



THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Devoted to International Socialism

Vol. II

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Changing Labor Conditions in Wartime

By FLORENCE KELLEY

Changes before America entered the War

Since August, 1914, labor conditions in the United States have been changing incessantly, but the minds of the mass of wage-earners have not kept pace with these changes.

Before the war European immigration into the United States had been, for several years, at the rate of more than a million a year, largely from the nations then at war,—Italy and the Balkan countries. This vast influx almost exclusively of people of the wage-earning class produced no conspicuous fall in wages. Unemployment was present, both seasonal and chronic as it had been for many years, but not obviously increased by the immigration. There was still enough cheap land and sufficiently rapid expansion of industry to keep wage conditions relatively stable.

Real wages were declining. The dollar was already buying less food, fuel and shelter from year to year. But this was recognized as permanent only by a very small group of writers led by Isbel King.

Then came the war followed instantly both by a reduction in immigration and by epidemic unemployment which led to no permanent organization—either legislative or voluntary—intended to prevent its appearance on an immense scale at the close of the war.

Six months after hostilities opened however, unemployment diminished, and the Allies' contracts and the social results thereof began to grow clearly visible. To fill the void in the labor market created by the cessation of immigration and by the international demand for food, fuel and munitions, there began a flow of recruits to the ranks of industry such as this country had not previously experienced. Connecticut, one of the permanent homes of the munitions industry, revealed to the observant eye that lowering of industrial standards which has since spread in many directions.

A famous Connecticut arms manufacturing company having huge contracts began in 1915 to require men in its employ to bring in their wives if these had, before marriage, worked in their factories. In Connecticut, more than in most of the states, building and loan associations and savings banks had thriven, and great numbers of working men's homes were in process of being paid for. When therefore, the dictum went forth from the munitions works that a man having a wife eligible for employment and failing to bring her in when requested, need not come himself, great numbers of mothers began to work at night while caring for their young children by day. They attempted, by thus doing the work of two persons, to aid their husbands in saving their homes from foreclosure.

Soon the visiting nurses raised voices of warning. Tuberculous mothers whose disease had been arrested were again open cases. Able to maintain their restored health under the ordinary strains of home life with care and guidance of the tuberculosis nurses, these Connecticut mothers were perishing like grain before the scythe under the stress of the war contracts, two years before the United States entered the war. Home-making mothers by day and wage-earning wives by night, these were early victims of the world war.

It had been widely believed that Connecticut forbade the employment of women in manufacture after 10 P. M. at night, as Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania,

Nebraska, and Indiana do. When, however, an attempt was made to enforce this provision, the Connecticut courts held that the limitation applied only to stores, which have naturally only slight occasion to employ women after 10 P. M. It has not been possible to get the Connecticut legislature, which sat in 1915 and in 1917, to extend the prohibition of work of women at night to include factories.

Connecticut was merely a sample. Wherever war contracts have appeared, suction has been applied to draw in fresh groups of workers new to industry. Country-bred men and women have swarmed to the new munitions towns, and heavy pressure has been brought to bear upon all laws regulating working hours of women, minors and children.

The Negroes in Industry

Negroes, both men and women, were brought from the rural Southern States to Northern industrial centers in 1915 and 1916 first by hundreds, then by thousands, to the serious disorganization of Southern food production.

The world suffers hunger and we, with our unmeasured wealth, can save neither ourselves nor the starving peoples. While Europe looks to us for food, fuel and cotton, we are not meeting our own demand, much less that of the other nations.

One reason is neglect of the South. The nation has tacitly approved while two generations of masses of people have remained in blind ignorance of modern agriculture and horticulture. For more than a half century, ever since the Civil War, millions of our rural people, both white and colored, have by our national policy of neglect of education been left unqualified for producing maximum crops wherewith to meet the demand that the present crisis makes upon us.

Only in the present year are appreciable sums becoming available under the Smith Hughes and the Smith Lever Laws, in the educationally least developed states for training teachers of agriculture, horticulture and domestic science, and

for providing the requisite buildings and equipment for teaching these eminently necessary branches. Until now no federal provision similar to the grants in aid to education, long since established in Great Britain, have ever been made by our federal government.

The Negroes have never been welcomed in the labor movement. There has been a vicious circle. As agricultural workers entering industry they have often unconsciously injured white union men in two ways at once. They have deprived strikers of the chance to return to their previous workplaces, and at the same time have shared, by their mere entrance into the situation, in crippling or killing the labor organization responsible for the strike. Their numbers in industry are now such that they can neither be ignored nor dealt with in detail, so the orthodox unions are doing to them what for several years they have done to women wage-earners,—languidly going through the motions of organizing them.

Not until Negro men do what white women are doing, will they cease to make the labor situation worse for themselves and their fellow workers. They, too, must form organizations and use their growing numbers, and the political power which they command in the Northern States, to get besides collective bargaining, all the slender statutory protection of labor which the courts allow to stand.

The northward migration into industry of Negroes (of whom there were 8,000,000 in the rural Southern States to be drawn upon), the increase of women engaged in manufacture, and the reduction in their legal protection previously believed to be in force, were well under way before the United States entered the war. The muster of children into industry was, as we shall see, active from the first.

The Drive Against Education

New York City, in the Fall of 1914, led by example the movement which is still increasing against popular education. Under the pretext of reforming the city's finances, appropria-

tions for new school buildings ceased. A few old buildings were remodeled or were enlarged, but the attempt to give every child a school seat was openly abandoned for the first time since New York City adopted public schools. The theory was promulgated officially that teachers should work longer hours and children should have less instruction and more supervised play.

New York City's policy of crowding out school children by administrative action, like Connecticut's reactionary judicial and legislative procedure in regard to nightwork of women in factories, was an omen. No sooner did the United States enter the war than bills were introduced in state legislatures to exempt children, boys and girls alike, from school attendance in the Spring and Fall from the 12th birthday on, ostensibly to work on farms, the summer vacation being prolonged for this purpose to cover the months from April 1st to Nov. 1st.

In the propaganda for thus robbing the children of the birth-right of school-life which is theirs as future American citizens, eminence was achieved by John Finley, Commissioner of Education of New York State who, in May 1917, supported an evil bill to so exempt children, and sailed for France soon after Governor Whitman had signed it, delegating to subordinates the task of drawing up the regulations for the guidance of local school authorities and the safeguarding of the children which the new law itself made his duty. In consequence of the agitation in this matter and of ambiguous instructions from state officials, schools in rural sections of New York were generally demoralized. The standard of elementary education was lowered for great numbers of boys and girls, and many educational authorities of the richest and industrially most highly developed state in the Union were revealed as the enemies of the children.

Foremost among the agitators for the reactionary law for long vacations were certain state educational authorities who, at a public hearing before Governor Whitman, at Albany, made the statement that already many boys had left school under the prom-

ise of the school officials, that the law would be passed, and the boys given school credit for the school work of the whole term. If the bill were not made law these boys would be placed in a most unfair position. This premature dismissal of boys, and the need to redeem the lawless promise of school credit for school work which the boys never performed, appears to have been a deciding factor in leading Governor Whitman to sign the bill.

The younger the children whose educational opportunity has been cut off, the more irreparable, of course, is their loss.

One result of the pernicious activity of the county school superintendents was the dispersal of many teachers whose term of employment was thus arbitrarily reduced. While teachers were released from their ill-paid work, they were loudly called for by the federal Government to enter its better-paid service in many occupations. This has been a process of continued depletion of the teaching profession.

It has been generally assumed, that our public schools need not suffer from withdrawal of teachers as the schools in other belligerent nations have done, because our teaching force is so much more largely composed of women. The facts give, however, little support to this assumption. For women teachers are called upon for many varieties of clerical service.

Although we have not yet suffered the losses by death, disease and mutilation, which have reduced the working class in the other nations, the labor movement suffers here in ways of its own. Besides the accustomed obstacles to maintaining powerful unions—the difference of language, religion and nationality—the war changes have brought new pressure, have given new significance to divergence of age, sex, and color. The usual difficulties of the labor organizations are enormously increased by the influx into industry of Negroes previously rural, of women not hitherto employed outside the home and the schoolroom, and of children urged prematurely into wage-earning in the name of patriotism.

The drive against popular education has taken five distinct forms: a) stopping the building of schools by cities; b) withdrawing teachers for federal government work in the departments and in connection with the draft; c) withdrawing boys from attendance at high schools for agriculture and for industrial work; d) attempting to relax or abolish the state child labor and compulsory school attendance laws; e) relaxing enforcement where reactionary legislation was successfully opposed. This process of relaxing the children's safeguards has been carried on by state, county and city school authorities in varying degrees, as well as by employers' organizations.

In defense of the rights of the children, there has been one long struggle of which the outcome is still uncertain. In 1916, Congress passed and the President signed the federal child-labor bill, to take effect September 1, 1917. This prohibits the shipment in interstate and foreign commerce of products of all mills, factories, workshops, canneries, mines and quarries in which children below the age of 14 years are employed, or children below the age of 16 years are permitted to work more than eight hours. Admirably enforced by the federal Children's Bureau, this new measure is the means of stimulating state and local authorities to register births and to issue proper "working papers" to children of legal working age.

Before the date for its enforcement arrived, however, an injunction suit was begun by representatives of the cotton manufacturing industry to stop the work of the Child Labor Division of the Children's Bureau. The suit was begun in Western North Carolina. The federal judge of that district held the new statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. This injunction is in effect, however, only as to that district. Purchasers in other parts of the country buying goods made in Western North Carolina, under the injunction, require manufacturers there to furnish the guaranty (required by the statute) that no child has participated in the production of the goods before its 14th birthday or longer than eight hours in a day below the age of 16 years. In order to sell their goods,

North Carolina manufacturers are, therefore, obeying the child labor law just as though they had never obtained an injunction against it. The case has been expedited and argument as to the constitutionality of the law will be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States at the April term. For the sake of the children, it is greatly to be hoped, that the court of last resort may not find this new law unconstitutional.

The federal child labor law is the first attempt of Congress to place children in all the 48 states on an equality, even to the limited extent that all alike must be free from factory work and mining until they are 14 years old, and from the strain of a workday longer than eight hours in twenty-four to the age of 16 years. Before that, we had had children of the first class in the Northwest Pacific States where cotton mills and sweatshops have not yet appeared. Children of the second class in the Middle and Northeastern States profited by compulsory education and child labor laws of varying degrees of insufficiency; while in the South with its cotton and tobacco, the boys and girls were largely outside the law. They were children of the third class. They had no right to childhood.

The Will of the People

The contest over the federal child labor law is the current exemplification of the failure of the working class in the United States to enforce its demand that legislation shall express the will of the people. At present any statute that interferes with the unlimited freedom of adults to work as many hours as may suit the convenience of the employers, must be clearly a health measure if the courts are to let it stand. More than this, it must indicate in its title and text that it is a health measure. And it must appear to the highest court to be one.

* It is, also, very important that it should not be kept under consideration twenty-seven months by the court, as recently befell the Oregon minimum wage law for women which, after that long delay, was in April, 1917, allowed to stand, by a 4 to 4 vote of the 9 judges composing the United States Supreme Court.

On this subject the powers of the legislatures depend utterly upon the interpretation by the court of the idea expressed in the words "health" and "welfare", and upon the skill, with which the argument is presented to the court that the statute involved is really adapted to promote the public health. The mere fact, that a law is economically necessary or desirable, cannot be considered, if there is interference with the freedom of adults to contract.

On the Pacific Coast, where women vote and where manufacture on a large scale has not yet developed, we see state minimum wage boards at work, and women's wage rates increased by their action to keep up with the increased cost of living. In New York State, the minimum wage bill is again before the legislature, and the new voters are lined up behind it. The result is still in doubt.

The labor press usually contents itself with criticism of a special decision or of a particular court. In a few of our states only, and those all in the Far West, local and state courts including the highest are all subject to recall by the voters. Citizens of these states are firmly convinced, that the existence of the recall goes far towards explaining the circumstance that courts in those parts of the country do not so frequently hold labor statutes void as courts elsewhere. They say that the will of the people must express itself not only in labor organizations and agreements, in statutes and the nomination and election of officials. They make their courts aware that the will of the people is a continuing force as capable of unmaking as of making the judges. They believe that this inclines the courts to treat with respect labor statutes enacted by means of the referendum.

Wartime Conditions affecting Consumers

Our American labor movement as such does not interest itself in its power over consumption. We have never developed any large co-operative distribution. We have allowed most of our sources of fuel to be given to private owners before our

eyes. Here is one opportunity to save for the public one of our extensive and precious resources in wartime.

One single example among thousands illustrates what the fuel shortage has meant to city workers. In January, 1918, a visiting nurse in New York City, was called into a tenement home to try to save the life of a little child that appeared to be dying of cold in its crib. After days of effort, the little patient's life was safe. But, meanwhile, the nurse was present when the child's father was brought home, having died of exhaustion and cold in the zero weather, while seeking from place to place for coal wherewith to keep his baby warm

This occurred in the richest city, of the richest nation on the planet, in the country most lavishly endowed with coal deposits and with flowing water. It occurred primarily because we have always wasted, and are now more profligately than ever wasting our coal and our water. People suffered and died in New York City in January, 1918, for want of coal for heating, which was blocked on railroad tracks, by trains of coal intended for generating power at the place where used.

It is one of the objects of this paper to suggest from the point of view of the workers as consumers:—

a. The desirability of using our water power in every possible way to eke out our coal supply, in order that our people may not suffer avoidable hardship;

b. The desirability of establishing a unified federal system for distributing power both from our water sources and from the mouth of the mine, in order that, we may avoid such chaos and losses, as we have suffered under the competitive management of the railroads and mines;

c. The need of an immediate official study of the relation of our coal and our water resources, similar to the study of England's coal resources recently issued by the Sub-Committee of the Munitions Committee of the English Parliament of which Lord Haldane was chairman and signed the report.

The third proposal is especially urgent because we have as yet no means of forming an enlightened and compelling popular opinion.

The American people have, at the present moment, no readily accessible fund of popular knowledge as to the location of the coal area in relation to potential sources of water power. We need facts on such essential points as these geographical relations, and as the possible use of navigable rivers for waterways and for sources of power (as the Rhine is used at Rhein-felden). The public cannot get by volunteer surveys authentic information of the possibilities of nation-wide flood regulation in connection with power generation; or of the possible use of coal to eke out irregularities of flow or drought.

For want of needed facts on these and other elements of the problem of transmitting power without the use of coal cars, the public mind is easily befogged by the threat that the beauty of whole great regions of scenery—which is now a precious part of the national treasure—may be destroyed in the process of impounding water for power generation. So much prejudice can be created by these threats as greatly to delay that prompt action which is now more urgently needed than ever before.

We have no trustworthy data readily accessible as to the length of possible transmission of power, the estimated unavoidable loss and waste in transmission, or the cost of copper for wire compared with the cost of wages, trackage, cars, and motive power for the conveyance of coal by railways.

For dwellers on the Atlantic seaboard and in the northern part of the Mississippi Valley during the present winter, it is needless to dwell on the disadvantages of our present methods of dealing with coal, and wasting water power. Life, limbs, health, industrial productivity, and in some measure the effectiveness of the national effort for the war, have all been in varying degree sacrificed to deferred treatment of our native resources of heat and power yielding agencies.

While there are areas in which by reason of climate and location people have hitherto suffered little in any conscious way from these forms of waste, unconsciously they, like all the world have paid in the price of the goods they consume, accepting the rising cost of living as an incident of the war and inquiring no farther.

The whole people are, in fact, deeply interested whether they are awake to its immediate importance or not, in prompt action by the Government in this field.

In the absence of needed technical data there are certain obvious facts, which are not at present receiving the popular consideration necessary if any steps are to be taken towards minimizing in future years the dire experience of this winter. Some of these obvious facts follow:—

The present method of getting power by transporting coal, wastes life and limb of employees who move the trains.

While we have no adequate figures as to the losses, that they are serious is a matter of common knowledge. Accidents are notoriously numerous in breaking up and making up coal trains, and in the whole shifting process incidental thereto.

Loss of life and industrial injuries to employees in this service are not made public as collisions and all spectacular injuries to passengers in transit tend to become public through the daily press. But records of workmen's compensation commissions are enlightening to students.

Similar injuries to travelers are caused especially where single track roads are used by passenger, freight and coal trains. It is only on exceptional roads, such as the four track stretches from New York City to Buffalo and Philadelphia to Pittsburg, that this danger of collisions, because of the presence of slow and clumsy coal trains is wholly eliminated; and on the limited number of coal roads in the North Atlantic States, (chiefly Pennsylvania) which are, as their name implies, not in the general transportation business.

Our present method wastes time because quick trains are delayed by coal train wrecks. Every commercial traveler knows that this is a commonplace experience of American railway travel. At all times coal trains are proverbially the slowest. They reduce the number and the running time of other kinds of trains. Perishable freight, such as refrigerated meat, fruit and vegetables, is delayed and spoiled in transit by coal cars blocking the rails. This aspect of the waste of time has amounted to a national calamity during the past six months.

To symbolize the waste of beauty, and of the joy of living, incident to our present use of coal for power, it is only necessary to mention Pittsburg, Chicago and, in less vivid illustration, Cleveland in this country. Most convincing of all is the vision of London, England. On the other hand, abundant supplies of electric power would enable us to keep cities cooler in summer; to do away, for instance, with the numberless fires now used in July and August for generating power for elevators in the torrid days common in the cities of the Atlantic seaboard.

Waste of man power is vastly larger than appears at first glance, and second to it in importance, the waste of vehicles. It is only necessary to enumerate locomotive engineers and men who move coal trains; captains and crews of coal schooners; captains, engineers, stokers of tugs and barges in coastwise and lake transportation; chauffeurs of coal trucks, drivers of horse-drawn coal carts. To these must be added all the men who load and unload at the mine mouth, at the ship, at the coal yard, and finally at the place of delivery, besides engineers and furnacemen in the innumerable scattered plants where power is finally generated at the point of use.

Further wastes involved in carrying power coal to its place of use by cars instead of wire include tracks, cars, engines, boats, barges, tugs, trucks and carts. The last named two vehicles are a great nuisance in winter in snow-filled city streets in the Northern cities where chronic congestion of traf-

fic is aggravated by delays incident to unloading coal trucks and picking up fallen horses.

Real estate used as coal yards is wasted. If coal in cities were used for heating only and for eking out hydro-electric power, great areas of water front could be set free for better uses.

Because all the ramifications of waste cannot be abolished outright, parts of the country being beyond the reach both of transmission of power from the mine mouth and of hydro-electric power, the point is to reduce the waste to a minimum, leaving the tracks free so far as practicable for transporting heating coal, food and other essentials.

Millions of horse-power are at all times wasting undeveloped in our streams. At recurring intervals floods waste lives and interrupt food production, sometimes doing permanent injury to great agricultural areas. By engineering measures of prevention, control and water storage, our floods could in large measure be saved for power production. These are no longer unsolved problems or insuperable difficulties.

Without a unified federal plan there will, however, inevitably occur in the new field of power production the same chaos that we have suffered in the struggle of privately owned railroads against all development of our water ways. The monopolist sellers of coal power will have the same incentive for deliberately choking off the future development and use of water power. An exception to the general choking practice is the use of power from the Great Falls of the Missouri in Montana by the St. Paul railroad. The exception is, however, so unique as to prove the rule.

The Land Question in the Russian Revolution

By W. D.

The agrarian question is one of the most delicate and important questions of the Russian Revolution. As we shall see later, its solution involves not only the welfare and the destinies of the many millions of peasants in Russia, but also the destinies of the entire Russian Revolution. Therefore a clear understanding of the agrarian question in Russia is necessary to everyone who would understand the Russian Revolution or forecast its probable outcome.

The roots of the agrarian movement in Russia, in particular, and of the Russian agrarian question, in general, are to be found in the agrarian conditions prevailing up to the Revolution, among the peasants and the great landed proprietors. And in the study of these conditions, most importance must be attached to those prevailing in the fifty governments of *European* Russia, from which I exclude Poland and Finland. These fifty governments include two-thirds of the entire population of Russia; in them the power of the great noble landholders was greater than elsewhere, and in them there was a greater lack of the necessary lands for the peasants, and a greater poverty. Finland has its own special agrarian conditions, which are being decided independently, moreover, by the Finnish people. Poland likewise appears to give promise of an independent solution of the agrarian question, in certain fundamental respects not unlike the Russian. The Caucasus has a very distinct agrarian situation, requiring a peculiar regulation, but there also, because of the slight extent of the holdings of the noble landholders, the agrarian question is not so pressing as in the above-mentioned fifty governments. As for Siberia and the Central-Asiatic part of Russia, these huge domains have never played an important part in the agrarian movement, for the simple reason that their vast territories have been inhabited by a comparatively thin population of peasants, who either suffered little or not at all from lack of

land, or from exploitation by the agrarian nobility, there being none such in Siberia or in Central-Asiatic Russia, or at least only in spots.

In view of what has just been said, it is necessary, in a discussion of the Russian Agrarian Question, to consider principally, although not exclusively, the agrarian conditions in the above-indicated fifty governments.

In order to get an idea of these agricultural conditions, let us first turn to the quantitative distribution of landed property between the peasantry and the great landholders of these fifty governments, and consider the mutual economic dependence of these two groups of proprietors.

The chief development of peasant ownership until the most recent times was on the *apportioned lands* of the peasants, which were allotted to them from the *feudal estates, state lands and appanage lands** by the agricultural reform of 1861. These lands the peasants acquired *by purchase*, on payments to the feudal holders, to the state, or to the Department of Appanages. At the present time the peasants of these 50 governments, not including the Cossacks, hold 124,000,000 dessyatins** of apportioned land.

How many dessyatins are there to *one* peasant holding? This is a variable quantity and depends on numerous local conditions which were taken into consideration by the makers of the agrarian reform laws. The state's peasants got more than any others, the appanage peasants got holdings of medium size, the feudal peasants least of all. Thus, one group of peasant communities, with a total number of 3,000,000 farms, received an average of only 3 *dessyatins per farm*; another group of peasant farms, with more than 5,000,000 units, has an average of 7½ *dessyatins per farm*; and only the remaining 4,000,000 farms have not less than 10 *dessyatins per farm*.

* *Appanage lands*: the property of the Imperial House; from these came the incomes of the Grand Dukes, Dukes, and other members of the prolific Imperial Family.

** *Dessyatina*: a Russian land-measure equal to 2.702 English acres.

The data given above show that with the low stage of advancement of peasant agriculture in Russia the great majority of the peasant holdings in 50 governments had not land enough to support the occupants. The insufficiency will be more evident if we consider the area of land *per single inhabitant* of peasant population. This area per individual, after the Reform of 1861, has been *going down* steadily, since the peasant population has been rising, while the area of the apportioned land has remained constant. Owing to this fact, while the area of apportioned land per peasant inhabitant, immediately after the Reform of 1861, was 2¾ *dessyatins*; in 1905, still more than 1½ *dessyatins*; it had gone down in 1915 to about 1-1/3 *dessyatins per individual*; for the peasant population of European Russia had more than doubled since 1861.

In view of these statistical data, there can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Russian peasantry do not have enough land to raise enough to feed their families and pay their taxes. Under *more intensive* cultivation, these parcels would of course yield more satisfactory results. For instance, the small peasantry of France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, have, on the average, *less land*, than in Russia, but owing to the very much more advanced methods of agriculture, they obtain a much higher yield from their holdings, than do the Russian peasants. For decades the latter lived in half-starvation on pieces of land that would have enabled the peasants of economically more advanced countries to lead a comfortable existence. Viewed in the light of this fact, there is nothing improbable or exceptional in the statistics of A. N. Maress, which show that 7/10 of the entire peasant population of Russia could not feed themselves on the product of their lands, 2/10 could feed themselves, but not their cattle, and only 1/10 could feed both themselves and their cattle from their own apportioned lands.

