that foreign operations would have been under the purview of an entirely different department.

said it was perfectly all right for the revolutionists to take that money, provided they didn't allow Spanish monarchists or Dutch monarchists to dominate their political line in the United States. For instance, we know that quite a lot of money goes to China through the medium of missionary organizations. We say that is perfectly all right, provided these missionary organizations do not attempt to dominate the political line off the Chinese government or the Chinese people. The issue that we had with the Stalin regime was that they attempted, through the support they gave us, to dominate and determine and dictate our political line. In other words, I am not here objecting to their donations, or denouncing the receipt of support by us as the weaker organization from the stronger, I am denouncing — and this was the point in our break — the attempt to utilize that financial support for determining or influencing our political principles in the United States.

I might say that one of the points of suspicion against us was as to our loyalty, so that as far back as 1926 and 1927 we had already begun to not only ask for funds, not only to not to ask for more funds, but to reduce the subsidy from the Comintern, and on a number of occasions Stalin very diplomatically alluded to that. It was a bit of Stalin diplomacy and I knew what it was. It was the first offer of a sort of mutual-assistance pact which I was not ready to sign. By 1928 we practically were sending over in one form or another to the Comintern almost as much as they sent to us.†

Mr. Matthews: On that point, Mr. Browder testified here that the American Communist Party did not pay dues to the Communist International. Is that what you are referring to now?

Mr. Lovestone: I am not referring to his testimony, I am referring to my own experience. We did pay dues to the Communist International, just as every party had to pay dues to the Communist Interna-

tional, and when we were not in a position to pay the dues, because we didn't have the money, it was reduced from our subsidy. So we paid dues regularly. I don't know what is the actual relationship between Mr. Browder and Mr. Stalin. Perhaps it is only a one-way traffic. I think in general we might say that the relationship wanted by the Russians with us then and now was a sort of cash and carry arrangement — they would give the cash and we would have to carry out. We had some objections to the cash and we had lots of objections to carrying out.

Mr. Starnes: How much annual subsidy were they giving you?

Mr. Lovestone: There are a lot of romantic figures about that. It is not true that we received very large sums. I might say about \$25,000 a year as general; \$20 to \$25,000 a year was the average in 1926, 1927, and 1928, and there were occasions for special donations, special campaigns, and sometimes there would be a good sized contribution for a special campaign. But in general it was no more than about \$20 to \$25,000 a year.

Mr. Matthews: That was the regular subsidy on average, but then often times large sums of money would come in for a particular program?

Mr. Lovestone: That is correct.

Mr. Mason: What was your membership at that time when you were getting \$20 to \$25,000?

Mr. Lovestone: About 18,000.

Mr. Mason: At a dollar a year?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, but they were dues-paying discipline members, not paper figures.‡

Mr. Matthews: In addition to the money received from the Comintern, which I think is what you are speaking about?

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Matthews: Were there funds which came through the channels of the Profintern apart from the Comintern's money?

†- These assertions by Lovestone about Comintern funding in the second half of the 1920s remain to be independently verified. In general terms, the Comintern attempted to substantially fund the American Communist movement in 1919-1920 but succeeded in delivering only a relatively modest amount, and in 1921-1922 the net flow of funds was from the American movement to Soviet Russia rather than vice versa (unsubstantiated allegations of diversion of Friends of Soviet Russia funds notwithstanding, speaking here of the documentary evidence in the Comintern archive provided by the American movement). In 1923-1924, the American movement was again the beneficiary of a net subsidy (the *Daily Worker* was launched from the weekly *Worker* with a very substantial infusion of Comintern money). Comintern funds during the first half of the 1920s were not unimportant — nor were they decisive.
‡- The reference to "a dollar a year" is unclear — Workers (Communist) Party dues were collected monthly and tallied to substantially more than that amount. Further, the W(C)PA in 1926-1928 had fewer than the 18,000 dues-paying members claimed here.

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, but I couldn't possibly tell you what those were because the Profintern took extraordinarily good care that I shouldn't know. They were sent directly to Foster and that money was used almost consistently for financing the factional fight, artificially and unnaturally in this country, under the direction of Lozovsky.

Mr. Matthews: Now, will you please make as clear and definite a statement as you can, Mr. Lovestone, about the way in which funds were transmitted from Moscow to the United States, according to your own personal knowledge.

Mr. Lovestone: To my own knowledge, I will say, first of all, the way they were not. They were not given to us by Amtorg or any Russian agency. We had absolutely nothing at all to do with them. In general, the funds were brought by delegates coming back from Moscow. I occasionally brought some funds with me, others did the same.

Mr. Matthews: Do you know whether or not Mr. Gitlow ever brought funds back from Moscow?

Mr. Lovestone: To the best of my recollection, he did.

Mr. Matthews: He so testified here.

Mr. Lovestone: I recall that from the press accounts of the testimony. That was true.

Mr. Matthews: What body in the Communist International has authority for the allocation of funds to the national parties?

Mr. Lovestone: That was the budget commission, headed by [Osip] Piatnitsky.

Mr. Matthews: Who was he?

Mr. Lovestone: I can only give you my opinion of him. He is an old Russian comrade. He was one of the first Secretaries of the Communist International. †

Mr. Matthews: Was he the author of the 21 points? ‡

Mr. Lovestone: No. He was one of the oldest — he was, I might say, “is” would be inaccurate, because I am in no position to say whether he is alive or dead at this moment. I think he has been liquidated. However, he was one of the leaders of the Russian movement.

Mr. Matthews: Were you on the budget commission of the Communist International?

Mr. Lovestone: I was for a while on the budget commission.

* * *

After Recess.

The committee reassembled in the caucus room, House Office Building, at 1:15 pm. Hon. Joe Starnes, presiding.

Mr. Starnes: The Committee will resume its hearings.

(The witness was previously duly sworn.)

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, before the recess you were testifying concerning money from the Communist International and the Profintern. In your own experience in administering the affairs of the Communist Party in the United States, you estimated, I believe, that receipts in cash from the Comintern was around \$25,000 a year?

Mr. Lovestone: That is for normal general party work.

Mr. Matthews: Now, based upon your experience in the cost of administering the Communist Party during the period of your secretaryship, would you be

†- Iosef (Osip) Piatnitsky was born Osip Aronovich Tarshis in 1882, an ethnic Jew, the son of a carpenter. He was a member of the RSDRP from 1898 and a delegate to the 2nd (1903) and 3rd (1905) Congresses of that party, as well as the 1912 Party Conference in Prague. He was arrested several times for his political activities, and exiled to Siberia in 1914. Released from exile by the February 1917 Revolution, Piatnitsky went to Moscow, where he served as a member of the Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik party. From 1919 to 1920 he was the President of the Unified Railroad Workers' Trade Union and in 1920 the Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the party. The 3rd World Congress of the Comintern (1921) named Piatnitsky the Treasurer of that organization, and he remained a leading Comintern functionary for the rest of his life. The 4th World Congress (1922) of the Comintern named him a member of the budget commission. At the 3rd Enlarged Plenum of ECCI, Piatnitsky was named one of the 4 members of the Comintern's Secretariat, along with Kolarov, Kuusinen, and Rakosi. During the entire period 1928-1935, Piatnitsky was a member of ECCI and its Presidium. From 1935, he headed the Politico-Administrative Department of ECCI but was not returned to his other positions. Piatnitsky was arrested July 27, 1937 for alleged membership in a “counterrevolutionary organization in the Comintern.” He was incarcerated for a full year before his execution on July 28, 1938. Piatnitsky was posthumously rehabilitated Jan. 28, 1956.

