

PALESTINE MONOGRAPHS

13

THE ZIONIST DIPLOMACY

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INTRODUCTION

This year—1967*—the Zionist Movement celebrates its seventieth anniversary. The first Zionist Congress, held in 1897, gave birth to the World Zionist organisation and issued the plan of action known as the Basle Programme, after the Swiss city in which the Congress was held.

Since that date, each new decade has seen a new drive towards the fulfilment of Zionist aims and aspirations.

In the course of the first decade—1897 to 1907—the Zionist Organisation set up its main departments: financial, administrative and propaganda; while the founder, Theodore Herzl, up to his death in 1904, made political contacts and undertook diplomatic negotiations with different countries to obtain a Charter permitting his movement to colonise Palestine.

In 1907, at the outset of the second decade, the Zionist Movement was carrying out a realistic plan of action which stood half way between its political and practical wings. On the one hand, the Zionist political school believed that no

*The book was originally written in Arabic in the first half of 1967.

colonisation should be started in Palestine before obtaining a charter from the Sultan permitting it to do so and acknowledging that its aim was to create an independent political entity. On the other hand, practical Zionism believed that settling on the land did not require prior approval by the authorities. Then a new plan was formulated which Weizmann called synthetic Zionism and which the eighth Zionist Congress, held in 1907, adopted. This plan called for a slow infiltration of Palestine to be organised and sponsored so that, once active and prosperous Jewish colonies in Palestine had been set up, they might become the nucleus of a new Zionist community which would permit the Movement to exert pressure on the authorities to issue the Jewish charter. After that, the necessary international guarantees to protect Zionist colonisation could be obtained.

The advent of the third decade in 1917 brought the official political permit for the colonisation of Palestine, not from the Ottoman authorities but from the British Government, whose military forces were at that time knocking on the doors of Palestine; the battle of Gaza took place on the same day Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, signed the declaration which carries his name. (Five years after this the political permit was approved by the League of Nations and incorporated in the text of the British Mandate Charter over Palestine.) As a result of the political charter granted by the British Government, the Zionist World Organisation was able to polarise an ever-growing number of world Jews, increase the scope of Jewish emigration to Palestine and change the character of the Jewish colonisation from a slow and careful process of infiltration to that of widespread immigration. This

was organised by the Zionist World Organisation and financed by Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, and Jewish immigrants poured into Palestine under the auspices and protection of the British Government.

In 1927, as the Zionist Movement entered upon its fourth decade, it had already obtained from the Mandatory Government official recognition of its local organisation in Palestine, as a result of which the Mandatory Government handed the Zionist organisation a large part of government and semi-government authority. From that date the nucleus Zionist colony acquired a large measure of self-rule and practised much of the authority of government.

Ten years later, in 1937, Britain tried to transform the semi-government into full government when a British Royal Commission recommended the setting up of a Jewish state in part of Palestine. But the Arab people of Palestine rose in arms in a protest which succeeded in frustrating the British plan at once, forcing the British Government to drop it publicly a year later and to implement the withdrawal of the plan by issuing the White Paper of 1939. However, the Zionist Movement from that day held on to the principle of a Jewish state, going on from that to the announcement in the Biltmore Programme of 1942 that the setting up of a state had now become an official and basic demand. (Prior to the British recommendation, the Zionist Movement had always pretended to be satisfied with a "Jewish National Home" in accordance with the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter).

In 1947, the Zionist movement ended the fifth and en-

tered upon the sixth decade intoxicated with the greatest victory of its life. For in the autumn of that year, the United Nations General Assembly issued its well-known recommendation to partition Palestine and set up a Jewish state in one part. In this manner, the World Organisation adopted a project which the British Government had tried to put into operation ten years earlier but which it had soon had to relinquish under pressure of the great Arab Revolution of Palestine; namely, the setting up of a Jewish state. (It is generally known that this project had been the Zionist dream from the start. It had been the aim which Herzl, the founder of Zionism, had preached in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" published in 1896 and on the basis of which he had summoned the first World Zionist Congress in the following year. Although that Congress had called the constant aim of the Jewish people in Palestine a "home" and although both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter had only added the word "national" and had called it a "national home," the two terms had always been in reality a mere temporary cover to hide the real aim at a given period. When the right opportunity was offered, the cover was discarded and the true face of Zionism appeared.) The Zionist Movement was quick to turn the recommendation of the U.N. General Assembly into actual fact: the State of Israel was established in the middle of the following year.

Finally in 1957, the Zionist Movement entered on its seventh decade while exerting every effort to save what it could of the gains of its expansionist ambitions resulting from the aggression which Israel conducted in collusion with her two imperialist allies, Britain and France, in Gaza and Sinai.

The aggression was censured by the whole international community and opened the eyes of world opinion to Israel as a colonialist state in the service of imperialism. But Israel succeeded in changing its great political and moral failure into an economic and strategic gain by obtaining guarantees from the U.S. and its allies for free use of the Gulf of Aqaba and the straits leading to it. This has permitted Israel—and still does—to set up regular maritime communications with the countries of Asia and East Africa and so pierce the Arab blockade at one of its sensitive points.

* * *

We thus see how the Zionist Movement has succeeded, over the past seventy years, in the colonisation of Palestine, achieving every ten years a big stride forward towards the fulfilment of its aims.

This constant, regular and uninterrupted growth calls for an examination of the method which the Zionist Movement has employed since its inception and which has permitted it to fulfil its aim in such big strides.

* * *

The present study is the result of such an examination. It is a mere preliminary attempt to analyse and explain the Zionist method, to name its component parts, to fix its distinctive qualities and hallmarks.

It seems to us from the study of the Zionist Movement over its seventy years of life that its method of work has fol-

lowed one unified pattern throughout the whole period; that the Zionist programme has been and still is a constant that may sometimes vary slightly or undergo some amendments of a secondary nature without any real change in its basic points.

The Zionist Movement has had a relatively long life-span. Moreover, it has passed through greatly different circumstances (universal, international, Jewish, and regional within the Arab area). Also, at certain stages in its history, the Movement had to suffer apparent contradictions in its objectives to conform to existing conditions: it had started as an infant movement striving for international recognition; it had then grown into a youthful movement which had won recognition from Britain, the U.S., France and Italy; then it had graduated with official approval of its aims by the League of Nations; in old age it acquired recognition by the United Nations of the Movement and the State of Israel it had established, followed by recognition from all the members of the international community with the exception of the Arab states and a small number of their friends. For a political movement to adhere with such constancy and continuity to its programme in such circumstances is most unusual.

Furthermore, and this is still more unusual, the basic dual change which influenced both the nature and the policies of the Zionist Movement, as a result of the decisive developments of 1948, was not followed by any basic changes in the Zionist programme and action. The basic dual changes that took place were:—

a. The transformation which the Zionist Movement underwent from a central organisation with a world-wide scope

of activity aiming at the colonisation of land, the eviction of a whole people and their replacement by another in order to establish a state—into an established state commanding the support, loyalty and obedience of masses of nationals of other states.

b. The second change touches the very foundation of the Zionist Movement's functions and policies. For before 1948, the main function of the Zionist Movement had been to attempt to upset the then existing situation in Palestine (i.e. to transform Palestine from an Arab country with an Arab character and an Arab population into a Jewish country with a Jewish Hebrew speaking population, and a Zionist face; at the same time to transform it from a dependent into an independent state). The establishment of Israel in 1948 has completely changed the function of the Zionist Movement, as well as changing its policy from that of upsetting the existing situation into that of preserving, upholding and defending the new status quo.

But this dual change in the functions and policies of the Zionist Movement was neither accompanied nor followed by any basic change in the Zionist programme or any halt in the now traditional plan of action or any departure from it.

If the Zionist Movement had been able to keep to its main programme in spite of all the factors that usually cause serious amendments or even the adoption of new plans of action, then it is not likely in the future to relinquish that programme or adopt another.

Consequently, to know the programme which the Zionist

Movement had followed in the past is to know the programme it will continue to follow in future, so that this knowledge has more than mere historical and theoretical value.

* * *

Having thus defined the subject of this study, it is now essential to define its scope, method and sources.

This study will concentrate on one facet of the programme followed by Zionism in its endeavours to colonise Palestine, its diplomatic facet. After a brief look at the position of diplomacy in the many-sided Zionist programme, we shall go on to study the chief model followed by Zionist diplomacy and policies (the model which goes by phases) and to analyse the philosophic basis of Zionist diplomacy (the individualistic outlook) and the ways and means it has adopted in the course of its practical application.

"Diplomacy" is a flexible expression which applies to many concepts that differ in scope. If in the narrow sense it describes a "negotiation" between the representatives of two or more states, in its wider sense it embraces all types of peaceful communication between states, public bodies or international organisation. As the Zionist Movement, throughout the first five decades of its existence, was represented by a world organisation and not by a state, we shall use the word "diplomacy" in its wider sense.

It follows from this that we shall use the expression "diplomatic action" in connection with every contact which has taken place between representatives of the Zionist Move-

ment on the one hand and any of the bodies, or states, or world organisations on the other. Such a contact may have taken the form of official "negotiations" leading up to the conclusion of an "agreement," a "contract" or a "treaty" or it may have merely taken the form of "talks," with the Zionists in such "talks" aiming at the conclusion of certain "arrangements", or the obtaining of a "promise" or a "pledge" or a "declaration" issued by one party or of a "recommendation" or a "resolution" by an international organisation.

Diplomacy is the practical tool of foreign policy, but as the dividing line between the two is not quite clear-cut even where conventional states are concerned, it becomes even less so in the case of a movement like Zionism. As a result, our study of Zionist Diplomacy will of necessity entail a study of some political aspects in the Zionist programme which cannot easily be separated from the purely diplomatic act.

The method this study will follow is that of historical interpretation and not historical review.

For this reason, the study is not a chronological narrative of events in the history of Zionist Diplomacy from 1897 up to the present. It is also not an attempt to record those events and the various stages through which they have passed.

This is an attempt to study the history of Zionist Diplomacy with a view to understanding the general strategic principles on which the details of that history were based, to elicit the types of strategic patterns it has followed and to discover the fixed unchanging and continuing programme to which it points.

We have made a point in this study of confining our sources to the writings of the leaders of Zionism themselves, their diaries, memoirs, correspondence, speeches, books. By doing this, we avoid any possible misinterpretation of their diplomatic behaviour as well as the probable misinterpretation of second-hand sources, whether Zionist or otherwise.

* * *

Lastly, we wish to record two points:

a. This study aims at analysing and not at evaluating the diplomatic course which Zionism has followed. It is an attempt to understand and explain that course, not to pass judgement on it. It is concerned with describing the component parts of the Zionist Diplomatic programme, not with colouring it with epithets.

b. This study is an attempt at a true understanding of the Zionist Diplomatic programme as it is, not at imagining it and then drawing an imaginary picture of it in accordance with our whims and desires.

CHAPTER I

THE POSITION OF DIPLOMACY IN THE ZIONIST PLAN OF ACTION

(1) *The Zionist Plan of Action*

The Zionist plan of diplomatic action is only one part of the overall Zionist plan of action. It, therefore, follows that the diplomatic plan applied by the Zionist Movement cannot be properly understood if separated from its wider context.

The Zionist plan of action is composed of seven elements, each of which has its clear phase and fixed function. It could be likened to a human body which has one brain, two arms, stands on two feet and is supported by two crutches.

The brain is represented by the general Zionist policy which activates the whole programme, as well as each one of its component parts, with regularity in timing, direction and scope. The overriding ultimate aim is to establish a Zionist state in Palestine and its neighbourhood (the area they call "the Land of Israel"), to transfer the Jews of the world to this area after evicting its original inhabitants and lastly to guarantee the continuance of that state and its prosperity and success.

The two arms symbolise diplomatic action and colonisation. The first arm—diplomacy—embodies all contacts between the Zionist Movement and outside bodies like private and public organisations, states and international organisations. These contacts aim at obtaining a permit for the Zionist Movement to colonise Palestine and establish a "national home" therein, later to transform this "national home" into a state, later still to represent that state, protect its interests and organise its relations with the outside world.

The second arm (colonisation) includes—among other things—the training of Jewish emigrants, their transfer to Palestine and the setting up for them of different economic, administrative, educational, health, military and other institutions.

The two feet symbolise organisation and collection of funds. Organisation aims at the mobilisation of world Jews, uniting their ranks into formations, whose potential and motion are channelled in accordance with the Movement's plans. These formations are either local or regional committees belonging to the World Zionist Organisation and allied groups, or Jewish and other organisations supporting the Movement.