This unquestionable land-poverty forced the Russian peasants to *add by purchase additional* land to their allotted portions, buying the same from the feudal holders, the state, or the Department of Appanages. For these purchases, the peasants received financial assistance from the State Agricultural Bank, founded by

the Czar's Government in 1882, with the object of aiding the peasants in the acquisition of land, and thus to avoid the impending agrarian revolution. Up to 1917 the peasants had in this manner purchased about 32,000,000 rubles worth of land, chiefly from feudal holders.

But these additional purchases were no protection to the peasant masses from land-poverty. As a rule only the wealthier peasants could afford to make such purchases, as they had implements and some cash. These better-situated peasants, who purchased lands in this way, frequently developed into real exploiting farmers, who forced the poorer peasants into a mortgaged state and frequently took possession of their lands for debt.

The purchased land, above all, turned many peasants and whole peasant communities into debtors of the Agricultural Bank, of the landed proprietors and usurers. Like leeches, the landed proprietors and usurers sucked the sweat and the blood out of the Russian peasantry, selling their implements for debt, ruining their establishments, and gradually reducing them to the position of a country proletariat.

The picture of the exploitation to which the peasant was subjected by the purchase of land from the big holders is rendered complete when we point out that the land thus purchased meant the payment to the big holders, by the peasants, of more than 2,000,000 rubles (about \$1,000,000). And we add that this sum does not include moneys paid by the peasants for apportioned lands, for which, in the course of 40 years, after the Reform of 1861, they paid the big holders not less than 1,000,000,000 rubles (\$500,000,000).

But this by no means terminates the enrichment of the nobles, at the cost of the peasants.

The latter were forced by their land-poverty to *rent* considerable parcels from the feudal holders, particularly meadow and pasture land, of which in many places the peasants had very little, and the feudal holders very much (not less than 9,000,000

dessyatins in 1905). Last year the area of land thus rented out was more than 11,000,000 dessyatins.

This land rent forced the peasant into a position of absolute dependence on the noble holders. The peasants, always poor in moneys, in most cases paid their rent in the form of *work*, by doing, together with their working cattle, the farm-labor of the feudal holders from whom they rented their land. The rate paid for this work on the part of peasant and cattle was fixed at a low figure, much to his detriment, and, owing to his work on the landlord's land, he often had not the time to till his own fields and raise his crop on them. As a consequence, many peasant farms deteriorated; thus this renting system improved the position, not of the poor, but of the richer peasants, who could afford to pay rent in money.

Another instrument in the hands of the feudal landlord for exploiting the Russian peasant was his *forest-land*, of which the landlords held about 20,000,000 dessyatins in 1905.* The majority of the peasants, having no forests of their own, were continually obliged to purchase building materials and fuel from the noble landlords, at a high price, since in many densely settled governments, with a numerous peasant population, there are no government forests, most of them being situated in the remote governments of the north and east. From the sale of forest-lumber alone the Russian nobles in 1905 made nearly 200,000,000 rubles, and the greater portion of this sum came, of course, from the peasants.

All the above sources of income for the Russian nobility, from the Russian peasants, are really moneys earned with the bloody sweat of the peasants and drenched with peasant tears. In the course of more than half a century which has elapsed since the liberation of the Russian peasants in 1861, from serfdom, the Russian nobility have drawn from them their lifeblood, have plunged them into poverty, in order that the nobility might be

* We use the 1905 data, because the most complete material thus far gathered on this subject in Russia is of that date.

enabled to lead the wasteful, brilliant, empty life of a landed aristocracy.

This the Russian nobility was able to do because it had altogether too much land, while the peasant mass suffered from land poverty. The agrarian statistics of 1905 show a total of 53,000,000 dessyatins of land belonging to the nobility, in European-Russia, distributed among 107,000 noble landholders. At the same epoch, 124,000,000 dessyatins of peasant *apportioned* land was, as we have previously pointed out in this article, held by 12,000,000 proprietors in the form of peasant farms. Thus, every holder of feudal lands had, on an average, 459½ dessyatins, and each peasant farmholder only 10 dessyatins. These figures show all too clearly the outrageous inequality in the distribution of land between these two classes of land owners.

And the great feudal landholders also had, within their class, a special landed aristocracy, who controlled vast properties. In 1905 there were in Russia 527 nobles of whom each held more than 10,000 dessyatins of land! Of these, Prince V. Vassilchikov had 49,500 dessyatins; Count A. Sheremetyeff, 126,250; a noble, J. P. Balashov, 300,500; N. P. Balashov, 387,250; Prince Galitzin, 1,067,300 dessyatins. And, by the side of these gigantic land holdings, most of which lay barren, millions of Russian peasants were damned to a half-starved existence for *lack of land!*

At the time of the Russian Revolution in March, 1917, the total area of the noble landlords had of course been going down, as the nobles, after 1905, were obliged each year to sell land to the peasants, fearing, as they did, the impending agrarian revolution, which threatened to take away all their land. Yet the total of the land sold in this period (1905-1917) did not exceed some 9,000,000 dessyatins (unfortunately, precise data are not obtainable). Therefore the inequality in the distribution of land, which has been previously described, was not lessened in any serious proportion before the beginning of the Revolution of 1917.

All the relations, above described, between the Russian peasantry and the Russian nobility, together with the resulting desire

of the peasants to wipe out the great system of landholding agriculture, were the motive forces of the Russian agrarian movement. The latter aimed at increasing the holdings of the peasants at the expense of the nobles, and to free them from the debts with which their lands were burdened.

It should be noted that the *Cossack* conditions are different from those of the Russian peasantry as a whole, for the Cossacks are economically much better situated than the rest of the peasantry. The Cossacks have never been under the oppression of the great landed gentry, and have had much more land. The 340,000 Cossack parcels had an area of 14,670,000 dessyatins of apportioned land, or an average of 43 dessyatins to each Cossack farm. On this account the Cossacks were more conservative than the rest of the peasantry, and, in the present Revolution, assumed a much more moderate position than the latter. Fearing lest the Revolution might diminish their holdings also, they became opponents of the plan to abolish private ownership of land, and of the "levelling down" division of the great estates, which is the hope of the great majority of the Russian peasantry. However, the attitude of the Cossacks, which is due to their relative numerical weakness, has little significance in the general agrarian movement of Russia.

Leaving out the Cossacks, the conditions of the many millions of peasants in Russia cannot conceivably be bettered without lessening their land-poverty, and this could be done only at the expense of the great landholders. But the total amount of land that can be applied to increase the peasants' holdings included not only the noble estates, but also other great areas under other forms of agricultural administration, which are also suitable for peasant cultivation. These lands are chiefly state lands, cabinet lands,* appanage lands, church and monastery lands. These forms of great proprietorship also cover a great portion of Russia's area.

* **Cabinet lands** are the former private property of the Russian Czars, consequently, of Nicholas Romanov.

The *state lands* or government lands of the 50 governments of European Russia alone, are 138,000,000 dessyatins in area; the *cabinet lands* in all of Russia, 68,000,000; the *appanage lands* about 8,000,000; *church lands* about 2,000,000; the *monastery lands* over 700,000 dessyatins. But about nine tenths of the state lands are situated in five northeastern and northern governments, not in agricultural regions, which are most in need of the addition of such lands. The cabinet lands, embracing many fruitful areas, include two great districts of Siberia, the districts of Altai and Nerchensk, again, however, too far removed from the centres of the peasant land-poverty. Above all, these two forms of land holdings, together with the appanage lands, contain immense forests, not suitable for immediate cultivation. The church and monastery holdings are almost all suitable for cultivation, but many of them are already under peasant working.

For the reasons above indicated, out of all the countless land riches of Russia at this time, only about 10,000,000 dessyatins may be utilized for the immediate enlarging of the peasant-cultivated land. But these lands, when the forests have been cleared and more intensive agricultural methods have been introduced into Russia, will mean, for the Russia of the future, a great reserve of agricultural wealth, which will support millions of peasants, simply by *settling them* in the remoter sections of the country.

For the present, to secure the absolutely imperative reduction of the land-poverty of the peasants, the chief source of supply for distribution is the noble estates: the other forms of great private ownership of land may be of assistance only in a supplementary sense. Not counting the forests, the noble estates in the fifty governments of European Russia hold not less than 25,000,000 dessyatins of land suitable for peasant cultivation. And once the forests of the nobles are subject to use by the people, the "forest-poverty" of the peasants will be at an end.

From the above the reader doubtless draws the inference that the principal tasks confronting the Russian Revolution in agricultural matters, in order to increase the wellbeing of the peasants and free them from economic exploitation by the landed

estates, particularly those of the nobles, were the following: The abolishment of all obligations burdening the purchased and rented lands of the peasants, the seizing of all noble, cabinet, appanage, church and monastery lands as the property of the people; the increase of the peasant parcels at the expense of the other forms of property, above mentioned, together with the state lands, wherever there may be land-poverty; and chiefly, the creation of such forms of land ownership as may release the peasant proprietors from further exploitation by the medium of land.

These tasks, in turn, are by no means hostile to the economic position of the Russian proletariat. The land-poverty and the pauperism of the peasants have always been causes for the low wages of the city and country workers. The small peasant-semi-proletarians, who had no means of purchasing or renting additional lands, were obliged, in order to live, to seek additional wages as hired laborers on the great estates or in the cities. Having been used to a low standard of living, and yet feeling that they had a material aid in their own land holdings, they were ready, as workers, to work for low wages. In this way they squeezed down the wages of the *landless* peasants also, pure proletarians, who were employed in agricultural labor and in the cities. Consequently, as long as the great mass of Russian petty peasant proprietors is unable, for lack of land, to live on its own holdings, the labor wages of the country and city proletariat of Russia will not be maintained at a sufficient figure.

In short, in the interest of democracy as a whole, the following democratic problem confronts the Russian Revolution, as far as the agrarian side is concerned: to bring about the agrarian transformation in such a manner as shall not hamper the economic development of the country and shall serve to strengthen permanently the democratic system of government.

The means of realizing the above, as well as the other problems indicated, may be seen in an analysis of the agrarian program and the agrarian policy of the Russian revolutionary organizations on whom the solution of the agrarian question has devolved. Principally this means the Social-Democrats and the Social-Revolutionaries, for from the standpoint of party lines, it is these two

political parties that constitute the present political strength of the Russian Revolution. The demands of their agrarian programs, in part or in whole, are contained in the decisions of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, the Soviets of Peasants' Delegates, in the agrarian policy of the Provisional Government up to the Bolshevik coup d'état in November (very fragmentary and undecided, however), and furthermore, in the decisions of the Bolshevik Government and of the prorogued Constituent Assembly.

It follows that the agrarian programs of the other Russian parties have no great practical importance in the solution of the agrarian question in Russia. The agrarian demands of the other Socialist groups were all more or less similar to those of the program of the Social-Revolutionaries; this is particularly true of the laborite group and the Populist-Socialists, which are now losing their significance. The more influential *Liberal Party*, the Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets, whose political influence had gone down enormously, demanded in their program the seizure of cabinet, appanage, church, monastery, and noble estates,—the latter *by purchase*, however—for the purpose of enlarging the parcels of the peasants. What this purchase would have amounted to, the Cadets themselves pointed out. According to the estimate made by them in the First National Duma, 70 per cent. of the immense purchase money, or 2,900,000,000 rubles (about \$1,450,000,000) would go to reimburse 9573 nobles. The Russian Revolution has as yet taken no steps to destroy in this way the exhausted finances of the people for the benefit of the nobles, and is not likely to take them.

Let me now turn to the agrarian program of the Social-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democracy.

The fundamental demands of the agrarian program of the Social-Revolutionaries, already declared in 1908 and repeated in 1917, are these:

"The socialization of all privately owned lands, that is, the taking of them out of the private ownership of persons into the public ownership and their management by democratically organ-

ized leagues of communities, with the purpose of an equitable utilization."

In this program nothing is said of the method of *taking away* the privately-owned land and its turning over into public management: is it purchase or confiscation? In practice, the Social-Revolutionaries, in their decisions in 1917, have set themselves down as in favor of seizure without compensation. The All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies, which was under the ideological guidance of the Social-Revolutionaries, in their famous declaration of May 25, 1917, on the agrarian question, came out for a passing of the land into public ownership by the people, *without any payment*.

We must point out a tendency among the Social-Revolutionaries to "socialize" even the peasant lands, and a desire to do away with all wage labor in the country, in the hopes of thus eliminating the class struggle among the peasantry.

The agrarian program of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, approved in 1906, contains the following demands:

1. The abolishing of all class restrictions as to the persons and the property of the peasants.
2. The abolishing of all imposts and services connected with the class restrictions of the peasants, and the cessation of all obligations or debts having the character of mortgages.
3. Confiscation of church, monastery, appanage, cabinet, and private estate lands, except small holdings, and turning them over, together with the state lands, to the great organs of local administration, which have been democratically elected. Land, however, which is necessary as a basis for future colonization, together with the forests and bodies of water, which are of national importance, are to pass into the control of the democratic state.
4. Wherever conditions are unfavorable for this transformation, the party declares itself in favor of a division among the peasants of such of the private estates as already have the petty farming conditions, or which may be necessary to round out a reasonable holding.

Such was the general program of the Russian Social-Democracy up to the Revolution, although the left wing, with a Bolshevik tendency, and with Lenin at its head, promulgated in principle the complete nationalization of all privately-owned land, even that of small peasant owners, granting, however, the division of the land, if the peasantry should demand it.

Essentially, the general party program stood for three agrarian principles: nationalization, municipalization, and division of the land among the peasants. What is the value of each of these methods of regulating the land question in Russia?

Under nationalization or municipalization, the occupant of the land has merely the use of it, but no property rights. Land rent, if it is to be paid at all, is to go not to the private owners (for there will not be any such), but to the government or the local administrations; the people itself, through its chosen representatives, determining the sum to be paid in rent. The nationalization and municipalization of the land will thus terminate the exploitation of the peasants by the great landed proprietors. It is clear, therefore, that the Socialists of Russia have every reason for taking over, as far as possible, all the great landed properties, and thus removing them from the hands of private owners.

After a consideration of the advantages of each of these forms of public ownership of land, one section of the Russian Social Democracy, the Mensheviks, have given the preference to municipalization. In their opinion, unlimited nationalization of all the land will give too great a power to the central government and may serve as a dangerous support to a possibly successful counter-revolution. But if the land is the property of the organs of the local administrations, it may become, in their hands, a powerful weapon with which to resist a counter-revolutionary government which may have succeeded in gaining possession of the state powers.

These objections to nationalization are not without foundation. But as Russia, in a final regulation of the agricultural question, can hardly dispense with a nationalization of land on a large scale, there are necessary two elements, to avoid the evils of such a

procedure: in the first place, the taking over of the land by the state must be accomplished simultaneously, at the same time permanently strengthening the political power of revolutionary democracy, as only this condition can serve as a guarantee against the success of counter-revolution; in the second place, the Socialists should not use undue haste in finally confiscating the lands, particularly that of the nobles, but should first rather give them to the local revolutionary peasant organs. And this latter policy is the one that has been actually carried out.

A serious hindrance to the nationalization of all the land is the unusually varied racial character of Russia. Such pronounced nationalities as the Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Caucasians, and others, require broad autonomy, even political independence, particularly the Finns and the Ukrainians. In view of the nationalistic tendencies prevailing in Russia, its most probable political system will be that of a *federative republic*, consisting of many more or less independent republics, bound together by certain general national obligations. These autonomous regions will hardly consent to a passing of all the land into the hands of the central government of the whole united country. They will soon demand as their property such lands as are necessary to satisfy local needs, particularly those needed for agricultural purposes.

But as the greater part of the huge area of national, cabinet, and appanage lands is situated in the non-agricultural, poorly-settled districts, and may serve only as a reserve for future settlements, since they include the northern forests, necessary for the breaking of the cold climate, a general Russian nationalization of these lands is in any case desirable and will probably be carried out.

It must be pointed out that it would be an error on the part of the Russian socialists to *insist* on the nationalization of the present *apportioned* land, unless the peasantry themselves demand it. Whenever the Russian peasants, hitherto, have spoken of a transfer of the land into the possession of the entire people, they have referred to the great estates. They are not so completely "social-

istic" as to renounce their own private property in land. A forcible nationalization of their lands might even deprive the Revolution of their support.

Nor would it be correct, on the part of the Social-Revolutionaries, to consider the transfer of private property in land to public ownership, which is advocated by them, as a *socialization*. In the capitalist system, during which they outlined their agricultural transformations, it is impossible to have a socialization, a complete economic equality of agrarian conditions. It would be conceivable in Russia at this time, only in case the present revolution succeeds in accomplishing a complete socialistic reconstruction of Russia. And its success in this is at present doubtful.

The hope of the Social-Revolutionaries to do away with wage labor and the class struggle in the country, without a complete Socialist system in the cities, as well as in the country, which would eliminate all classes and all class struggle altogether—is utopian. The program of the Social Democracy is, in this connection, free from such utopias; it states clearly that the party considers it its task to organize the village proletariat in independent class bodies, the elucidation to them of the opposition of interest between them and the peasant proprietors, and guiding them to a complete socialistic upheaval, which will abolish all exploitation and poverty.

What should be our position with regard to the *division* of the great country estates that is announced by the Russian Social Democracy?

From the socialist-democratic standpoint, the large-scale administration of agriculture is preferable to one on a small scale, and therefore a division of the estates of the nobles will *temporarily* be a setback for agrarian production. But this applies only to about 7,000,000 dessyatins of noble estates, whose own proprietors have introduced cultivation on a large scale. The remaining suitable noble lands either have not been cultivated at all, or they have been rented, and their allotment to the share of the peasants could only serve to increase the total of agricultural products. However, the Russian Revolution has no reason to

spare the larger scale model farms of the nobles from confiscation. Their confiscation and division, as well as that of the other noble lands, would be a final blow to the economic, and simultaneously, the political power of the Russian nobility, and this is one of the tasks of the Russian Revolution, for the nobility was the pillar of the whole Tsarist régime and of all reaction. A democratic republic is impossible so long as any remnants of a nobility still exist.

Consequently, if the peasants do not agree to a nationalization or municipalization of the land of the great estates, but insist on its division, the Russian Social Democracy has every reason to support (and has already supported) this demand, in order to bring the peasants to the side of the Revolution and to clear the way for the complete rule of democracy.

To what extent the division of the land will be undertaken in Russia is difficult to prognosticate. Most likely, it will be chiefly resorted to in the regions of peasant land-poverty, and will not apply to the remote lands of the state, the appanages, and the cabinet.

After analyzing the agrarian demands of the Social Democracy and the Social-Revolutionaries it becomes clear, that in spite of their differences, they have many principles in common, thus indicating that *these* demands cannot be (and in fact, have not been) the basis of the existing serious schism between the Socialist parties of Russia. Their common principles are these: confiscation of the great landed estates in the interests of the people, their transfer to public ownership in some form or other, and the enlarging of the parcels of the peasants. These common principles serve as a guarantee that the Social Democracy and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, differing between them in theory, and, in some particulars, on the agrarian question, may nevertheless to a serious degree *together* solve the *fundamental* tasks of the agrarian revolution, i. e., the confiscation of cabinet, appanage, noble, church and monastery lands, and their transfer to the control of the people. And the possibility of such common aspirations of the two great tendencies of Russian Socialism

will assure the success of a complete and thoroughgoing Revolution.

Let us now take up the question: What changes in the agricultural conditions of Russia have already been carried out by the Russian Revolution, and what changes are still to be wrought?

The provisional governments in the course of 1917, up to the November *coup d'état* of the Bolsheviks, issued a number of decrees on the agrarian question. *Land committees* were established, for the whole country as well as in the localities, for the working out of the agrarian reform as well as for provisional regulation of local land conditions. The Kerensky Government resolved to hand over to the administration of these committees certain lands of private owners, which were of value agriculturally. In practice this led to the land committees' beginning to assign noble lands to peasant occupation, themselves determining the rental sum. The provisional government likewise stopped all purchase, sale and mortgage on land, recognizing the validity only of the land deeds that had been executed before the 1st of March, i. e., before the Revolution. By this means the desire of the nobles to sell out as fast as they could, for cash, was frustrated; for they were doomed by the Revolution to lose all their lands to the peasants, without compensation.

Furthermore, the Provisional Government declared all cabinet and appanage lands to be national property. But they hesitated to declare the transfer of noble lands also to the ownership of the people, continually postponing this radical agrarian transformation for the Constituent Assembly.

But, after the November *coup d'état*, the Bolshevik government immediately resolved that all the great, privately-owned lands should go to the land committees. Thus was accomplished the first revolutionary act of confiscation of great private estates for the benefit of the people. This ordinance was issued in accordance with the decisions of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Delegates, at the end of October, and the November decisions of the General Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the General Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies.

It is already clear from these facts how untrue is the interpretation of the November Land Decree in many American capitalist newspapers. They considered it simply as an anarchistic *attentat* of the Bolsheviks alone. As a matter of fact, this decree was the result of the aspirations of the Russian proletariat and of the most revolutionary section of the peasantry, as it was *their* Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, which in turn set the pace for the activity of the Petrograd revolutionary government.

The short-lived Constituent Assembly in January, in its turn, succeeded before its dissolution in passing a motion for the transfer of the great country estates into the hands of the peasants. It can hardly be doubted that the peasants were already enforcing this measure when they elected their representatives to the Constituent Assembly.

The all-powerful All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in its new resolution on the land question, passed late in January, merely confirmed the previously described measures of the Petrograd Government of Workers' Commissaries and of the Constituent Assembly, thus simply giving a final stimulus to the peasants to complete the liquidation of the property of the nobility.

In this manner the *essentials* of the agrarian question have already been solved by the Russian Revolution. The cabinet, appanage, nobles' lands, and possibly, those of the churches and monasteries, have already been taken by the people. Of course this does not mean a final regulation of the new form of land property in Russia. Much time will still be needed before all the confiscated lands, including those of the state, can be distributed, according to the requirements, and before they finally pass into the possession of the government as a whole, or of the local autonomous powers or of the petty peasant owners.

But there can hardly be further doubt that as early as the spring of this year, millions of Russian peasants will already be ploughing and sowing the lands that have been handed over to them from the great estates, particularly those of the nobles, and will

also use the nobles' forests and pastures, and mow the nobles' meadows. But together with this enormous expansion of the peasant farm area for cultivation, there will loom up before the Russian revolutionary democracy the question of increasing the *productivity* of peasant agricultural labor. For this purpose the Russian peasants need numerous new schools, to give instruction; they need agricultural machinery, artificial fertilizer, and other aids in cultivation, to increase the productiveness of the peasants' labor. Without all this, the Russian agrarian revolution, by destroying the more productive of the private *large-scale* establishments, will have placed the peasants in a position of economic stagnation.

The establishment of new schools and the providing for the peasants of all the agricultural aids for intensive farm management, will require an enormous amount of financial capital. For securing the latter the government must make use of the great treasures of the monasteries and churches, which have supplies of gold, of precious stones, costly utensils, and other valuable objects. By the confiscation of these riches for public ownership, the necessary sums will be obtained for increasing the productivity of the reborn agricultural system. Only by such determined measures, together with the increase of the peasant lands, can the Russian Republic reduce the poverty of the peasants and enjoy their continued support against the efforts of counter-revolution.