‡- Piatnitsky was listed as the author on a pamphlet edition of *The Twenty-One Conditions of Admission into the Communist International*, published by the CPUSA's Workers Library Publishers in 1934. Piatnitsky did author a book, *Memoirs of a Bolshevik*, in 1933.

willing to make an estimate of the subsidy required since your secretaryship in order to carry on the activities of the Communist Party as you have observed them?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, first of all I would say that the Stalinists never could lick us in this country unless they had either a rich uncle or several hundred thousand Pollocks digging gold for them, which means a very heavy subsidy from somewhere and the only place, from my experience, that it could come from was from Moscow. Generally I would say, in order to beat us, let alone an extensive diversification of their work, they would have to get somehow, somewhere, money running into six or seven figures.

Mr. Matthews: Annually?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, yes, sir. It cost them that to operate on the basis of their own admitted budget. Now, they get it from dues, they get it from donations, they can get it from Hollywood — that is a nice place in more ways than one — but I think that the Pollocks are the backbone of their support.

Mr. Matthews: By that, you mean the literal Pollocks in Russia that are working, mining gold for the American Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: I mean the Pollocks who were driven off of their land, whose lands were collectivized, and they were sent to dig in the gold mines of Siberia, or wherever gold is found.†

Mr. Matthews: Now, by six or seven figures, you mean between \$100,000 and \$1,000,000?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, there is great latitude there.

Mr. Matthews: Would it be your estimate — at any rate, on the basis of your own experience, you would be qualified to make some estimate of the cost of conducting the present operations of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, yes. You see, I understand Mr. Browder testified that *The Daily Worker* has a paid circulation of 50,000. I do not know whether he testified how many they printed, but assuming that his figures are correct — and I do not want to call Mr.

Browder a liar — they could not possibly finance a paper without a huge deficit, if they had a paid circulation of only 50,000 for the average of a year.‡

Mr. Matthews: In your own writing you have used the expression “the degeneration of the Communist International,” and at other times you have spoken of the “running sore of the Comintern,” and later on of the “cancer of the Comintern.” Would you please be more explicit as to what you mean by those phrases?

Mr. Lovestone: When I became a Communist and I enlisted in the movement to establish an international socialist society, I did so in the best of faith, and the very first days of the International, the Internationals, I think were dedicated in thought and action to this objective. Later on, because of the factors that I mentioned and other factors, the Communist International degenerated into an agency of the dominant Russian faction and became a nest of intrigue, a swamp of factional maneuvers — that is what I meant by degeneration. I used the term and wrote at one time of the “running sore,” because I refer to the obligations, direction, and financing of the faction fight in the American Communist Party by Lozovsky.

When I came to Moscow they asked me whether I used the term “running sore.” They did that with the hope that I would apologize for it. I confessed I was wrong and changed it to “cancer” instead of “running sore.”

Well, I think my confession was in order and my analysis was sound. It became a cancer, in the most incurable sense of the word. You could not cure it by freezing and you could not cure it by surgery, because the surgeons continually cut out the healthy flesh and left the diseased tissue.

Mr. Matthews: Now, you have testified—

Mr. Starnes: Would you call it a malignant or benign cancer?

Mr. Lovestone: I would surely not use “benign” under these circumstances. I would call it an extraordinarily malignant cancer.

Mr. Starnes: Very well.

†- Lovestone’s use of the epithet “Pollocks” for the collectivized peasantry of the Soviet Union (virtually none of whom were ethnic Poles) is bizarre. The English word, an ethnic slur directed at people from Poland, derives from the Russian word *poliak*, an emotionally neutral noun meaning a person from Poland. One wonders if Lovestone actually said “kulaks” in his testimony and the unfamiliar term was misheard and mistranscribed in the Congressional stenogram.

‡- This is a strange assertion. Newspapers have large economies of scale — a certain set of fixed production costs with additional copies coming off the press produced at an extremely low unit cost. A paid circulation of 50,000 at any rate over the average cost of production would make for an extremely healthy publishing operation, not an impoverished and heavily subsidized one.

Mr. Matthews: You have testified that the factional strife inside of the Russian Communist Party has been reflected in the national parties outside of the Soviet Union. Is it true that a period was reached in the Soviet Union when the party apparatus destroyed to all intents and purposes the trade unions of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Lovestone: If you examine the position of the Russian trade unions up to the beginning of the revolution, with the position they occupy today, you will inevitably arrive, unless you are afraid of being purged, at the conclusion that the vitality, the life, of the Russian trade union movement has been taken away.

In the beginning, I might say Lenin time and time again advocated trade unions so as to divide the power, in order to have discussion, and to curb the bureaucrats. That policy was in the beginning, as put forward by [Mikhail] Tomsky. I was for that policy, and one of the reasons for Tomsky's being "suicided" — I did not say he committed suicide, I said he was "suicided" — [was] because he was zealously trying to preserve some vestige of bona fide character and independence for the Russian trade unions.

Today they are state agencies, dominated by the Stalinist police absolutely.

Mr. Matthews: In other words, they have no character, you mean to say of the trade unions?

Mr. Lovestone: They are not trade unions in the sense of the word used by us in this country or in England, and they are no longer trade unions in the sense of their functioning right after the revolution.

Mr. Matthews: Now, was it somewhat coincidental with the destruction of the real character of the trade unions in Russia that you received instructions from Moscow to rule or ruin trade unions in America?

Mr. Lovestone: That is a very interesting question. You see, in Russia the trade unions increasingly became part of the state apparatus, the state apparatus there being a Soviet state. The Russian Communist Party, the International, was at that time transferring the mechanics, all tactics, from Russia to the other countries, and the reasoning was something along this line: Well, if in Russia we have trade unions, they are part of the Soviet state; in the capitalist countries we have trade unions, therefore they are part of those states. Those are capitalist states, which we must destroy.

Obviously, since we must destroy the capitalist states, we must destroy every part of that capitalist state. The union is a part of the capitalist state and we must destroy the unions, and since they were closest to the Communist Party, as labor organizations, they would be the first ones in practice under the theory of social fascism to be destroyed. It was a straight mechanical transfer of the tactics from Russia to this country.

Mr. Matthews: Will you please, in a few words elaborate on the principal party reasons for destroying the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union between 1925 and 1926?

Mr. Lovestone: First, let me say that I shared to quite an extent the guilt for that campaign. I regret it, as I learned from experience in other work, though I by no means am responsible for the policy.

We began to work on the ILGWU to capture it. In 1925 we almost did, but as I said before, we were outmaneuvered. Then we were criticized by Lozovsky for failing to capture it in 1925. By that time we were still working as a destructive force in the ILGWU, gradually shifting the line to the ultra-Left, preceded by an open split movement, culminating in the organization of a new Needle Trades Workers' International Union, dominated by the Communist Party as a dual union to the ILGWU.

Well, we tried in every way to win control and then to win away the membership from [Morris] Sigman and [Eugene] Lezinsky. I must say this, I had no part in this, but it was directly inspired by Lozovsky. We resorted to tactics of this sort: For example, the Communist Party would denounce the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union for giving up week work and accepting piece work. While denouncing that — and denunciations were made on the one hand — the employers were offered for that same so-called revolutionary union piece work in order to get the contract away from the bona fide AF of L union. That was part of the practice pursued under direct orders from Lozovsky.

Mr. Matthews: Now, if I understand what you have just said, you mean that this was at least one instance where the Communist-controlled union offered terms more satisfactory to the employers for the purpose of undermining the influence and prestige of the American Federation of Labor union.

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: Were there any other instances in which the Communist-controlled union underbid the American Federation of Labor union for the purpose of destroying the American Federation of Labor unions?

Mr. Lovestone: There were quite a number. I do not remember them all. I recall just one which is a rather flagrant case. We conducted a campaign against John L. Lewis because he was surrendering the wage scale of the Jacksonville agreement. We did not get very far, some though. I thought we did. It is a matter of opinion. But when we were at Moscow at the [6th] World Congress of the Communist International, in the summer of 1928, we were advised to continue our campaign against Lewis for dropping the wage scale laid down in the Jacksonville agreement and at the same time to offer the operators, in order to get the contract away from the United Mine Workers, to offer the operators a wage scale beneath not merely the Jacksonville scale, but beneath the scale offered by Lewis. In other words, I may say in the spirit of self-criticism, this was rank duplicity.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: Would you say that there is a certain type of mind that is peculiarly adaptable to membership and work in the Communist Party as it operates?