The collection of funds aims at providing sufficient money to finance all the Movement's activities.

The two crutches are the two chief means by which Zionism strives to achieve its ultimate aim: they are propaganda and military action.

Propaganda varies in accordance with the party at which

it is directed and includes internal propaganda within the ranks of the Zionist Movement itself, propaganda directed towards world Jewry and that aiming at world opinion in general.

Military action includes all acts of violence whether conducted by the regular or semi-regular military formations or by terrorist or sabotage organisations.

* * *

The Zionist programme was formulated during the very first years of the life of the Zionist Movement, on both the ideological and organisational levels.

In Theodore Herzl's pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" (indeed, even in the drafts and opinions which preceded it and which Herzl noted in his diary), as well as in the first Zionist Congress of Basle and the plan of action to which it gave birth, later in the different organisations which subsequent Zionist Congresses set up towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, in all these we find the roots of all the elements referred to above without exception, including the organisations or plans for the organisations needed for the implementation of those elements. We also find therein a clear setting of the phase of each element within the framework of the overall programme and a definition of its proper role in that programme.

We find the two arms given the role of twins in regard to the aims fixed by the Zionist Movement in the preamble to the Basle programme. We meet them later in the second

and fourth clauses of that programme. Even before then, we discover them in the guise of the two bodies which Herzl called for in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat!" to put into operation the Zionist plan he drew up two years before the Congress of Basle.

The preamble to the Basle programme has defined the aim of Zionism in these words: "To create for the Jewish people a home¹ in Palestine secured by public law." Then Article One called for "the promotion on suitable lines of the colonisation of Palestine, by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers," while Article Four stressed the necessity for taking "preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, for the attainment of the aim of Zionism."

This duality between, on the one hand, diplomatic action (to endeavour to obtain guarantees from the general international law to secure the Jewish "home," and also to obtain government consent for the establishment of that "home"), and on the other, the work for colonial settlement—that is, the duality of the two arms in the Zionist programme, was also apparent in Herzl's pamphlet "Der Judenstaat," as well as in the drafts and notes that preceded its publication. In these writings, Herzl called for the establishment of two bodies, the first of which he names "the Society of Jews" and the second "the Jewish Company." He allots to "the

(1) In the second chapter, we shall deal with the meaning of the word 'home' and the purpose of its use in place of 'state' in the Basle Programme, the Balfour Declaration and then the Mandate Charter. This is very relevant to, and significant in, the analysis of the diplomatic programme which the Zionist Movement has followed.

Society of Jews" political and diplomatic tasks such as representing the national will of the "Jewish People," conducting the necessary diplomatic negotiations with the states concerned and proclaiming the establishment of the state. To "the Jewish Company," he allots the practical tasks of administering and financing colonial settlement.²

As for the two feet, the Basle Programme spoke about only one of them—organisation—in Article Two which called for "the organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international." The Congress also passed a resolution creating "the World Zionist Organisation" and its main bodies.

The second foot (providing the necessary funds to finance the Movement) saw the light at the second Zionist Congress, also held at Basle in 1898, which set up the first of its bodies, "the Jewish Colonisation Bank." Later, other bodies were set up, like the Jewish National Fund (the Keren Kayemet).

In its first years, the Zionist Movement concentrated its efforts on only one of the two crutches, propaganda. For obvious reasons, it avoided publicising its efforts towards setting up the second, the military, although it neglected neither planning it nor preparing for it.

Propaganda appears in Article Three of the Basle Programme which stipulates "strengthening and fostering Jewish

(2) Herzl has defined the function of the "Society of Jews" in the fifth and those of the "Jewish Company" in the third Chapter of his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat."

national sentiment and consciousness." Only a few weeks before the first Zionist Congress was held, Herzl had begun publishing "Die Welt" magazine which later became the official organ of the Zionist Movement.

Selected pages from Herzl's diaries were published some years after his death, while the full text was only published in 1960. In these diaries there are many references to the necessity of setting up the required military organisations, although in his public speeches, correspondence and publications he only mentioned the setting up of a regular army to defend the borders of the state after its inception. As far as we know, the actual formation of Zionist military forces was only begun in 1907 when the "Hashomer" was formed. Ben Gurion, who had emigrated to Palestine only a year earlier, played a leading role in the formation of this force.

(2) *The Inevitability of Emphasis on Diplomacy*

We have seen that diplomatic action was one of the seven most important elements in the Zionist plan of action, indeed it was one of its principal arms. We must now explain that that emphasis was not brought about by the hazards of chance, but was on the contrary inevitable and was imposed on Zionism by its special character and its distinctive position. If the Zionist Movement has paid special attention to diplomacy, it is because the circumstances of its birth have forced it to invest diplomacy with a role of special importance. Other nationalist liberation movements or colonialist and imperialist movements were never in need of such diplomacy. This means that Zionism, alone amongst movements of national libera-

tion and those of national militancy, found itself obliged to depend totally and decisively on the diplomatic arm of its general programme. The other movements saw in diplomatic action only a secondary supporting factor.

The reason for such a difference between the Zionist and the other different movements is to be found in the special distinctive nature of Zionism.

Unlike other movements of national liberation, Zionism aimed at the transfer of groups of people from all parts of the world to one rallying spot and settling them there. This was a prerequisite for the establishment of the Zionist State and its accession to political independence, since Zionism had no people living in the country which was ear-marked for the future state. This provides Zionism with the basic difference, both in its nature and later in its strategy, from all the other movements. For they all began from one rallying point which was the existence of a people settled on the land, which desired to be liberated from foreign occupation or domination that was curbing its will and depriving it of freedom of action. So, whereas other movements saw in external help—be it from other states or from international organisations—nothing more than a supporting factor facilitating their liberation from foreign domination, the Zionist Movement by contrast saw in the obtaining of a political charter, permitting emigration to and settlement in the country to be colonised, a basic and decisive element. For if this was not fulfilled, the organisation of large-scale emigration and the settlement and protection of colonists would be impossible to achieve.

The special distinctive character of Zionism, which im-

posed on the Movement the strategy it had to follow, resembles to a large extent the special character of the movements of colonial settlement in the past centuries, which also imposed on them the necessity of adopting a certain strategy. But here, too, we discover a basic difference in circumstances which places Zionism in greater need of diplomacy than the previous movements of colonial settlement. For all those movements of settlement began in one country, while the companies which organised them obtained the official permit to transfer the emigrants and settle them from one government: that to which both the company and the settlers belonged. The Zionist Movement, on the other hand, had the intention of bringing emigrants from tens of countries to the coveted country, and this imposed upon it the necessity of obtaining an international sanction in which several states, and not only one, would participate. This mere fact of having to conduct negotiations with a large number of countries has placed diplomatic action in the Zionist programme on a totally different level from that needed by a company to obtain a charter from its own government.

There is also another factor which distinguishes the Zionist operation of colonial settlement from similar operations in the past. The latter aimed at setting up colonies linked to the mother country, loyal to it, expanding its sphere of influence, raising its prestige internationally and serving its strategic and economic interests. That is why it was easy for a colonising company to obtain the required charter from the authorities. Contrary to this state of affairs, Zionism aimed to revive Jewish nationalism and primarily to serve the interests of the Jews at the projected rallying spot. As Zionism

had no "mother country," it had to find a replacement, not in one artificial "mother" but in several (since Jews were dispersed in many countries of eastern, central and western Europe and America), and had in consequence to reconcile the conflicting imperialist ambitions of the powers and to convince each one of them that Zionism would serve its own particular interests and widen its own particular sphere of influence. This required extensive diplomatic effort, proficiency in the powers of persuasion and clever manipulation to reconcile the conflicting imperialist interests and ambitions of the powers.

A third distinction between the Zionist and previous movements for colonial settlement lies in the fact that the latter for the most part went out, to the New World, into territories that had not been densely populated and that had no established government (except in two cases) to prevent the inflow of colonising immigrants. Pre-Zionist colonial settlement was almost entirely confined to countries of the New World: the two Americas in the 16th and 17th centuries, Australia in the 18th century and New Zealand in the 19th century. But since 1897, Zionism had its eyes fixed specifically on Palestine³, which was a populated country under the rule of the Ottoman Empire; and the latter, no matter how weak it had grown by the end of the 19th century, could still stop the large inflow of settlers aiming to set up an auto-

(3) Although Herzl was still in a dilemma about choosing Palestine, Argentine or any other country. Incidentally, Leo Pinsker, who was Herzl's most important predecessor in the formulation of the Zionist idea, had also felt the same dilemma.

nomous political entity. Zionism, therefore, had no alternative but to seek the Ottoman Government's approval to colonise Palestine. This need in turn gave diplomacy an exalted position in the Zionist plan of action and made the success of the Movement conditional on diplomatic success.

We have so far seen how much the Zionist Movement differs from all previous and subsequent movements of national liberation, as well as from other movements of colonial settlement of which it is the very last. We now maintain that it also differs basically from other imperialistic movements. It is all these differences that have given diplomatic action its important — even fundamental — role. For imperialist expansion can only be undertaken by an existing government which can mobilize its own resources as well as those of the countries under its domination to create a powerful military force by which it occupies the countries it aspires to subject and exploit. On the other hand, Zionism was initially created to establish its own state, so that neither the instrument of government nor its resources were available and without these no military occupation is possible. In such circumstances, it was necessary for Zionism to knock at the gates of other states offering its services in return for what they would be willing to give Zionism in the way of assistance to enter the promised land with foreign imperialist protection. This, too, requires diplomatic activity which by necessity is thus invested with a decisive role in the Zionist programme.

* * *

And so we find that all the circumstances, within the

framework of which the Zionist Movement has been active, point, for different reasons, to the distinguished place which diplomacy has inevitably and inescapably occupied (in the Zionist plan of action) from the very first days of the Movement.

However, diplomacy's distinguished phase has not ended with the end of the initial phase of founding and launching, but has continued to accompany the Zionist Movement in its subsequent phases, and still continues to do so after the establishment of the Zionist state and its accession to membership of the United Nations and recognition by many states.⁴

All the factors we have referred to remained in existence and were effective during the first two decades from 1897 to 1917. After this date (with the issuing of the Balfour Declaration by Britain in 1917, then its adoption by the U.S., France and Italy and finally its adoption by the League of Nations in the Mandate Charter in 1922) some factors did actually disappear, but the others remained. Moreover, the new circumstances required new tasks from Zionist diplomacy, one of which was to exert constant efforts to stop Britain from going back on the pledges she made in the Declaration and to convince her to give new and more embracing pledges.

In 1945, the end of the Second World War and the

(4) The reader will find a full list of the states that recognise Israel and have diplomatic or consular relations with it, and another list of the international bodies to which Israel belongs in "Israel in the International Field" by Miss Leila Kadi, published in July, 1966 by the Research Center (Beirut) under No. 4 of the series "Facts & Figures" which the Center brings out.

replacement of the League of Nations by the United Nations Organisation offered Zionist Diplomacy a new challenge. It was active at San Francisco to ensure the incorporation of a clause in the charter of the new organisation (Article 80) to maintain the guarantees which the Mandate had contained in connection with "the National Home" and which threatened to disappear with the disappearance of both the Mandate and the League of Nations.

This was followed by Britain's announcing her intention to relinquish her Mandate over Palestine and to leave the future of that country in the hands of the United Nations; this provided Zionist diplomacy with still another challenge which it accepted. The decisive role played by its diplomacy at that time led to the General Assembly of the United Nations issuing its 1947 recommendation for the partition of Palestine.

The new circumstances, attendant on the creation of the Zionist state the following year, entrusted diplomacy with new tasks. It had to enter the struggle for bilateral international recognition, for collective recognition through membership of the United Nations and the struggle of resistance to all the results of the "Unnatural International Position," which continued to affect Israel even after obtaining bilateral and collective recognition. There were the issues remaining in suspense after the establishment of the Zionist State, which was a partial and incomplete fulfilment of a comprehensive recommendation. There were such issues as the internationalisation of Jerusalem, the return of the original inhabitants whom Zionism had dispersed, the fixing of boundaries, international observation of the armistice lines; all of which were

the result either of Security Council resolutions or resolutions adopted in the bilateral armistice agreements with the neighbouring countries; and all of which provided the Zionist Movement with a constant reminder that its State still had, in the eyes of the international community, an unnatural position which did not yet possess all the elements of stability.