The great Russian agrarian revolution, if thus brought about, will destroy for ever the economic and political power of the Russian nobility, will increase the economic wellbeing of the peasant owners and the proletariat, and lay the foundations for a more rapid economic development of the Russian countryside, thus clearing the way for a complete socialistic reconstruction of Russia, even if the present Russian Revolution should not succeed in immediately bringing about the socialization of all the means of production and distribution.

Forming a War Psychosis

By DR. JOHN J. KALLEN

Not since the French Revolution has the social psychologist had such rich material to draw on in the formulation of laws governing the working of what has been called the "Social Mind" as the World War is hourly creating. If there is any such thing as a "disinterested science of society" it is decidedly more advantageously equipped today to demonstrate the true psychic forces utilized as means of social control. Not only is the science of psychology itself further advanced. Socialism is here with a scientific basis to develop the negative aspect of social psychology. Non-Socialist thinkers from the Revolution on developed the socially constructive psychic laws and, either from unconscious class bias or what not, left to the Socialist the study of the negative and destructive psychic forces utilized by the Parasite in his own interest.

There are two aspects to the social life process—mental or psychic, and material, including the economic. Both must be considered. Otherwise Socialists, as I have shown (Call, Oct. 21, 1917, "Socialists on War—A Paradox"), harbor a gross contradiction in the theory and practice of the movement. Was the war inevitable? Yes, we say, economic development made it so. If inevitable, then why did we attempt to stave it off? Evidently we thought it was not inevitable, like the coming of night, else we would not, save for effect, have undertaken the task of preventing it. Economic development alone could not bring on the war. It was inevitable with economic development *plus* the consent of the masses, *plus* a certain psychologic attitude which, if it can be moulded by the Parasite for war makes the last inevitable and which, if Socialism could have succeeded in making it "class-conscious," would not have been inevitable, in spite of economic development.

Hence the exploitation of psychic forces by the parasite to confirm him in his economic "rights." Between the capitalists as a class and the Socialists as a class-conscious group there

rages what the brilliant Tarde would call a "logical duel" for the possession of that psychic confirmation or lack of it. With this the war would have been either inevitable or not inevitable, according as the Parasite figured on the consent of the masses to fight for him.

Obviously any discussion on the modus operandi of capturing "public opinion" should begin with a statement of the psychic elements of the individual that can be called on to induce him to carry on a war as the present, or to make him refuse to enter into it as the Socialists have tried to make him do.

In an article of this length justice cannot be done to the subject except in a very general way. Yet we can gain some insight into the problems that have arisen within the international movement, for the so-called "failure" and breakdown of the movement; we can find how it is that the Parasite has succeeded in creating a war psychosis; what innovations have come into being recently in the line of psychic phenomena of warfare, and to what extent Parasites can succeed; these and many problems can be rationally explained by an investigation of the most general laws governing human action, based as these are on the existence of the three general aspects of the mental process.

These are the Instincts, the Feelings, the Intellect. How these have functioned psychological sociology has quite well investigated. Tarde, Le Bon, Durkheim, Ratzenhoffer, Ross, Giddings, etc., are some of the illustrious who rescued sociology from the biologic schools based on analogy. Yet they suffer from the non-recognition of the perversions of these categories in the hands of the Parasite. True, social life is not rational. But is there any other reason for this than the ones advanced by the sociologists? Fundamentally society rests on psychic bases, true. Instinct of gregariousness has clustered primitive men together, not reason; the sex and parental instinct held together man and woman and their offspring; the instinct of acquisition and construction has prompted men to create and achieve; the instinct of pugnacity prompted them to defend their creations and their group; those and other instincts did operate to create the synthetic product, society.

But the "crown and head of creation" has an intellect. It *can* function socially. Essentially reason cannot harbor contradictions. In a mathematical or geometric problem reason is at its best. In these domains its non-contradictory nature is manifest. In social life it would operate as well—but. Parasitism has a selective action as to the basis on which he would desire society to be built. He exercises a selective action as to the implements he uses to create "public opinion."

Reason stands convicted and condemned by the Parasite as a means to induce the masses to fight. Ask a rational question on the meaning of "Democracy" or "Kultur" or "no annexations and no indemnities *except* reparation!" As William Graham Sumner said, it would ruin a doctrine to define it. And to define it opens it to analysis, criticism, rational treatment. Reasoning to be sure, does exist which is a species of "reason." But the method and spirit of Reason, the inquisitive attitude of mind, the contradiction-perceiving attribute of intellect is avoided by the Parasite. Were space at our disposal a thousand and one incidents of the World War would be culled to illustrate the principle. Consistency in a "democracy" at war against "autocracy" is as rare as pigeon's milk, and as impossible.

Yet Reason is always there as a foe to parasitic action. It will out at times in revolution and uprising. But in the main it can be controlled by its controller. The wish is father to the thought. Control the Feeling and you control the higher centres. What applies to Feelings also holds for the Instincts. Reason is suppressed, any attempt to analyze aims and motives is sat upon by "thought controller" or mailed fist. This is the course taken in all parasitic wars. Instinct and Feeling are appealed to and these force action, spite of Reason.

But apologetic psychology today masks the true facts. Prof. Dewey not long ago in the "New Republic" claimed that the American people have a "novel psychosis" in which all the older methods of stimulation to war are discarded. He claims that the Zeppelin that a newspaper man prayed for to boost up recruiting, and such-like old fogie methods do not apply to America with

its "novel psychosis." Prof. Small in the September "Journal of Sociology" arrives at the same conclusion that the methods and aims of America in the World War are not selfish. Did not Wilson himself urge the people to fight without malice?

Yet if the learned gentlemen but read the press, the ways and means of creating a war psychosis would be found to be pretty much the old reliable ways of appealing to the Instincts and Sentiments with a suppression of Reason and the questioning spirit. Most powerful is the instinct so-called of self-preservation appealed to, the most ancient method of arousing action. Parasitism has raised in America the idea that the safety of America has been threatened. A few illustrations are in order.

Said Wilson in his speech to congress:

"Their (the Germans') sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to *take our very territory away from us* and disrupt the union."

Congressman Caldwell in the "Times" of December 9th, says of the war:

"It will set back the development of Europe a century, but out of it will come progress and *America will remain free . . . liberty is cheap at any price.*"

Secretary McAdoo in the "Bankers' Magazine" of November, 1917, says, in an article conspicuous for its absence of the usual bombast about "Democracy," that Germany's threat to our commerce through U-boats would

"prevent America from selling her surplus products of the farm, the factory, and the mine to other nations of the world," and, this "would result in *suffering and want would stalk the land*" with injury to every man, woman and child in America."

Senator Reed warns:

"The German war engine will beat with such terrific power against our remaining allies that we will find it necessary to *have an army upon the coasts of North America.*"

Roosevelt:

"We did not go to war to make democracy safe, we did go to war because *we had a special grievance.*"

So that there is nothing "novel" about the war psychosis of the Americans. As to France, she was invaded, likewise Belgium, where the self-preservation is evident. By what has been called Prestige Suggestion, the foremost men in America have hypnotized the masses into believing America was threatened, its very existence, at that. This appealed to several instincts and sentiments, some of them the most powerful. Masses over the face of the globe have had instilled in them the Illusion of Ownership, I have called it, under which they react as though not only the language and culture were the common heritage of the whole people, but the very land which here 2 per cent. of the people own to the extent of 50 per cent. This acquisition of theirs being threatened, the response was fairly good. The Church, the Press, the School, uniting in the suggestions as to the threat to the institutions in America, of the very lives of its peoples, created a relatively homogeneous mass.

Following the law of self-interest even those opposed to the war eventually fall in line. How is that? By such a thing as conscription. Force alone never could sustain the Parasite. And yet by the use of coercion judiciously applied he accomplishes two things. He can fill his army and he can unite the people whose offspring fight. There is no wonder that the Germans back up the military on this ground. No one, no matter how radical, can suppress the wish that in a fight the "other fellow" will stop a bullet instead of his son or relative. Thus is secured harmony among the elements that if permitted free reign would seriously menace the conduct of war. Attention is focalized on nothing but the war. This excludes reforms, as in Germany or England or America. The most ultraradical will admit, once they are affected, that if we must have militarism let us have one in which the soldiers are well fed, well protected against disease, etc. This gives him things to think about. In Germany he thinks of nothing, nothing else. And little wonder.

"Baby-killing" Zeppelins again arouse "moral indignation"

which the most skeptical cannot but yield to. Sinking of hospital ships, etc., effectively put the brakes on rational interference with action. Some of the most famous Socialists, with full knowledge of Parasitic control and action, have succumbed. Feeling so overpowers as to urge action. Prof. Dewey's unfounded assertion as to the Zeppelin-method of arousing American war sentiments needs scarcely any refutation. No less a man than Taft said in a recent number of "Leslies":

"We haven't patriotism in our souls, and we won't get it until those that are dear to us are killed or wounded."

And this will do more towards quieting the "pacifist" than "thought control," etc. A recent newspaper report has it that a number of boys enlisted to "avenge" the death of their friend, to one of them, relative, who went down with the first American ship to be sunk. Nothing "novel" about this psychosis, created by arousing an instinct or feeling.

In condemning the Socialists abroad these facts should be borne in mind. Masses are very suggestible. Their instincts and feelings appealed to in the proper ways, they will respond very easily. Not only that but the very ones whom they previously fought as Parasites they bend the knee to. The dog in slinking before his master, tail down, between his legs, acts under the stimulus of what McDougal calls the instinct of self-abasement which is useful in the struggle for existence, as it mollifies the threatening person or animal. This instinct is very easily aroused in humans. Especially so in dangerous times. When in the middle of the night we hear the cry, "fire," it is better to heed the warning and follow the crier, than to wait and investigate. In a panic or in war or in revolution Le Bon correctly notes the most insignificant persons become leaders at times and are followed. The reason precisely is the one here offered—in danger even the tyrant and the onetime hated "militarist" elicits the instinct of submission that makes for solidarity. The masses do not stop to question, but follow.

Masses thus are ruled by appeals to instincts and feelings which today are exploited in every possible way. But how can

we account for the failure of internationalistic movements to prevent or stop the war?

Socialists as well played with the psychology of the masses. In their appeal were ethical, material and egoistical elements. The workers have to pay the price of the war in blood and suffering. This is a serious deterrent involving the fundamental emotion of fear, self-preservation, resentment, etc. Then, too, Socialists claimed that the wives and children would be in want, involving the parental instinct and the sentiment of pity. They pointed out the Illusion of Ownership, whereby Parasites have made masses believe that they "own" their country as much as they "own" the culture and religion of a nation. They saw the Illusion of Solidarity through which Parasites argued for a common interest of capitalist and worker. Seeing that all have a common interest in the preservation of the national culture, seeing that some of the royal blood has been spilt in the war, the workers have come to hold the Illusion of Solidarity involving a solidarity on economic grounds. Then, too, ethical elements were involved. There was Christianity, etc.

Between these forces, those of Parasitism and those of Socialism, raged, we said, a logical duel. What factors of a psychologic nature determined victory temporarily for the Parasite? A number.

First, in favor of the capitalists were a number of things. While Reason is controlled by Feeling, Feeling in turn is controlled by the material conditions of existence. The Illusion of Ownership was there, already implanted for centuries. The masses felt a material interest in the war, affecting either acquisition of new territory or preservation of their own. Capitalism, hence, in the face of the Socialist onslaught, was on the defensive.

Le Bon formulated the law that the methods of arousing crowds to activity consisted in Affirmation, Repetition, Contagion which were backed up by Prestige of persons and institutions. But not only that, between two contending movements success depends on the *amount* and *force* of Affirmation, etc.

Then, too, the *method* of appeal—whether to Feelings or Reason, is a deciding factor.

Socialism did not have the power of bringing before the masses its principles in the first place. Their Affirmations and Repetitions of their principles were very weak. On the other hand Parasitism had unlimited means—cartoon, picture, handbill, in magazine, subway, in bazaar, in concert, in school, in church, the idea was repeated and affirmed again and again that the country was threatened. Thousands of times the instincts were appealed to by the killings by the Boches—but not by the allies. Scrupulously keeping out all adverse stimuli, the volume of repetitions of the idea in the minds of the Parasite powerfully affected the suggestible mass. Socialism had neither a powerful press nor prestige. Its intellectuals are unknown to untold millions. In sheer amount of affirmation and repetition of the Socialist idea the fight between it and the parasite idea was not a “duel” which is fought by equal weapons, but a massacre.

But the very nature of the Socialist appeal made it difficult to reach men’s minds. Fundamentally it involves the instincts as do the parasitic appeals—the instincts of self-preservation from parasitism, etc. Yet before one could perceive the illusory nature of time honored ideas, before one could grasp the fact of antagonism of economic interest between classes, one would have to break with custom, reason through facts that confirmed the Illusion of Solidarity and the Illusion of Ownership. This means a considerable amount of ratiocination, foreign to crowds and crowd units.

The crowd, it has been shown, reasons by false analogy. The slightest resemblance camouflages, masks the differences. This the Parasite exploits. Is there not a common possession of language, heredity, etc., between capitalist and worker, ergo, on all matters there is common interest. Is the strip of land in Africa not “his” even though a trust own it and even though the worker cannot go for a rest there or to cure a tubercular lung? In the present war have not the Germans come across the sea in a submarine? Is it impossible that they come over here, then? Have they not “conspired” to establish a Mittel-Europa? Ergo,

they would dominate the world. Socialism to affect the feelings of solidarity, the instincts of class and self-preservation against Parasitic encroachments appeals to the higher centres which in the face of stimuli directly affecting the lower stand very little chance of success.

Another thing favors of Parasitism in the “logical duel” for possession of the masses’ consent and “opinion.” All the cries of the belligerents are not subject to disproof. They are not subject to proof, but that, psychologically, is not important and it leaves room for the most diverse interpretations. Can it be disproved that Germany will not “come over here” or that America is not endangered? Allow the barest possibility of truth for a cry and like water it will dissolve a huge amount of error and still retain its truthful appearance.

Take the cry, “Democracy versus Autocracy.” What does it mean? It cannot be denied that if the allies win there will be democratic countries on top. This fact masks three distinct things. First, the *purpose*, second the *method of procedure*, and third the *results* of the war. The fact that a victory of the allies is a victory of relatively democratic countries makes the means, the purpose and the result all coincide.

Yet the slightest amount of thought will reveal the possibility of their absolute antagonism. To illustrate. A thief steals my purse. I make a dash after him. As I do so I hear a thud behind me; the store sign above my head crashes to the ground; my leap after the thug saved my life. Now, the thief had in mind my wallet, not my life; yet the result of his action ended in my escape from injury, while his “method” was anything but “moral.” In the World War the intent may be imperialistic, on the part of the Parasites having an economic interest in colonies and commerce. Pleading military necessity, they may crush out all democratic aspirations, freedom of the press, of speech, conscription, etc., and be in a word thoroughly autocratic. Resulting from the war may come several goods—woman suffrage, government ownership of utilities, etc., absolutely unintended as was the Russian Revolution.

The most recent innovation along psychologic lines is the attempt to capture not only the masses of one nation to fight against another, but to capture the opinion of the enemy peoples. Wilson created a precedent when he distinguished between the German people and the rulers. This is a highly interesting psychologic question that should be separately discussed at length. But this move demonstrates anew the transcendent importance of the psychic factors in parasitic control of today. No longer relying on brute force, as did the slave owner, and to a lesser extent the serf master, the modern Parasite uses the subtlest of psychic influences.

But the lesson to Socialists is fundamental. Truth will not prevail because of inherent power to expand. It depends on the methods to spread it through infinite Affirmations and Repetitions, yes, by those with Prestige among us, even though the idea of leadership is falsely denied among us. It teaches us that more psychologic elements in the make up of the masses must be taken into account. If, if, I say, *that* appeal wins, when two are urged by contending camps, which hinges on the most fundamental instincts, which are essentially egoistic—the instincts of individual self-preservation, then we must even descend to this level and point out for the masses the threat to themselves and their progeny of Parasitism which does more than a war involving an illusory possession of a country belonging to the parasite, converts them into shadows of men the awakening in whom of Reason is prevented by bodily fatigue of industrial life on the one hand, and clever manipulation of the objects of Attention in press and school and pulpit on the other. The lesson has practical bearings on the "local" activities, the soapbox speech, the campaign cry, the leaflet, the editorial policy, etc. The most brilliant minds as we could show in dozens of pages have studied the psychology of the crowd and are exploiting it, in the interest of Parasitism. It is not alone the mission of the Socialist to supplement their researches by pointing out the negative role of some psychic forces in the hands of the Parasite, but that knowledge must be coined into practice.

The Future of the Russian Revolution

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"Russia is a derelict without any power of resistance." This is what Mr. Balfour of England says. Is it true?

"The Russian Revolution is crushed."

"Germany has full sway in Russia." "It is a prey to a rejuvenated German imperialism." "The foolish and criminal policy of the Russian Bolsheviki has brought the Russian revolution to its grave." "The future has nothing but darkness in store for Russia." This is the current liberal opinion and this is what many Socialists say. Is it true?

It is not true. The Russian Revolution is not crushed, and what is more, it will not be crushed.

In order to understand the possibilities of a resurrection of the revolutionary movement in Russia it is necessary to see what causes led to the present seemingly desperate situation. We must understand this, also, in order to know on what the Russian Revolution may count in the future for help in its struggle for existence. The present situation might have been brought about by the following causes: First, possible errors in the tactics of the Russian socialist statesmen; second, the failure of the German socialists; third, the failure of Allied socialists; fourth, the tactics of the Allied governments in regard to Russia.

A few days ago Trotzky was reported as having said that if the Russian socialists were in a position to remake their politics since November 1st there would be nothing which they would do or could do otherwise than they actually did. This was not a mere phrase. There are many serious students of Russia who fully share his opinion in this regard.

Some socialists say it was an error on the part of the Bolsheviki deliberately to pursue a policy which alienated the Allies from Russia. It was wrong, they say, deliberately to pursue a policy which alienated from the Soviets not only the Russian bourgeoisie, including the bourgeois national group in Ukrania, Finland, Poland, etc., but also the so-called moderate socialists.

I believe, however, that their policy does not involve the question of what was wrong and what was right, it is a question of what was possible and necessary or impossible in view of the social aims of the Russian Revolution and the demands as well as the power of the Russian masses. Each act on the part of the workers' government which tended to alienate the bourgeoisie and the moderate Socialists from the Bolsheviki, as for instance, the expropriation of land, the nationalization of banks, the repudiation of debts, the confiscation of church property, the abolition of capitalistic courts, etc., was an inevitable step in the necessary social transformation of Russia. The bourgeoisie could not have been appeased in this regard by anything else than by completely refraining from taking any steps which would have endangered the capitalist system. Their opposition to the Bolsheviki would have been just as relentless if the workers' government had pursued such policies in a more moderate form. The only prize with which the bourgeoisie could have been induced to support the workers' government would have been that it had not been a workers' government.

These facts do away with all the Menshiviki criticism of the Bolshevik position on social questions. There can be no "middle way" in the class struggle, other than that determined by the comparative power of the opposing classes. There was no "middle way" in the class struggle of the Russian Revolution because the most fundamental and vitally necessary demands of the absolutely powerful revolutionary masses—first of all, the demand for the confiscation of land—was of such a nature that it could not be solved in any manner recognized by capitalist social philosophy and politics. The

confiscation of land automatically led to an open fight against vital principles of capitalist society, at each and every point of its development and its consequences meeting open hostility on the part of capitalist elements. It is also clear that because of the international nature of capitalism this national anti-capitalistic policy at once became a matter of international capitalistic concern, automatically alienating from Russia all capitalist elements throughout the world.

Those who believe that the social tactics of the Bolsheviki could have been different can be only those who are actually opposed to socialism as such. And it is not our intention in this article to discuss things with them.

Then there is the question of whether the military policy of the Bolsheviki could have been another,—one which in a lesser degree would have provoked German invasion of Russia. Was it an error to demobilize the Russian army, thus making it impossible to resist an invasion? Was it an error not to submit to the Hoffmann peace proposition at Brest-Litovsk, thereby being later compelled to sign a much more disastrous treaty? Was it right or wrong to start peace negotiations at all? Should Russia have stayed in the war? Let us discuss these points beginning with the last one.

Here again we find that the question is not a question of right and wrong—it is once more a question of the possible and the impossible, and of the vitally necessary. It should by now be clear to every one that ninety per cent. of the Russian people did not want to continue the war. The peace negotiations *had to be held*, altogether regardless of all the ultimate international considerations in this regard represented by the class-conscious leadership of the Russian Revolution. The army *had to be demobilized*, altogether regardless of the tactical considerations which favored such a step, as for instance, the destruction of militarism, the prevention of the army being used as a counter-revolutionary weapon, the invitation to other nations to do likewise, etc. The army demobilized itself by the very fact of the soldiers going home as soon as the

cohesive power of the autocratic forces was eliminated from the social structure of Russia. This very thing would likely happen in any other country in which the fetish of government authority would be destroyed in one way or another. In view of this fact, the peace negotiations became a necessity, already as a Russian matter alone. The international of labor is forever indebted to the Russian socialist statesmen, because they utilized this national necessity so as to try to safeguard the vital interests of international labor, even to the point of almost breaking with the masses who wanted peace and peace at any price. No greater mistake can be made in regard to Russia than the presumption that the pacifist leaders compelled the masses to accept a peace which they did not want. The real situation is the very opposite of this presumption.

At this point it should be understood that there certainly existed a certain amount of difference between the tactics of Lenine and Trotzky. Lenine, a cool, calculating exponent of economic determinism, altogether devoid of any sentimental considerations, fully understood the above-mentioned situation and took the propagation of "peace at any price" as a matter of prosaic necessity, well understanding that any particular peace terms at this moment did not count much as the abolishment of the battle-fronts between Russia and Germany was the first preliminary for the success of the Revolution in Russia and in Germany, and only such a revolution would rewrite any peace terms made at this moment. Lenine also had no faith in the possibility of a revolution in Germany during the war, and he foresaw the inevitableness of more harsh terms and ruthless invasion of Russia by Germany if the Hoffmann peace terms were not "accepted." Trotzky, on the other hand, although he, too, understood the above mentioned situation in general, laid more stress, led by his more imaginative and temperamental nature, upon sentimental considerations of the honor of the socialist movement. He also always has been inclined to exaggerate the revolutionary

readiness for action in Germany and the possibility of creating there a revolutionary sentiment by more or less abstract and sentimental presentation of the danger facing the international labor movement through the Hoffmann plans.

We can well presume that the somewhat dramatic performance of Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk—his refusing to sign a treaty with the German imperialists, yet proclaiming the war ended, and his parrying Hoffmann's cool suggestion that in such case the Germans would instantly take Reval, by saying that the working-class of Germany never would allow him so to do—probably would not have taken place if Lenine had been at Brest-Litovsk in place of Trotzky. It is very likely that Lenine would have signed Hoffmann's peace terms at least as readily as he signed the much more outrageous terms now presented by the German government.