Mr. Lovestone: It is the type of mind, and it is a peculiar thing that Stalinism has a greater hold on that particular type of mind than Kaiserism ever had in its most potent hours. A person can be a great scientist in his own field; he can be a great artist in his own field; he can be a great thinker in his particular field; but the moment he throws himself into that stream he is just carried along as a particle of dust would be in a powerful current. He surrenders all right to question. He has after a while succeeded in atrophying his critical existence in the political field. I can say that frankly from experience. I have seen the germs of this begin in myself, and I am happy that I broke with it, and when I say I broke with it, I mean this particular type of mind, not the ideals of socialism, to which I adhere today more strongly than ever, because I have learned to adhere more firmly than before.

Mr. Mason: Would you say Stalinism is a fetish?

Mr. Lovestone: I would say that it is a toxin, and a fetish sometimes can amount to a toxin, in the realm of mind.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: Now, Mr. Lovestone, I would like to have you outline very briefly, if you will, the various stages — I think there are perhaps several of them, three or four — represented in this question of domination of the American Party by the Comintern or Stalin, or whatever it was that was dominating it at the time. In the first period of that domination, what was the power of the domination or the effect which made it possible for Russian to control the American Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: In the first stage of the Communist International, Russia really did not control in any mechanical sense, as we speak of it today, but influenced it decisively through its prestige. You see, they had just licked the Tsar and given him a one-way ticket to somewhere. They had gotten rid of the capitalists. They had organized a workers' government. They were living a dream that we had, and naturally we looked up to them. Besides, they tended to treat us as equals, with equal respect — respecting our opinions, and we appreciated that. They were big men, and because they were big men they did not act in little or small ways, but nevertheless the Russian influence was decisive.

That ended with Lenin's departure from active line in the Communist International.

Mr. Matthews: Around 1923?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, even before, when Zinoviev came in there was a radical change at Moscow. First there was the beginning of slavishness and mechanical transference, and what I called the Byzantine court at Moscow — kowtowing to the potentates — but it was not yet worked up into a system. With this control, a good deal of their dislike for one country or another was tied up with their factional struggles in Russia. Then that culminated in the triumph of Stalin in Russia and thereafter the triumph of Stalin in the Communist International, Stalin setting up the type of leadership that I had characterized before in the story of Caligula. The first days of Stalin domination was unquestionably the domination of the International... I illustrated before the trade union question. I might

give other illustrations. I do not know whether it is necessary.

All of this has culminated in total Stalinization — or what we [call] sterilization — of the Communist International... At the moment the Communist International is nothing but an agency to reflect the maneuvers and interests of the Soviet foreign policy. When Stalin was seeking to do business with Chamberlain, with England and France, then the Communist International followed in this country one line of policy. When the Russians switched and went into a profound and extensive partnership with Hitler, the line of policy here had to be changed to reflect that.

I might be a little more specific. For example, you gentlemen in Congress know, you recall the Bloom Bill last June or thereabouts. It was defeated by about 65 votes. At that time the Communist Party in this country was the most vigorous campaigners for the Bloom Bill. Why? Because it was trying to drive the United States into war against German imperialism, against the Nazi bandits. Well, since then Stalin has changed his policy. I do not think that politics nowadays makes strange bedfellows. No bedfellows could be strange enough in present day European politics. But, Stalin and Hitler became bedfellows, and presto, *The Daily Worker* was no longer the champion of any bill like the Bloom Bill, but became the most ardent opponent of the revision of the old neutrality legislation and was for a maximum embargo. The change of policy was not dictated by concerns with the interests of the great masses of the population, of the workers and the farmers — the middle class people in this country. The change in policy was dictated by the switch in Russian foreign policy. The same Foster, the same Browder, would write that this glass (*indicating*) is made of gold on Monday, and on the temperature of the International and a change of policy, it was made of tin on Tuesday. It was not that the glass changed, but circumstances changed. The organization changed. And, orders were determined solely by the Russian foreign policy.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, I wonder if you would be willing to give, from your own viewpoint, some suggestions as to how you think this kind of a

movement which you have described during your testimony should be opposed, should be fought. You have had experience in fighting on behalf and fighting against it.

Mr. Lovestone: I will first of all say that it should not and cannot be fought — you cannot fight Stalinism in this country, or elsewhere, by repression, by outlawing legislation, by declaring it a crime to be a member of it. When you do that, you supply them the most powerful sentiment, that is, blood of martyrdom.

Secondly, I think their ideas ought to be subjected to maximum sunlight. They represent a special type of character, and I am convinced, in the light of their own traditions and the light and the character of the labor movement, that if their ideas are subjected to the opening, scorching sunlight and sunshine, that they cannot flourish. I think that would be far more effective than any other measure.

Thirdly, I think in many ways the problems involved here are problems of the labor movement and they should be settled within the household, in the family of labor, by labor itself. I have had quite a bit of experience in the trade union movement and I can say that when we succeed in defeating these things in trade unions through democratic discussion processes, we inflict upon them a far more decisive blow than any arrests or persecution might deal to them, in the eyes of some people.

Mr. Mason: May I interrupt there for just a moment? How can labor settle its problems if it enters into alliance with, as the CIO has done, these Communist leaders? They are taking the enemy right into their camp and the enemy then attacks them from within.

Mr. Lovestone: I do not desire to go into any detailed discussion of personal or leadership problems of the trade unions before the committee, and I would ask that I be excused in that respect.

Mr. Mason: All right.

Mr. Lovestone: But I will just say this: Unquestionably there have been conditions — and not naming names, and I do not want to discuss it in that light — there have been conditions where trade union leaders made alliances with them. They thought that they could use them and then throw them out. You can take lots of things into your bosom, but sometimes

you find that you have a snake in your lap, or around your bosom, and you do not get much of a chance to live. It is like riding a tiger. You do not dare stop. That has happened on occasions, and naturally it is fatal to the unions involved and fatal to the workers in those unions, and fatal to those leaders who have a chance to render real service to labor, without doubt.

Mr. Voorhis: I would like to just say, because I think it is fair, at this point, that in contacts which I have had myself, not only with American Federation of Labor leaders, but also leaders of the CIO unions in my district, that I find a very determined spirit on the part of those people to be rid of these Communists.

Mr. Mason: That is the hopeful thing, though, that labor itself can clean out these destructive elements.

Mr. Voorhis: I agree thoroughly, but I just think, in the interest of fairness, I should say that because I think it is true.

Mr. Lovestone: I might add if and when we re-establish a united labor movement in this country, the Communist influence in unions will be reduced considerably.

Mr. Voorhis: That will probably do as much as any one thing, too.

Mr. Lovestone: They are fishing in troubled waters. I might just add one or two or three more illustrations of struggle against totalitarianism. Of course, there has to be conducted constantly a campaign against all species of totalitarianism.

Mr. Voorhis: That's right.

Mr. Lovestone: There are differences between them as there are differences between Stalin and Hitler totalitarianisms, without doubt, and one point I think labor must emphasize, it must guarantee in its own ranks the right to opinions, differences of opinion, and expressions in a democratic manner regardless of how radical the social ideas or ideals of the proponents of the certain movements may be; but no labor organization or no self-respecting institution can permit in its ranks the operation of forces that are not controlled by themselves, that are not responsible for themselves, that at best are irresponsible or whose responsibility is outside along the line of the descriptions I have given. We have to conduct our fight in that light.

Mr. Voorhis: And still less responsible to the la-

bor organization itself.

Mr. Lovestone: Absolutely — not concerned with the labor organization itself.

Mr. Matthews: Would you say that also applies to a state — that a state cannot tolerate intervention through subterfuge or any other method of a foreign government in its internal affairs?