Furthermore, this unnatural quality remained attached to the Zionist State on the level of inner stability and inner fulfilment. For to gather the Jews of the world into the Zionist State, which was an element of the utmost importance in the Zionist belief and which had only been fulfilled on a very limited scale, still needed bilateral arrangements with the states concerned. Also, the economic situation of the Zionist State required the continued inflow of aid from abroad, not only from Zionists and Jews, but also from governments that supported the Zionist Movement or that profited from its existence and success. Then there was the question of the State's security in face of the surrounding hostility of people who refused to recognise the new status imposed on Palestine and the resulting need for the conclusion of international agreements to supply the Zionist State with arms and to obtain pledges of military protection. The first of these was the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 by the U.S., Britain and France and the last so far is the American Declaration of 1967.

* * *

All these factors — the results of the "Unnatural International Position" which distinguishes the Zionist State and makes it unique among all the members of the international

community — require diplomacy to retain its distinctive position in the Zionist programme in spite of the existence of a state which has been recognised individually and collectively.

However, the unusual need of Zionism for a diplomacy which performs exceptional duties does not stop at the special circumstances and unnatural situations we have described. For the status quo has another aspect which forces the Zionist Government to continue inevitably and decisively to rely on diplomacy and to entrust it with duties that differ generally from the duties of the ordinary diplomacy of other governments. We shall see later that the Zionist Movement has not yet reached the end of its endeavours to fulfil its ultimate aims despite the twenty years that have elapsed since the establishment of the Zionist State. Israel, as it stands today, does not represent the end of the road of the Zionist Movement, but merely one stage along that road; the present existence of Israel is not the end of Zionist activity but merely one phase of it. So long as Israel exists, it will undoubtedly remain in a state of aspiration and preparation for a further expansionist stage in terms both of population and of geographical situation. In the same way that arrangements and agreements with foreign governments, especially the imperialist ones, had been necessary for the preparation of every stride which Zionist colonial settlement had taken, the same arrangements and agreements will be necessary for every future stride to transform colonial settlement into imperialist expansion, unless, of course, it is nipped in the bud. And as diplomacy has been a principal arm in the Zionist plan of action before and since the establishment of the state, so will it remain in the stages of expansion to which Zionism inevitably aspires in fulfil-

ment of its constant aim, which has not yet been completely achieved.

* * *

For all these reasons, diplomacy has occupied an exalted place in the Zionist plan of action ever since the Movement was started, has continued to occupy it throughout the subsequent stages of development with all their temporarily changing circumstances and objectives and will still occupy it as long as the Zionist Movement exists.

We shall next have to define with some precision the true place of diplomacy in the Zionist plan of action and to fix its exact role in the Zionist Movement.

(3) *The Birth of the Theory of Zionist Action*

The point which occupied Theodore Herzl's thoughts from start to finish could be summarised as his consideration of the "Jewish Problem" as a political one which could not be solved successfully and decisively save by political means on the international level. According to him, the Jews constituted one nation, whose position would remain disturbed and embarrassing and upon whom the world would continue to look with enmity so that "anti-semitism" would remain alive and active until the Jews could live like any ordinary nation and enjoy what the other nations enjoy. For this they had to be gathered in a land of their own and to set up there a state which could organise their public life and prevent others from interfering in their affairs.

Announcing the political aspect of the nature of both the "Jewish Problem" and its solution amounted to announcing the birth of the Zionist Movement. It set up the dividing-line between the pre-Herzl Jewish attempts to solve this problem on the one hand and, on the other, the Zionist attempt which had its roots in Herzl's theory and mission.

Herzl viewed all the other attempts as futile attempts that would neither save the Jews nor put an end to "anti-semitism".

For example, the theory of assimilation might be adequate to save some individual Jews, but sooner or later it would come up against "anti-semitic" reactions which would increase in violence as assimilation increased. Moreover, if assimilation succeeded, it could only save the Jews by eliminating the "Jewish Nation" as such. In other words, assimilation was fated to have one of two results : either it was to provide partial success which would be confined to a small minority of Jews, or it was to save all the individuals through the extinction of the whole nation, like a medicine which puts an end to the disease by killing the patient !

Likewise, Herzl had no use for the other attempts of revolutionary Jews who hoped to end "anti-semitism" by killing its national roots in Europe; that is, through a socialist revolution aiming to build a new social structure which would not acknowledge national differences. Herzl considered that these Jews, too, were trying to save the Jews by melting them, by the extinction of the Jewish nation.

Other Jewish groups sought a solution to the "Jewish Problem" through escape. In accordance with this solution, the

Jews emigrated from one country to another to escape persecution or poverty. Herzl's answer to this was that emigration from one "anti-semitic" country to another which was free from it merely leads in the end to the creation of "anti-semitism" in the new country of refuge; so that escapist emigration, far from ending "anti-semitism", spreads it about in the world and brings it to countries that had been free from it. For this reason, Herzl called the operation an export operation of "anti-semitism" from one country to another without solving the "Jewish Problem" but rather keeping the Jews in a minority wherever they went.

One last attempt remains. This was the setting up of small colonial settlements in Argentine and Palestine, the first of which were financed by a wealthy Jew named Baron de Hirsch, and the second by another wealthy Jew, the Parisian Baron de Rothschild. The idea began to appeal to the Jews during the last two decades of the 19th century, especially in Russia, which then included Poland.

On the face of things, this solution appeared to be the nearest to that advocated by Herzl. But Herzl attacked it most vehemently. For in his opinion, these colonies, whether in Argentine or Palestine, did not aspire to become a state or at least to acquire autonomous status, and were merely satisfied with settling small groups of Jews in non-Jewish countries, so that each new colony would remain a Jewish "ghetto" in the midst of an alien community.

Both in their motives and aims, the pre-Herzlian waves of colonial settlement had never been political but, in Herzl's view, had been escapist in motives, dependent at birth, slow

in operations and limited in scope. Over and above all this, they would remain in constant danger of persecution, and as such could not, in Herzl's opinion, provide a proper solution to the "Jewish Problem".

For these reasons, Herzl began his life as a Zionist by attempting to persuade first Hirsch and then Rothschild to stop financing those settlements and to divert the funds towards the financing of the movement for political colonial settlement which he expounded. When he failed to stop those operations by stopping the financial resources, he undertook a public campaign to enlist Jewish public opinion to replace those operations by the organised Zionist Movement. So he published his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" expounding his new solution to which the title referred and summoning the first Zionist Congress on the basis of his theory and plan of action.

* * *

The political aspect of the "Jewish Problem", therefore, constitutes the substance of the Zionist Movement, the factor which distinguishes the Zionist solution from all the other solutions (especially that of non-political settlement), and is the common ground on which all the differing Zionist groups find a meeting place.

Because of this basic political characteristic, Herzl's Zionist programme invested diplomacy with the leading role in the establishment of the state and the fulfilment of the Movement's aims.

From the first instant of its conception in Herzl's mind

up to the final form in which it was expressed, Herzl's programme has laid total stress on diplomacy as the means for achieving the Zionist aim.

The first reference to this programme occurs in a short note in Herzl's diary for June 7th, 1895,⁵ in which he says:

"As soon as we have decided on the land and concluded a preliminary treaty with its present sovereign, we shall start diplomatic negotiations with all the great powers for guarantees. Then, issuance of the Jewish loan."⁶

So, diplomatic endeavours with the government which had sovereignty over the coveted land and then with all the great powers, were to be the very first steps after the choice of the country destined to be transformed into a Jewish State, and before raising the necessary funds for emigration and settlement.

This same order of priorities concerning Zionist steps also appears in the draft speech⁷ which Herzl had the intention of addressing to the Rothschild family council, but which he published instead with some amendments in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat", after failing to convince the head of the Rothschild family in Paris. In that draft he says :

(5) That is, only two or three weeks after he had begun to confide his thoughts to his diary. He continued to write down all that occurred to him about Zionism up to his death nine years later.

(6) Herzl's Diaries, Vol. I, pp. 40-41.

(7) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 129-182.

"As soon as the Society of Jews has constituted itself, we shall call a conference of a number of Jewish geographers to determine, with the help of these scholars... where we are going to emigrate."

"Once we have agreed on the continent and the country, we shall begin to take diplomatic steps..."⁸

After talking about Argentine and Palestine as two possible places, he goes back to explain his programme and its stages :

"As soon as we have determined the country that is to be occupied, we shall send out trusted and skilful negotiators who are to conclude treaties with the present authorities and neighbouring states covering our reception, transit and guarantees for internal and external peace."⁹

"Once the negotiations are over and the necessary agreements concluded, the first ship will be despatched, carrying the first pioneering settlers who will undertake to study the resources of the natural wealth of the land, set up the nuclei of the central administrative institutions and complete the preliminary preparations which will finally lead to the stage of large-scale emigration and settlement."¹⁰

In "Der Judenstaadt", Herzl explains his plan as follows :

"The whole plan is in its essence perfectly simple, as it

(8) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 133.

(9) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 134.

(10) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 174.

must necessarily be if it is to come within the comprehension of all."

"Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves..."

"The plan, simple in design, but complicated in execution, will be carried out by two agencies : the Society of Jews and the Jewish Company."

"The Society of Jews will do the preparatory work in the domains of science and politics, which the Jewish Company will afterwards apply practically."¹¹

Then Herzl describes the tasks of each one of the two agencies separately. About the "Society of Jews", he says :

"Should the Powers declare themselves willing to admit our sovereignty over a neutral piece of land, then the Society will enter into negotiations for the possession of this land..."

"The Society of Jews will treat with the present masters of the land, putting itself under the protectorate of the European Powers, if they prove friendly to the plan."¹²

The "Jewish Company" will undertake to liquidate the property of Jews who are willing to emigrate and to organise trade and economy in the coveted land.¹³

(11) Theodore Herzl, "Der Judenstaadt," Chapter II (Herzl's collected works, p. 252).

(12) *Ibid.*, pp. 253-254.

(13) *Ibid.*, p. 252.

This was the plan which was formulated in Herzl's mind up to the time when he published his pamphlet, "Der Judenstaat".

After publishing the pamphlet, Herzl went to London to meet with the leaders of the Maccabees, a Jewish Society which he hoped was prepared to accept his plan, adopt it and put it into operation. He expressed his theory and plan in one sentence which was to become the programme for the said society to adopt; once it adopted it could itself become the "Society of Jews" which he advocated in order to launch the Zionist Movement on the following basis :

"The Society of Jews sets itself the task of acquiring, under international law, a territory for those Jews who are unable to assimilate."¹⁴

But the Maccabees refused to go along with Herzl's plan, so he was left with only one alternative : to call for a Zionist Congress which met in Basle and issued, at the end of August 1897, its programme. This became the official programme of the Zionist Movement and its fourth article, as we have seen earlier, called for "preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism." The preamble had fixed that aim as being "the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, secured by public law."

Many years later, Herzl recalled the evolution of his

(14) Herzl's Diaries, Vol. I, p. 408 of July 5th, 1896.

Zionist ideas in an article in which he said in connection with the holding of the first Zionist Congress of 1897:

"... we wanted to enter into bona fide negotiations with the Turkish Government in order to achieve legal assurances for the large-scale settlement. For it is clear that nothing would have been accomplished if the colonists were left at the mercy of minor bureaucrats and perhaps, after a short respite, after heroic labour, could again be driven away."¹⁵

* * *

Herzl realised that the establishment of a Jewish State would need the support, assistance and protection of one of the big powers. This conclusion was the same as that reached by his predecessors of whose writing he had no knowledge when he launched his Movement in "Der Judenstaadt". ("Nationalism" from Moses Hess and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer in the two respective books they published in 1862 to Leo Pinsker who published his in 1882). But while Hess had his eyes on France and Pinsker had believed in the support of Britain, Herzl's thoughts went out directly to the Ottoman Sultan (in whom authority over Palestine was vested—quite in line with Herzl's programme) as well as to a number of European governments at the same time. In the year that followed the pub-

(15) Herzl, "Zionismus," in *Gesammelte Zionistische Werke*, Vol. I (Berlin, Judisches Verlag, 1934), pp. 371-380. The article was written in 1899, translated into English by Hella Freud Barways and published in English under the title "Zionism" in Ludwig Lewisohn: *Theodore Herzl: A Portrait for this Age* (Cleveland, the World Publishing Co., 1955), pp. 320-329. The extract appears on p. 326.

lication of "Der Judenstaadt," Herzl conducted negotiations with the Kaiser of Germany and his ministers, with two British ministers, with officials in the Austrian Empire and Russia, the King of Italy, the Pope, and he tried to meet personally both the King of England and the Tzar of Russia.

Reliance on the big Powers, striving to obtain their support for Zionism, inducing them to use pressure on the Ottoman Empire in order to persuade it to relinquish Palestine and convincing those Powers to extend their protection to whatever could be agreed upon with the Sultan—these were his aims. Herzl did not confine his efforts to advocating them, but himself carried on contacts and negotiations to accomplish them.