Yet, I on my part do not believe that either course would have resulted in anything much different from the situation prevailing in Russia now. If there could have been a difference it might be said that the present situation has some distinct advantages in comparison with the one which might have been created if the Hoffmann peace treaty had been signed. As will be seen from the following paragraph, the writer of these lines does not at all pessimistically regard the present situation in Russia. I do not believe for a moment that Germany will be able to crush Russia or the Russian revolution. And as appalling as the present situation looks it is not a very important matter whether the Germans just now are fifty or a hundred miles more eastward or westward. The advantages of the present situation are that if the Brest-Litovsk treaty had been signed it would have established a somewhat undesirable *modus vivendi* in Germany and Russia. That situation would have been indeed of more actual advantage to Germany because she then would have been able more easily and peaceably to utilize the material resources of Russia. But now, in spite of the bombastic terms of the enforced peace treaty, Germany actually has to fight for every ounce of bread which she will get from Russia. The greatest advan-

tage of the present situation, however, is, that it so very clearly brings out the actual desires and tendencies of all the reactionary elements throughout the world. German militarism and imperialism, Japanese imperialism, the real nature of the Russian bourgeoisie, the nature of Finland's capitalism, is being shown up in bright light. The present situation in Russia has brought about the crystallization of the class lines all over the world to an extent which certainly will be of great advantage to the rallying of the forces of the labor movement. It is also obvious that the present situation is much more likely to complicate the internal policies of Austria and Germany and to strengthen the position of the revolutionary elements in both countries. A peace on the basis of the Hoffmann terms would, on the other hand, have temporarily created a certain amount of satisfaction on both sides which would have made more possible a stabilization of German-Russian relations on the basis of capitalistic intercourse.

Thus I frankly maintain that as far as the tactics of the Russian Soviets have contributed to the creation of the present situation there is nothing which they could have done otherwise and there really is nothing which they should have done otherwise.

The question then arises, to what degree other elements are responsible for the present situation in Russia and to what degree they can be relied upon in the work of liberating Russia from the grip of the Germans and international imperialism.

The German social democracy can not escape the responsibility for the present situation, although we fully understand that forces not within the control of the German socialist leadership in the German labor movement, contributed to the betrayal of the Russians by the German socialists. Yet, it is a fact that the German majority socialist leaders deliberately subdued such revolutionary activity which, in spite of all, actually existed among the German masses, as the general strike in February clearly shows. The German majority

socialists never will be able to wipe off their face the brand-mark of deliberate traitorship toward Russia. Even the independent socialists, although we fully realize the limits of their possibility of action, cannot be fully released from blame for not having more desperately tried to call the attention of their people to the black crime being committed against the world in regard to Russia.

In this regard I would wish to refer to an article in the Finnish daily *Raivaaja*, which shows some of the reasons why no revolution took place in Germany at this time. It says:

As certain as it is that in Germany, sooner or later, there will be a revolution against the Kaiserism, and at the same time a social revolution, it is not at all sure that such revolution will happen at the present stage of the world crisis.

We have hoped for a revolution in Germany at this time and we have based our calculations on this hope. Our Russian comrades based the foundations of their tactics on such a hope. But now we find that the evolution of events is not as rapid as we would like it to be.

A war which to all appearances is a victorious one and which at least holds out the hope of victory is not apt to encourage revolutionary movements, because a revolution is not to be had at the wish of conscious leaders. A revolution becomes a fact only in as far as such conditions arise which set into motion the broad masses, who are not able abstractly to grasp problems well understood by minds schooled in world politics.

Although the far seeing leaders of the labor movement well understand, that the German government is planning and committing an outrageous crime against the world, although they understand that the temporary advantages arising from that crime to Germany very soon must change into distinct disadvantages, and although they understand that the crime is too great to become permanent and to be recognized by the world as an accomplished fact which can not be changed, the tragedy of the situation is that there is no human power which has at its disposal words and persuasion only which were great enough to arise to sacrificing action people ridden by military discipline. It is a misfortune, but it is a fact, that the nemesis of the crime first must

hit the hide of the people themselves. It must be conclusively proven, that the "victorious war" was an illusion only.

A revolution needs a material impetus. It might be said that the sense of justice of human beings is easier awakened by the cruel pangs in their own stomachs than by the simple fact of brigandage being committed in another country, especially when the brigandage is being justified with the explanation that it will provide a necessary solution of the food question. A hungry stomach in the first place thinks of satisfying its own needs at any price.

An unsuccessful war usually leads to a revolution. A successful war strengthens the position of the ruling power. This is very necessary to bear in mind. This should always be remembered when we are considering the possibilities of a revolution in Germany. There are many indications that Germany just now is spending her days in hopeful celebration of "victories." The radical Socialists do their best in explaining that the "victories" are very wretched ones and that the material value of these "victories" is very questionable. Yet, this knowledge must reach the people by actual experience. The continuation of privations and superhuman efforts is the only thing which will bring the understanding of the true situation. If in spite of the "victories" and in spite of "victorious" conclusions of peace the people will find that the situation has not been actually improved, but that instead of that there is more misery, more rebellions, more suppression of the liberty of that and other people, then the revolutionary movement will rise above the edges of the social bowl.

And then there is another important consideration, which has not been sufficiently taken into account. The best schooled elements of the labor movement of the Central Powers, are kept under the heel of an iron war discipline. They are in the army. Last year the Berlin "Vorwärts" published statistics about the trade unions of Austria. The membership of these organizations has decreased during three years by about 70 per cent. The decrease is due to the fact that the army of labor is being transformed into an army of soldiers. The same thing may be said about the German labor movement. The army of labor now consists mostly of women, children, old men and prisoners of war. The women and children, as experience shows, may, if the conditions become altogether unbearable, start a revolution. It has been noticed that women may ardently fight in street rebellions. Yet the first premise of a successful rebellion is that the greater part of the army turn their arms to help the popular rebellion against the ruling power. A revolution may start with a general strike, but the general strike must then at the very outset of the revolutionary enthusiasm turn into a revolution. If a general strike is prolonged it

will kill the rebellion. So did actually happen during the great strikes in Germany a few weeks ago.

It should also be said that the revolutionary propaganda carried on on behalf of the Western Allied governments is more apt to confuse than to clear the situation. The effect of such propaganda on the German people is very much similar to that of the propaganda carried on by the German government in the United States. It is being despised and real popular movements seek by all means to avoid being identified with the propaganda of a foreign government because it damages their cause.

Persons familiar with the present situation in Germany and particularly in the German labor movement are of the opinion that just now no revolutionary uprising in Germany should be expected. In the foregoing we have tried to explain why it is so. These reasons, of course, can not remain very long, but at a certain time they have an influence all their own.

* * *

Some time ago Comrade L. Boudin wrote in *The Class Struggle* an article named "The Tragedy of the Russian Revolution." The tragedy of the Russian revolution, in his opinion, is that the great work of social reorganization of Russia must take place in the midst of the world war. Yet this is not Russia's greatest tragedy. On the contrary, it might be said that the war tremendously contributes to the success of the revolution by paralyzing the international forces of capitalism which, if the revolution had taken place in times of world peace, would have been more able to undertake concerted action toward the crushing of the Russian Socialists. We might even say that the very fact of the Russian revolution taking place at this time was a direct outcome of the war.

The greatest tragedy of the Russian revolution is that this event of tremendous social importance, overwhelmingly more important than the Paris Commune so glorified by the International, is not only meeting indifference on the part of socialist elements throughout the world, but, on the contrary, is met with open hostility on the part of the International officialdom, which has been intrusted with the duty of championing the cause of Socialism all over the world.

The German Socialists are to blame for their attitude toward the Russian revolution. But the allied Socialists cannot escape blame either. Responsible officials of the International labor movement as Huysmans, Vandervelde, Branting, Thomas and others have vied with the capitalist news-writers in vilifying and abusing the Bolsheviki movement, and thus they contributed very much to the weakening of the influence of the Russian Soviets abroad. At best the allied Social Democracies have been altogether indifferent. They have done little or nothing in order to induce their respective governments not to hamper the work of Russian labor. They have done little or nothing in order to make the working classes fully acquainted with the great aims and possibilities of the Russian revolutionary labor movement.

Thus the allied Socialists must be, to a very great degree, held responsible for the policy pursued by the allied governments in regard to Russia—a policy which, unconsciously, did everything to strengthen pro-German tendencies and German influence in Russia, and to weaken the influence of the workers' Soviets which is the only element in Russia, consciously and effectively opposed to German domination.

A few days ago Mr. Arthur Ransome, the correspondent of the London Daily News, who is writing remarkably sympathetic accounts of the work of the Russian Socialists, expressed the hope that the Allies now, at least, would refrain from repeating the mistake they made when they allied themselves with the Ukrainian Rada on the presumption that because the Rada was against the Soviets, it therefore was opposed to Germany. But this is exactly what the Allies have been doing and there is scant hope of their being able to change their minds. Since the first Bolshevik Revolution in July, 1917, the Allied and neutral press so often repeated the absurd and consciously lying story about the Bolsheviki being paid agents of Germany, that they, by and by, began to believe it themselves. Yet, by the very logic of the class struggle the Bolsheviki are the only anti-German force in Russia, not because Germany is Germany, but because Germany at present is the most dangerous exponent of reaction-

ary capitalism and ready to place itself in the service of all reactionary capitalist tendencies, the services being readily accepted in certain circles. The Allies and the neutrals supported the Ukrainian Rada even to the extent of lending it millions of dollars of money—but the Rada concluded an anti-Ally peace treaty with Germany and is one of the most important allies of German plans in regard to Russia.

The same thing happened in Finland. The Finnish bourgeoisie was received with open arms by Scandinavia, by France, even by England, on the presumption that because they were anti-Socialist they also were anti-German. The outcome was the very opposite. The Finnish bourgeoisie betrayed France, and Scandinavia and England—it is now inviting a German princeling to rule Finland, it is delivering the whole country into German hands. And then the Allies directly and indirectly supported every counter-revolutionary movement in Russia, with the result that now these elements are the greatest allies of German control on Russian affairs. And so all along the line.

In view of the ultimate interests of every non-Socialist government in the world, there is nothing illogical in the above-mentioned policy. The time is rapidly approaching when the labor movement will be *the* enemy in the eyes of the rulers of all countries of the world, wiping out all the battle fronts of today. But the Allies do not admit that such a condition exists now. They are still rallying the peoples of the world against German militarism. If they are at all sincere in this regard, the policy they have pursued in Russia is the very height of illogic.

No intelligent person can deny that this policy is, perhaps, more than anything else responsible for the strong strategic position of Germany today. If the Allies had taken part in the peace deliberations at Brest-Litovsk, it would have been possible to compel Germany to accept a peace without annexation and indemnities, which, at once, would have utterly destroyed the influence of the Junker element in the Teuton countries. Failure to aid the Russian workers in their work at Brest-Litovsk is the very basic cause of Germany's invasion of Russia.

All this we have mentioned in order to show that there is absolutely no reason for putting the blame for the present situation in Russia on the shoulders of the Russian labor movement. On the contrary, it might be said that in view of the relentless opposition of the Allies toward the Bolsheviki, and in view of the ardent desire of the Russian people for a peace at any price, the Russian workers' government showed the Allies more consideration and readiness of co-operation with them than any one under similar circumstances could have expected from a capitalist government towards other governments.

And now let us consider the chances of the Russian labor movement to overcome Germany's plans. Recent events clearly show that the grip of the workers' movement on the situation in Russia is tremendously strong. The predictions have not materialized that the German invasion of Russia, the signing of the horrid peace treaty with Germany and the subsequent flight of the Russian government to Moscow, have altogether discredited the Russian Socialists, and now, at least, made a Bourgeois counter-revolution possible. On the contrary, the Russian Soviets are as undaunted as ever. Just study the reply to President Wilson's message by the Russian Soviets. The people still support the workers' government. A counter-revolutionary move on the part of a former crack regiment of the Czar ended with the arrest of every member of that regiment. Prince Lvov's adventure in Siberia has born no fruits. There is absolutely no possibility on the part of the Russian bourgeoisie to establish themselves with their own help. The same is the case in regard to Finland. The only power which promises some aid in this regard is Germany. Arthur Ransome says that the Russian bourgeoisie is praying for Prussian invasion. A prominent Russian business man told Ransome that they would rather take the Emperor of China as the ruler of Russia than submit to the workers' rule.

Thus the whole question in regard to Russia dwindles down to these two questions: Will the Germans succeed in their contemplated control of Russia's political and economic life, and will the Allies be allowed to fall back to the lines of the blackest kind of imperialism, by using Japan as a cat's paw in dividing up

Russia between the two contending imperialistic camps, and thus on their part do their share in subduing the power of the Russian labor movement.

Let me then say, here and now, that the German imperialists never will control Russia. First, Russia is too big a proposition. In order to control the occupied territories of Russia, and those territories which the Germans are bent upon to take in addition, Germany would be compelled to station in Russia an army of millions of soldiers to do police and military work in the midst of a rebellious people, well-trained in active and passive resistance to autocracy, well-trained in underground propaganda, and now, for twelve months, having enjoyed full liberties, the spirit of which cannot be crushed in a few months.

As we already said in the foregoing paragraphs, Germany will have to fight for every ounce of bread which it is going to get from Russia. In addition to that, even the much-heralded German efficiency will not be able in a short time to reorganize the prostrated railroad system of Russia and use the means of communication which are now being blocked, and will be blocked for at least a year, by the gray masses of the returning Russian army. Any advantage which Germany expects from occupation of Russia in regard to food supplies, however, must be got very rapidly, if it may serve as a counteracting force against the ever growing dissatisfaction among the German masses. To get any advantages from the Russian situation Germany would need time to organize the country according to her plans—yet time is the very thing which Germany does not have in this regard.

But the Russian people have plenty time. As the situation stands now, there certainly will be no peace between the Russian workers and the German imperialists. Whatever stipulations in this regard have been written in the outrageous peace treaty enforced upon Russia, they do not mean anything at all. A peace treaty, in order to stand, must be in accordance with the actual corresponding strength of the contending powers.. The war will go on between the Russian people and the German army, although

in other form. Any military forces sent into Russia to do the dirty work of German imperialism, cannot be kept immune from the virus of Russian Socialist propaganda and influence. The work done during one year of the revolution cannot be wiped out by the German military machine. Instead of a powerless, disorganized army on the eastern front, easily yielding before the onrush of the German military machine, German militarists in Russia will be faced by an army of several tens of millions of rebellious, secretly and openly organized aggressive workers, using a thousand and one different means which are not predicted in the theoretical books on strategy of the German generals.

And what is true of Russia is in a higher degree true of Finland, because of the higher perfection of the labor organizations in Finland. The war between Germany and Russia and Finland will continue as a class war, in a field in which the strategy of the Russian revolutionists, developed under long years' struggle against the Tsarism, will overcome all the obstacles which German ingenuousness and efficiency will place in its way.

And then, whatever may be the attitude of the German workers now, the very fact that the German people is in for new bitter disappointment in regard to hopes of relief from Russia, nursed by the militarists, the revolution in Germany must come. Without the German revolution the Russian revolution cannot accomplish its work. But the deeper the Germans dig themselves down in the bowels of the rebellious Russia, the sooner they open the door for a change in the present situation.

Then, what about the Japanese adventure? There is no doubt about Japan's intention, and there is certainly no doubt about the role of the English government in this regard. Yet there are other forces, which are altogether in harmony with usual capitalist interests, which work against the Japanese plans, on the part of elements otherwise not at all interested in preservation of the Bolsheviki revolution. This is being written on March 18th. We dare to make the prophecy that very soon the American government will come out openly against Japan's plans—not

because America loves the Bolsheviki more, but because America, at this time, loves Germany less. Important trade interests of the United States—altogether regardless of the humanitarian and sentimental considerations of preserving democracy, etc.—make Japan's establishment in the Far East, which certainly would be the outcome, if Japan and England would be allowed to do what they want, one of the greatest dangers to the new-won trade supremacy of the United States. And a still greater danger to the United States in this regard is the establishment of Prussian supremacy in the Near East. The Social Revolution which will be an outcome of the stabilization of the Bolsheviki rule is, of course, a still greater danger. Yet America, the youngest, most vigorous, and aggressive capitalist state, does not look upon this danger as a very immediate one, at least, in these parts of the world. And so, we might, with great interest, look upon the development of events today, well knowing that whatever prophecies fail and whatever calculations do not materialize, there is one prophecy which can't fail—the old Europe cannot be reorganized on any other basis than on the basis of Socialism, and the Russian revolutionists, not at all down and out, not at all downhearted, very much alive, resourceful and conscious, are leading the world, the willing as well as the unwilling part of it, on the road to industrial liberty.

The Tragedy of the Russian Revolution

SECOND ACT

By L. B. BOUDIN

On the morrow of the Bolshevik overturn in Russia which closed the first phase of the Russian Revolution, writing in the November-December issue of *The Class Struggle*, I expressed the opinion that the tragedy of the Russian Revolution consisted in the fact that, being born of the great world-war and therefore indissolubly connected with it, its success depended upon the assistance of either the "democratic governments" of the Allied nations, on the one hand, or the "revolutionary proletariat" of the Central Empires, on the other. I attributed the failure of the Kerensky regime to its betrayal by the "democratic governments" upon which it had pinned its hopes; and I predicted a similar fate for the Bolshevik regime, which was evidently depending for its success upon the "revolutionary proletariat" of Germany and Austria. I stated then that: "unless the unexpected happens, the hopes which the Russian "extremists" place upon the German proletariat are doomed to disappointment, even as the hopes which the "moderates" have placed in the "democracies" of Europe and America." And I closed that article with the following paragraph, summarizing the situation as I saw it then:

"Herein lies the tragedy of the Russian Revolution—for a real tragedy it is, in the old Greek conception of that term, a fatal situation from which there seems to be no escape. Bolshevik and Menshevik, 'extremists' and 'moderates' seem to be alike foredoomed to failure. At least as long as the Russian Revolution is compelled to choose between the Scylla of 'democratic governments' and the Charibdis of a 'German revolutionary proletariat.' For, the present at least, both are pure figments of the imagination, each bound to prove a broken reed in the hands of any one who places reliance upon it."

Hardly four months have passed since those lines were written and our worst fears have already been fulfilled, making what may have then seemed to many unwarrantedly gloomy forebodings, a rather mild and reserved statement of an appalling situation. In these four months Russia, Revolutionary Russia, has been broken up into fragments; the Russian Revolution has been brought to its knees, humiliated, outraged, and compelled to accept a disgraceful peace, denying its own revolutionary-internationalist principles; and the counter-revolution placed firmly in the saddle, working its counter-revolutionary will with a swiftness and thoroughness which no Korniloff, nay, even no Czar, could ever have dreamed of.

All of these events hang together, depend upon one another. Russia broken into fragments means such a weakening of the Russian Revolution as to make her an easy prey to external and internal enemies. Russia capitulating before German Militarism means Russia laying herself prostrate before the counter-revolution.

In the same issue of *The Class Struggle* in which I wrote on the Tragedy of the Russian Revolution I also called attention, in an editorial note, to the warning which the veteran Socialist thinker Karl Kautsky sounded to all those who were straying from the field of true Socialist and revolutionary policy by helping, or at least not exerting themselves to prevent the break-up of Russia. And I quoted in this connection from an article which he had written for the *Neue Zeit* before he had been displaced in the editorship of that once famous organ of Socialist thought by a Scheidemann lackey, in which Kautsky said:

"Such considerations may under certain circumstances demand imperatively that a great revolutionary state be held together against its reactionary enemies If the Finns and Ukrainians now want to get away from the Russian state, it is merely an after-effect of the policies of Czarism which drove them into opposition to Russia and of a lack of faith on their part in the staying qualities of the

Russian Revolution. But they ought to know that their hopes of national independence are intimately bound up with the Russian Revolution—that the only way in which they can secure their independence is by *their standing by Russia and not by their separating from it, thereby weakening it.*”

To a Socialist not affected by the virus of bourgeois nationalism Kautsky's warning was entirely unnecessary, and it was evidently written for the especial benefit of the German Socialist workingmen whom the Scheidemann governmental recruiting agency was trying to lure into an acceptance of the German Government's annexationist plans on the specious plea that Finland and the Ukraine were being made “independent.” The Russian Socialists did not need this warning. Not even the Bolsheviki, as may be seen from their stubborn refusal to recognize the German-made “Ukrainian Republic” and the war which they have waged on this imaginary “nation” as well as on Finland's “independent” government, even while they were laying down their arms in the war against Germany.

And the situation with respect to a “German” peace—and every separate peace was in the very nature of things bound to be a “German peace”—was even more simple and was well recognized by all Russian Socialists as well as by all good Socialists the world over, not excluding Germany. The Russian Revolution could not co-exist with a victorious German Militarism. But a separate peace meant German Militarism triumphant. Hence the repeated and passionate declarations of *all* Socialist parties and factions in Russia that they were not working for and would not conclude a separate peace.

Some are now inclined to doubt the sincerity of these declarations—at least in so far as the Bolsheviki leaders are concerned. I do not belong among them. I can no more credit these accusations that I can credit the counter-accusations that the “Menshevik” leaders were intentionally playing into the hands of Allied imperialists. The fact is, as I have pointed out in my first article on the Tragedy of the Russian Revolution, that the Rus-

sian revolutionists are the unfortunate victims of a cruel fate which has placed them upon the horns of a terrible dilemma, the acceptance of either alternative being equally fatal to their aspirations. The “Mensheviki” took what seemed to be the line of least resistance:—an appeal to the Western “democracies” seemed the natural thing to do for the new-born democracy of the East, and most promising of results. Their failure seemed to call for more heroic, more venturesome expedients, and the Bolsheviki were willing to try them.

But Trotzky went to Brest-Litovsk for exactly the same purpose that Skobelev was to go to Paris—in an attempt to bring about a general and democratic peace. The means adopted may seem to some of us like a foolhardy adventure upon which only reckless adventurers could embark. But in judging our comrades we must remember the desperate straits in which the Russian Revolution found itself, not only physically by reason of the exhaustion of the long war, but also morally by reason of its alliance with nations that were manifestly unwilling to give up their imperialistic aims. To which should be added the consideration that a certain amount of confidence in the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat of all countries is not only an article of faith in all Socialist creeds, but one of the most essential ingredients in the make-up of a true revolutionist. Too much faith of this sort is liable to become dangerous under certain circumstances. In the present instance it turned out disastrous. And we have a right to criticize Trotzky and his associates for not being more careful about the people in whom they put their trust, and particularly for recklessly destroying their bridges behind them before making sure of their ground. But we have no right to suspect their good faith or their fidelity to principle.

Trotzky did not go to Brest-Litovsk to make a separate peace—an “honorable” separate peace, such, for instance, as the “good” Ukrainian Rada has made. The best proof of that is the fact that he did not make such a peace. Nor did he for a moment entertain the belief that he would convert the German Militarists to the idea of a general democratic peace. Concerning the true character of the German Militarists, Trotzky and his associates

need no instruction. Unlike the Scheidemanns in Germany and out of Germany, Trotzky could never bring himself to believe that the German ruling class could ever be reformed. Trotzky went to Brest-Litovsk in the hope that his extraordinary step, and inevitable unmasking of the true character of the German designs on Russia and the Russian Revolution, would bring the German working class upon its feet so as to frustrate these designs by forcing a general democratic peace. And for a time it looked as if he were going to succeed. The German and Austrian workingmen began to wake up. It is not beyond the range of possibility that had the German and Austrian workers not been betrayed by their own leaders they would have awakened from the long lethargic sleep which has lain upon them like a dead weight, paralyzing their strength and freedom of movement, and in the process some things might have happened which would have turned Trotzky's "foolhardy adventure" into the greatest stroke of statesmanship of modern times.