Mr. Lovestone: You put me in an embarrassing position. I am not a state. If I were a state, I assure you I could take care of it.

Mr. Matthews: I take it that that agrees with the labor principles you have set forth?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I take it that I am not going to do the legislating, and I can understand very well how any self-respecting institution, whether it be a state or any other organization, would say, "Look here. I want to know something about you, if you are going to ask something from me, particularly if you are going to ask my head." That I could see as reasonable; but I think the way to meet that is the way I suggested. Anyway, that is my opinion. I may be wrong.

Mr. Matthews: I am referring to such matters as intervention in internal affairs of the country through the agency of espionage.

Mr. Lovestone: I absolutely agree with that, without question, unqualifiedly so.

Mr. Matthews: The state must take measures to protect itself against espionage?

Mr. Lovestone: I am opposed to any faction of any labor movement being an appendage of any government. I would be opposed to the American Federation of Labor or the CIO being appendages to the American government. That would destroy their vitality, make government unions a basis of fascism, and I would be opposed to the American Federation of Labor and the Communist Party or any other organization being an appendage of the Federal government, or of the Nazi, or Soviet, or British, or any government. It must be a movement growing out of the conditions in the country representing the will or opinion of the people in the country.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, when Mr. Browder was on the stand here he stated that the statutes of the Communist International published in a pamphlet which was introduced here in the record as an exhibit, are not in any formal sense, at least, enforced, or considered enforceable or even applicable to the conduct

of the American Communist Party. What are the facts on that as you understand them?

Mr. Lovestone: There are two points involved here. First, the 21 points, the foundation articles of the Communist International, have been dead for quite some time. They have never been formally repudiated, but they have been replaced.

On the other hand, there are these statutes of organization — that is, statutes of the Communist International. There is something in what Browder says. They must be applied. They may not be applied when the Russians are involved, but when it comes to the others, they are very applicable. I know they were applied very practically and Stalin wants them applied in relation to us. But woe be unto anybody who tries not to apply them when the Russians want them applied.

Mr. Matthews: I believe in the case of the 21 points, *The Daily Worker* asserted you had been guilty of violating the 21 points, and that has been made a part of the record of the hearings, so that they were not dead in 1929.

Mr. Lovestone: No, they have not been officially proclaimed as dead. They can always be brought back to life when necessary. It is a form of freezing to preserve life.

Mr. Matthews: Now, outlining the various periods through which the Communist International has passed, with particular reference to changing strategies, changing world outlook, or what not, would you say the present International has now definitely entered the phase of Red Imperialism?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, I would characterize it and explain it in the following way: It is not Red Imperialism, it is Yellow Imperialism. There is nothing red about the attack on Finland. There is quite a little yellow — but you have got to view it from the point of evolution. Now, as to the point of evolution, the Communist International in its first stages really stood for world revolution and in an idealistic and practical sense. We at that time felt that the British Empire was pretty much smashed up and with the British Empire smashed up the heart of world capitalism was finished. Well, we miscalculated. I say we — I take as much responsibility as anyone else could take for it, and I contributed my might toward the theory which later proved to be false.

When we saw it was false, we broke with the ultra-Leftists in the infantile days of communism and turned to a period say from 1921 to 1928 of what I would consider in general a sound, practical approach based on reality. By 1928 there was a change for the reasons I have given before and there was another swing to what we then called ultra-Leftism — adventurous radicalism, irresponsible radicalism divorced from reality.

That lasted from about the end of 1928 or say 1929 to the 7th World Congress [of the Comintern] of 1935. In that period Roosevelt was called the Fascist, but beginning with 1935 down to the Stalin-Hitler pact, there was what we called the period of ultra-Rightism, the extremest and most rancid type of opportunism. You could not distinguish a Communist Party member from a devout Catholic who took an oath against Communism every morning, because it was very common for them to take oaths against Communism, as long as it advanced Russian foreign policy, and such things were done.

With the Stalin-Hitler pact coming into full bloom, the weed in its present shape and growth, the Communist International has ceased to be in the slightest way either communist or international, or an international organization. Today I would characterize it as an agency of the Stalin-Hitler bloc — not merely Stalin, but Stalin-Hitler bloc. That is quite a change, and quite an advance in degeneration.

Mr. Matthews: Now, Mr. Lovestone, there is really not anything absolutely new in this attack of the Soviet Union on Finland or in the Stalin-Hitler alliance, or any other form of duplicity in which we find the Russian government now engaged, is there?

Mr. Lovestone: It is not new, was not new to us. We expected it about a year ago, but it is not at all tied up with any of the ideals that animated the other revolution.

Mr. Matthews: Let me give an illustration of what I have in mind in saying that there is not anything absolutely new. It is not true that the Red Army actually invaded and conquered the state of Georgia when the overwhelming majority of the population of that country was anti-Communist or Menshevik in its political life?

Mr. Lovestone: I do not associate myself with that opinion. I do not think so. The state of Georgia

was an integral part of Russia. The state of Georgia was being used to buy British imperialists as a basis from which to assault Russia and steal its oil, and the Russians were fully justified in driving out the British from there. If somebody were to try to move into Texas, I am sure Congressman Dies would lead an army to chase them out, and I think Lenin was perfectly correct in driving the British into the sea and elsewhere, where they never could return.

On the other hand I come back to the policy with regard to Finland. If the Russians wanted to continue the war at that time, they certainly could have mastered Finland at one time or another. They did not want to, because Finland never was really an integral part of Russia. Even under the Tsar they had tremendous possibilities for independence; they were not merely a grand duchy — and Lenin was as much responsible and the Russians at that time were as much responsible as any power could be for Finland being given independence.

Now, what is Stalin doing today? The very opposite. The vulnerability of Leningrad or sections around Leningrad was always there, and yet the Russians for a period of time were able to be friends with Finland and were not concerned about the vulnerability of Leningrad, but what Stalin wants is to sustain and prolong his bureaucratic Stalin hold on the Russian people and that explains the establishment of the protectorates over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is a sort of mutual-assistance pact such as each of us has when we have a turkey for Thanksgiving. I help the turkey and the turkey helps me, and so on down the line.

That was not the policy of the Russians in the beginning, and I would say that Stalin made a major and disastrous contribution here to the ideals of the Russian Revolution.

Mr. Matthews: Now, I will not enter into any debate with you on the subject of Georgia. Let us see if we can find another illustration. You know of the Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and Russia, I believe in 1922?

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Matthews: I think perhaps you know by this time there was a secret clause in the Treaty of Rapallo whereby the Russian government agreed to have operated on Russian territory munitions plants for the

express purpose of providing Germany with munitions in order to enable Germany to circumvent the Treaty of Versailles.

Mr. Lovestone: I think so.

Mr. Matthews: You are acquainted with that?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: And is it also true that in the Treaty of Rapallo, which enabled the Reichswehr to get munitions from Soviet territory, that the Reichswehr at that time, that particular period, was using those munitions to a considerable extent in shooting down the representatives of the Communists in Germany?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I think you have simplified the picture too much. Let me express my opinion. I think in general it was quite sound for the Russians, as an independent state and [with] whose policies we on the outside should not seek to interfere, just as they should not seek to interfere in ours, to sign a treaty of friendship with Germany so as to make it harder for France and England to invade Russia, because Germany would not let them. Now, at the same time there is a certain contradiction involved here, when they signed such a treaty with Germany, they signed with the powers that be in Germany. Those powers that be, in a certain way, are interested in suppressing their own labor movement. That cannot be helped.

The test must come in this sense: In those days the Russians were compelled to sign for one reason or another treaties with capitalist countries. They did not dictate, as a result of that, the policies of the labor movement in that country with which they signed the treaty. While they signed the Treaty of Rapallo, they did not try to weaken the revolutionary character of the German labor movement.