In his negotiations with the Sultan, Herzl laid stress on promises of loans, the payment of the religious tax and technical aid to save Ottoman economy. In his negotiations with the big Powers, he laid stress on the imperial, strategic, economic and moral benefits that each would reap from the setting up of a "Jewish State" in Palestine.

But Herzl failed to obtain the desired "political charter" from the Sultan and failed to persuade the other governments to intercede with the Sultan on behalf of Zionism. However, he remained hopeful until the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, when he admitted his failure to obtain the "Charter" from the Sultan and submitted instead a proposal made by the British government to facilitate Jewish settlement in East Africa. This gave rise to strong opposition from those whose ambitions had centered on Palestine, and in the next Congress held after

Herzl's death, the British proposal was rejected and so all thought of replacing Palestine by any other territory was ended.

* * *

Thus Herzl succeeded in giving diplomacy the place of honour in the Zionist programme, but failed to achieve the expected diplomatic victory. In his programmatic theory, he laid down the political foundations of Zionism, but he left Zionist action suspended in mid-air, for he failed to provide it with the practical political basis of which his theory spoke. It was made clear later that Herzl had carried the Zionist Movement along a cul-de-sac.

His followers were left the choice between two alternatives: either to reject Herzl's theory altogether or to discover the causes of his failure in the application and remedy them. Rejecting Herzl's theory meant the return to non-political settlement and the relinquishing of the whole idea of a Jewish state; this was not acceptable to the Zionist Movement. So it became necessary to discover the mistakes that Herzl had committed in the application, separate them from the original theory and draw up a new plan of operation which would acknowledge the realities of the situation without departing from the principles of the theory. This was achieved in the course of the three years that followed Herzl's death, so that by the time the eighth Zionist Congress was held at the Hague in 1907, the plan had been formulated and had obtained the approval of the majority to become thenceforward the fixed Zionist Programme.

* * *

As a result of the revision of Herzl's method, it was found that his mistake had not stemmed from his imagining that the "Jewish Problem" was basically a political one, nor from his belief that the solution must be political in character and international in scope, nor from his belief that to save the Jews as a nation, to end "anti-semitism" and to ensure for the Jews a secure national life could be achieved only by gathering them in one country (Palestine) and the setting up thereon of an internationally recognised and protected state. It was revealed that Herzl's mistake was in the simplified naïve picture he had given of the relationship which should exist between diplomatic action on the one hand and the operations of colonisation and settlement on the other.

Herzl had imagined these two actions as two successive phases: the first begins, then, when its aim is achieved, it ends and there is no place left for it; then the second begins. In other words, Herzl had made a mistake when he thought that diplomatic action can be conducted and can succeed independently of the operation of colonial settlement and that the latter can begin after the completion of the diplomatic phase and can then get along without it.

However, the realities of the case differ from this naïve picture. For, in reality, diplomatic action and the operation of colonial settlement are interactive, and it is this constant interaction which drives Zionism in an upward movement.

Herzl had imagined the Zionist programme as a transition

from the phase of diplomatic action to the phase of settlement in a vertical movement carrying Zionism from the first to the second. The picture, as drawn by Weizmann in 1907 and as approved then by the Zionist Organization and as applied ever since, is that of a constant oscillation between diplomacy and settlement which applies to every phase of the programme. From the interaction permitted by this oscillation an ascending and spiral movement results.

In the application of the new phase, Weizmann's success was as complete as Herzl's failure had been. It was Weizmann, through this plan, who achieved for Zionism most of its diplomatic victories; it was he who succeeded in obtaining the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (considered by Zionists as the "Charter" which Herzl had coveted so much). It was he who first negotiated with Faisal, son of Hussain, and signed with him the well-known agreement in 1919. It was he, as member of the Zionist delegation to the Peace Conference, who succeeded in having the Balfour Declaration incorporated in the Mandate Charter. It was he who convinced non-Zionist Jews to participate with the Zionist Organisation in the formation of the "Jewish Agency," which effectively fell under the complete influence of Zionists in spite of the presence of non-Zionist Jews, from which Zionism benefited in finance, politics and propaganda. It was again Weizmann, who was instrumental in defeating the White Paper of 1930 by obtaining from the British Prime Minister an explanatory letter which dynamited the very foundations of that Paper. It was he who played a leading role in persuading the Royal Commission to recommend the project for the Partition of Palestine in 1937. It was he who convinced Churchill to form the Jewish Brigade in

1944. It was he who persuaded Truman to keep the Negev within the boundaries of that part of Palestine which was to go to the Jewish state and then again convinced him later to recognise that state only a few minutes after the proclamation of its establishment in Tel Aviv—all this while the General Assembly of the United Nations in a special session was debating an American proposal to replace the Partition Plan by a temporary International Trusteeship over a non-partitioned Palestine.

It is, therefore, timely now to undertake an analysis of this plan of action drawn up and applied by Weizmann and his colleagues, with a view to seeing the nature of the relationship which exists in that plan between diplomatic action and the operation of colonial settlement.

(4) *The Spiral Movement in the Interaction of Diplomacy and Settlement*

It can be said, according to the tenets of the Zionist Movement, that diplomatic action and the operation of colonial settlement are inseparable twins. These two elements are and should remain in a state of interaction and their constant interaction strengthens each one of them, activates it and increases its chances of success, driving Zionism in a spiral movement upwards towards the achievement of further parts of its fixed objective.

To attempt to give this aspect of the Zionist Movement on the march a physical form, the first parallel that comes to mind is that of a man using a rope to climb from the ground

to the roof. Such a man will need to use both his arms spirally if he is to climb at all. If he uses only one arm, he loses his balance and falls to the ground. Should he stubbornly hold on to the rope with one arm, he may be saved from falling, but all he can achieve is to remain fixed in his place. To climb, he must use both arms in properly synchronised movements, so that his right hand holds on to the rope at a given point while the left hand moves a stage higher and so on until he reaches the top.

Likewise, if diplomacy and colonial settlement fail to interact constantly, diplomacy becomes futile. In such a case, agreements, or pledges, or promises, or accords remain useless because the second party can easily back out whenever it chooses. At the same time, colonial settlement which has not been preceded, accompanied and protected by international agreements runs the risk of getting stopped and becoming wasted. It is therefore clear that when each of the two elements remains isolated from the other, both their efforts are wasted; whereas when their actions are properly synchronised, progress from one phase to the other becomes possible.

* * *

This idea contains five programmatic principles:

(a) *Diplomatic endeavours to obtain international promises and agreements cannot succeed unless they are preceded by pioneer work in Palestine.*

This reality was first brought home to the Zionists as a

result of Herzl's failure in all his efforts to obtain from the Sultan permission for the Zionist Movement to colonise Palestine. The conclusions they drew from this in that phase were of the utmost importance. To them, Herzl's failure meant that diplomacy alone, no matter how clever, could not persuade the parties concerned to see eye to eye with the Zionist Movement and grant it a permit to undertake the colonisation of Palestine, unless that diplomacy was preceded by a tangible Zionist success in Palestine. Such a success in pioneering settlement will act as an effective instrument in the diplomatic negotiations to induce the Powers whose support is required that the Zionist community inside Palestine can serve their interests in the area if permitted to grow and expand. At the height of the debate in 1907, when it became clear that all Herzl's efforts had failed, Weizmann said:

“(it is) necessary for us to keep our case before the tribunals of the world, but the presentation of our case could only be effective if, along with it, there was emigration, colonisation and education.”¹⁶

Recently Ben Gurion, reviewing the history of Zionism, referred to the Zionists preoccupation with diplomatic activities during the first decades, in the following words:

“They were not always convinced that only the backing of solid settlement achievements by the Jews in Palestine could give success to their activity, and that without the practical side of Zionism their efforts would be

(16) Chaim Weizmann's "Trial and Error," p. 122.

sterile."¹⁷

And so practical achievements become a political argument in the hands of diplomatic negotiators which could be more effective than any legalistic or religious argument. Again we quote Ben Gurion:

"Unless we extended our physical settlement of the land, the most eloquent and energetic political approaches to Whitehall would come to naught; and that in fact physical achievement was the weightiest political argument and the one to which the mandatory and other governments would pay most heed."¹⁸

Ben Gurion gives an example to illustrate this view when he speaks of the Peel Commission which recommended the partition of Palestine in 1937, but did not include the Negev in the Jewish area, attributing this to the absence of Zionist settlements in that region at the time. And although Ben Gurion qualifies this statement when he says that there might have been other reasons for the non-inclusion of Negev—such as British strategic interests—he again maintains that if the Negev had been colonised and inhabited, the Peel Commission would not have so easily excluded it from the areas which it recommended should be allotted to the Jewish state. He ends up by saying, "Had we actually developed the Negev, that achievement would have had more effect on the Commission than any political argument."¹⁹

(17) Ben Gurion: "Ben Gurion Looks Back," p. 48.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 54.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

(b) *Even when diplomatic efforts end in success, the resulting agreements remain like empty frames unless the Zionist Movement fills them with the substance of successful settlement.*

Weizmann gave brief expression to this view when he said, in his speech to the Congress held at The Hague in 1907 :

“Our diplomatic work is important, but it will gain in importance by actual performance in Palestine.”²⁰

Forty years later Weizmann wrote as follows in explanation of that principle:

“All these political formulas, even if granted to us by the powers that were, would be no use to us, might possibly even be harmful as long as they were not the product of hard work put into the soil of Palestine. (The settlement of Nahalal, Daganish, the Hebrew University, the Ruthenberg electrical works, the Dead Sea Concession meant much more to me personally than all the promises of great governments or great political parties. It was not lack of respect for governments and parties, nor an underrating of the value of political pronouncements. But to me a pronouncement is real only if it is matched by performance in Palestine. The pronouncement depends on others, the performance is entirely our own. This is the essence of my Zionist life . . . (Others) wanted the easy road, the road paved with the promises of others.

(20) Weizmann's "Trial and Error," p. 122.

I believed in the path trodden out by our own feet, however wounded the feet may be."²¹

(c) Political pledges and agreements, which Zionist diplomacy is successful in obtaining, remain at the mercy of foreign sources unless they are immediately accompanied by actual achievements which alone implement and maintain them.

In his speech before the Hague Congress in 1907 Weizmann said:

"Even if a charter, such as Herzl had dreamed of, were possible, it would be without value unless it rested, so to say, on the very soil of Palestine, on a Jewish population rooted in that soil, on institutions established by and for that population. A charter was merely a scrap of paper; unlike other nations and governments, we could not convert it into reality by force; we had nothing to back it with except work on the spot."²²

What Weizmann had said in 1907 about the charter which Herzl had done his best to obtain from the Sultan, he repeated in 1919 in connection with the Balfour Declaration which he himself had succeeded in obtaining from the British Government:

"The Balfour Declaration was no more than a framework which had to be filled in by our own efforts."²³

(21) *Ibid.*, p. 358.

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 122.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 242.

Weizmann also said the same thing about the Mandate Charter. In a speech he delivered in 1931 before the Zionist Congress, he proclaimed:

“Like all people and groups without the tradition of political responsibility, the Jews are apt to see in the printed text of a document the sole and sufficient guarantee of political rights. Some of them have clung fanatically to the letter of the Mandate and have failed to understand its spirit. Practical politics, like mechanics, are governed by one golden rule: you can only get out of things what you put into them.”²⁴

Ben Gurion has expressed the same evaluation of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter in the memoirs he has recently published:

“The Balfour Declaration and the aim of the League of Nations Mandate would remain pieces of paper if we did not manage to bring Jews into Palestine and prepare the land for large scale settlement.”²⁵

When the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation passed its recommendation on the partition of Palestine on the 24th of November, 1947, Ben Gurion urged his followers not to relax or give themselves up to optimism, warning them that UNO might go back on its recommendation and calling for military action to turn partition into an accomplished fact before UNO could revise its views. In a speech

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 242.

(25) Ben Gurion's "Ben Gurion Looks Back," p. 53.

he delivered on the 8th January 1948 before the Central Committee of the Israeli Labour Party, he said:

"We know of old that international verdicts can be upset. We remember the adjustments of the all-powerful Allies in the Near East after their victory in the First World War, parcelling out Turkish territory. Mustapha Kemal came along, and turned the tables . . .

"Force of arms, not formal resolutions, will determine the issue."²⁶

(d) If, however, political pledges and agreements which the Zionist Movement obtains through diplomatic action are followed by regular colonising activity, then the "rights" acquired through those agreements become secure and cannot be effected by broken pledges or agreements.