Unfortunately, while Trotzky's faith in the revolutionary character of the masses of the German proletariat proved not quite well founded, his estimate of the character of Messrs. Scheidemann & Co. proved but too true. It will be remembered that the Bolsheviki refused to participate in the projected Stockholm Peace Conference, in the belief that even at an International Socialist Peace Conference, Scheidemann & Co. would only be doing the dirty work of their governments. In this estimate of the character of Scheidemann & Co., Trotzky was not mistaken. No sooner did the German and Austrian workers show signs of revolt than the Scheidemanns in Germany and Austria stepped into the breach and saved the day for their governments, betraying the workers in the most shameful manner into the hands of the German militarists and imperialists.

This base betrayal sealed the fate of the Russian Revolution, in so far at least as it was staked on the success of the Brest-Litovsk manoeuvre. There was nothing left for Trotzky to do but to liquidate what has now become an "adventure" as best he could. It was evident that Russia was going to be dismembered in all manner of ways; by direct annexations, by veiled annexa-

tions and by the creation of all sorts of imaginary "nations" and independent "states" from the Arctic Ocean to the Black and Caspian Seas and from the Vistula to the Ural Mountains and beyond. And it was equally evident that the Russian Revolution as dreamed by Trotzky and his associates was doomed. It was a question merely of what could be saved from the wreckage. In order to save anything it was necessary that the honor of the Revolution should remain unsoiled—that it should not dishonor itself by putting its stamp of approval on a peace which was humiliating beyond measure both to Russia and to the Revolution. Hence, the expedient of the "declared" peace; the throwing away by Russia of her arms and refusing to fight further, while also refusing to sign a formal peace.

To some, Trotzky's refusal to sign a peace treaty while in fact making a separate peace may have seemed like a mere subterfuge on his part—an attempt to escape the consequences of his former declarations that he would not conclude a separate peace. To others again this may have looked like a mere pose, a magnificent gesture by a man fond of theatrical posing. To those, however, who have followed the tortuous course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations there was deep meaning in this apparently purely "academic" distinction between a signed and an unsigned peace. By submitting to the conqueror the Russian Revolution was bending its knee before German Militarism. But as long as it did not formally renounce its principles by agreeing to the peace imposed upon it, its backbone remained unbroken, and it could hope, by some turn of good fortune to be brought to its feet again. Also: it was a final appeal to the manhood and latent revolutionary spirit of the German proletariat.

What the German Government thought of Trotzky's signature to a parchment sealing the terms of the surrender is proven by its subsequent conduct. It evidently believed that the sealing of that parchment would seal the doom of the Russian Revolution. In this view Trotzky concurred. Hence his refusal to sign a peace treaty. As another Bolshevik leader, Karl Radek put it: "The Russian revolutionists are not *slave traders*; they cannot, therefore, sell the workers of Poland, Lithuania and Cour-

land into German slavery." They may be forced to stand by and see them carried off into slavery by force majeure. But they cannot sign a deed *selling* them into slavery.

But here something quite unexpected happened. Something which neither Trotzky nor anybody else did or could expect. The German Government actually marched into an undefended country, making war upon a people that had thrown away their arms! And the German proletariat, led by Scheidemann & Co., stood by and said nothing. Nay, the German Social Democratic Party actually hastened to "shake" the Bolsheviki, with whom they had tried to flirt before, when such a course seemed useful to the German Government.

No wonder the latest Bolshevik proclamation—issued while the German army was marching into the interior of Russia, strangling Russia and the Russian Revolution, brands the German workers and their leaders as Cains and Judas and calls down curses upon their heads.

As we go to press the Bolsheviki are still nominally in power in "Russia." In reality the German bayonet reigns supreme in what was not so long ago Revolutionary Russia. The curtain has fallen upon the Second Act of that terrible drama known as "The Russian Revolution" amid general gloom and despondency.

Will it stay down? Has History written "finis" to that great historical phenomenon? Or will there be a third, a *brighter Act*?

It is well to remember that it is always darkest before dawn. Perhaps the very extraordinary character of the gloom of the situation presages the approach of a brighter day. Perhaps the very extraordinary character of the crime of the German Government and of the shame of the German Government Socialists will stir the German proletariat into revolt against both, thereby saving the Russian Revolution and democracy for the world.

Self-Determination of Nations and Self-Defense

By KARL LIEBKNECHT

"But, since we have been unable to prevent the war, since it has come in spite of us, and our country is facing invasion, shall we leave our country defenseless? Shall we deliver it into the hands of the enemy? Does not Socialism demand the right of nations to determine their own destinies? Does it not mean that every people is justified, nay more, in duty bound, to protect its liberties, its independence? "When the house is on fire, shall we not first try to put out the blaze before stopping to ascertain the incendiary?"

These arguments have been repeated, again and again in defense of the attitude of the Social-Democracy, in Germany and in France. And even in the neutral countries they have played an important part in the discussions.

But there is one thing that the fireman on the burning house has forgotten: that in the mouth of a Socialist the phrase "defending one's fatherland" cannot mean playing the role of cannon fodder under the command of an imperialistic bourgeoisie.

Is an invasion really the horror of all horrors, before which all class conflict within the country must subside as though spellbound by some supernatural witchcraft? Has not the history of modern capitalist society shown that in the eyes of capitalist society, foreign invasion is by no means the unmitigated terror as which it is generally painted; that on the contrary it is a measure to which the bourgeoisie has frequently and gladly resorted as an effective weapon against the enemy within? Did not the Bourbons and the aristocrats of France invite foreign invasion against the Jacobites? Did not the Austrian counter-revolution in 1849 call out the French invasion against Rome, the Russian against Budapest? Did not the "Party of Law and Order" in France, in 1850, openly threaten an invasion of the Cossacks in order to bring the National Assembly to terms?

And was not the Bonaparte army released, and the support of the Prussian army against the Paris Commune assured by the famous contract between Jules Favre, Thiers and Co. and Bismarck? This historical evidence led Karl Marx, 45 years ago, to expose the "national wars" of modern capitalist society as miserable frauds. In his famous address to the General Council of the International on the downfall of the Paris Commune, he said:

"That, after the greatest war of modern times the belligerent armies, the victor and the vanquished, should unite for the mutual butchery of the proletariat—this incredible event proves, not as Bismarck would have us believe, the final overthrow of the new social power—but the complete disintegration of old bourgeoisie society. The highest heroic accomplishment of which the old order is capable, is the national war. And this has now proved to be a fraud perpetrated by the government for no other purpose than to put off the class struggles, a fraud that is bared as soon as the class struggle flares up in civil war. Class rule can no longer hide behind a national uniform. The national governments are united against the proletariat."

In capitalist history, invasion and class struggle are not opposites, as the official legend would have us believe, but one is the means and the expression of the other. Just as invasion is the true and tried weapon in the hands of capital against the class struggle, so on the other hand the fearless pursuit of the class struggle has always proven the most effective preventative of foreign invasions. On the brink of modern times are the examples of the Italian cities, Florence, and Milano, with their century of bitter struggle against the Hohenstaufen. The stormy history of these cities, torn by inner conflicts proves that the force and the fury of inner class struggles not only does not weaken the defensive powers of the community, but that on the contrary, from their fires, shoot the only flames that are strong enough to withstand every attack from a foreign foe.

But the classic example of our own times is the great French Revolution. In 1793 Paris, the heart of France, was surrounded

by enemies. And yet Paris and France at that time did not succumb to the invasion of a stormy flood of European coalition; on the contrary, it welded its forces in face of the growing danger, to a more gigantic opposition. If France, at that critical time, was able to meet each new coalition of the enemy with a new miraculous and undiminished fighting spirit, it was only because of the impetuous loosening of the inmost forces of society in the great struggle of the classes of France. Today, in the perspective of a century, it is clearly discernible that only this intensification of the class struggle, that only the Dictatorship of the French people and their fearless radicalism, could produce means and forces out of the soil of France, sufficient to defend and to sustain a new-born society against a world of enemies, against the intrigues of a dynasty, against the traitorous machinations of the aristocrats, against the attempts of the clergy, against the treachery of their generals, against the opposition of sixty departments and provincial capitals, and against the united armies and navies of monarchial Europe. The centuries have proved that not the state of seige, but relentless class struggle is the power that awakens the spirit of self-sacrifice, the moral strength of the masses, that the class struggle is the best protection and the best defense against a foreign enemy.

It is true Socialism gives to every people the right of independence and freedom, of independent control of its own destinies. But it is a veritable perversion of Socialism to regard present day capitalist society as the expression of this self-determination of nations. Where is there a nation in which the people have had the right to determine the form and conditions of its national, political and social existence. In Germany the determination of the people found concrete expression in the demands formulated by the German revolutionary democrats of 1808, the first fighters of the German proletariat, Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Bebel and Liebknecht, proclaimed and fought for a united German Republic. For this ideal the revolutionary forces in Berlin and in Vienna, in those tragic days of March, shed their heartsblood upon the barricades. To carry out this program Marx and Engels demanded that Prussia take up arms against Czarism. The foremost demand made in the national pro-

gram was for the liquidation of that heap of organized decay, the Hapsburg monarchy, as well as of two dozen other dwarf monarchies within Germany itself. The overthrow of the German revolution, the treachery of the German bourgeoisie to its own democratic ideals, led to the Bismark regime and to its creature, present day Greater Prussia, twenty-five fatherlands under one helm, the German Empire. Modern Germany is built upon the grave of the March Revolution, upon the wreckage of the right of self-determination of the German people. The present war, supporting Turkey and the Hapsburg monarchy, and strengthening German military autocracy, is a second burial of the March revolutionists, and of the national program of the German people. It is a fiendish jest of history that Socialdemocrats, the heirs of the German patriots of 1848, should go forth in this war with the banner of "self-determination of nations" held aloft in their hands. But, perhaps the third French Republic, with its colonial possessions in form and its colonial horrors in two continents, is the expression of self-determination of the French nation. Or the British nation, with its India, with its South African rule of a million whites over a population of five million colored people. Or perhaps Turkey, or the Empire of the Czar.

Capitalist politicians, in whose eyes the rulers of the people and the ruling classes are the nation, can honestly speak of the "right of national self-determination" in connection with such colonial empires. To the socialist no nation is free whose national existence is based upon the enslavement of another people, for to him colonial peoples, too, are peoples, and, as such, parts of the national state. International socialism recognizes the right of free independent nations, with equal rights. But Socialism, alone, can bring self-determination of their peoples. This slogan of Socialism is, like all its others, no apology for existing conditions, but a guiding post, a spur for the revolutionary, recreative, active policy of the proletariat. So long as capitalist states exist, *i. e.*, so long as imperialistic world policies determine and regulate the inner and the outer life of a nation, there can be no "national self-determination" neither in war nor in peace.

In the present imperialistic milieu there can be no wars of national self-defense. Every socialist policy that depends upon this determining historic milieu, that is willing to fix its policies in the world whirlpool from the point of view of a single nation, is built upon a foundation of sand.

In a discussion of the general causes of the war and of its significance, the question of the "guilty party" is completely beside the issue. Germany certainly has not the right to speak of a war of defense, but France and England have little more justification. They, too, are protecting, not their national, but their world political existence, their old imperialistic possessions from the attacks of the German upstart. Doubtlessly the raids of German and Austrian imperialism in the Orient started the conflagration, but French Imperialism, by devouring Morocco, and English attempts to rape Mesopotamia, and all the other measures that were calculated to secure its rule of force in India, Russia's Baltic policies, aiming toward Constantinople, all of these factors have carried together and piled up, brand for brand, the firewood that fed the conflagration. If capitalist armaments have played an important role as the mainspring of that brand, the outbreak of the catastrophe, it was a competition of armaments, in all nations. And if Germany laid the cornerstone for European competitive armaments by Bismark's policy of 1870, this policy was furthered by that of the second Empire and by the military colonial policies of the third empire, by its expansions in East Asia and in Africa.

The French Socialists had some slight foundation for their illusion of "national defense," because neither the French government nor the French people entertained the slightest warlike desires in July, 1914. "Today everyone in France is honestly, uprightly and without reservation for peace," insisted Jaures in the last speech of his life, on the eve of the war, when he addressed a meeting in the People's House in Brussels. This was absolutely true, and gives the psychological explanation for the indignation of the French Socialists when this criminal war was forced upon their country. But this fact was not sufficient to

determine the socialist position of the world war as a historic occurrence.

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Imperialism is not the creation of any one or any one group of states. It is the product of a particular stage of ripeness in the world development of capital, an innately international condition, an indivisible whole, that is recognizable only in its relationships, and from which no nation can voluntarily withdraw. From this point of view only is it possible to understand the question of "national defense" in the present war correctly.

Let us assume for a moment for the sake of argument, for the purpose of investigating this phantom of "national wars" that controls Social Democratic politics at the present time, that in one of the belligerent states, the war at its outbreak was purely one of national defense. Military success would immediately demand the occupation of foreign territory. But the existence of influential capitalist groups, interested in imperialistic annexations, will awaken expansionistic appetites as the war goes on. The imperialistic tendency that, at the beginning of hostilities, may have been existent only in embryo, will shoot up and expand in the hothouse atmosphere of war until they will, in a short time, determine its character, its aims and its results. Furthermore the system of alliances between military states that has ruled the political relations of these nations for decades in the past, makes it inevitable that each of the belligerent parties, in the course of war, should try to bring its allies to its assistance, again purely from motives of self-defense. Thus one country after another is drawn into the war, inevitably new imperialistic circles are touched and others are created. Thus England drew in Japan, and spreading the war into Asia, has brought China into the circle of political problems and has influenced the existing rivalry between Japan and the United States, between Mexico and Japan, thus heaping up new material for future conflicts. Thus Germany has dragged Turkey into the war, bringing the question of Constantinople, of the Balkans and of Western Asia directly into the foreground of affairs. Even he who did not realize at the outset that the world war, in

its causes, was purely imperialistic, cannot fail to see after a dispassionate view of its effects that war, under the present conditions, automatically and inevitably develops into a process of world division. This was apparent from the very first. The wavering balance of power between the two belligerent parties forces each, if only for military reasons, in order to strengthen its own position, or in order to frustrate possible attacks, to hold the neutral nations in check by intensive deals in peoples and nations, such as the German-Austrian offers to Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece on the one hand and the English-Russian bids on the other. Finally the fact that all modern capitalist states have colonial possessions that will, even though the war may have begun as a war of national defense, be drawn into the conflict from purely military considerations, the fact that each country will strive to occupy the colonial possessions of its opponent, or at least to create disturbances therein, automatically turns every war into an imperialistic world conflagration.

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In view of all these considerations, what shall be the practical attitude of the Social Democracy in the present war. Shall it declare: since this is an imperialistic war, since we do not enjoy Socialist self-determination, its existence or non existence is of no consequence to us, and we will surrender it to the enemy? Passive fatalism can never be the role of a revolutionary party, like the Social Democracy. It must neither place itself at the disposal of the existing class state, under the command of the ruling classes, nor can it stand silently by to wait until the storm is past. It must adopt a policy of active class politics, a policy that will whip the ruling classes forward in every great social crisis, and that will drive the crisis itself far beyond its original extend. That is the role that the Social Democracy must play as the leader of the fighting proletariat. Instead of covering this imperialistic war with a lying mantle of national self-defense, the Social Democracy should have demanded the right of national self-determination seriously, should have used it as a lever against the imperialistic war. Yes, Socialists should defend their country in great historical crises. And here lies the great fault of the

German Social-Democratic Reichstag group. When it announced on the 4th of August, "In this hour of danger, we will not desert our fatherland," it denied its own words in the same breath. For truly it has deserted its fatherland in its hour of greatest danger. The highest duty of the Social Democracy toward its fatherland demanded that it expose the real background of this imperialistic war, that it rend the net of imperialistic and diplomatic lies that covers the eyes of the people. It was its duty to speak loudly and clearly, to proclaim to the people of Germany that in this war victory and defeat would be equally fateful, to oppose the gagging of the fatherland by a state of seige, to demand that the people alone decide on war and peace, to demand a permanent session of Parliament, for the period of the war, to assume a watchful control over the government by parliament, and over parliament by the people, to demand the immediate removal of all political inequalities, since only a free people can adequately govern its country, and finally, to oppose to the imperialist war, based as it was upon the most reactionary forces in Europe, with the program of Marx, of Engels and Lassalle.

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The great historical hour of the world war obviously demanded a unanimous political accomplishment, a broadminded, inclusive attitude that only the Social Democracy is destined to give. Instead there followed, on the part of the parliamentary representatives, of the working class, a miserable collapse. The Social Democracy did not adopt the wrong policy—it had no policy whatsoever. It has wiped itself out completely as a class party with a world conception of its own, has delivered the country, without a word of protest, to a fate of imperialistic war without, to the dictatorship of the sword within. Nay, more, it has taken the responsibility for the war upon its own shoulders. The declaration of the "Reichstag group" says: "We have voted only the means for our country's defense. We decline all responsibility for the war." But as a matter of fact, the truth lies in exactly the opposite direction. The means for 'national defense,' i. e., for imperialistic mass butchery by the armed forces of the military

monarchy were not voted by the Social Democracy. For the use of the war credits did not in the least depend upon the Social Democracy. They, as a minority, stood against a compact three-quarter majority of the capitalistic Reichstag. The Social-Democratic group accomplished only one thing by voting in favor of the war credits. It placed upon the war the stamp of democratic fatherland defense, supported and sustained the fictions that were propagated by the government concerning actual conditions and problems of the war.

"But what action should the party have taken to give to our opposition to the war and to our war demands weight and emphasis? Should it have proclaimed a general strike? Should it have called upon the soldiers to refuse military service? Thus the question is generally asked. To answer with a simple yes or no were exactly as ridiculous as to decide 'when war breaks out we will make a revolution.' Revolutions are not 'made' and great movements of the people are not produced according to technical recipes that repose in the pockets of the party leaders. Small circles of conspirators may organize a riot for a certain day and a certain hour, can give their small group of supporters the signal to begin. Mass movements in great historical crises cannot be initiated by such primitive measures. The best prepared mass strike may break down miserably at the very moment when the party leaders give the signal, may collapse completely before the first attack. The success of great popular movements depends, aye, the very time and circumstance of their inception is decided by a number of economic, political and psychological factors. The existing degree of tension between the classes, the degree of intelligence of the masses and the degree of ripeness of their spirit of resistance—all these factors that are incalculable, are premises that cannot be artificially created by any party. That is the difference between great historical upheavals, and the small show-demonstrations that a well disciplined party can carry out in times of peace, orderly, well-trained performances, responding obediently to the baton in the hands of the party leaders. The great historical hour itself creates the forms that will carry the revolutionary movement to a successful outcome, creates and im-

provides new weapons, enriches the arsenal of the people with weapons unknown and unheard of by the parties and its leaders.

What the Social Democracy as the advance guard of the class-conscious proletariat should have been able to give was not ridiculous precepts and technical recipes, but a political slogan, clearness concerning the political problems and interests of the proletariat in times of war.

“Would the masses have supported the Social Democracy in its attitude against war?” That is a question that no one can answer. But neither is it an important one. Did our parliamentarians demand an absolute assurance of victory from the generals of the Prussian army before voting in favor of war credits? What is true of military armies is equally true of revolutionary armies. They go into the fight, wherever necessity demands it, without previous assurance of success. At the worst, the party would have been doomed, in the first few months of the war to political ineffectuality. It would have accomplished nothing but to save the honor of the proletariat; and thousands upon thousands of proletarians who are dying in the trenches in mental darkness, would not have died in spiritual confusion, but with the one certainty that that which has been everything in their lives, the international, liberating Social Democracy, has been more than the figment of a dream.

The voice of our party would have acted as a wet blanket upon the chauvinistic intoxication of the masses. It would have preserved the intelligent proletariat from delirium, would have made it more difficult for Imperialism to poison and to stupefy the minds of the people.

And as the war went on, as the horror of endless massacre and bloodshed in all countries grew and grew, as its imperialistic hoof became more and more evident, as the exploitation of blood-thirsty speculators became more and more shameless, every live, honest, progressive and humane element in the masses would have rallied to the standard of the Social-Democracy. The German Social-Democracy would have stood, in the midst of this mad

whirlpool of collapse and decay, like a rock in a stormy sea, would have been the lighthouse of the whole International, guiding and leading the labor movements of every country of the earth. The unparalleled moral prestige that lay in the hands of the German Socialists would have reacted upon the Socialists of all nations in a very short time. Peace sentiments would have spread like wildfire and the popular demand for peace in all countries would have hastened the end of the slaughter, would have decreased the number of its returns.

Truly this was a task not unworthy of the disciples of Marx, Engels and Lassalle.

Germany, the Liberator

By LUDWIG LORE

How quickly the human mind forgets! For should we otherwise have believed the peace protestations of the German Government and the assurances of German government socialists? Should we otherwise have allowed them so completely to lull our suspicions that we forgot the things that had gone before, that the disclosure of German imperialism in all its shameful nakedness, that the true significance of its role as "liberator" of the Baltic Provinces should strike us like a bolt from the clear blue sky?

How was it possible that we should have forgotten the words of the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, when he declared in the Reichstag on the 5th of April, 1916: "Even Mr. Asquith has emphasized the principle of nationalities. If he does this, putting himself in the place of an unconquered and unconquerable nation, can he really assume that Germany would ever return to the dominion of reactionary Russia the peoples between the Baltic Sea and the Swamps of Volhynia, whether they be Poles or Lithuanians, Balts or Letts, that Germany and its Allies have liberated?" In the same speech the Chancellor showed that the German nation would have to recreate boundaries in the East.

In September, 1914, the psychologist Professor Wilhelm Wundt had demanded the liberation of the Baltic Provinces. And Ernst Haeckel, whom the war has shown to be little better than a small minded chauvinist had spoken in the same year in a similar tone. Then came the victories on the Russian front and the occupation of Courland. In May, 1915, petitions were circulated by the six great German manufacturers' association with the active assistance of the ever servile German professors. The literature on the Baltic question became more and more voluminous, until finally the official leader of the German nation took an open stand on the side of the "liberators."

On the 12th of December, 1916, the German Chancellor sent up the first dove of peace. Germany desired an honorable peace. It made no demands from other nations, but insisted, equally, upon the inviolability of its own possessions. It was left to the world to interpret the German declaration. But on the very next day Professor Hans Delbrueck, the famous historian and editor of the "Preussische Jahrbücher," published an article in the "Tag," in which he declared the German peace proposals to be a stroke of genius, and acceptable to every nation of Europe. But then he added: "I will not go into detail, but will only say that I can see but one factor that will probably arouse violent opposition, upon which we, nevertheless, must absolutely insist. That is Courland."

In a meeting of the "Unabhängigen Ausschuss für einen deutschen Frieden," on January, 1917, the conservative Reichstags-deputy, Count Westarp, declared, amid general applause, that Germany needs new farmland in the East for colonization purposes. He declared Courland to be a more valuable war aim than the independent Polish Kingdom. The national-liberal leader Fuhrmann in the Prussian Diet declared in February, 1917: "A statesman who would emerge from this war without Briey, Longwy, without Belgium, Courland and Lithuanian possessions, would go down as the grave digger of German power and German greatness."

At that time, only Courland was in German hands. Livonia and Esthonia had still to be overpowered. Dr. Paul Rohrbach devoted a special brochure, "The Struggle for Livonia" to this noble purpose and was seconded by Dr. Richard Pohle. Indeed the latter outlined, in the 12th of January number of the "Deutsche Politik" a plan for the subjugation of Russia by separating it from the Baltic Sea. Russia's weakest point, he declared, is on the shores of the Baltic. It is here we must concentrate our forces to cut off Russia from the rest of Europe. And today Germany is acting according to this plan.