On the other hand, Stalin came in when he signed his pact with the French government. The first thing that was done was the issuance of an order to the Communist Party of France to give up all militancy, to give up all effective concern for the workers in France. The Communist Party in France became an agency to carry out the pact between the French government and the Soviet government. That is wrong. The Russians have a right to make their treaties. We do not want to interfere with them, and let them not interfere with international labor unions.

Mr. Starnes: Let us get down to the question, if

we can, of Dr. Matthews, of whether there is any espionage activities on the part of the Soviet government and the Soviet Communist Party in the United States.

Mr. Matthews: Would you please give us the benefit of your information, Mr. Lovestone, on the question of the relationship of the Communist Party of the United States to the GPU?

Lovestone: Well, the relationship is of two sorts. It would be a mistake to say that every Communist Party member is a GPU member, and also be a mistake to say that at all time the Communist Party as such is cooperating with agencies of the GPU. On the other hand, there was some limited cooperation at one time or another with the GPU agents, but far more important is this, that the Communist Parties of the various countries have been transformed as such into agencies that play the role of a GPU for the Soviets. Their psychology is that. Their spirit and mind is that. Their attitude is that. It is not that they are GPU agents on the payroll or making daily reports. It is not that simple, mechanically, but in a psychological sense that is very true. I might emphasize here that it is not logical, but it is also psychological, and the psychology of the Communist Party leadership today is a police psychology. It is in this case GPU psychology.

Mr. Mason: Which makes very effective agents in troublesome times to get the information necessary to do certain things.

Mr. Lovestone: It makes it a very effective agent at all times for knowledge or influence or tarnishing or monkeying with public opinion.

Mr. Starnes: That psychological factor would lead, then, any member of the Communist Party to impart any information that he had that would be of value to the Soviet government.

Mr. Lovestone: It is not that he sits down and takes notes.

Mr. Starnes: I understand that.

Mr. Lovestone: But the attitude.

Mr. Starnes: The attitude does.

Mr. Lovestone: The state of mind.

Mr. Starnes: And the state of mind which leads him to a sense of loyalty to the Soviet government rather than a sense of loyalty to this government.

Mr. Lovestone: It is not a question of loyalty, it is a question of animal habit, pure animal habit. You just start swinging your arms when you walk, and that

is the way it is.

Mr. Starnes: Regardless of what line of endeavor this Communist is in, so long as he had that attitude or state of mind he could be used, either wittingly or unwittingly, as an agent for espionage activities.

Mr. Lovestone: In effect, yes.

Mr. Matthews: And does your experience, Mr. Lovestone, in GPU psychology indicate that it even overflows the boundaries of actual party membership and include some sympathizers who become quite enthusiastic about the party?

Mr. Lovestone: It affects every special operation of the Communist Party, whether it would be a sympathetic organization or an organization that they worked in that is really hostile to them. It is unavoidable.

Mr. Matthews: Will you give us some of the types of activities involved in that character of the Communist Party which you describe as one of the GPU mental or GPU psychological?

Mr. Lovestone: That psychology has largely developed since our expulsion and resistance on our part to it entailed our expulsion, but I would say the primary point would be the judging of the good of all problems and penalties in the country, not from the viewpoint of conditions and reality of the land, but from the viewpoint of the interest and actual manipulations or adorations or adulations on the other side. You have your feet in this country, but your head and your heart are outside.

Mr. Starnes: That's right.

Mr. Lovestone: That is it in reality.

Mr. Starnes: Therefore, anyone who subscribes to the tenets of the party and who had this police mentality, as you describe it, who has his feet here but his head and heart over there, if he were a worker in a munitions plant or in a navy yard, or were employed as a worker in any other plant, or if he were connected with a state or the Federal government and by virtue of his employment, either private or public, information vital to the welfare and safety of this country came to his possession, that type of mentality, and that state of mind which he has would lead him to furnish that information to the Soviet government.

Mr. Lovestone: Consciously or unconsciously, or subconsciously, he would make good material for it.

Mr. Starnes: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: Not necessarily in every individual sense. That would be wrong to say that. But, he would make very good material for that.

Mr. Starnes: And generally speaking it would be true.

Mr. Lovestone: That is the type as it would tend to run.

Mr. Starnes: All right, proceed.

Mr. Matthews: Now, Mr. Lovestone, the Communist Party, for example in this country at the present time is what we might call strictly isolationist in its attitude toward European war. Could we reduce that to terms that are much more correct by calling it just a case of pro-German propaganda?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, you see, I am an isolationist myself, but for a totally different reason. I was that. I do not mean in the narrow sense of the word as used on the Hill here. I think the one hope of the world is to keep this country out of the war. I had that idea a year ago, 5 years ago, and 10 years ago. The Communist Party up until September 1 [1939], or sometime around September 4, had the very opposite idea. It had that idea as a result of its GPU character, its police mind, because of the situation over there.

Today the Communist Party is isolationist, not because it is concerned with the interests of the workers or the farmers of this country, but because at the moment the interests of Soviet foreign policy dictate that it would be best for the United States not get into the war, since if it should get in, it would get in against Germany, and Russia and Germany have a common defense, and therefore the Communist Party in this country is against war, and a great deal of the propaganda against war today is not genuine antiwar propaganda, but is pro-Stalin-Hitler propaganda.

Mr. Matthews: Now, Mr. Lovestone, you have had a good deal of experience, both while you were in the leadership of the Communist Party of this country, and subsequent thereto, with reference to the so-called nuisance clubs which the Communist Party sets up and operates. I wonder if you would give us the benefit of your information with reference to some of these organizations specifically. For example, can you identify clearly and without qualifications the International Workers Order as one of the organizations under the control of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: Of course Mr. Browder is an expert and he gave you all of them in his theory of transmission belts, but I might mention when we split from the Communist Party, one of the issues we had with them was we were against the organization of the International Workers Order as a competing organization to the Workers' International. Subsequently the Communist Party went ahead and organized the International Workers Order as a strict appendage of the Communist Party.

Mr. Matthews: What could you say about the International Labor Defense in the same connection?

Mr. Lovestone: The International Labor Defense was organized in my time. We were the inspiring force in organizing it, but I must stress that at that time we were quite nonpartisan in administering funds and help to those in need of legal defense. Since that time I do not think that has been the case, and it has been a strictly speaking Communist Party organization.

Mr. Matthews: What about the Friends of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, that is an obvious institution. I think nobody will challenge that. I endorse Browder's opinion here.

Mr. Matthews: You have had some personal experience in the American League Against War and Fascism, which has now become the American League for Peace and Democracy.

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: What is your opinion, from your experience in that organization, with reference to its character?

Mr. Lovestone: When it was first organized we tried to affiliate our organization to it and we needed the assistance of a lot of fellow travelers in order to enable us to step into the hall, and when we tried to win representation of its committees, we were denied that, and I came dangerously near getting my skull cracked, because I was going to ask for the floor. Otherwise, the organization was quite nonpartisan.

Mr. Matthews: Now, I think we had better make that perfectly clear. You say otherwise it was nonpartisan. You mean strictly under the control of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: It is under the control of the Communist Party like a blot is under the control of a blotter — inseparable. If you separate the blot from

the blotter there is a hole in the blotter, and no blotter.

Mr. Matthews: There is a good deal of debate, both public and private, on this question, Mr. Lovestone. I would like to ask you if you have even the slightest doubt as to the character of the American League?

Mr. Lovestone: You see, I am not in a position to speak from documents, and I suppose in a court of law I could not adduce exhibits. I am in a position to speak rather in the sense of a teleologist or geologist. I can tell a footprint, or I can tell fossils, or I can smell something, and the basis of my experience is in the sense of utilizing the function of the olfactory nerve or judging footprints, and I would say regardless of the nobility or sincerity and genuineness of intentions and motives of many of those who supported it — it is nothing but a tool, a weapon, an instrument, a utensil of the Communist Party.

Mr. Matthews: Well, I am only asking you for your expression, based on your information and firsthand experience. You may not recall it, but at the time you came very near getting your head cracked for asking for the floor, I was in the chair on that occasion.