If political promises, international agreements or the resolutions of international bodies—all of them the fruits of diplomatic action—remain shaky and at the mercy of the outside world, so long as they remain an empty framework which the Zionist Movement has not filled with the substance of colonising achievement, then regular endeavours to intensify effective colonising achievement becomes the greatest security. This in reality protects the "rights" acquired by the Zionist Movement (only in theory) when promises are proclaimed, agreements signed and resolutions passed.

(26) Ben Gurion's "Rebirth and Destiny of Israel," pp. 227 and 252.

Basing themselves on this principle, the Zionist historians of the Movement explain the vast difference in the attitudes of that Movement towards three events: the Movement withdrew in the face of the White Paper of 1922; it stood firm before the White Paper of 1930; it rebelled against the White Paper of 1939. Those historians attribute the changes of attitude to the changes in the ability to resist which stems directly from the effective achievements in bringing over emigrants, settling them and setting up the required communal institutions for them. During the period that elapsed between the end of the First World War and the issuing of the White Paper in 1922, the operation of settlement was still slow and limited, and this prevented the Zionist Movement from resisting the Paper and forced its leaders to sign an official document accepting it. Between 1922 and 1930, settlement had progressed sufficiently to enable the Zionist Movement to take a different stand *vis-à-vis* the White Paper of 1930 from that of 1922, to resist it and to induce the British Prime Minister to issue an interpretation which virtually negated it. By the late thirties, the Zionist ability to resist had increased to such an extent that, as soon as the White Paper of 1939 was issued limiting emigration and the sale of land, the whole Zionist Movement rose to resist it with terror, propaganda and international pressure. The intensity of that resistance forced Britain in the end to relinquish its Mandate over Palestine and to place the whole matter in the hands of the United Nations.

The same thing can be said about the vacillation of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the spring of 1948 over the partition resolution which it had passed as a recommendation in the autumn of the previous year. No sooner

had the special session been held to debate the "trusteeship project" as a replacement for the "partition plan" than Zionism resorted to resistance and faced the General Assembly with an accomplished fact which made it desist from cancelling its previous partition recommendation.

Analysing the attitude of the Zionist Movement towards the White Paper of 1939 and the factors which enabled it to overcome what he described as "the concentrated effort" of the British Government to break the pledge it had made to the Jewish nation in the Balfour Declaration, Weizmann said that "the firm structure of the national home while in the process of becoming and the support given by British public opinion to the Zionist attitude succeeded in frustrating the British attempt." He then adds:

"Had we, in the years between 1922 and 1929, concentrated on obtaining settlements, declarations, charters and promises to the neglect of our physical growth, we should perhaps not have been able to withstand."²⁷

Ben Gurion, giving the same explanation to the success of the Zionist Movement in frustrating the efforts exerted to induce the General Assembly to cancel its Partition Plan and replace it by the Trusteeship project, says:

"Our wider bounds, the advance of Jewish Jerusalem and its embodiment into the state, are far more convincing than any formal recommendation of the United Nations

(27) Weizmann's "Trial and Error," pp. 335-336.

that is still born."²⁸

(e) *Lastly, when practical achievements follow closely on international political agreements, and when these achievements are completed on the strength of those agreements and within their framework, they soon create new situations which may be used as springboards towards demands of newer agreements. These provide the Zionist Movement with better conditions, greater freedom and more far-reaching "rights," or lift some of the restrictions which the previous agreements had imposed.*

For a growing dynamic movement like the Zionist Movement, pledges and accords obtained at the outset of each phase of development are like "work permits" opening new vistas before the Movement, soon to turn into spokes in the ever-turning wheel. For such instruments, while defining what is permitted to Zionism, allowing it freedom of action on that basis and providing it with the required aid and protection, also define what Zionism should *not* do. So while they grant the Zionist Movement "rights" which it had not previously possessed, they also and at the same time impose upon it certain obligations.

The Zionist Movement, at the beginning of each of its phases of development, finds in the pledge or the agreement which it has obtained through diplomatic action (the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Charter, the Partition Plan of the General Assembly of the United Nations) a pure gain for

(28) Ben Gurion's "Rebirth and Destiny of Israel," pp. 227 and 252.

itself. But as soon as the Movement has poured into the new political mould all its practical colonising potential, it finds the obligations and limitations of that new mould burdensome and comes to look at them in the end as obstacles which it must overcome, although at the beginning it had considered them a great assistance and a resounding victory.

In other words, the Zionist Movement obtains a new pledge or licence, holds on to its very letter, fearing the party which gave it might break its pledge or give it a limited interpretation. Then, as soon as the Movement has completely exhausted the potentialities of that pledge or that permit, it prepares itself to break away from it and ends up by tearing it up with its own hands.

Here, the interaction between diplomacy and practical achievement plays a role which is complementary to that described in the previous principle.

The theory underlying the Zionist programmatic theory considers, according to the previous principle, that pledges and agreements—in as much as they constitute a political licence—remain pieces of paper at the mercy of those who issue them until the Zionist Movement implements them with practical achievements and then—and only then—do they become secure. It further believes that the same pledges and agreements in as much as they impose obligations which ultimately restrict the Movement's freedom of action—now fall at the mercy of the Zionist Movement which is able to break away from their yoke when it has succeeded in its practical achievements in Palestine.

So it is the colonial operation which saves the pledge and agreements from possible breaches by the foreign ally. (This happens at the start of the alliance when the Zionist Movement is in need of the permit and aid which the alliance provides.) It is the same operation which enables the Zionist Movement itself to break the agreements and liberate itself from the pledges. (This happens when the Movement has exhausted all the gains provided by the agreement and when its limitations have begun to weigh heavily on the Movement.)

* * *

This last principle of the theory of Zionist programmatic theory, which crowns all the preceding ones, is the one which is most deeply set in the Zionist mind and is also, as we shall see in the next chapter, the principle which has the greatest influence in determining the main pattern of the Zionist Programme, i.e., the plan of phases.

It is the principle of the spiral movement, the interaction between the two arms, diplomatic action and practical achievement, which drives the whole Zionist Movement forward from one phase of development to another.

As we have already seen, Ben Gurion has expressed a similar view when he asserted that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter would remain scraps of paper "if we did not manage to bring the Jews into Palestine and prepare the land for large-scale settlement."²⁹ Immediately after this he goes on to say:

(29) Ben Gurion's "Ben Gurion Looks Back," p. 63.

"Immigration and settlement would themselves create the inescapable political facts which would bring independence."³⁰

As Ben Gurion looks back and sees the opportunities which Zionism had lost because the Jewish masses had failed to rally round the Movement in order to benefit from the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter to the extent which he had expected, he says:

"With more emigration and more money . . . it would have been far easier for us to build up in the early 1920's what we did a decade and two decades later. And if this had been done, we could have saved many more thousands of German Jews than we were allowed to do when Hitler reached power. For not only would our capacity to absorb them have been greater, but we would then have been a more formidable political force to overcome the restrictions of the British Government. Who knows? Perhaps we might then have got our state before the war, and we would have been independent and free to take in our brethren from the European countries who later perished when they were overrun by the Nazis."³¹

The way Weizmann expresses this principle is almost identical:

"The Balfour Declaration was no more than a framework, which had to be filled in by our own efforts. It

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 53.

(31) *Ibid.*, pp. 68 and 69.

would mean exactly what we would make it mean—neither more nor less. On what we could make it mean through slow, costly and laborious work would depend whether and when we should deserve or attain statehood.”³²

Perhaps the most eloquent expression of this principle came in a speech delivered by Weizmann in London on 21st September, 1919, less than two years after the Balfour Declaration:

“A Jewish state will come about; but it will come about not through political declarations, but by the sweat and blood of the Jewish people. That is the only way of building up a state . . . [The Balfour Declaration] is the golden key which unlocks the doors of Palestine and gives you the possibility to put all your efforts into that country . . . We were asked to formulate our wishes. We said we desired to create in Palestine such conditions . . . that as the country is developed we can pour in a considerable number of immigrants, and finally establish such a society in Palestine that Palestine shall be as Jewish as England is English, or America is American.”

“.. It is to be a Jewish state in the future or not?”

“.. On whom does it first of all depend whether it is to be made sooner or later? I contend that it depends largely on us. It depends a good deal upon the other powers, I agree, but the speed of the other powers, and

(32) Weizmann's "Trial and Error," p. 243.

particularly Great Britain, depends upon the pressure we put on, and the pressure we put on depends on the strength of our organisation, the strength of our funds and our knowledge of how to do things to bring the people into the country."³³

(33) Chaim Weizmann: Excerpts from his Historic Statements, Writings and Addresses; A Biography with an Introduction by Nahum Goldman, The Jewish Agency for Palestine, New York, November 1952.

CHAPTER II

THE POLICY OF PHASES

(1) *The Main Pattern of the Zionist Programme*

Introduction: The Zionist programme appears to have principal and secondary patterns.

The most important of these, the one which has full control of the whole programme, is the pattern of phases.

This is the most striking colour on the Zionist canvas, the main theme in its music, the linking thread of its material.

Talk about the Zionist programme is, in its truest sense, talk about the pattern of phases which runs right through it and appears every minute and at every turn.

* * *

The idea of the policy of phases, in the theory of Zionist action, rests on the interaction between four principles:

1. **Realism:** this defines the maximum claim of the Zionist Movement at any phase in accordance with the circumstances and possibilities of that phase.

2. Flexibility: this conditions the forms and means.

3. No-retreat: this defines the maximum claim of Zionism at any phase.

4. Escalation: or transition, after exhausting the gains of each phase, to a newer phase in which the Zionist Movement expresses new claims, the minimum of which constitutes what had been a maximum, allegedly complete claim in the former phase.

* * *

Realism: the springboard

Perhaps realism is the springboard of the Zionist Movement's understanding of the idea of phases and its application, for it is the foundation on which Zionism has built the whole structure of its policy of phases.

To judge existing circumstances realistically and without exaggeration, to assess existing possibilities carefully and objectively—this is the principle which decides what the Zionist Movement will claim at every phase in which the initiative rests in its own hands, or decides what the Zionist Movement will accept, or reject, or attempt to expand, or increase, or improve, at every phase in which the initiative rests with other parties.

So it is the objective assessment of the realistic situation—not Zionist aims, desires or subjective emotions alone—which

is the deciding factor that defines the claim, gives it its scope and also evaluates the offer and ends up by accepting it, attempting to amend it or rejecting it.

The objective assessment of the realistic situation requires among other things, firstly a comparison between the favourable and unfavourable factors and their relative strengths; secondly, an evaluation of the potentialities of Zionism without neglecting the weak points in the Zionist Movement which might disable or restrict its activity; and thirdly, a proper consideration of the time-factor in all this, with special attention to the comparison between the little that can be achieved today and the more that might be achieved tomorrow. This latter comparison is undertaken in the light of existing urgent needs which call for immediate, even if incomplete, fulfilment which cannot wait until it is too late in the hope of a fuller achievement. It is also undertaken in the light of possible risks inherent in a postponement, the most important of which is losing present favourable opportunities, by insistency on the attainment of a greater part of the objectives of the Movement and rejecting the lesser part which is attainable, thus depriving the Movement of the possibility of obtaining even the lesser part in future.

These are some features of Zionist realism which are seen and felt in every decision the Movement has taken from the very beginning. Here are only some examples:

When Herzl was carrying out political negotiations with the German government in the hope of obtaining from it the promise of a German protectorate for the colonising company

he had intended to found, he realised that the German side was not prepared to proclaim a protectorate in advance. Herzl describes the German attitude as follows:

“They want us to complete the arrangements first, acquire land and settlers’ privileges—then we should ask for and obtain the protectorate.”¹

Herzl does not conceal his annoyance at this attitude which he describes as unsatisfactory. While describing it, he comments as follows:

“One can’t be any more cautious and prudent than that. The only thing to be said against it is that once we have got that far, we shall no longer need that onerous German protectorate.”²

However, Herzl decides to continue his negotiations with the German Government on that very same basis, although he considers it an inadequate one, justifying his pursuit of the negotiations as follows:

“Yet I accept further negotiations on this basis, because I must accept everything.”³

This realism requires the acceptance of what must be accepted or it requires the acceptance of the best that is available, even though it is not entirely satisfactory:

(1) “Herzl’s Diaries,” Vol. II, p. 788.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 788.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 789.