The Baltic Provinces must become German—on this all were agreed. The word "liberated" served merely to cover up a disgraceful piece of imperialistic robbery.

But what were the Germans to liberate? How numerous is the German population in the Baltic Provinces? These provinces, Courland, Livonia and Esthonia, cover an area of 90,000 square kilometres and, according to the census of 1897, have a population of 2,386,015. Divided among the various nationalities there are 1,070,295 Letts, 884,553 Estonians, 165,627 Germans, 128,789 Russians, 62,686 Jews, 36,657 Poles, 23,211 Lithuanians and 14,897 of other nationalities.

The masses in these provinces are the Letts and the Estonians. The Germans and the Russians are but a small percentage of the whole population of Courland: The Germans 6.9%, the Russians 5.4%. In the country districts the Letts make up 95% of the agrarian population. The Estonians occupy the government of Esthonia and North Livonia to Walk. The Letts live in South Livonia and in Courland. Besides, there are approximately 400,000 Letts in three counties of the Government of Vitebsk that border upon Livonia and Courland. Considering that the population has increased materially since 1897, the sum total of Letts will amount to about 1,800,000, of Estonians 1,200,000, of Germans 180,000.

Even in the cities that are generally regarded as German, the German population is in the minority. In Riga, for instance, in 1897, the Germans made up only 23.8% of the total population, in 1913 only 13%; in Libau in 1897, 18%, in 1911 11.5%, in 1913, 9.7%. There is not a single city in these provinces in which the German population makes up even one-third of the total population.

The Baltic Provinces, therefore are not German country. Not only in the agrarian sections, but even in the cities the German population is in the decided minority.

The Baltic Provinces are at the present time economically and culturally undoubtedly the most highly developed part of Russia. In the last 50 to 60 years the Baltic Provinces, particularly their Lettish parts, have developed into a modern capitalist country. Intensive agricultural cultivation goes hand in hand with highly developed industrial and commercial acti-

vities. In 1910, 114,800 workers were employed in 782 factories, producing goods valued at 796,726,000 Rs. These products were exported almost exclusively into Russia. The Baltic harbor cities of Riga, Libau, Mitau are the outlets of the great North and Central Russian Hinterland.

The rapid growth of the Baltic cities is a direct outcome of this industrial development. Thus, in a few decades, Riga has developed into a modern city with 530,000 inhabitants. Dvinsk and Libau have 100,000, Mitau and Windau 32,000 inhabitants.

Their favorable geographical situation was partly responsible for this development. In the economic development of Russia, Lettland plays the role of the industrial Vorderland and serves moreover as a trading and commercial centre for a part of the great Hinterland of Russia. Culturally the country is on a high level, not only higher than any other Russian province, but even higher than that of the Austrian ally of its "liberator." In 1897, 79% of the inhabitants were able to read and write. The illiterate in these provinces are mostly the Jews, Russians and Lithuanians. The Germans, Letts and Estonians are usually literate. And since then conditions have improved to a marked degree. It is noteworthy, that of 2644 noblemen between the ages of ten and sixty, 252, i. e. 9% were unable to read. Among the Lettish farmers of the same age there were only 6.5% alphabets.

The German minority is the ruling class in the Baltic Provinces. In the agrarian sections they are the nobility, the great landowners, in the cities they make up the manufacturing and commercial classes. The Letts and the Estonians are the farmers and farmworkers, the small tradesmen, the factory-workers, and the professionals in the cities. To be sure, there are also Lettish and Esthonian landowners and factory-owners, but they form an exceedingly small minority.

The German nobility that has not been clamoring for liberation for the past two centuries, has been the most dependable support of the Czarist government. Nothing was too low, nothing too brutal for this junker-gang, they were the most subser-

vient tools of the Russian aristocracy. The large landholders, moreover, are a powerful political factor. They hold a number of medieval political privileges and are the sole rulers in the provincial Diets. The Baltic nobility is on a level with its brother in Prussia, it belongs to the cast of overlords who thrive only in an atmosphere of brutal suppression.

But we must not be too unjust to the Baltic nobility—after all it is not much worse than the Baltic-German bourgeoisie, which also has become in the decades that have passed, thoroughly reactionary and conservative. The German bourgeoisie has always shown a remarkable affinity with the Russian bureaucracy.

The masses of the people are staggering under a double yoke, that of the junkers and that of the Russian bureaucracy. The former are the exploiters, the latter the political and national oppressors. And here it should be remembered that the German nobleman was frequently a Russian official as well, and active in both capacities.

The Letts and the Esthonians, particularly the latter, have developed culturally very rapidly in the last two decades. Political and social questions play an important part in their existence. A spirit of democracy has taken complete possession of these nations and as the foundation of this democracy was the movement of the modern proletariat, the Lettish Social-Democracy has become the spokesman of the Lettish people in the fullest sense of that term.

The important work done by the Lettish Social-Democracy in the Revolution of 1905 is well known; and not less notorious is the shameful role that was played by the Baltic nobility in the counter-revolution. Never has a national group so degraded itself as did these German Balts, never has a small people deserved greater honor, shown more remarkable bravery and fidelity to its principles than did the Lettish Socialists.

The punitive expeditions of Rennenkamp and Co. alone shot 1200 Letts without trial or investigation, and thousands were exiled for their political faith. To be "freed" by such scoundrels and their ilk in Germany is bitter indeed.

Nothing lies further from the Letts than the desire for a union with Germany; industrially and politically they belong to Russia, to the Free Russia, which they have helped to build up and to create, to the Russia for which they have bled and suffered.

The statement of the German chancellor that Courland and Lithuania will be granted self-government will nowhere meet with serious consideration. The Baltic Provinces are necessary for the political strengthening of the conservative junker element, and for the imperialistic interests of capital, and they will be blessed with a system of self-government closely resembling that of the former kingdom of Hannover and the grandduchy of Brunswick. They are to become vassal states—not even of Germany—but of Prussia.

This makes the fulfillment of the demands made by the Letts of the Russian government impossible at the very outset. On the contrary, the very oppression against the Letts so vehemently protested in Russia, will come, in an aggravated form, under German "self-government."

In the Revolution of 1905 that was forcibly crushed by the German Baltic junkers and the Russian bureaucrats the Letts demanded:

1. Abolition of the privileges of the Baltic nobility.
2. Abolition of forcible rule and oppression at the hands of the Russian bureaucracy.
3. Introduction of democracy in all social-political institutions.
4. National equality and political self-government within the Russian nation.

After the world war broke out the Letts again reiterated these demands, national freedom, national equality and self-government being even more prominently emphasized than before. The Lettish people have never sought the solution of their national problem in a separation from Russia, but in its democratization. Their struggle has always been directed against Russian reaction, not against Russia as a state. Nowhere have the Lettish people advocated separation from Russia, at no time has it raised its voice in favor of German annexation. Every statement to the

contrary emanating from German press agents is based upon lies and falsifications. The entire Lettish people was as one in its opposition against a German war of "liberation." The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Lettish Social-Democracy, in 1915, protested against the German plan of annexation and the Lettish Committee in Switzerland likewise denounced the speech of the German Chancellor that we have quoted above in the name of the Lettish people.

Just before the occupation of Riga the fifth congress of the Social-Democracy of Lettland, meeting in the palace of Riga, adopted a resolution concerning the future fate of the Lettish nation. The resolution contains the following main declarations:

"The fifth congress of the Social-Democracy of Lettland fundamentally recognizes:

1. That the free development of capitalism and the interest of the proletarian class struggle demand the political autonomy of large territorial units;
2. That this inevitable historic and capitalistic tendency must be founded upon a strictly democratic basis: democratic centralization.

"In view of the peculiar conditions in Russia—the fact that Russia has only just freed itself from bureaucratic centralization; the largeness of its territory; its enormous population (170,000,000) and the large number of separate nationalities within the Russian nation (over 100); the fact that the industrial and cultural development and the percentage of the proletariat in Russia is smaller than in Lettland—in view of all these facts the Congress of the Lettish Social-Democracy finds itself under the necessity of modifying the generally recognized principle of democratic centralization.

"The Congress recognizes the dangers that an extreme separatist policy bears for democracy, and therefore favors an intimate union with Russia, demanding, at the same time, the fullest democratization of Russia. In consequence of these fundamental considerations the Congress has adopted the following resolutions concerning the future of Lettland:

"In the interest of the Lettish proletariat the fifth Congress of the Lettish Social-Democracy stands most emphatically for a unified, undivided Lettland (i. e., a unit comprising Livonia, Courland and Latgale, the Lettish portion of the Government of Witebsk) and categorically demands Lettland's political autonomy, i. e., full local control in all industrial, political, and administrative questions.

"However the war may end, the fifth Congress of the Lettish Social-Democracy, moved, above all, by the interests of the Lettish proletariat, demands the absolute unification of Lettland. The Social-Democracy will guard the unified Lettish nation from being sacrificed to the imperialism of the world powers.

"The Social-Democracy of Lettland demands that the decision over the future and the international position of Lettland remain alone with the inhabitants of Lettland. Every attempt to gamble with our fate will meet with the most determined and most bitter opposition of the Lettish Social-Democracy."

This attitude is the natural outgrowth of the historic past, of the economic conditions of the present and the political outlook for the future of the Baltic peoples. They have accumulated a hatred against the Baltic nobility that is as bitter as it is justifiable; a hatred so intense that they would certainly refuse to submit to a new brand of junker rule. Their present economic interests bind them indissolubly to Russia, while the political development of Russia, its political maturity, its proven revolutionary fighting spirit have always assured the Lettish people that Russia will be politically democratized more rapidly and more thoroughly than the German working-class under the infamous leadership of Scheidemann, David, Lensch and Legien. The Lettish Social-Democracy has not suffered and fought for years for the privilege of living as subjects of the third class under Prussian rule, to labor as productive farm hands for Prussian junkers, to die as useful troops in future wars of German imperialism.

The Federated Russian Republic as conceived by the Bolsheviks, and in the aspirations of the Finnish revolutionists, as it was

and is demanded by the Socialists of every other national group of Russia, is and must be the aim of the Lettish, Polish, Lithuanian and Esthonian Socialists.

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It is the fate of every great world empire, that it carries in its body the germs that will cause its own destruction. The population of the Baltic Provinces are neither the priest-ridden folk of Alsace-Lorraine, nor the ignorant, downtrodden Polish masses of Upper Silesia. Will the Hohenzollern be more successful in subduing a people that even the Tsar, with all his ruthlessness, could never succeed in taming, especially since the decree of economic development of Germany at the outset makes the application of old Russian methods impossible?

The revolutionary movement of Greater Germany will acquire in the Baltic proletariat a tried, trained, self-sacrificing body of fighters that knows no compromise with bourgeoisie and government-bureaucracy.

When the Socialist Letts, Esthonians, Lithuanians have become a part of the German Social-Democracy there will be no suspension of the class-struggle, no civil peace in Germany.

The State in Russia—Old and New

The Farce of Dual Authority

By LEON TROTZKY

The war conditions are twisting and obscuring the action of the internal forces of the revolution. But none the less the course of the revolution will be determined by these same internal forces, namely, the classes.

The revolution which had been gathering strength from 1912 on, was, at first, broken off by the war, and later, owing to the heroic intervention of an exasperated army, was quickened into an unprecedented aggressiveness. The power of resistance on the part of the old regime had been once for all undermined by the progress of the war. The political parties who might have taken up the function of mediators between the monarchy and the people, suddenly found themselves hanging in the air, owing to powerful blows from below, and were obliged at the last moment to accomplish the dangerous leap to the secure shores of the revolution. This imparted to the revolution the outward appearance, for a time, of complete national harmony. For the first time in its entire history the bourgeois liberalism felt itself "bound up" with the masses—and it is this that must have given them the idea of utilizing the "universal" revolutionary spirit in the service of the war.

The conditions, the aims, the participants of the war did not change. Guchkov and Milyukov, the most outspoken of the imperialists on the political staff of the old régime, were now the managers of the destinies of revolutionary Russia. Naturally the war, the fundamental character of which remained the same as it had been under Czarism—against the same enemies, with the same allies, and the same international obligations—now had to be transformed into a "war for the revolution." For the capitalist classes, this task was equivalent to a mobilization of the revolution, and of the powers and passions it had stimulated, in the interests of Imperialism. The Milyukovs magnanimously consented to call the "red rag" a sacred emblem—if only the working

masses would show their readiness to die with ecstasy under this red rag, for Constantinople and the Straits.

But the imperialistic cloven hoof of Milyukov was sticking out too plainly. In order to win over the awakened masses and guide their revolutionary energy into the channel of an offensive on the external front, more intricate methods were required—but chiefly, different political parties were needed, with platforms that had not yet been compromised, and reputations that had not yet been sullied.

They were found. In the years of counter-revolution, and particularly in the period of the latest industrial boom, capital had subjected to itself, and had mentally tamed many thousands of revolutionists of 1905, being in no wise concerned about their laborite or Marxist "notions." And among the "socialistic" intelligentsia there were therefore rather numerous groups whose palms were itching to take part in the checking of the class struggle, and the training of the masses for "patriotic" ends. Hand in hand with this intelligentsia, which had been brought into prominence in the counter-revolutionary epoch, went the compromise-workers, who had been frightened definitely and finally by the failure of the 1905 revolution, and had since then developed in themselves the sole talent of being agreeable to all sides.

The opposition of the bourgeois classes to Czarism—upon an imperialistic foundation, however, had, even before the revolution, provided the necessary basis for a *reproachment* between the opportunist socialists and the propertied classes. In the Duma, Kerensky and Cheidze built up their policy as an annex to the progressive *bloc*, and the Gvozdyevs and Bogdanovs merged with the Guchkovs on the War Industry Committees. But the existence of Czarism made an open advocacy of the "government"—patriotism standpoint very difficult. The revolution cleared away all the obstacles of this nature. Capitulating to the capitalist parties was now called "a democratic unity," and the discipline of the bourgeois state suddenly became "revolutionary discipline," and finally, participation in a capitalist war was looked upon as a defence of the revolution from external defeat.

This nationalistic intelligentsia, which Struve had prognosticated, invoked, and trained, in his paper, *Vyekhi*, suddenly met with an unexpectedly generous support in the helplessness of the most backward masses of the people, who had been forcibly organized as an army.

It was only because the revolution broke out in the course of a war, that the *petit bourgeois* elements of city and country at once automatically took on the appearance of an organized force, and began to exert, upon the *personnel* of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, which won an influence which would have been far beyond the powers of these scattered and backward classes in any but war times. The menshevist-populist intelligentsia found in this great number of backwoods, provincial, for the most as yet hardly awakened persons, a support that was at first entirely natural. By leading the *petit bourgeois* classes on to the path of an agreement with capitalist liberalism, which had again beautifully demonstrated its inability independently to guide the masses of the people, the menshevist-populistic intelligentsia, through the pressure of these masses, acquired a certain position even among the proletarian sections, which had been momentarily relegated to a secondary position by the numerical impressiveness of the army.

It might at first seem that all class contradictions had been destroyed, that all social fixtures had been patched up with fragments of a populist-menshevist ideology, and that, thanks to the constructive labors of Kerensky, Cheidze, and Dan, a national *Burgfrieden* had been realized. Therefore, the unparalleled wonderment when an independent proletarian policy again asserted itself, and therefore the savage, in truth disgusting wail against the revolutionary socialists, the destroyers of the universal harmony.

The *petit bourgeois* intelligentsia, after it had been raised, by the formation of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, to heights for which it was itself entirely unprepared, was frightened more by the idea of responsibility than by anything else, and therefore respectfully handed over their power to the capitalist-feudal government which had issued forth from the womb of the Duma of the Third of June. The organic terror of the *petit bour-*

geois in the presence of the sanctity of state power, which was perfectly transparent in the case of the populists (laborites), was veiled, in the case of the menshevik-patriots, by doctrinaire notions as to the inadmissibility of having socialists assume the burden of power in a bourgeois revolution.

Thus there came about the "dual authority," which might with much more truth be termed a *Dual Impotence*. The capitalist bourgeoisie assumed authority in the name of order and of a war for victory; yet, without the Soviet of Deputies, it could not rule; the latter's relation to the government was that of an awed half-confidence, combined with a fear lest the revolutionary proletariat, in some unguarded gesture, might upset the whole business.

The cynically provocative foreign policy of Milyukov brought forth a crisis. Being aware of the full extent of the panic in the ranks of the *petit bourgeois* leaders when confronted with problems of power, the bourgeois party began availing itself, in this domain, of downright blackmail: by threatening a government strike, i. e., to resign any participation in authority, they demanded that the Soviet furnish them with a number of decoy socialists, whose function in the coalition ministry was to be the general strengthening of the confidence in the government on the part of the masses, and, in this way, the cessation of "dual authority."

Before the pistol-point of ultimatum, the menshevik patriots hastened to slough off their last vestiges of Marxist prejudice against participation in a bourgeois government, and brought on to the same path the laborite "leaders" of the Soviet, who were not embarrassed by any supercargo of principle or prejudice. This was most manifest in the person of Chernov, who came back from "Zimmerwald, Kienthal," where he had excommunicated Vandervelde, Guesde, and Sembat out of Socialism—only to enter the ministry of Prince Lvoff and Shingariov. To be sure, the Russian menshevik patriots did point out that Russian ministerialism had nothing in common with French and Belgian ministerialism, being an outgrowth of very exceptional circumstances, as had been

foreseen in the Amsterdam resolution. Yet they were merely repeating, in parrot fashion, the argumentation of Belgian and French ministerialism, while they continued constantly invoking the "exceptional nature of the circumstances." Kerensky, under whose long-winded theatricality there is, nevertheless, some trace of reality, very appropriately classed the Russian ministerialism under the same category as that of Western Europe, and stated, in his Helsingfors speech, that thanks chiefly to him, Kerensky, the Russian socialists had in two months traveled a distance that it had taken the western socialists ten years to accomplish. Truly Marx was not wrong when he called revolution the locomotive of history!

The coalition government had been sentenced by History before it was established. If it had been formed immediately after the downfall of Czarism, as an expression of the "revolutionary unity of the nation," it might possibly have held in check, for a time, the external struggle of the forces of the revolution. But the first government was the Guchkov-Milyukov Government. It was permitted to exist only long enough to expose the full falsity of "national unity," and to awaken the revolutionary resistance of the proletariat against the bourgeois propaganda to prostitute the revolution in the interests of imperialism. The obviously makeshift coalition ministry could not, under these circumstances, stave off a calamity, it was itself destined to become the chief bone of contention, the chief source of schism and divergence in the ranks of "revolutionary democracy." Its political existence—for of its "activities" we shall not speak—is simply one long, dissolution, decently enveloped in vast quantities of words.

To contend against a complete breakdown on the economic, and, particularly, on the food-question side, the Economic Department of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates worked out a plan for an extensive system of state management in the most important branches of industry. The members of the Economic Department differ from the Political managers of the Soviet not so much in their political tendencies as in a serious acquaintance which the economic situation of the country. For this very reason they were led to con-

clusions of a profoundly revolutionary character. The only thing their structure lacks is the driving force of a revolutionary policy. The government, for the most part capitalistic, could not possibly give birth to a system that was diametrically opposed to the selfish interests of the propertied classes. If Skobeleff, the Minister of Labor, did not understand this, with his now proverbial "hundred per cent" talk, it was fully understood by the serious and efficient Konovalov, the representative of trade and industry.

His resignation was an irreparable blow to the coalition ministry. The whole bourgeois press gave unmistakable expression to this fact. Again began the exploitation of the panic terror of the present leaders of the Soviet: the bourgeoisie threatened to lay the babe of authority at their door. The "leaders" answered by making believe that nothing special had happened. If the responsible representative of capital has left us, let us invite Mr. Buryshkin. But Buryshkin ostentatiously refused to have anything to do with surgical operations on private property. And then began the search for an "independent" minister of commerce and industry, a man behind whom there stood nothing and nobody, and who might serve as an inoffensive letter-box, in which the opposing demands of labor and capital might meet. Meanwhile the economic expenses continue on their course, and the government activity assumed the form, chiefly, of the printing of *assignats*.

Having as his senior colleagues Messrs. Lvoff and Shingarov, it turned out that Chernov was prevented from revealing, in the domain of agrarian matters, even the radicalism in words only, which is so characteristic of this typical representative of the *petite bourgeoisie*. Fully aware of the role that was assigned to him, Chernov introduced himself to society as the representative, not of the agrarian revolution, but of agrarian statistics! According to the liberal bourgeois interpretation, which the socialist ministers also made their own, revolution must be suspended among the masses in a passive waiting upon the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and as soon as the social-revolutionists enter the ministry of the landholders and manu-

facturers, the attacks of the peasants against the feudal agricultural system are designated by the term anarchy.

In the field of international policy, the collapse of the "peace programs" proclaimed by the coalition government came about more swiftly and more catastrophically than could possibly have been expected. M. Ribot, the premier of France, not only categorically and unceremoniously rejected the Russian peace formula and pompously reiterated the absolute necessity of continuing the war until a "complete victory" should be gained, but also denied the patriotic French socialists their passports to the Stockholm Conference, which had been arranged with the cooperation of M. Ribot's colleagues and allies, the Russian socialist ministers. The Italian Government, whose policy of colonial conquest has always been distinguished by exceptional shamelessness, by a "Holy Egotism," replied to the formula of "a peace without annexations" with the separate annexation of Albania. Our government, and that includes the socialist ministers, held up for two weeks the publication of the answers of its allies, evidently trusting in the efficacy of such petty devices to stave off the bankruptcy of their policy. In short, the question as to the international situation of Russia, i. e., *the question of what it is that the Russian soldier should be ready to fight and die for*, is still just as acute as on the day when the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs was dashed from the hands of Milyukov.

In the Army and Navy Department, which is still eating up the lion's share of the national powers and of the national resources, the policy of prose and rhetoric holds undisputed sway. The material and psychological causes for the present condition of the army are too deep to be disposed of by ministerial poetry and prose. The substitution of General Brussilov for General Alekseyeff meant a change of these two officers, no doubt, but not a change in the army. The working up of the popular mind, and of the army, into an "offensive," and then the sudden dropping of this catchword in favor of the less definite catchword of a "preparation for an offensive," show that the Army and Navy ministry is as little capable of leading the nation to

victory, as Mr. Tereshchenko's Department was of leading the nation to—peace.

This picture of the impotence of the Provisional Government reaches its climax in the labors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which, to use the words of the most loyal Societ of Peasants' Delegates, "with partiality" filled the offices of the local administrations with the feudal landholders. The efforts of the active portion of the population gain for them the communal self-governments, by right of conquest, and, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, are immediately designated in the state-police jargon of the Dans, by the term *anarchy*, and are greeted by the energetic opposition of the government which, by its very composition, is fully protected against all energetic action when it is really of creative character.

In the course of the last few days, this policy of general bankruptcy has found its most repulsive expression in the Kronstadt incident. The vile and out and out corrupt campaign of the bourgeois press against Kronstadt, which is for them the symbol of revolutionary internationalism and of distrust in the government coalition, both of which are emblems of the independent policy of the great masses of the people, not only took possession of the government and of the Soviet leaders, but turned Tseretelli and Skobelev into ringleaders in the disgusting persecutions of the Kronstadt sailors, soldiers, and workers.