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Matthews: However, I had nothing to do with your almost getting your head cracked. I lost complete control of the delegated assembly, and we were in a stage of riot for an hour or more.

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Matthews: And, I am asking you, on the basis of your own experience how you characterize this organization.

Mr. Lovestone: On the basis of that experience, and a lot of other experience, I characterize it in that sense.

Mr. Whitley: Mr. Chairman, if I may refer to Mr. Lovestone's explanation of a moment ago, I think there is no doubt but what he is thoroughly qualified from experience as an expert to express opinions on organizations having to do with the Communists.

Mr. Starnes: Why certainly not.

Mr. Voorhis: Of course he is.

Mr. Starnes: If the man who helped form the organization, was in it from its inception, does not know, I would like to know how anyone could know.

Mr. Voorhis: What organization was it that you

just mentioned?

Mr. Matthews: The American League for Peace and Democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Whitley has some organizations he would like to ask the witness about, and some individuals also.

Mr. Whitley: Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Lovestone, of an organization known as the American Student Union? Either firsthand or from your observation as an expert on the subject?

Mr. Lovestone: No knowledge firsthand or otherwise, except I might say when it was formed we were against its formation, because we said, "Well, once it is formed, the Communist Party will grab control of it." I could not prove that the Communist Party has control of it, but somehow or other I know when these organizations get together there is something at the bottom of them, somebody gets them. They just don't run in a vacuum. And here I have only suspicions on the basis of my experience, but which suspicions I feel quite sure of — but I could not give any documentary proof.

I have no personal experience with the American Student Union. I know in a number of localities where our own people tried to work in there we ran into Communist Party domination and well, if we did not get our heads cracked, it is because students are not so vigorous. On these occasions we get our "walking papers." Our applications are lost.

Mr. Voorhis: When you refer to "our own people," who do you mean?

Mr. Lovestone: Members of the Independent Labor League of America.

Mr. Matthews: You know that your members ran into considerable difficulty at the annual convention of the American Student Union, which was held at Vassar?

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Matthews: In the Christmas holidays of 1937.

Mr. Lovestone: [We] could not even present a motion, could not get the floor. While others might get the floor, our people could not, and to me that would be a sign of Communist Party domination in the sense that the Communist Party would be ready to allow some preacher, pastor, to get up and pray for mercy, and have an opportunity to express an opin-

ion, whereas our people would not be allowed to speak. If our people got up they would bludgeon them with argument, or beat them down in a discussion, because we have had experience in doing that.

Mr. Whitley: Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Lovestone, of an organization known as the American Youth Congress?

Mr. Lovestone: None at all in the form of personal experience, but if you will examine the date of its organization and you examine the trend of changes of Communist Party policy, you will find a coincidence and you will find the spirit carried over into it. I would say again that Mr. Browder was right, the Communist Party has tried to use that as a transmission belt. It does not mean that everyone must be officially a member of the Communist Party. It does not mean that one even be a fellow traveler. He might be a fellow limper, just limp along with them — but he must be usable, not necessarily useful in a social sense, but must be usable from the point of view of the Communist Party.

Mr. Matthews: I understand that you have followed in a general way the shifting line of the American Youth Congress, and it is your observation that that shifting line follows the same shifts as the Communist Party.

Mr. Lovestone: Well, take the example of the organization toward the Oxford pledge as a classic example. At one time the Communist Party was against the Oxford pledge. Today it is not against the Oxford pledge. It is against war. While the pledge has not changed — the pledge is the same, the pledgers are the same — something has changed somewhere. It is the same pledge, the same people take the pledge, but they have changed their attitude toward the pledge. If you tie up the situation in that way, you will be able to find some perhaps invisible, imponderable, nevertheless effective force moving things.

Mr. Whitley: In other words, Mr. Lovestone, would you say from your experience and the opportunity which you have had to study and observe Communist-controlled organizations over the period of many years, would you express it as your best opinion and judgment that the American Student Union and the American Youth Congress are subject to Communist control and influence?

Mr. Lovestone: Both my olfactory nerve and my

extensive experience in investigation would dictate that conclusion.

Mr. Voorhis: Well, when you say that, however, just so the record will be plain, that does not mean that there are not many organizations which have affiliates with the American Youth Congress, does it? Nor that there would not be so very many people in most any of those organizations who will be so?

Mr. Lovestone: The overwhelming majority of the members may be anti-Communist?

Mr. Voorhis: Yes.

Mr. Lovestone: The overwhelming majority of the organization's affiliates may be anti- or non-Communist, but the dominating, dictating spirit or effort to have a dominating, dictating spirit is of a particular character.

Mr. Mason: And their object in getting in these other organizations that are not Communist is to give a front and cover up and hide their activities within the larger organizations?

Mr. Lovestone: The outer circle of the periphery is what they call it. You make your nucleus within the periphery. The nucleus is a very small part of the periphery. The bigger, the better — the more the nucleus has to feed on.

Mr. Starnes: There would be no sense, no rhyme nor reason, in setting up a front organization if everybody in it was a Communist.

Mr. Lovestone: You must recognize this: At one time that was the policy. They wanted to organize organization in which only they themselves were in the organization. They had a United Front with themselves, but now it is different. Today, it is just the other way around.

Mr. Starnes: Certainly. It is a strategy that they used — devised and used to lure innocent people in there and lend respectability to a movement that was communistic in its inception or parts of the Communist program. That is all that it was.

Mr. Lovestone: That is an element of strategy.

Mr. Whitley: Mr. Lovestone, are you acquainted with Mr. Joseph Brodsky, an attorney in New York?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Whitley: Have you ever known him to be a Communist, party member, or active in the Communist Party?

Mr. Lovestone: He was our lawyer. He was quite

sympathetic. In my days he never carried a card in the Communist Party, but we always trusted him in the sense of a confidant. Whether he has joined the Communist Party since or not, I am in no position to say.

Mr. Whitley: There was introduced into the record of the committee's proceedings sometime ago official documents of the British government which had to do with the raid conducted by Scotland Yard on Arcos, the trading organization, Russian trading organization in London, that raid being conducted in 1926, and in that document the name of Mr. Brodsky is listed several times under two addresses in New York with a notation for the transmission of party funds or a notation to that effect. Do you know whether he ever functioned in that capacity?

Mr. Lovestone: We generally employed or used the names and addresses of people who were not in the Communist Party to receive confidential mail from other countries and sometimes the confidential mail might include some money without the recipient even knowing what was inside. I would say, very definitely, Mr. Brodsky never received any money for the Communist Party in my days — very definitely.

His name was on these address lists that you refer to in the sense that I mentioned before. He was a trusted sympathizer and confidant and as such he could receive anything, whether it be confidential instructions or confidential cash, without his knowing what was the contents of the envelope.

Mr. Whitley: Did Mr. Brodsky know why his name was found on the lists which were seized in that London raid?

Mr. Lovestone: That would be very hard for me to answer. Generally our practice was to get the permission of anyone whose name we used, but sometimes, I confess, we used names without permission. Whether it was so in this case or not, I could not say.

At any rate, even if his name had been used without permission, he was a very reliable person, very honest man, and would be perfectly safe.

Mr. Whitley: Mr. Lovestone, you have already in your testimony referred to a Mr. Benjamin Gitlow, who has previously appeared before the committee, and Mr. Joseph Zack. Were you acquainted with them?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes. Joseph Zack [Kornfeder] was a charter member of the Communist Party, at one time a member of the Central [Executive] Committee. On several occasions he was a member of the Central [Executive] Committee of the Communist Party.†

Mr. Whitley: What was his particular field of activity?

Mr. Lovestone: He was very active in the trade union field and after we were expelled, he, having been one of the original defenders of dual unionism, became a department head, that is, trade union director.