"It is like a bridge. I come roaring along with a locomotive and cars. There is a stream I have to cross. If there is a good bridge . . . so much the better. But I would get across even if the bridge was bad."⁴

Weizmann shows this same realistic outlook when he explains the reasons that moved him and the other members of the Zionist Executive to accept the White Paper of 1922 (known as Churchill's White Paper), in spite of the restrictions they felt it placed on the liberties which the Balfour Declaration had implied. He says:

"The Churchill White Paper was regarded by us as a serious whittling down of the Balfour Declaration . . . (But) it was made clear to us that confirmation of the Mandate would be conditional on our acceptance of the policy as interpreted in the White Paper, and my colleagues and I therefore had to accept it, which we did, though not without some qualms."⁵

Realism means that one will not let go of the one bird in one's hand, in the hope of getting the two on the bush. This would be a gamble which sacrifices the partially attained objective on the altar of a hasty passion to achieve the total, uncertain aim. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen—a pro-Zionist extremist, a British imperialist soldier and a close friend of Weizmann, who played a significant role at the beginning of the British occupation of Palestine—reports a conversation he had with Weizmann, on February 12th, 1919, during the time

(4) *Ibid.*, pp. 676 and 677.

(5) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," p. 290.

of the Peace Conference, but before the Zionist delegation appeared at the Conference. He says:

"I had a long talk today with Weizmann and advised him to go all out for Jewish Sovereignty in Palestine. He might get it now whereas in a year's time it will be impossible . . . But Weizmann thinks the time inopportune and might wreck the whole idea of Mandatory Zionism."⁶

Realism also requires that the time-factor and its effects on the objective assessment of the situation be taken into consideration. In this connection, Weizmann explains the reasons why he had accepted the final amended text of the Balfour Declaration, which introduced minor amendments on the texts initially suggested by Zionism. He calls these amendments "bitter" and asks how things would have developed had the Zionist side been adamant and had insisted on its complete unamended text. He says:

"Should we then have obtained a better statement? Or would the Government have become wearied . . . and dropped the whole matter? Again, the result might have been such a long delay that the war would have ended before an agreement was reached, and then all the advantages of a timely decision would have been lost. Our judgement was, to accept, to press for ratification. For we knew that the assimilationists in Britain would use every delay for their own purposes; and we also knew

(6) Richard Meinertzhagen, "Middle East Diary," New York, Bosliov, 1960, p. 15.

that in America the same internal Jewish struggle was going on."⁷

In short, Zionist realism has always meant that the tackling of political problems and the passing of political decisions should be inspired by a purely logical assessment of the objective circumstances—without regard to the pressure of subjective desires and emotions—exactly like the decisions of a military commander in regard to his military operations or the businessman in regard to his economic affairs.

* * *

But Zionist realism, while required to conform to reality in fixing the speed of its progress and deciding how much of the ultimate aims is to be divulged, does not have to conform to reality in fixing the ultimate aims themselves or in deciding the direction they should take.

For Zionist realism is a strategic principle and not an end in itself. It influences the programme and governs strategic decisions, but it is not allowed to affect the ultimate aim of the Movement or the content given it by Zionism.

Perhaps history has not known a movement before Zionism, which has departed as far from realism in its ultimate objective and has conformed so much to realism in the execution of the programme, both at one and the same time. For from the very beginning Zionism chose a most unrealistic aim, namely,

(7) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," pp. 207-208.

to devote its energies to the colonisation of a fully populated country which formed an integral part of wide area densely inhabited by peoples who had close national ties with the country it wanted to colonise. Moreover, the vital interests of those peoples would be decisively affected by the settlement of that intruding coloniser in the usurped part of the greater homeland. In all this, the Zionist objective ran contrary to all previous colonial movements which aimed at countries that were not fully inhabited by people with close ties with the peoples of other countries who would remain free and capable of adverse reaction. Zionism was also unrealistic in its aim when it sought the imperialist occupation of the desired country without having a mother country or a state of its own from which to set out. This, too, distinguishes Zionism from other imperialist movements which preceded, accompanied or followed it.

These and other distinctive qualities go to prove that the Zionist aim was far from reality. In spite of this, we find that the movement, which showed such little regard to realities when it set down its ultimate aims and was in these, among all the movements of modern times, the most irreverent and neglectful of reality, was at the same time the most consistently realistic movement when it came to drawing up the programme, deciding the plan of action and putting it into operation one decade after another.

* * *

We have said that Zionist realism was purely a programmatic principle and as such it did not influence the fixing of

its ultimate aims. But there is yet another quality which distinguishes Zionist realism.

Even purely as one principle of the Zionist programme, Zionist realism does not mean surrender to reality; rather it means acting within the framework of an existing reality with a view to changing, evolving and making it yield to the Zionist will, since, at the outset, it had constituted a restriction on its actions and had set an obstacle in its path.

Zionist realism, therefore, placates realism in order to tame and use it; it agrees to act within the scope fixed by reality so that later it might reach a new reality which would permit it to act according to its own decisions.

Finally, Zionist realism does not look with pessimism at the shortcomings in existing formulas and limitations of action, but rather looks forward with optimism to the opportunities and possibilities contained in the formulas and which in the end permit Zionism to overreach the present reality and penetrate its limitations. Referring to the 1922 White Paper, Weizmann says:

"Constructive criticism was needed: not belittlement of the White Paper, but indication of methods by which those terms could be taken advantage of in order to expand the Jewish Homeland."⁸

Flexibility

According to the tenets of Zionism, flexibility means that priority must be given to substance over form, ends over means

(8) *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295.

and the content over the letter. It, therefore, means adapting the form (or the means or the letter) to suit the pressure of realities and their possibilities and limitations, for the purpose of acquiring the desired substance.

If the principle of realism says, "Let us accept temporarily a part of our objectives, so long as existing circumstances prevent us from achieving the whole," the principle of flexibility says, "Let us also accept any means which enables us to achieve that part of our objectives, regardless of the form."

So we see that flexibility has both a negative and a positive side.

On the negative side, flexibility aims to avoid wasting Zionist potential in pursuit of a given form of action, if it is possible to attain the same objective by means of a different form which might be easier to attain and might avoid raising undue obstacles.

On the positive side, flexibility aims skillfully to create substitutes to achieve the same ends without raising the obstacles which the rejected forms of action might raise.

The Principle of No-Retreat

Inspired by its realism and flexibility, Zionism decides, at every phase of action, the immediate objective of that phase, fixes that part of its overall plan, which it aspires to fulfil during that phase, and determines the ways and means that should be used.

In addition to realism and flexibility, there is a third factor which influences the planning of Zionist policy at every phase in its history; and that is the principle of "no-retreat" which, as we have said, fixes the minimum claim of Zionism at every phase.

So far, the Zionist Movement would seem to resemble a train which runs in one direction; it slows down or it increases its speed in accordance with the requirements of the track. It may even stop completely for a time, because it is too weak to proceed or because of a break-down or an obstacle. But it never goes back, never returns to its point of departure, never retreats to stations that it has passed.

In the history of Zionism, there were often pitched battles between the principles of realism and flexibility on the one hand, and the principle of no-retreat on the other; and the latter has always emerged triumphant except when opposing forces were of such dimension as to force Zionism to retreat.⁹ Such cases were few in number, but in each one of them, the decision to retreat was never taken voluntarily, but was always forced on Zionism from outside; and at any rate the decision to retreat was never taken except after a long internal struggle,

(9) We must distinguish here between two kinds of retreat: the first is retreat from an actual gain, and the second is retreat from an aspiration or a claim. By the first, we mean the surrendering of a "right" which Zionism has acquired through a "promise" given by a second party or in a bilateral "contract" or in a "resolution" passed by an international body; also the surrendering of a "right" acquired in the course of practical achievement. The second kind is not a real retreat and does not apply to what we have said above. It includes exaggerated claims which Zionism presents during the bargaining and before the conclusion of an agreement, and which it surrenders with flexibility and realism during the bargaining or negotiations.

much hesitation and great opposition. Such a decision always came out in the end accompanied by a last-minute stand to shorten the retreat or to lighten its effect through other means—such as obtaining other apparent gains which would compensate the loss. It may be said without exaggeration that this was so in every decision to retreat throughout the history of Zionism; in the other decisions to retreat which did not conform to this rule, retreat was only in appearance and served rather to prove the principle of no-retreat than otherwise.

Perhaps the most important cases in which Zionism was subjected to pressures aiming at forcing it to retreat were the following ten:

(1) The 1922 White Paper, which excluded Transjordan from the area where the British pledge to encourage the setting up of a "national home for the Jewish People" was to be fulfilled.

(2) The 1930 White Paper, which laid down rules and regulations of a nature to restrict Jewish immigration in Palestine and the Jewish acquisition of land.

(3) The 1939 White Paper, which buried the British plan for the partition of Palestine and the setting up of a Jewish state on one part, and replaced it with a policy aiming to grant Palestine independence after a period of transition during which Jewish immigration and land acquisition would be restricted.

(4) The Trusteeship plan, which was submitted to the

second special session of the General Assembly in the spring of 1948 as a substitute for the Partition plan, which the General Assembly had recommended in the autumn of the previous year.

(5) The Bernadotte plan — and in particular that part of it which called for the retention of the Negev as an Arab area—which was submitted to the General Assembly in the autumn of 1948.

(6) The armistice Agreement of 1949 and their adoption of the armistice lines based on the effective military occupation of each sector. If implemented in their entirety, these would have incorporated in the Israeli side large areas which the Partition plan had allotted to the Arab state, while incorporating in the Arab side small areas allotted to the Jewish state; it would have meant that the Zionists had 'relinquished' some of the land given them by the Partition plan.

(7) The General Assembly recommendation in its fourth session in 1949 confirming the internationalisation of Jerusalem, and the Trusteeship Council's appeal to Israel in 1949 to stop the measures taken to make Jerusalem its effective capital.

(8) The six General Assembly resolutions in the autumn of 1956 and the winter of 1957 ordering the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Sinai.

(9) The announcement by West Germany of its decision to stop delivering gifts of arms to Israel in accordance with

an agreement concluded between Adenauer and Ben Gurion in New York in 1960.

(10) A number of proposals—the first by the Palestine Conciliation Commission in 1949, then others by international conferences such as the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Belgrade Conference of 1961, and the last by the President of Tunisia in 1965—all of which stipulated that the United Nations resolutions, and especially those connected with the return of Palestinians to their homeland as well as with the return to the boundaries laid down by the Partition plan, should be regarded as the basis for any settlement of the Palestine question.

Over a period of forty-three years, these ten cases were the most important attempts to induce the Zionist Movement to relinquish—or to retreat from—certain “rights” it had acquired through diplomatic negotiations or effective achievement. If we review the outcome of these ten cases, we reach the following conclusions:

(1) In six cases, the Zionist Movement has succeeded in maintaining the whole status quo and stopping any changes aimed at by these attempts or any revised formulas.

(2) In three cases only, the Zionist Movement succumbed to the pressure, but either temporarily, or partially, or it had them accompanied by concessions from the other party concerned, or from a third party or from both. These concessions constituted a direct or an indirect compensation to the Zionist Movement for the retreat that was forced on it.

(3) In one case only, Zionism succumbed unconditionally, but this was the exception which proved the rule, as we shall soon see.

Let us now observe each of these three conclusions separately:

(1) *Resisting or ignoring attempts to force retreat*

The Zionist Movement resisted one of these attempts (the tenth in the cases listed above, that relating to certain proposals); first by pretending to accept it when Israel signed the Lausanne Protocol, which the neighboring Arab countries also signed, on May 12th, 1948, soon to wriggle out of its commitments; secondly by neglecting the resolutions of conferences, which repeated the attempt; and finally by scorning the Tunisian proposal, which renewed those attempts a few years later.

For another attempt (the seventh case on the list, relating to the internationalisation of Jerusalem), the Zionist Movement had nothing but scorn—even defiance. It did not stop at refusing to hand over that sector of Jerusalem which it occupied to an international body, it went further by transferring the ministries and parliament of Israel to Jerusalem. After this the parliament proclaimed Jerusalem the capital with retro-active effect dating from the day the state of Israel was established.

By using propaganda and diplomatic pressure, the Zionist Movement refused to apply the policy contained in the 1930 White Paper (the second case on the list) until it succeeded in making the British Government abandon that policy in an

official letter addressed by the British Prime Minister to the Zionist Organisation.

The Zionist Movement rejected the serious restrictions embodied in the 1939 White Paper (the third case on the list) by using terrorism and violence inside Palestine and outside it, by resorting to "illegal immigration" operations and by using pressure through propaganda and diplomacy, especially in the U.S., until Britain effectively abandoned the execution of the policies of that White Paper and referred the whole Palestine problem to the United Nations.