At a moment when revolutionary internationalism was systematically displacing patriotic socialism in the factories and workshops and among the soldiers at the front, the socialists in the ministry, obedient to their masters, were risking the hazardous game of overthrowing the revolutionary proletarian advance-guard with one single blow, and thus preparing the "psychological moment" for the session of the Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets. *To rally the peasant-petit-bourgeois democracy around the banner of bourgeois liberalism, that ally and captive of Anglo-French and American capital, politically to isolate and "discipline" the proletariat, that is now the principal task, in the realization of which the government bloc of mensheviks and social-revolutionaries is expend-*

ing all its energies. An essential part of this policy is found in the shameless threats of bloody repressions and the provocations of open violence.

The death-struggle of the coalition ministry began on the day of its birth. Revolutionary socialism must do everything in its power to prevent this death-struggle from terminating in the convulsion of civil war. The only way to do this is not by a policy of yielding and dodging, which merely wets the appetite of the fresh-baked statesmen, but rather a policy of aggressive action all along the line. We must not permit them to isolate themselves: we must isolate them. We must answer the wretched and contemptible actions of the Coalition Government by making clear even to the most backward among the laboring masses the full meaning of this hostile alliance which maskades publicly in the name of the revolution. To the methods of the proper-tied classes and of their menshevik-social-revolutionist appendage in dealing with the questions of food, of industry of agriculture, of war, we must oppose the methods of the proletariat. Only in this way can liberalism be isolated and a leading influence on the urban and rural masses be assured to the revolutionary proletariat. Together with the inevitable downfall of the present government will come the downfall of the present leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. To preserve the authority of the Soviet as a representative of the revolution, and to secure for it a continuance of its functions as a directive power, is now within the power only of the present minority of the Soviet. This will become clearer every day. The epoch of Dual Impotence, with the government not able and the Soviet not daring, is ineluctably culminating in a crisis of unheard of severity. It is our part to husband our energies for this moment, so that the question of authority may be met with in all its size.

Current Affairs

The new Danger: Peace by Negotiation

It is becoming increasingly evident from day to day that the reactionaries of the world are preparing to "negotiate" and conclude peace at the expense of Russia, and to strangle the Russian Revolution in the process of "peace"-making.

For nearly three years—in fact since Germany failed in her initial rush at the battle of the Marne—the ruling classes of the world were living on the horns of a terrible dilemma: To continue the war, which had become a war of attrition, was fraught with great danger, since a war of attrition made the governments of the belligerent countries more and more dependent upon the working class—not merely the working class in the trenches, but the working class not subject to military discipline, the working class on its own battlefield, the mine, mill, and factory. On the other hand a "stalemate" peace, a peace in which neither side gained anything, in which both sides come home from the field of battle empty-handed, was equally as dangerous, particularly for the aggressor in the conflict. The failure of the aggressor meant the failure, and therefore the futility of all militarism and of the institution and social groups which go with militarism and live by it. Hence the frantic efforts of both sides for "peace with victory" even on the part of those elements of the ruling classes on both sides of "no man's land" which would otherwise have preferred to live in peace and harmony with their brethren across the line. It was a case of *sauve qui peut*—each "national" ruling group trying to save its own skin at the expense of its rival in other belligerent camps.

Then the Russian Revolution suddenly broke upon the tedium and monotony of the "stale-mate" world, and things began to move with lightning rapidity.

The Russian Revolution which at first seemed nothing more than an attempt of the Russian people to "modernize" their

state by ridding it of the incubus of Czarism, soon turned out to be a danger to the entire existing order of things not only in Russia but the world over. The Conflagration which started in Petrograd in March, 1917, was threatening to spread far beyond the confines of Russia, reaching out even beyond the European continent and into the British Isles. Already there was a "maximalist" movement in Great Britain, which, although much more moderate in its demands and modest in its ambitions than its Russian namesake, was nevertheless quite beyond anything that was ever attempted by the English working class, at least not since the Chartist Movement. The very name of this movement had an ominous ring, and was evidently a Russian importation. There was also talk of the organization of "Workmen's Councils," and many other disquieting symptoms.

Under these circumstances it was only natural that the more "far-sighted" among the ruling classes in both belligerent camps should seek a way to compose their differences so as to be able to present "a united front" to the common enemy. Fortunately, the very presence of this common enemy which made "peace by negotiation" an imperative necessity from the point of view of the reactionaries of the world, also furnished the means of bringing it about to their entire and mutual satisfaction. The problem of how to get "peace with victory" without either side "breaking through" on the Western Front was solved;—nay, the quite impossible feat of both sides carrying home "the prize of victory," suddenly became possible: There is that great shaggy bear that suddenly broke loose from the chain by which it had been fettered for centuries, and which was now running amuck—a danger to all good people and civilized order. If he be felled—as of right he ought to be—there will be enough booty to go round. It is true that the duty of felling him will devolve upon our "German cousin," who will naturally keep the entire booty to himself and his immediate associates in the enterprise. But then the matter could be arranged by way of "compensations"—a mode of international plunder with which

"our betters" are quite familiar. That is quite easily fixed by "negotiation." Hence the demand from quite unexpected quarters for "peace by negotiation."

As a matter of fact the "negotiations" have already begun. And the demand now is to give these negotiations formal recognition and due sanction.

The negotiations began last summer. When the dangerous character of the Russian Revolution became apparent to those whose business it is to watch over the world and its destinies, a Bankers' International Peace Conference met secretly at Switzerland for the purpose of arranging a "peace by conciliation." That such a conference was held soon became known, and there were different versions current as to the "program" agreed to thereat. The true character of the program agreed upon by the conference was first revealed by Trotzky when he published the secret treaties of the Allies. Along with these treaties Trotzky published the secret reports of the Russian Chargè d'Affaires in Switzerland about this conference,—which revealed it as an attempt of the imperialists of both warring camps to "get together" on the basis of "taking it out" of the hide of the Russian Revolution.

The documents relating to this conference published by Trotzky consist of two telegrams of the Russian diplomatic representative in Switzerland to his Government, which, together, read as follows:

"In the local press there slipped through information that certain financiers of both the enemy camps lately had extensive conferences in Switzerland. The make-up and aims of the conference are being kept strictly secret. The certain participants were: Jacques Stern from the Netherland Bank of Paris, Tuchman from the Paris Branch of the Lloyd Bank, Fürstenberg, director of the German Disconto—Gesellschaft, also a director of the "Deutsche Bank" and a director of the Austrian "Austro Bank." Although the English have denied that they participated in the consultations, yet, on the 2d of September, Head-Director Bell of the Lloyd Bank, arrived here from London

under the pretext of establishing a branch in Switzerland. According to rumors, this basis of agreement was discussed: Return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and satisfaction for Italy. Nothing definite was established with regard to Russia, only propositions were expressed that the Central Powers could receive certain compensations in the East. The German participants in the negotiations especially insisted on the cession to Germany of the Baltic Region and on the independence of Finland."

"An influential Anglo-Jewish financier, who took part in the conference mentioned, stated that Germany's aim was to promote separatism in Russia so far as possible, so as to split her up into small states. For Germany it will be easy to conclude commercial treaties with weaker states (Lithuania, Courland, etc.) The maintenance of Russia's unity is equivalent to leaving her in the economic sphere of the Allies, which would be above all advantageous to America. For England the Russian market is not of special interest, because England is more occupied with her colonies and sea trade. Hence, for England, the splitting up of Russia into several small states seems acceptable, all the more so because in the event of Russia being weakened England would secure a free hand in Asia. In a dismembered Russia German industry and trade will find work for a long time to come. America's competition with Germany in the Russian market will be even more advantageous for England than the predominance of the influence of one or other of the two Powers. From the words of my informant it may be concluded that it was just these proposals which were the foundation for an exchange of views with the Germans at the conference in August and September. It can certainly be assumed that with the English, French, and German branches of the international financial clique a political agreement also has been concluded in this sense."

The next move in the game was Lord Lansdowne's famous "letter of conciliation" which surprised a world that likes to be surprised and fooled some people who long to be fooled. Just what those who know Lord Lansdowne best think of his real

aim and purpose is shown by the following statement of H. G. Wells in a recent article in the New Republic:

"Our Tories blundered into this great war, not seeing whither it would take them. In particular it is manifest now by a hundred signs that they dread the fall of monarchy in Germany and Austria. Far rather would they make the most abject surrender to the Kaiser than deal with a renascent republican Germany. The recent letter of Lord Lansdowne, urging a peace with German imperialism, was but a feeler from the pacifist side of this most un-English, and unhappily most influential section of our public life. Lord Lansdowne's letter was the letter of a peer who fears revolution more than national dishonor. But it is the truculent wing of this same anti-democratic movement that is far more active. While our sons suffer and die for their comforts and conceit, these people scheme to prevent any communication between the republican and socialist classes in Germany and the Allied population. At any cost this class of pampered and privileged traitors intend to have peace while the Kaiser is still on his throne. If not, they face a new world—in which their part will be small indeed. And with the utmost ingenuity they maintain a dangerous vagueness about the Allied peace terms, *with the sole object of preventing a revolutionary movement in Germany.*"

But the noble Lord does not worry very much over what radicals and socialists think of him. The reactionaries evidently believe that they have the situation well in hand, and they are growing bolder from day to day.

One of the first demands of the radicals and Socialists after the war broke out was for the abolition of secret diplomacy; and as the war was settling down to a war of attrition and the workers of the world were gaining in power against their governments this demand was gradually conceded by all belligerent governments, at least to the extent of doing it lip service. But now the collapse of Russia has emboldened the reactionaries the world over, and they therefore openly demand the restoration of the secret diplomatic conclave as a peace working engine. A secret conclave and a meeting of diplomats

will always be a secret conclave, is, of course absolutely indispensable for the proper arrangement of a "negotiated peace" at the expense of the Russian Revolution. It would never do to discuss such delicate matters at long range—say, in an exchange of views between Hertling speaking in Berlin in the presence of the Reichstag and the hearing of all the world, and Lloyd-George speaking under similar conditions in London.

Hence Chancellor Hertling's plaintive reference in his last speech to "the existing method of dialogue across the Channel and ocean," and his suggestion that instead of thus carrying on negotiations in the presence of the whole world "the responsible representatives of the belligerent powers should come together in an intimate meeting" for the discussion of the terms of peace. And Count Hertling's plea finds a sympathetic rejoinder in the breast of Lord Lansdowne who hastened to second it in a letter to the London Daily Telegraph—a letter which is truly remarkable for the brazen effrontery with which it is demanded that all the great questions for which, we have been told, the world has been bleeding for nearly four years, should be left to be settled at a Peace Conference of diplomats, which will have the task of confirming and perhaps working out in detail the agreements reached at "an intimate meeting" of gentlemen like Mr. Lansdowne who can be relied upon to discuss matters "confidentially." In commenting upon Chancellor Hertling's request for "an intimate meeting" Lord Lansdowne says:

"By 'intimate meeting' I understand Count von Hertling to mean a small and informal meeting, not of plenipotentiaries, but of persons authorized to discuss confidentially and without prejudice the possibility of a more formal conference. It is true, as Mr. Balfour has pointed out, that it was unwise to begin negotiations unless there is a certain amount of potential and preliminary agreement. But how is such preliminary agreement to be reached unless there are preliminary conversations?"

But how about the preliminary conversations now being carried on in the form of "dialogue across the Channel and ocean"—why cannot the preliminary agreement be reached by this method? Evidently because the noble Lord and his no less noble friend "across the Channel" want to discuss things that cannot be discussed except in a "small intimate meeting" of statesmen of a certain type—the Metternich-Bismarck type.

It is only at such a gathering, for instance, that a bargain could be struck that Germany take and keep what she can get from Russia and incidentally "reestablish order" in Russia for the good of all concerned, in consideration of her "reconsidering" the question of Alsace-Lorraine as a gift to France, while England keeps Mesopotamia and some other highly desirable portions of the habitable globe. It is only at such a conference that it could be arranged that Turkey should be compensated for the loss of Mesopotamia by grabbing Cis- or Transcaucasia, or perhaps both. And it is only at such a conference that "negotiations" could be conducted, for instance, for the return of Kiau-Chau by Japan to Germany, in exchange for permission to Japan to take and hold as much of Siberia as she thinks she can swallow.

And such a conference will be held and the nefarious work now in contemplation carried out, unless the working class steps in to prevent it.

It is therefore up to the working class to announce clearly and firmly that no "round table" conference will be permitted whether formal or informal, small or large, until the entire peace program, not only the principles but all of the essential terms of the future peace shall have been agreed upon in the presence and hearing of the entire world.

And to make assurance doubly sure, it would be well for the working class to announce its firm determination not to permit a peace at the expense of Revolutionary Russia; and that should the ruling classes attempt to force such a peace upon the world it will, if necessary, take the sword into its own hands and hold it until Revolutionary Russia is completely restored.

B.

Recall Berger

The election of Victor L. Berger, as one of the Delegates of the Socialist Party of this country to the contemplated International Socialist Peace Congress, is one of the most disgraceful things that have happened in the entire history of the party, and calculated to do it infinite harm. This action should be reversed as speedily as possible, and before the harm done shall have become irreparable.

In the entire membership of the Socialist Party there could hardly have been found another man so little suited for the task of delegate to an International Socialist Peace Congress than Victor Berger. In fact, his selection as one of the delegates casts reflection on the entire delegation, and is well calculated to give color to the accusation that the entire movement for the holding of an international Socialist Peace Congress is tinged with a pro-German bias, which is supposed to be the justification for the Government's refusal to issue passports to the delegates.

Ever since the outbreak of the great world-war, Victor L. Berger has been conspicuous in the advocacy of everything that tended to help the success of German arms, and in defending the worst excesses of German Imperialism. In so doing he has repudiated every principle of socialist internationalism; and has treated with the greatest contempt and contumely the anti-militaristic position and the peace professions of the Socialist Party of America. A born jingo, he has been a German jingo and an American jingo by turns—contriving a synthesis of the two which has become familiar under the name of Hearstism, an attempt to put American jingoism at the service of German Imperialism.

When the German cohorts succeeded in wiping Serbia off the map in the summer of 1915, Berger's Milwaukee Leader published an editorial eulogy of this enterprise, advocating the permanent Germanization of the Balkans, and approving highly of the action of Messrs. Scheidemann and Co. for supporting the Kaiser in his Balkan expedition. In order to make his

German imperialism more palatable to his Socialist readers. Mr. Berger assured them that the Kaiser's Balkan policy had been approved in advance by Karl Marx himself, and that Scheidemann and Co. in supporting that policy were carrying out the last will and testament of Karl Marx.

And when, a year later, Hearst and other jingoes—some American and some German, and some both—tried to embroil this country in war with Mexico, Berger loudly demanded war,—in defiance of the Socialist Party which was holding meetings protesting against such a war. Berger's enthusiasm for a Mexican adventure by the United States was so great that his then puppet in the Mayor's chair of Milwaukee ordered that the day when the Milwaukee National Guardsmen were to leave for the Mexican border be kept as a public holiday, so that the citizens of Milwaukee could give 'our boys' a proper send-off, for the expedition which Berger evidently believed would keep them employed in Mexico long and profitably. The Milwaukee Leader even went into the flag business so as to be able to supply its readers with American flags for the joyful occasion.

During the three and a half years that the great European conflict has lasted, there was not an occurrence, either in American or world politics, that Berger has appraised otherwise than from the point of view of German imperialism. When the German Socialists split into a Kaiser and anti-Kaiser party, he openly ranged himself on the side of the Kaiser Socialists, and in opposition to the Liebknecht group and the Independents.

When the Russian Revolution broke out—and it was feared at Berlin that it might lead to reorganization of Russia's military resources and a vigorous prosecution of the war by the new Russian Republic—Berger heaped abuse upon the Russian Revolutionists, informing them at the same time, however, that they could redeem themselves by making a separate peace with Germany, and advising them to lose no time in doing so.

During the terrible days of the last months of the "peace negotiations" between Russia and Germany, the Milwaukee

Leader did its best to discourage the fighting spirit of the Russian Revolutionists and their sympathizers in this country, searching for precedents in American Revolutionary history to justify a separate peace. In his zeal for a separate peace, he even went to the extent of praising the Bolsheviks—whom he hates and despises for their internationalism—when they seemed to be inclined towards a separate peace.

But all this is nothing in comparison to Mr. Berger's latest feat in "internationalism" à la Berlin and Potsdam.

When the world stood amazed and horror-stricken at the dismemberment of Russia by Germany and the strangling of the Russian Revolution by German Militarism, when Germany was actually marching her army into a defenseless country, into a country that has thrown away her arms, Berger actually came out with a defense of German Imperialism in its nefarious work of raping Russia and strangling the Revolution.

Whenever an extraordinary occasion arises and Mr. Berger wants to convey some special message to the world, he usually has himself interviewed, Hearst-fashion, by his own paper. Such an occasion arose when Germany started on her march into Esthonia after Russia threw away her arms. And Berger was equal to the occasion. On the same day that his paper brought the news of Germany's march into Esthonia, Washington's Birthday, he published an interview with himself on the front page of his paper, in which he frankly took German Imperialism under his protection and openly put his stamp of approval on what the Kaiser and his cohorts were doing in Russia.

"Creating independent states", Berger reported himself as saying, "is not annexing them to Germany."

"Poland, Courland, Lithuania, Esthonia, Livonia and Finland are to be independent states, which according to the London version means, that they are annexed to Germany. The average reader will not be able to make out the sense of this. At least we Socialists stand for the right of every nationality to assert itself and to live its own national life as far as this is

possible. No nation can do so without being independent in its own internal affairs.

"I fail to understand how Poland will become annexed to Germany by being declared an independent state, especially if the Polish speaking part of Austria and of Germany (Galicia and Posen) be included in that national unit.

"I fail to see how an independent Finland will mean that it is annexed to Germany. The same holds good for an independent Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia."

Thus does our American Scheidemann outdo his German original. For Philip Scheidemann did not have the gall to pretend that Germany was creating "independent states" out of dismembered Russia. This brazen approbation of the Kaiser's handiwork was left for his American representative. And as if in a desire to add insult to injury Berger hypocritically refers to a possible inclusion of Galicia and Posen in the new Polish "national unit", although there is not a man in Germany or out of it, that believes such a thing possible, and although Berger's own favorite Socialist Party in Germany has expressly declared itself against it.

And this is the man who is to represent the American Socialist movement at an International Socialist Peace Congress!

Berger should be recalled at once. And the Socialist Party locals who want their party represented at the International Socialist Peace Congress, whenever it comes, by a real Socialist and not a Hindenburg Socialist, should lose no time in moving for his recall.

B.

As we go to press, the news comes that Berger was indicted under the Espionage Act; this is unfortunate, as our sympathies are naturally with all those under prosecution by the government. But this must not deter us from doing our duty by the Party. The matter is entirely too important to permit such considerations to influence us in the least. We cannot permit the government to impose upon us undesirable leaders by indicting them.

Strategy and Conscience

In commenting upon the Italian debacle in a former issue of the CLASS STRUGGLE, we expressed the view that the Italian disaster was directly traceable to the nature and character of Italy's war-aims; and we ventured the opinion that the Allies are doomed to bad strategy so long as national selfishness dominates their outlook upon international affairs, thus determining their aims and objects in the present conflict.

We are glad to note that the view that there is an intimate relation between military strategy and political war-aims, in the sense that bad conscience in the matter of war-aims is directly productive of poor strategy on the battlefield, is gradually gaining ground and is now coming to be recognized even in some pro-war quarters in this country as well as abroad.

This is the view taken by the "New Republic" in an editorial article which appeared in one of its recent issues under the suggestive title of "The Price of Victory." In that article the "New Republic" says:

"The underlying cause of the military disasters of the Allies is not only multiplicity in military control, but divergence of political purpose. The attempts made to bring about military co-operation have failed or have insufficiently succeeded, because so many members of the alliance have cherished special political objects which seemed to them of more importance than the common object of defeating German military aggression. These special political objects, *which sometimes were as dubious as they were exclusive*, have had a decisive effect on the military policy of the several Governments. . . . And it was the pursuit of these special *national* objects which has not only prevented them from concentrating on their main job of defeating the German army, but which exposed their military forces to one triumphant German attack after another."

The "New Republic" then points out that the Russian defeat in 1915, the Rumanian defeat of 1916, and the Italian defeat of 1917, were all due to bad strategy directly traceable to those

countries' bad war-aims, and proceeds to draw the following lesson from the misfortunes of the Allies during the three years of the world-war:

"Surely the moral of these repeated defeats, all associated with the pursuit by members of the Allied coalition of special political objects, speaks for itself. Centralization of military control must be born of unity of political purpose. The Allies have not been able to concentrate their armed forces on the all-important object of annihilating German military power, because they cherished different and in some respects *divergent opinions as to the political objects for which a general victory should be used*. . . . Not until these special political objects have been subordinated to the attainment of political objects which all the Allies share in common, will a political condition be brought into existence favorable to the effective and triumphant co-operation of the Allied armies."

All of which is undoubtedly well said. But, we are afraid, to no purpose whatsoever so long as people remain steeped in nationalism—and therefore consider it the highest virtue to work for "national interests," "national objects," and "national ideals."

It is utterly absurd to tell the Italians that they ought to subordinate their *national* objects in this war to some common Allied object, be it that of "defeating German military aggression" or anything else. The Italians have nothing against "German military aggression," and cannot therefore have any such "common" object with the other Allied nations. The Italian Government has for a generation past been closely associated with what we have since the war been wont to call "German militarism." It may or may not have approved of all of its ambitions and contemplated aggressions. But it certainly saw nothing morally wrong in them, until they crossed the path of its own "national objects," which, according to all accepted canons of national morality, are the highest good. In this connection it is well to remember that Italy remained quite unmoved by Germany's "aggressions" in Belgium, Northern France and elsewhere. She remained a calm, cool and calculating

observer for nearly a year after Belgium was invaded. And when she decided to enter the conflict, *it was not against Germany, but against Austria, her "national" foe*. If Italy could help it she would today be at war with Austria only, maintaining friendly relations with Germany, all of the latter's "aggressions" notwithstanding.

And what is true of Italy is true of all other countries. Italy simply being in the unfortunate situation of furnishing an object-lesson of "the true inwardness" of all "national objects." The form which these *objects* take may be different in the case of different nations—due to the different conditions under which they are placed—but their *real* character remains the same so long as they remain *national*. Should we, of this country, therefore, be inclined to assume superior airs toward Italy and attempt to lecture her for not subordinating her "national objects" to the so-called "common object" of the Allies—that of "defeating German military aggression"—she might turn the tables on us and retort *tu quoque*.

"Since when—Italy could say to us—had the defeat of 'German military aggression' become a 'common object' of yourself and the Allies? When the most striking—and *now* to you the most shocking—manifestation of German military aggression, the invasion of Belgium, took place, *you* remained calm and unaffected, even as I. Nay, more so: *You remained neutral in thought*, while I only remained neutral in deed. And it took you much longer than it took me to make up your mind that 'Germany's military aggressions' ought to be resisted. Now, I am not holding it up against you, I am only reminding you of it. We both looked with more or less equanimity—you with more than I—when Belgium was invaded, because that particular act of 'German military aggression' did not affect *our national interests*. Both of us stayed out of the war as long as *those* sacred interests dictated that policy. You stayed out longer, because your *national interests* remained longer unaffected by 'German military aggression.' That accursed thing has finally hit us both, and we are now fighting in common. But remember: For both of us 'the defeat of German military aggression'

is merely a means to an end—the end being the realization of our several national objects. Your national objects may be of a different kind than mine. Your situation makes you disinterested in the acquisition of territory, at least on my continent. Your national objects may be served by a defeat of Germany anywhere—of that you are the best judge. But you as well as I serve *nothing but national interests*, which is the proper thing for good and respectable nations to do. Only people like those terrible Russian revolutionists-internationalists can act for non-national interests, out of non-national motives, and for non-national ideas. Neither you nor I are ready for that. Not yet. *So it is useless to talk of subordinating national interests to common objects.*”

Such a rejoinder would be unanswerable. When the Russian Revolution asked for a revision of the treaties as a condition of its continuance in the war, it was this very thing that it was asking for: the giving up of *national objects* by the different countries of the anti-German alliance and the adoption of a *common object*, that of defeating German militarism, thereby securing to the world a just and lasting peace. *And it was not Italy alone that refused that demand.*

The truth, the sad truth, is that it is sheer nonsense to talk of giving up national objects in a world in which *national interests* are recognized as the *highest good* and the striving for the attainment of *national objects* the *highest duty*.