Mr. Whitley: Now, Mr. Lovestone, there has been considerable testimony before the committee previously with reference to Comintern representatives, that is, representatives from the Comintern to the United States. That testimony has been conflicting in that some witnesses have stated that it was the general practice and policy for the Comintern to have a representative here, whereas I believe Mr. Browder and Mr. Foster testified that it was the most exceptional practice, and I believe one or the other, I do not recall which, could only remember one instance in which there had been a Comintern representative here. Can you help the committee clear that up? Do you have any different expression on that point?

Mr. Lovestone: No. In our days there were no permanent Comintern representatives in this country. There were occasions when the Communist International representatives came here. There was one here in 1922 — I think he has been executed since. That

†- Joseph Zack Kornfeder was born March 20, 1897 to a Catholic family in Austria. During his adult life he used his mother's maiden name, Zack. He came to the United States in 1916, gaining employment as a garment worker. Using the pseudonyms "A.C. Griffith" and "J.P. Collins," Zack served as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the United Communist Party in 1921 and of the unified Communist Party of America in 1921-22. On April 17, 1922, Zack voluntarily resigned from the CEC to help make way for the addition of Earl Browder, Robert Minor, and Alfred Wagenknecht, who were being co-opted to the body. Zack served as Secretary of the National Committee of the Needle Trades Section of TUEL, organized in Nov. 1922, and was a TUEL functionary throughout the 1920s. In 1928, Zack was sent to Moscow to attend the Lenin Institute. He served as the Foster faction's man in Moscow over the next two years, also sitting as a member of the Anglo-American Secretariat of ECCI as well as a Profintern functionary. In 1930 he was dispatched as a Comintern Rep to South America. He returned to the US in the fall of 1931 and was enlisted as head of the Trade Union Unity League for the Eastern District. An advocate of the dual union tactics of TUUL, Zack broke with the CPUSA in the fall of 1934, ostensibly over Browder's revisionism. Having had to leave his wife and son in the USSR in 1930 and unable to gain their

was Mr. [Henryk] Walecki. He was a Pole.† And then I think the 6th National Convention of our organization [New York: March 1929] had two representatives of the Communist International. One of them was Harry Pollitt, the other Mr. Dengel.‡ They stayed here for a short time. There was no permanent representative here.

Mr. Whitley: That was during your period?

Mr. Lovestone: During my time. They occasionally came. These were occasions for special things — that is, whenever there was difficulty or some fight brewing, in order to make peace, or whenever they wanted to ram something through, as they did in the case of the 6th National Convention. We [Lovestone and his allies] were the majority and they wanted to change it.

Mr. Whitley: In other words, the purpose of the Comintern representatives here was to see that some particular policy or some particular program was properly carried out.

Mr. Lovestone: That's right.

Mr. Whitley: This was just a further method of exercising the Moscow control.

Mr. Lovestone: Without doubt.

Mr. Whitley: Through direct representation.

Mr. Lovestone: Without doubt.

Mr. Whitley: And you do not know whether that policy of having Comintern representatives in this

country has been expanded or extended since the time you were in the party?

Mr. Lovestone: I do not know in any documentary sense, but if you are asking my opinion, I would say it has been extended to the point of stranglehold.

Mr. Starnes: Is that on account of the peculiar characteristic of this fellow Stalin or his mode or operation?

Mr. Lovestone: It is characteristic. It is that, and a little more. I think they work through the Roman consul system now. They want to have their people on the job and on the spot watching and they do not allow any possibility for development of initiative. So, it is best to have the initiative killer on the job all of the time. I could not prove that in any way. I am not qualified to speak of it in the sense of experience today. I can only surmise on the basis of past experience and what I see happening.

Mr. Starnes: I suggest that we stay out of the field of surmising and conjecture. If you have anything definite, let us have it; if not, let us close.

Mr. Whitley: This morning you mentioned George Mink, with reference to Logorsky. What was George Mink's functions in the United States, Mr. Lovestone, to your knowledge?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, at first he had no functions, because he was incompetent to have any functions. Then all of a sudden he was made an active leader

release, Zack soon moved to a position of anti-Communism. His wife was arrested as the spouse of an enemy of the people late in 1936 and she was apparently either exiled or sent to the camps. Zack was a friendly witness of the Dies Committee on Sept. 30, 1939. †- Henryk Walecki [Russified rendition: Genrik Valetsky, which is more phonetic] was an ethnic Jew born Maksymilian Horwitz in Warsaw in 1877. He was a founder of the Communist Party of Poland and was named by the CPP as the representative of the party to the Comintern in February 1921, in which capacity he served until 1925. In the middle of 1922 Valetsky was dispatched to the United States where, using the pseudonyms "Ward Brooks" and "Michaelson," he helped to broker unity between the unified Communist Party of America and the dissident "Communist Party of America" established by the Central Caucus faction. He remained a Comintern functionary for the rest of his life. Valetsky was arrested by the Soviet secret police in June 1937 and died in custody, possibly through execution, that same year.

‡- Harry Pollitt (1890-1960), a boilermaker and trade union militant, was one of the leading figures in the history of the Communist Party of Great Britain — on a par with Earl Browder in the United States. Pollitt was a member of the Independent Labour Party from 1906 and the British Socialist Party from 1912. He was a founding member of the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1920 and a delegate to the founding congress of the Profintern in Moscow in 1921. Pollitt was installed as Secretary-General of CPGB in 1929, in which capacity he served until April 1956 (less a period from Aug. 1939 to June 1941, when he was demoted due to his opposition to the changed party line towards fascism and war).

Philipp Dengel (1888-1948) held a college degree in history and worked as a teacher, joining the Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1911. He was drafted in 1913 and served in the German army throughout the war, rising from a noncommissioned officer to the rank of lieutenant. Dengel was a member of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) from March 1919, briefly joining the Left Oppositional Communist Workers Party of Germany (KAPD) in 1920. Dengel was elected as a Communist deputy to the Reichstag in May 1924. At the 6th World Congress of the Comintern (1928), Dengel was elected a member of ECCI, and he worked thereafter for the central apparatus of the CI until his political career was abruptly ended by a stroke suffered on June 22, 1941 — the very day of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Dengel returned to Germany in 1947 and died in East Berlin.

of the Marine Workers and then he went to Russia and came back as an authority on trade union questions and afterward he cut loose from the trade union work and began to handle some confidential work in the nature of which we did not know, and we did not ask anything about it.

Mr. Whitley: Did you have any reason to believe that he might have been connected with the GPU?

Mr. Lovestone: Good reasons to believe that. Again, I could not prove it in a court of law.

Mr. Whitley: From your knowledge and acquaintanceship with him, knowing of his activities at that time, that would have been an accurate observation or a fair observation, you would say?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, that would be an accurate conclusion.

Mr. Whitley: Mr. Lovestone, do you know whether the Comintern or Profintern, or both, considered the maritime industry in the United States and in other countries as a particularly strategic industry in which they made unusual efforts to expand their influence and control?

Mr. Lovestone: For a while we did not, but a little later we did, and I think since I have left it has been developed very much.

Mr. Whitley: Are you acquainted with the present organization of the National Maritime Union, the NMU, Mr. Lovestone?

Mr. Lovestone: I do not know any of the leaders. I know about them from what I have read in the press and what I study about them, in my general studies of the trade union movement.

Mr. Whitley: You do not feel that you are qualified?

Mr. Lovestone: I do not think so.

Mr. Whitley: To discuss it?

Mr. Lovestone: I do not think I would be

qualified to give any authoritative statement about it, personally, except a general evaluation that there is a very unhealthy situation in that union. But otherwise, I do not know. I do not know a single one of them personally.

Mr. Whitley: You mean unhealthy with reference to the Communist influence and control?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, I would say the Communist Party influence in there is quite decisive.

Mr. Whitley: Now, can you name for the committee, Mr. Lovestone, any GPU or military intelligence agents of the Soviet Union who have, to your knowledge, operated in this country? In previous testimony of one witness, the name of Felix Wolf was mentioned as a military intelligence agent in this country during the period of approximately 1924 to 1929. Were you acquainted with him?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, I knew Felix Wolf very well, from Hamburg. Felix Wolf is a fine person. He was here for a while, and he has been executed.†

Mr. Whitley: Do you know whether General Kléber was here? You mentioned him this morning. Do you know whether he was ever active in this country?