The Zionist Movement resisted the Trusteeship project (the fourth case on the list) by using military force to create a new *fait accompli* with which it faced the United Nations, thus stopping the latter from annulling the Partition Plan in order to replace it with the Trusteeship project. As soon as the Security Council on April 1st, 1948, convened a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the Partition Plan and discuss the Trusteeship project and while Britain still occupied Palestine, the Zionist Movement launched a concentrated military campaign in order to occupy areas allotted to the Jewish state, to expand those areas and to evict the Arabs from territories it occupied. And while the General Assembly was still debating, the Zionist Movement proclaimed the establishment of Israel on the eve of the end of the Mandate, with close competition on the part of the U.S. Government to recognise that State.

The Zionist Movement also resisted the Bernadotte plan (the fifth on the list) in the same manner: armed action and

the creation of a new *fait accompli*. Even before the General Assembly had begun to discuss the plan, Jewish armed forces had attacked the Negev and had occupied large areas; then they refused to abide by succeeding Security Council resolutions calling upon Jewish forces to withdraw.

(2) *Partial Retreat, or Retreat with Compensation:*

By partial retreat we mean that connected with the attempt referred to in the sixth case on the list. When the armistice negotiations took place in 1949, and the armistice lines were drawn to conform to actual military positions, large areas allotted by the Partition Plan to the Arab state had entered within the areas occupied by Zionist forces. At the same time, a small number of pockets allotted by the Partition Plan to the Jewish state had been occupied by Arab armies. It was therefore a matter of principle that the armistice lines should be drawn in such a way as to keep those pockets under Arab control. But such a thing would have required a Zionist "retreat," a "relinquishing" of "rights" acquired by Zionism on the strength of the General Assembly recommendation concerning the partition of Palestine. So the Zionist Movement resisted that "retreat" until it was counter-balanced by these pockets being considered "demilitarised zones" which would remain, for the duration of the truce, outside the "territorial sovereignty" of both parties and in which neither party was permitted to station troops. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission was to supervise the return of normal civilian life to those enclaves within the framework of the local ad-

ministration of each village or colony.¹⁰

Although these measures constituted only a partial "retreat" by the Zionist Movement, it nevertheless tried to lighten their effect by exercising some of the appearances of sovereignty in the demilitarised zones, by forcing Arab inhabitants to abandon some of them, by building new colonies in them and by claiming to possess legal sovereignty over them, contrary to the Armistice Agreement, the decision of the Mixed Armistice Commissions and the resolution of the Security Council.

The second retreat came in 1957, when the Zionist state yielded to the six international resolutions referred to in the eighth case on the list. All the same, the military evacuation of the Gaza Strip and Sinai was accompanied by recognition from the U.S. and other Western states of Israel's "right" to navigate in Arab territorial waters by a pledge to protect that "right." In other words, Israel obtained from a third party its approval to protect measures of economic importance as a compensation for military and political retreat.

The third retreat was in 1965, when Israel "excused" West Germany from carrying out its remaining commitments, under the agreement signed between Adenauer and Ben Gurion

(10) This system was applied in the Syrian-Israeli and Egyptian-Israeli Truce Agreements. The Jordanian-Israeli Agreement contained special regulations applicable to Jewish pockets in the Jerusalem area which fell within the territory occupied by the Jordanian forces and not along the lines dividing the two sides. The Lebanese-Israeli Truce Agreement made no provisions for the setting up of demilitarised zones because, when this Agreement was signed, the same situation which called for this provision in the other three agreements did not exist there.

in New York in 1960, in return for German financial and diplomatic compensation and direct American compensation to make up for the gifts of arms which Germany had stopped.

(3) *Unconditional Retreat:*

In the one case that remains, the Zionist Movement experienced a total and unconditional retreat. This was in connection with the 1922 White Paper. The British Government asked the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organisation to submit a memorandum signed by all the members of the Committee confirming their acceptance of the interpretation given to the Balfour Declaration as well as the exclusion of Transjordan from its provisions. The British Government made it a condition that this be done before the promulgation of the Mandate Charter in order that the interpretations and exceptions made in the White Paper may be reflected in the text of the Charter. The Zionist Movement bowed down to this demand "reluctantly" as we have already seen.¹¹

It is important to note that this incident was the first test of the extent to which the Zionist Movement would adhere to its principle of "no retreat." So if the Balfour Declaration was the first diplomatic victory achieved by the Zionist Movement since its inception twenty years earlier, the 1922 White Paper was the first British attempt to limit its scope.

It would seem to us that the causes which forced the Zionist Movement to bow down and retreat were stronger

(11) See above, pp. 65-66.

than its ability to resist. For Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration had begun to assume serious and violent dimensions, contrary to what the Zionists had hoped after obtaining Faisal's approval. Moreover, the Arabs then constituted the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants and the Jews were incapable of standing up to them without support from the British forces. Another factor was that British public opinion at the time was beginning to debate the Balfour Declaration in a way which did not reveal any widespread support for it. Finally, the League of Nations had not yet approved the Mandate Charter, so that it was not yet possible to subject Britain to political pressure through the other members. For all these reasons, the Zionist retreat this time was inevitably forced by the nature of the choices before it: to accept it *in toto* or to risk losing it altogether. So the Movement opted in favour of relinquishing one part in order not to lose the whole.

But this Zionist retreat, which was inspired by Zionist "realism", was not free from the veiled intention of coming back to the subject diplomatically and of effectively breaking away from its restrictions when the Zionist Movement had the required means at its disposal.

A return to the subject diplomatically was made in an attempt to raise the question of Zionist settlement in Transjordan before the League of Nations' Mandates Commission, and later in the efforts exerted by representatives of the Zionist Movement to persuade the Royal Commission (1936-37) that to open Transjordan to Zionist settlement would help solve the Palestine question. Furthermore, speeches of delegates of

the Jewish Agency before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947, when the Partition Plan was being discussed, contain repeated references to Zionism's "surrender" of its "rights" in Transjordan as proof of its good intentions and its readiness to sacrifice its "rights" for the purpose of reaching a peaceful solution. Even as late as 1960 Col. Meinertzhagen—that constant British champion of Zionism and the close friend of Weizmann—was still declaring that Zionist "rights" over Transjordan remained valid and binding by international law. After reviewing the history of the Palestine border demarcation and how it had included Transjordan until Churchill excluded it, he says:

"Neither the Balfour Declaration, nor its confirmation by the League of Nations, nor the resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations, nor the original boundaries of Mandated Palestine have been revoked. They still live and are binding."¹²

Serious attempts to break away effectively from the restrictions of the White Paper in connection with Transjordan were made from the mid-twenties to the mid-thirties, when the Zionist Movement conducted negotiations for the long-term lease of large areas of Arab land in Transjordan, from Abdullah himself or from some of the sheikhs. However, these attempts came to nothing thanks to the alertness of the Arab people which destroyed the secret deals, and to British intervention, the causes of which lie outside the scope of this book.

* * *

(12) Meinertzhagen, "Middle East Diary," pp. 354-355.

The principle of "no-retreat" does not stop at the Zionist Movement's resistance of every attempt from whatever source to stop it exercising a "right" it has acquired through diplomatic endeavour or practical achievement. Sometimes it goes beyond that to taking "preventive action" before the need arises.

An example of this is the effort exerted by the Zionist Organisation and its supporters at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 to incorporate in the United Nations Charter a text which would safeguard the Zionist "right" embodied in the Mandate Charter a quarter of a century earlier, by transferring the British obligations contained in a unilateral declaration (the Balfour Declaration) to international obligations guaranteed by the United Nations. This effort had its effect on article eighty of the Charter which stipulated that "nothing in this Charter shall be construed in as of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."

The motive behind this preventive measure was Zionist fear that the texts of the Charter dealing with self-determination might be interpreted in such a way as to nullify the Balfour Declaration or the League of Nations commitment to it in the Mandate Charter. Zionists also feared that the Mandate over Palestine might be replaced by independence, an event which would leave the fate of the "national home" at the mercy of the Arab majority of an independent Palestine.

Escalation:

When the Zionist Movement has attained all the objec-

tives fixed for a given phase through agreements concluded or pledges obtained at the beginning of that phase, it goes on to think seriously of the following phase.

We have already seen in the previous chapter¹³ how a pledge or agreement or resolution at the beginning of a phase constitutes a licence which permits Zionism to perform an act and offers it a good opportunity, but becomes a restrictive element at the end of the phase; and how the "rights" which it strives for at the beginning of a phase become, at the end of that phase, burdensome "obligations" from which it tries to liberate itself. The best example is the Balfour Declaration which had been a coveted hope and a generous opportunity but which became after a quarter of a century, or even less, a heavy burden and an obstacle in the path of the Zionist Movement.

It remains to be noted that this change in Zionist outlook and attitude, between the beginning and the end of a phase, is not the result of an unpredictable development in circumstances but rather, on the contrary, it is intrinsic to the very nature of its conception. For it is born from the ultimate aim of Zionism which from the start is constant in the Zionist vision of the future, no matter how hidden it might be made to seem by temporary objectives and temporary Zionist slogans. It is this ultimate unchanging aim which, at the end of each phase, causes dissatisfaction with the obligations imposed by the temporary objectives achieved, defiance of them and an aspiration to break away from them.

(13) See above, pp. 54-56.

There is abundant proof of this. In previous pages¹⁴ we quoted from Weizmann and Ben Gurion frank words which express the Zionist intention, from the beginning of the stage created by the Balfour Declaration, to exploit that promise and the opportunities it offered Zionism for large-scale colonial settlement, for the purpose of transforming Palestine into a Jewish state instead of remaining for ever contented with a "National Home" under British protection, patronage and control. This is only one example and a few more follow:

On September 2nd, 1898, Herzl had one of his important talks with one of the greatest champions of Zionism at the time, the Grand Duke of Baden, the German Kaiser's uncle and one of the intermediaries between the Zionist Movement and the higher authorities of the German Empire. The talks, which centered round the Zionist plan of action and the possibilities of its execution, were carefully recorded by Herzl the following day in his diary. He says that the Duke asked him: "Do you intend to establish a state? I believe that would be the only right thing to do if you wish to have legal security." Herzl comments: "I had told him that earlier, and I also assured him that we didn't want to expose ourselves to the whims of pasha government." Then the Duke says:

"A formula could be found by which you keep the overlordship of the Sultan, something like the Danube principalities. What it would turn to later (he smiled)—say in a generation—that, after all, we cannot tell today."¹⁵

(14) See above, pp. 49-51.

(15) "Herzl's Diaries," Vol. II, p. 657.

So, acceptance of Ottoman suzerainty was to be only temporary; and it was acceptable as long as there was no escape from it and as long as the hope to break away from it later existed.

When Herzl despaired of his negotiations with Germany and Turkey, his mind turned to Britain which occupied Cyprus and controlled Egypt, including Sinai and El-Arish. He worked to obtain a British charter for settlement in Cyprus or in Sinai, and El-Arish or in both areas (both of which the Zionists included in what they called "greater Palestine") in order to have a rallying point for the Jews in them and then to invade Palestine from them. As regards Cyprus, Herzl writes in his diary for January 4th, 1901:

"We would rally on Cyprus and one day go out to Eretz Israel and take it by force, as it was taken from us long ago."¹⁶

On October 22nd, 1902, Herzl met Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, and opened the subject of colonisation in Cyprus, El-Arish and Sinai. Chamberlain understood Herzl's intention of using either of these two areas or both as a rallying point where the future invasion of Palestine could be prepared. The story of the invasion of Transvaal, which Cecil Rhodes had planned and Jameson had executed in collusion with Chamberlain himself, was still fresh in the minds of people; so Chamberlain referred to it in his talk with Herzl. Far from learning the lessons of that incident, which in the

(16) *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 1023.

end led to the Boer War, and instead of warning Herzl against such a plan, Chamberlain plots with Herzl for the execution of this plan and acts as intermediary with his colleague the Foreign Secretary (under whose competence the British presence in Egypt came) as well as with Cromer to facilitate Herzl's task. At the same time, Chamberlain urged Herzl not to divulge his intention of invading Palestine from those points. On the day following his first meeting with Chamberlain, October 23rd, 1902, Herzl writes in his diary:

"Only now did he understand me completely, my desire to obtain a rallying point for the Jewish people in the vicinity of Palestine."¹⁷

Herzl attributes Chamberlain's approval to the services which Zionism can render to the British Empire in return for this cherished assistance. He writes:

"In El-Arish and Sinai there is vacant land. England can give us that. In return she would reap an increase in power and the gratitude of ten million Jews."¹⁸

As a result of this understanding, Herzl requests Chamberlain to help him and the latter promises to do so and asks him to come and see him the following day.¹⁹ At the appointed hour, Chamberlain receives Herzl cordially and begins the conversation by saying:

(17) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 1362.