And so we must go on blundering, suffering defeat after defeat, until the world will wake up to a realization of the fact that a revaluation of all fundamental values is in order. B.

Documents for Future Socialist History

(Weekly People)

The Bolsheviki Rising

By Karl Kautsky

Now, for the first time in history the proletariat has conquered the governmental powers in an entire great state. Every rising on the part of the proletariat has ever hitherto been acclaimed by the Socialists of all countries with stormy jubilation. Thus lately even the Russian revolution in March. Consequently one ought now expect that the Bolsheviki's success should everywhere create in earnest an enthusiasm beyond all bounds.

Instead we meet, as far as we now can see, in wide circles of the Socialist International, the uneasy question: How will this end? And this is easily understood in view of the peculiar circumstances under which the rising took place and which are a consequence of the enormous difficulties with which the Russian Social Democracy is struggling for the present.

The population of Russia is still three-fourths agricultural, a great number are illiterates, agriculture is technically little developed, the system of communication utterly poor.

In this backward agrarian country, however, in a few industrial centers, which at the same time are the centers of Russia's political life, there have developed, on a large scale, entirely modern industrial enterprises, with a proletariat which, true enough, has not yet emancipated itself from the low cultural level of the peasant class from which it issued, yet at the same time is perfectly free from the bourgeois traditions with which the proletarians of Western Europe are afflicted, those who have already fought through so many bourgeois revolutions. The workingmen of France are today even dominated by the traditions of the great revolution; those of England are still in many respects enmeshed in the free trade radicalism methods of thinking. The leaders of the Russian proletariat, on the other hand, readily and thoroughly adopt the youngest and highest form of proletarian thought: Marxism; and through it the farthest advanced and most powerful strata of the Russian proletariat have been led forward on a road entirely Marxian.

It is these strata who carried to victory the revolution they still dominate.

Thus is explained the paradoxical in the situation; that a revolution, which according to the whole structure of the country can be

but a bourgeois and not a Socialist revolution, rests on a proletariat possessed of a far clearer class consciousness, and which has far more clearly realized its implacable antagonism to the bourgeois world, than any proletariat participating in any of Europe's earlier victorious revolutions.

To maintain their position in this paradoxical situation implies in itself a gigantic task on the part of the Russian Socialists. And now it is a question of accomplishing that task in the midst of the most terrible world war history has ever known.

The army that went to war with the 1905 traditions of defeat and dissolution has fallen asunder as a consequence of the long fruitless fighting, full of the most painful losses and humiliations. Only that made possible the revolution which was carried through by the army as much as by the civil population.

All rose in March against the regime of the Czar; some because it did not carry on the war vigorously and successfully; others because it carried on war at all. The latter constituted the great majority; to this category belonged the proletarians and the peasants as well as the great mass of the middle class. All longed for peace, peace the revolution would bring.

Among the pacifists, however, one could distinguish two currents, one crying for peace at any price in order to put a stop to the slaughter and hunger; another composed of men, who, while they in nowise underestimated the great significance of that endeavor and had an eye to the realization of political goals at the conclusion of peace; yet now rejected the peace of brutal Might, whether the consequences of such peace would fall on foreign peoples or on the people at home. They willed a peace that corresponds not only to the commandment of physical self-preservation, but also to the conditions requisite for the re-establishment and strengthening of international democracy and the political foundation for the proletarian struggle.

The Socialists who thought thus could not well agitate for a simple laying down of arms with no regard to whatever results might follow therefrom. But neither could they simply leave to the bourgeoisie the army.

In peace time it would have been conceivable that the Socialists would have contented themselves with the thought that Russia under existing conditions could not become a Socialist State, and that it would be enough for the nonce to make of her the world's freest bourgeois republic, with one of the farthest reaching social polity's

withal. That alone would have been an enormous gain not only for the Russian people, but for all peoples. But in the midst of war to abdicate to the bourgeoisie the power the proletariat had won in and through the war, that would have meant to turn over the army to the bourgeoisie and intrust it with the formulating of the war aims and the concluding of peace; it would have meant a conjuring forth of the danger of a useless prolongation of the war for anti-democratic annexationist purposes.

The very war which made so enormously difficult the position of all governments, which to an awe-inspiring extent aggravated the evils heaped up by the regime of Czarism, which heightened to the extreme the army's and the civil population's demands on the government and at the same time caused the means of satisfying those demands rapidly to shrink together—that very war compelled the Russian Socialists to exert themselves to the limit of their strength, in order to keep the bourgeoisie from establishing itself in supreme command.

To attain this, however, two roads were open, and it was over the question of which road to travel that the split of the Russian Socialist forces came about. The one wing, the Mensheviks, sought to circumscribe the all-powerfulness of the bourgeoisie through a coalition cabinet; the other the Bolsheviks, which aimed at the same goal through a dictatorship of the proletariat, which, true enough, had to derive support also from the revolutionary element of the peasantry. The Bolsheviks held forth the prospect of immediate peace if the proletariat alone were to take the government into its hands and with force keep the bourgeois elements down, incurring the risk, of course, of letting loose a civil war thereby.

The Bolshevik way of reasoning was the one most simple, the one that closely corresponded to the proletariat's position as a class. But also the one that threatened to aggravate to the extreme the antagonisms between the high aims of the proletariat and the low stage of development of the country.

The dictatorship of the proletariat means the inhibition of capitalist production. The capitalist mode of production becomes an impossibility under a proletarian regime. Is Russia already equipped to put in its place a Socialist mode of production? Besides, the Russian working class is neither sufficiently strong nor sufficiently developed to be able to take over the entire apparatus of government and supervise its needs. Therefore the danger lay close at hand that the proletarian regime would strive to dissolve the power of the state instead of conquering and reshaping it. And in that country, where a few advanced centers are in danger of being pulled down

by a backward majority out in the provinces it is quite possible that the threatening elements seek to retain their position by working for complete independence for the provinces, aye, for the communes, as for example the Bakunin adherents in Spain in the early seventies.

Thus, under the conditions of Russia's life, the dictatorship of the proletariat threatened to lead to the political and social dissolution of the country, to chaos, but thereby also to the moral bankruptcy of the revolution and a preparing of the way for a counterrevolution.

As a consequence of these fears, it happened that until now the Mensheviks held the upper hand in the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, although a bourgeois-proletarian coalition cabinet cannot possibly be a durable formation and cannot create anything great. The longer such a cabinet lasts the more must both classes, the one as well as the other, in view of the inherent antagonisms between them, come to lose confidence in the government, so that little by little the ground is pulled from under its feet. The Russian revolutionary cabinets were also only meant as provisional governments to bring about peace and call together the Constitutional Assembly. They could only perform their function on the condition that peace and the Constitutional Assembly were brought about quickly. The longer peace took in coming the more untenable the coalition became and all the faster grew the mass of Bolshevik adherents until they finally came into power.

Now we shall see whether the fears entertained regarding their advent were well grounded. In the matter of energy nothing is lacking. They count among their adherents very intelligent keen-sighted comrades. But the difficulties that lie in the actual conditions before them are enormously great. Should they succeed in overcoming them their success will carry in its train unheard-of consequences. It will mean the beginning of a new epoch in the world's history.

For the present nothing can be said with certainty regarding this, however.

That does in no wise imply, though, that the Russian events must leave us passive. Whatever the result may be, whether peace be brought about or the war prolonged, whether these events leave Russia a defenseless spoil to be disposed of according to pleasure, or whether the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks come out on top,—whatever the outcome may be these events signify to us a serious admonition to deliberate upon the question of making easier the situation for the Russian Proletariat.

Still we need do nothing more for the Russian revolution than just the fulfilling of our duties to the German proletariat, to the German

people. These duties resolve themselves into a peace according to our fundamental principles and the democratization of Germany.

Establishing the supremacy of the parliament is a step toward democratization, but alone and in and of itself insufficient. However great is the significance of the dependency of the government on the parliament, this makes for democratization only provided that hand in hand with this condition goes the growing dependency of parliament on the great mass of the people. A parliament that does not derive its support from the mass of the people is powerless. On the other hand, the people in a parliamentary state that leaves its fate exclusively in the hands of the parliament is likewise impotent.

Marx acknowledged the necessity for the parliament in modern politics, but just as much the necessity of pressure on the parliament from without. He who demands the supreme power be lodged in the parliament, but at the same time holds back the proletariat from all efforts to influence the parliament through methods corresponding to the nature of the proletariat as a class, he does not seriously desire the democratization of the (German) political system. His declarations of sympathy for the Russian revolution are consequently only hypocritical.

Sadly enough, the Socialistic elements which in this manner paralyze the proletariat at present—at a time so decisive as regards the future of the working class—they still dominate a number of important portions of the proletariat.

Only if events in Russia take a direction so that they carry with them all the proletarian masses of Western Europe will it be possible to overcome the paralyzing influence of these elements.

It were idle today to try to prophecy anything as regards this matter. We must be prepared for anything, the worst as well as the best.

(The Survey)

The British Miners and the War

An Interview with Robert Smillie, President of the Lanarkshire Miners' Union (Scotland), President of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, Chairman of the Triple Alliance of Railway Men, Transport Workers and Miners

Our experience in this country was that when war was declared it undoubtedly created an enormous amount of enthusiasm. Men of all ranks rushed to join the army, for what to them seemed the holiest cause that could be—the defense of small nations and treaties. Fathers and sons went together to recruiting offices, and fathers made misstatements about their ages in order to be accepted as recruits.

Moreover, there seemed to be a special desire to have miners on the part of the military authorities, who stated on many occasions that miners made the best class of soldiers. They had been used to facing dangers all their lives in mine work. The nature of the employment had developed them and made them strong. They did not require so much training as people who joined from sedentary employments. Within the first eighteen months about a quarter of a million miners joined the colors—or, roughly, 25 per cent of the mine workers.

We found so many miners leaving the mines, there was serious danger that a falling output of coal would interfere with the engineering and munitions works. A very large number of elderly men who had previously been miners came back to the pits, and a large number of outside laborers came in. In addition, some thousands of miners who either broke down in training or were wounded were sent back. The military authorities did not, however, return any Class A men, and the districts managed to keep up output with the additional labor mentioned.

It was evidently the intention of the military authorities and employers that soldiers coming back into the mines and into munition work should be under military discipline and should wear the uniform and work at soldiers' pay. The miners in conference decided that they would insist that these men should have full civilian rights, that they should have to be members of the trade union, and that they should not be used as strike breakers. The government agreed to this line, and the soldiers returned to the mines are in the same position as other workers.

All members of the miners' union who have gone to the front have been kept in full membership without payment while there, and will be accepted back in good standing on their return. All those who have come into the mines from the outside have, of course, linked up with the unions. (The present situation is that in probably 95 per cent of the coal mines of Great Britain all persons connected with mining labor must be members of the organization.) In the majority of the branches of the miners' federation the payment of six-pence per year to the union secures funeral benefits to the miner, his wife and children. Because of the number of miners who joined the army, the deaths at the front have been exceptionally heavy, and death claims have been paid out in all cases. This has been a serious drain on the unions, but as there have been no serious or widespread strikes, they are financially stronger than they were prior to the war. Including those at the front, they number 800,000 miners—60,000 or 70,000 higher than before the war. But no less than three hundred thousand have joined the forces. Since the falling off of the export coal trade the output of the mines is, of course, considerably under that of normal times, not because the individual miner has turned out less, but because there are less men engaged.

Previous to the war, miners usually sent one or two of their sons to learn a trade outside the industry; since the war, all boys of a miner's

family, generally speaking, have gone to the pits or are working on the surface. In Scotland the boys go right to the coal base as drivers; in other parts they go as trapper boys or pony drivers. At all conferences the miners are in favor of raising the minimum age to fifteen and sixteen, but during the war this has not been possible.

There are no women underground in any part of Great Britain, as was the case in the middle of the last century; but on the surface, in Lancashire and Scotland, there has been an increase since the war in the number of women employed to take the places of men and boys in clearing and manipulating coal on the surface. We insist that these women or young girls receive the same wages paid to the men or boys whose work they are doing, and in our last claim for an increase in wages the women got the full increase of nine shillings per week, secured by the men. In nearly all the mining districts outside of Lancashire and Scotland the mine workers object strongly to their women being employed about the mines. If it had not been for the war, the probability is that a strong movement would have been set afoot to have female labor abolished even in Lancashire and Scotland. The question of the women being competitors of the men has not entered in. By insisting on the same wages for the same work we eliminate that. The miners do not think it is suitable work for the future mothers of the race. It is in many cases dirty and hard work. The women who have come to mining work since the war broke out will, in all probability, leave it—after things have settled down. Under reconstruction, if it is seriously gone into in the nation's interest, many channels of employment will open up, and make the pressure on them to earn in this way less severe.

Reconstruction as the Miners See It

I have probably a more unique opportunity for testing the views of the organized workers of the country than most people because I have spent the last three years in addressing mass meetings in every corner of England, Scotland and Wales. The majority of those meetings have been called under trade union auspices, and the chief matters dealt with have been the preservation by organized labor of the liberties which it has taken so many years to secure, and the furtherance of a greater after-the-war reconstruction movement, by which the land of Great Britain will be taken over from its present holders and used in the interests of the people; and mines, railways and workshops will be used for the production of commodities for use, and not merely to build up fortunes for the capitalist class. The miners' conferences are practically unanimously in favor of state ownership of the land and of replacing the people as food producers on land which is now unused. They are certainly determined that as far as in them lies the government shall not only continue in control of the mines, but extend that control to state ownership. The syndicalist idea of miners' working, managing and owning the mines has not a very deep hold

on the miners of this country. They fully expect, if the mines are owned and controlled by the state, that the workmen will have a considerable voice in the management in view of the fact that they have more than livelihood at stake. Their safety of life and limb justifies the claim that they shall be represented in the management. We feel that many accidents of a more or less dangerous character arise not from the carelessness of the present management so much as through the desire to secure the largest possible output at the smallest possible cost.

How They Held on to the Right to Strike

Probably the most important factor in industrial relations in the war was the attempt of the government to put miners under the munitions act. This would have taken from them the right to strike, and would have placed their leaders under a clause which imposed a heavy fine or imprisonment on any leader who had part in one. Mr. Lloyd George was minister of munitions when that bill went through. I saw him on behalf of the miners and told him that under no circumstances would the miners allow themselves to be placed under the munitions act. He ultimately agreed. That very fact has done more to keep some little shred of freedom for the workers of this country than any other thing that has happened. All the strikes that have taken place in shipyards, engineering and munition centers have been illegal strikes. They have been unconstitutional, as the officials of the unions dare not consent to them. No trade union funds have been paid out to the strikers. Yet the government could not act as strongly as it pleased against men who came out on strike because of the fact that the great mining movement was still free to take industrial action at any time. The government could not act drastically elsewhere, when the trade union movement generally knew the miners had held out and were free when their own leaders had permitted them to be put under the act.

One of the local branches of the miners' organization in Scotland passed a resolution that if other trade unionists were badly treated they would stop out of sympathy. But the necessity has never arisen.

In South Wales a dispute broke out immediately after the munitions act was passed—the most important area in Great Britain from the point of view that it supplies admiralty coal for Britain, France and Italy.

The government got the king to "proclaim" the South Wales miners, which was equal to placing them under the munitions act for the time being. The government then endeavored to get them to return to work. But the very fact that the line had been taken of proclaiming their strike as illegal stiffened them; and the government ultimately had to take over control of the Welsh mines and to force the employers to concede the points for which the workers were contending—a substantial increase in wages to help meet the increase in the cost of living.

Since then the government has taken over control of all the mines of Great Britain, metal, as well as coal; lime and other quarries; also brick ovens and coke-producing plants.

In August last the Miners' Federation, which includes the men of all of the coal mining districts of England, Scotland and Wales, made a demand for a general increase in wages, to help meet the increase in the cost of living. They made this demand not to the mine owners, but directly to the government through the coal controllers and threatened a common strike unless a substantial advance was conceded. In September last an increase of one and sixpence per day was granted to all men and women working in and about the mines who were over sixteen years old, and ninepence per day to all minors under sixteen.

It might be said that during the first two years of this war the mine workers of the country were probably the strongest in their devotion to the government in its policies and in their enthusiasm for the war. They always opposed and voted against conscription, but accepted it with other measures as they came along. But as mining was made an exempted industry, it did not fall on them hard.

Now, I feel sure, not only could it be said that their enthusiasm has been seriously dampened, but to a great extent it has gone out altogether. Voluntary recruiting is now out of the question, not only at the mines, but from the industries. Nearly every soldier that joins from industry at the present time is a conscript.

The Change in Feeling

I think the feeling is now with the majority of the workers of the country that a satisfactory and lasting peace could be secured by negotiation between the allies and the central powers. The feeling is strongly held by the majority that a peace could have been secured by negotiation twelve months ago, had it not been for the imperialistic aims of the ruling and government classes in the allied countries and, of course, in Germany and Austria.

I am speaking now for what I believe to be the majority and, more important, the more active and rebellious section. Their view of a settlement is that this war will ultimately be settled by negotiation and not by a military victory on either hand—and that hunger in the belligerent nations and the lack of supply of men will be the deciding factors in bringing this about. If this view is a correct one, then it follows that it must be also correct that negotiations ought to take place now rather than twelve months hence, when hundreds of thousands of men of all nations whose lives might be saved, will have been wiped out.

I should like to add that from very wide experience in public meetings I was simply amazed at the enthusiasm shown. I feel certain that eighteen months ago I should not have been allowed to de-

liver those speeches here. I find that this change in temper, generally speaking, applies to every district in which I have been during the past few months. Though it is well known everywhere what my views are, and that I have been and am in direct opposition to the vast majority of the national trade union leaders of the country, I am receiving hundreds of letters from branch trade unions and local trade and labor councils to address meetings.

The rank and file of the workers are changing their minds far more rapidly upon the question of the necessity for pushing in the direction of an early peace than are the old leaders. I am convinced that the pressure from the rank and file will within a very short time force a change, if not in the opinions at least in the expressions of many of the leaders of the trade union movement.

There will not be this change in Scotland or Wales, because in those two countries the men have been anxious for peace negotiations for a considerable time. The same thing may be said of Northumberland. But the change which I have described as taking place in Nottingham is going forward in Durham, Yorkshire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire.

I have watched the change in my own county (Lanarkshire) and there it is very marked. Two years ago, though I am a trusted and favorite servant of the men, and they would not like to do anything that would seem to injure or offend me, I remember that in our conferences the vast majority of the delegates were fight-to-the-finish and knock-out-blow men. I have watched the change carefully, and I venture to say that the question of the earliest possible peace by negotiation, without annexation or indemnity, would be carried in Lanarkshire almost to a man. There is certainly a strong feeling in the districts of the county and in the conferences where the branch delegates meet against any more men being taken from the mines. The feeling is that peace could be secured if the British government were anxious to bring about an early settlement of the war.

Causes of the Change

The first cause of this change has been a natural one. We have been three and a half years in the most terrible war ever seen. Every village has its widows and orphans and mothers who have lost their sons. There is undoubtedly a war weariness.

Then the greed of the capitalist class and the profiteers has been another fruitful cause for bringing the people to look for peace. And the hideous mistakes which have undoubtedly been made, the blunders by some of our higher commands which have meant the useless slaughter of so many of the rank and file—Gallipoli, Mesopotamia and the latest at Cambrai—have added to the causes. These have all

tended to make people tired of the thing; the food shortage, women and children standing in queues have added to it.

But probably the chief cause of the change which has taken place in the minds of our people has been that they have come to find out through recent revelations in Russia that to a very great extent we were misled at the outbreak of the war, that we have not been in it solely because Belgium was invaded, but that there are many other factors. Our capitalist classes and great armament firms and the jingo imperialists with their greed for new lands to exploit and develop—a greed common to Russia, Germany, Austria, Italy, France and ourselves—they were all in it—were desirous of laying their hands on the possessions of other more primitive peoples. When you recall how Russia and ourselves divided Persia, how Germany wished for Bagdad and we sought to prevent it—out, all of us, for mineral resources and oil—those were the real causes. And there is now an extraordinary number of our work people that are reading those facts and spreading them among their fellows. Our people, in growing numbers, have come to the conclusion that so far as the working people of Germany are concerned they are pretty much the same as ourselves, and there is no real cause for war between us. I must admit that to me it has been rather amazing that all the efforts of the jingo imperialistic press to get up a bitter hatred against the German and Austrian people amongst the workers of this country have utterly failed. There is a hatred of the Junker and military class of Germany, and there is a growing bitterness against the same class in our own country. Our people to a very great extent believed that the very strength of the German military machine was proof that she was preparing for years for an attack on her near neighbors. But now, from the information that has leaked out, our people are realizing that Germany's great preparations may have been caused by her fear that combinations and preparations outside her own borders made it inevitable that she should prepare for a combined attack. The difficulty has been that up to the present time the governments of the opposing nations have managed to make their own peoples believe that they are fighting a defensive war and not one of aggression. That is the reason why working class opinion has not been more strongly expressed. If we can prove to the German people that the democracy of this country is not out to smash Germany as a nation and cut off Germany from free commerce with the rest of the world—if we can prove that we are out to rebuild the world nationally and internationally on lines of brotherhood and lasting peace—if we can prove to them that our ultimate aims are in keeping with the proposals of the best of the Russian revolutionists, for the final establishment of the co-operative commonwealth, and the rights of

the people of all the nations to govern themselves in their own way, I have great hope of a strong and hearty response from the German people. If they did not respond, I at least should be sadly disappointed and should, I think, have to change absolutely my views of them.

Once we get our allies to accept labor's war aims (or peace aims, as I prefer to call them) we must manage to put them before the representatives of the German and Austrian democracy. If we then get an authoritative statement, representative of the views of the German Socialists and trade unionists, that they are not prepared to enter into negotiations, but are prepared to stand behind their government and military machine until the allies are conquered and military victory secured for Germany, then I feel sure there would be a strong and almost a united movement amongst the people of this country, that we must fight on and use all the powers we possess in what would then be a defensive war against unreasonable and outrageous opponents.

To American Labor

If I were to send a message and greeting from the federation and myself to the whole working class of America, and especially the mining movement it would be this: we have so much in common—a common language and almost a common fatherland. And then we have this, that the workers from practically every nation in Europe are finding their way to your great republic, your great developing nation. They are forming under the stars and stripes a great human brotherhood of men of different creeds and different races such as we are hopeful to establish among nations of Europe in the near future.

The war aims of the British labor movement have now been brought out and have been passed with comparative unanimity by a conference representing every phase of the labor movement. I hope that our American fellow workers and the American people as a whole will join with us in endeavoring to secure peace along the lines marked out by the British workers.