Mr. Lovestone: Kléber visited us a number of times. I never met him in the United States. I know he was here. That was after my expulsion.‡

Mr. Whitley: Are you acquainted with the circumstances, Mr. Lovestone, surrounding the trip which Mr. Browder made to China about 1928 or 1929, I believe?

Mr. Matthews: 1927, I think, perhaps.

Mr. Whitley: Or 1927?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, sir. He was working at that time.

Mr. Whitley: I believe it was stated it was in connection with some mission for the Profintern trade

†- "Felix Wolf" was an alias of Werner G. Rakow, an ethnic German born in 1893 who was a founding member of the Communist Party of Germany. Rakow worked as a Comintern functionary from 1920, moving over to the employ of Soviet military intelligence in 1922. Rakow served in Austria (1922-23), Germany (1923-24), and acted as the first military intelligence *resident* in the United States (1925-27), where he worked under the cover of Columbia University and Amtorg. Rakow was expelled from the RKP(b) as a Trotskyist in 1928, but readmitted to the party in 1929. He was again expelled in 1933, and once again readmitted in 1934. On July 27, 1936, Rakow was arrested by the NKVD. He was executed Sept. 14, 1937.

‡- "General Emilio Kléber" was a pseudonym of Manfred S. Shtern, a Red Army Intelligence officer from 1921. After serving in Germany and China in the 1920s, Shtern was the resident in the United States in 1930-31. Shtern was later moved to Manchukuo before becoming chief military advisor of the Soviet Union to the Communist Party of China in 1932-34. Shtern (as "Kléber") commanded the 11th International Brigade in Spain in 1936-37. During 1937-38 he was a political advisor to Otto Kuuusinen in the Comintern, before being arrested by the NKVD. Shtern died in the camps in 1954.

union work.

Mr. Lovestone: Yes, he was working for the party, the Profintern delegation to China at that time, and the Pan-Pacific Bureau.

Mr. Whitley: I believe there is some previous testimony to the effect that that trip on the part of Mr. Browder was on instructions from either the Comintern or Profintern and had nothing to do with the American Communist Party and activities, either politically or financially.

Mr. Lovestone: The trip was solely for the Profintern and had nothing to do with the American Communist Party and activities, either politically or financially.

Mr. Whitley: One further question, Mr. Lovestone, that occurs to me at the moment. Do you have any reason to believe that the fundamental activities of the Communist Party have changed in recent years even though the line itself has changed on several occasions, to meet the situations as they arose? In other words, did the change from an ultra-Left position to at least a publicly avowed ultra-Right position, did that mean that the party has actually changed fundamentally in its program or in its characteristics and strategy, or was that just merely a maneuver?

Mr. Lovestone: It was a very important practical change dictated by Russian domination and Russian practices and the Russian foreign policy, but had nothing to do with the change in the fundamental rule of the Communist Party as such.

Mr. Whitley: In other words, it was just a strategy to, if anything, conceal or cover up that role?

Mr. Lovestone: To get further.

Mr. Whitley: Yes. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Matthews: Yes. Mr. Lovestone, in the testimony before the committee Mr. Browder said he never sent reports or regular reports to the Comintern. Do you know anything to the contrary?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, I can only speak from my own experience and then my conclusions. In my custodianship, in the office of Secretary, I sent regular reports and discussed quite in detail many of the American problems with the Comintern. I would assume that that practice continued after I left on an even more extensive scale, unless the Comintern was so sure of Browder that it did not even need any reports from

him, which is entirely possible.

Mr. Mason: May I ask whether you sent those reports regularly because you knew they were expected, or demanded?

Mr. Lovestone: It was a part of the requirements of my office.

Mr. Matthews: Was it also the practice to send representatives of the American party for periods of residence in Moscow?

Mr. Lovestone: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, we were criticized many times because we would not send people across to stay there. Some of our boys were not too anxious to stay there. We had a tough time getting people to go over, but we did do that.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Browder said that the American party always took an active part in changing the party's line, whenever it was changed in this country. Is that correct?

Mr. Lovestone: That, in the Mark Twain sense, is slightly exaggerated. It is totally incorrect.

Mr. Matthews: Mr. Lovestone, you may have noticed from the current reports from abroad that [Otto] Kuusinen, who has been mentioned in your testimony, and who made a speech on the American question which we introduced in the record this morning, is heading the political government which has been sent into Finland from the Soviet Union. You know Kuusinen personally?

Mr. Lovestone: Very well, and I admire him, and he is one of the living miracles to me that he is still alive. He is a brilliant person in many ways, but he has not a strong personality. He is a very willing person, but rather able.

Mr. Matthews: Did he say to you, in effect at least, during your fight with Stalin that he injured your position?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, that was quite common knowledge in the Communist International that when we broke, Kuusinen's heart and mind was with us, but as he said himself, he was a refugee, a man without a country, an exile, and what could he do but just go along? That was the basis of his real position — not conviction and not feeling. He felt very badly in the whole fight.

Mr. Matthews: Well, Mr. Lovestone, without going into any details regarding the position of your present organization, I will ask you if the resolutions

of the convention of the Independent Labor League of America [8th: Sept. 2-4, 1939] as set forth in *The Workers Age* of September 23 [1939] is a correct statement of the program of your organization?

Mr. Lovestone: The three fundamental resolutions of our organization as adopted at the last convention are the following:

First, a resolution on the trade union question, a part of which I read before in the evaluation of Stalinism.

Secondly, a resolution on socialism and democracy which is in complete opposition to totalitarianism as the road for the achievement of social life.

Thirdly, a resolution on socialist unity, which is an attempt to create a united socialist movement in the America, in this country, as totally opposed to and distinct from the Stalin movement.

Those are the three fundamental programs, and documents which reveal our position today.

Mr. Matthews: I will ask, Mr. Chairman — I do not think you have quite answered my question exactly — I will ask if these resolutions of the ILLA convention set forth the program in full?

Mr. Lovestone: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: If that is the case, I would like to have these resolutions incorporated in the record.

Mr. Starnes: Without objection, it will be done.

* * *

Mr. Matthews: Do you wish to characterize your present organization any further?

Mr. Lovestone: Well, our organization is a militant Socialist organization working in this country, not seeking to dominate the labor movement, but working within the labor movement, with a view of helping it to gain improved conditions, with a view of helping it become the decisive force in this country. We

are a radical Socialist constructive force. Our difference with the Stalinists is not only along the lines that I have mentioned before, but we consider them as an anti-revolutionary and anti-Socialist organization — simply an agency of the Stalin-Hitler combination. We work in the trade unions primarily, because most of our people are trade union people.

We, of course, have connections with organizations outside of this country, like the Independent Labour Party of England, the Workers and Peasants Socialist Party of France, an underground movement in Germany, where no other labor movement could exist, but we determine and decide our own policies in this country solely and strictly on the basis of our own conditions here and on our own judgment. We make our own bitter mistakes. We learn sometimes in time, sometimes too late, to overcome them — but my experience over quite a number of years in the labor movement is that this is the only sound and genuinely democratic way of working and we are dedicated to that procedure.

Mr. Starnes: Mr. Mason, do you have any questions?

Mr. Mason: No.

Mr. Starnes: Do you have any questions, Mr. Voorhis?

Mr. Voorhis: No.

Mr. Starnes: Is that all, Mr. Matthews?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Starnes: Do you have anything, Mr. Whitley?

Mr. Whitley: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Starnes: The committee will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chairman of the full committee.

(Thereupon, at 2:58 pm, the committee took a recess as above indicated.)

Edited with footnotes by Tim Davenport.

Second Edition, August 2006 — revised and expanded footnotes.

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