(18) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 1363.

(19) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 1362.

"I have arranged a meeting between you and Lord Lansdowne (the Foreign Secretary). He expects (you) . . . this afternoon. I have already smoothed the way for you. Present the whole matter to him . . . Tell him in particular that your proposed colony is not a jumping-off-place aimed at the Sultan's possessions."²⁰

Herzl describes Chamberlain when he said this: "His face was all smiles."²¹ He then goes on to record the conversation:

"I said, 'Of course there can be no question of that, for I intend to go to Palestine only with the Sultan's consent.' He gave me an amused look, as if to say, 'Go tell that to the Sultan.' But aloud he said to me, 'Reassure Lord Lansdowne that you are not planning a Jameson raid from El-Arish into Palestine.' 'I shall set his mind at ease, Mr. Chamberlain,' I said, also smiling."²²

This pattern is not confined to Herzl and his negotiations with the Powers, for it recurs throughout the whole history of Zionism. Perhaps Herzl's successors even surpassed him in the execution, and Weizmann was the most conspicuous in this. In a speech to the English Zionist Union at a special conference held on May 20th, 1917, for the purpose of reviewing the progress of negotiations conducted with Britain by Weizmann and his colleagues, he sums up the philosophy of going by stages most eloquently:

(20) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 1368.

(21) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 1368.

(22) *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 1368-1369.

"One reads constantly in the Press and one hears from our friends, both Jewish and non-Jewish, that it is the endeavour of the Zionist Movement immediately to create a Jewish state in Palestine . . . but it must be obvious to everybody who stands in the midst of the work of the Zionist Organisation, and it must be admitted honestly and truly, that the conditions are not yet ripe for the setting up of a state adhoc. States must be built up slowly, gradually, systematically and patiently. We, therefore, say that while a creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine is our final ideal . . . an ideal for which the whole of the Zionist Organisation is working . . . the way to achieve it lies through a series of intermediary stages. And one of those intermediary stages, which I hope is going to come about as a result of the war, is that the fair country of Palestine will be protected by such a mighty and just Power as Great Britain. Under the wings of this Power, Jews will be able to develop and to set up administrative machinery which . . . would enable us to carry out the Zionist scheme."²³

It will be remembered that the 1922 White Paper had excluded Transjordan from the provisions of the Balfour Declaration and had given the Declaration an interpretation which was calculated to reassure the Arabs that it did not aim to subject them to the rule of a Jewish majority or to compromise their existing rights and status;—an interpretation which in consequence amounted to an implicit pledge that

(23) Text of speech in a study of the "ESCO" Zionist Institute entitled, "Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies" (New Haven, Yale University Press), Vol. I, pp. 98-99.

the "national home" would not become a "state." Conforming to its constant pattern, the Zionist Movement, while forced to accept the said White Paper, did so reluctantly and with the intention of refusing it and breaking away from its restrictions when the opportune moment came. It will also be remembered how the leaders of Zionism made several attempts over a number of years to do away with the restrictions placed by this White Paper on the colonisation of Transjordan.²⁴ In regard to the other restrictions, Weizmann relates how Jabotinsky, who was the most extremists of Zionists, did not abstain from signing a letter approving the White Paper because he was certain that, in spite of its conditions and restrictions, "it would still afford us a framework for building up a Jewish majority in Palestine for the eventual emergence of a Jewish state."²⁵ Weizmann also held a similar view and this is his answer to his colleagues who had opposed the official Zionist attitude:

"Constructive criticism was needed: not belittlement of the terms of the White Paper, but indication of methods by which those terms could be taken advantage of to expand the Jewish Homeland."²⁶

The pattern recurs till the very end. It stands out clearly in the late forties when preparations were under foot for the establishment of the Zionist state. For while the Zionist Movement was assuring the General Assembly of the United Nations that it accepted the Partition Plan and all the details contained

(24) See above, pp. 80-81.

(25) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," p. 241.

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295.

in the General Assembly's recommendation—the boundaries of the state, the treatment of the Arab inhabitants residing in it, the internationalisation of Jerusalem—serious preparations were being made by the Zionists to violate every one of them.

The territorial expansion which took place the following year was merely a partial execution of the territorial aims fixed by Zionism from the start (although it submitted a "moderate" version of them in its official memorandum to the Peace Conference in 1919). These aims embrace southern Lebanon, south-west Syria and inhabited regions of Transjordan. It must be emphasized that the occupation of certain areas by Zionist forces at the beginning of April 1948 was carried out in accordance with a military plan which was revealed by a Zionist military spokesman in the preceding March in an interview with the correspondent of a pro-Zionist American Paper.²⁷

It is no longer a secret that the expulsion of Arab inhabitants of occupied areas also proceeded according to plan. However, it must be noted that this plan, like the plan for territorial expansion, was not drawn up in 1948, but goes back in origin many decades, indeed to the very beginning of the Zionist Movement. It is clearly recorded in Herzl's diaries starting June 12th, 1895²⁸ although he was careful in the writings he prepared for publication not to make any frank reference to the subject. Weizmann, too, in spite of all his public assurances to the contrary, did secretly reveal to

(27) G.F. Eliot, Hate, Hope and Explosives, *A Report on the Middle East*, The Boobs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1948.

(28) "Herzl's Diaries," Vol. I, p. 88.

his closest friends his plan for the expulsion of the Arabs of Palestine from their own country.²⁹

* * *

The one conclusion to be drawn from all these concrete examples is that the change of attitude which the Zionist Movement undergoes, starting with positive compliance at the beginning of a phase and ending with negative defiance, is never an unpredictable development, but rather the meticulous application of a preconceived plan which expresses openly, when the opportunity offers, what had been hidden in adverse circumstances. In short, compliance at the beginning is never more than a tactical deception calculated to give temporary appeasing assurances until the favourable moment comes to proclaim the truth.

This is the constant pattern of all Zionist attitudes of which we have given some examples. It dominates all the practical application of Zionist phase policy.

It is also the lesson to be drawn from a study of Zionist policy throughout its long history, by those who wish to know what Zionism holds for the future and what it will be capable of doing when it finds the right opportunity.

Summary

To summarise all the foregoing we say that the Zionist plan of action moves in accordance with the phase tactic and

(29) Meinertzhagen, "Middle East Diary," p. 170.

is inspired by certain fixed and clear principles: at the beginning of each historical phase, the Zionist Movement sets its objectives for that phase, the maximum of which are represented by what the practical circumstances permit it to announce and claim; the minimum of these objectives—according to the principle of “no-retreat”—are represented by the objectives already attained in the previous phase. The form and the means are selected in accordance with the principle of “flexibility” which gives priority to substance over form and to ends over means, and leads to the acceptance of any formula or method so long as it fulfils the required object. Then, as a phase ends and a new one begins, the whole cycle begins all over again.

In its overall picture, the policy of phases is therefore a continuous movement which does not stop until Zionism attains its ultimate aims—which are still very distant—or until it is forced to retreat and fade away, that is, until it is destroyed.

Now that we have broadly outlined the phase pattern in the Zionist plan of action and before proceeding to consider this pattern as it was expressed in diplomatic action, we propose to complete the general picture by distinguishing between the Zionist phase policy and the policy by phases of other types of action.

(1) *Characteristics of the Zionist Phase Policy*

In some previous passages³⁰ we mentioned some of the

(30) See above, pp. 62-69.

distinctive features of the Zionist concept of the principle of "realism" and explained how it was the springboard for the movement in a phase, how it accepted reality without surrendering to it, how it looked upon it not with pessimistic submission which sees in reality an end to hope but with self-confident optimism which sees in it—however dark it may seem—an opportunity for action and greater effort to benefit by it and eventually lighten the burden of the obstacles it holds.

In the light of the above, it is relevant to add other distinctive features:—

The phase process does not mean relinquishing the final target but, on the contrary, it is persistent in striving to attain a constant target which imposes the choice of action by phases. Whoever aims at a target is faced with one of three alternatives: he will either strive to attain it immediately and reject every other solution; or he will submit to the limited possibilities of the situation by replacing his final target which is not immediately attainable with a partial substitute; or he will choose to attain his goal gradually by a regular policy of phases which permits him always to go forward, never to stop or retreat. The failure of Herzl's attempts to take a short cut to Palestine by bribing the Sultan, using the big Powers and persuading the Jews to emigrate at once in large numbers convinced Zionism that the first alternative was out of the question. As the Zionist Movement announced that the second alternative was unacceptable in the first place, it realised that it was only left with the third alternative—the policy of proceeding by regular phases. Herzl adopted this policy immediately when he began thinking of colonising Cyprus or El-

Arish or Sinai as a first step on the road to Palestine; then his successors followed this constant pattern.

The Zionist aspiration to attain the ultimate aim explains the Zionist Movement's choice of the policy of phases. Therefore, this policy does not mean that Zionism relinquishes the rest of its ultimate aims as a price for attaining the immediately possible ones; otherwise, Zionism would not be constant in its aspirations.

As a result of this, the choice of an objective for a given phase must be given great and careful thought; the most important condition which makes the temporary acceptable is that it should draw the Movement nearer—even a short distance—towards its ultimate aim and should never drive it away from that direction or allow the fulfilment of the temporary objective to prevent the attainment of the final goal.

It is clear from what we have said that the Zionist policy of phases does not believe in the saying, "A half-loaf is better than no bread," because that would mean definitely giving up the other half. Zionism accepts to have a half-loaf now as a first instalment of the whole loaf—provided the other half is in reserve for it to take possession of at the opportune moment. It refuses to share the loaf, which it considers its own property, with any other party if participation means that that party will eat its share and so deprive Zionism of it in future. In short, the Zionist policy of phases accepts the fulfilment of a part of its aim only if this constitutes a step towards fulfilling a whole, but rejects partial fulfilment when it constitutes a substitute for the whole.

Finally, no difference exists in the Zionist Movement between "moderation" and "extremism"; for every Zionist, no matter what his colour, is strongly committed to the ultimate Zionist aim; and he who is not so committed can no longer be regarded as a Zionist. This makes Zionist moderation a non-existent notion. The "extremist" is the person who insists on attaining today what the "moderate" agrees to attain tomorrow. So the difference between them is in timing, not more nor less. The "extremist" is impatient, cannot wait, whereas the "moderate" is the patient one. The "extremist" wants the whole aim to be attained in one instalment, whereas the "moderate" accepts the attainment of the same aim by successive instalments. It has been said that if you want to discover ahead of time what the official "moderate" quarters in the Zionist Movement will claim in a few years, you only have to listen to the present-days claims of "extremist" and "militant" Zionists.

(2) *Diplomacy in the Service of the Policy of Phases:
Ways and Means*

The policy of phases, like all the other facets of the Zionist programme, relies in its application on interaction between the two principal arms of the programme, namely, diplomacy and effective colonisation, in their spiral movement. Like them, too, it relies on the use of careful planning, abundant financial resources, propaganda and at times military force.

Our particular concern now is the role played by diplomacy—alone among the other complete elements in the Zionist

plan of action—in pushing the Zionist Movement during a phase towards the fulfilment of its aims, as well as the ways and means it employs in the process.

Perhaps the most important method employed by diplomacy is that to which it resorts in order to “justify” its transition from one phase to another—when it takes upon itself to pull down the restrictions contained in the agreements which had been concluded at the outset of the previous phase and to replace them with new and more favourable and less restricting agreements. The latter, in their turn, become the framework for Zionist action during the following phase until Zionism has exhausted all their uses, when the process of pulling down and replacing starts all over again, and so on.

In this context, the most important methods would seem to be:

(1) To falsify the original meaning of the former agreements which diplomacy wishes now to change, by claiming that the new desired agreements do not overreach the old ones or that the latter provide a firm basis for the former.

(2) To shift continuously from demanding that the literal text of the previous agreements be used as a basis for interpretation to demanding that the intentions which Zionism claims lie behind the text should be used—and that in accordance with the direct and immediate interests of Zionism.

(3) To oscillate between considering some agreements or resolutions as definitely binding, and denying that charac-

teristic to similar or even the same instruments—again in accordance with Zionist interests in each case.

(4) To make the meaning of decisive political words and phrases in existing agreements deviate from their original sense in such a way as basically to change the meaning and scope of those agreements.

(5) To invent non-existent agreements and to claim that they are valid and binding, that they give the Zionist Movement "legitimate rights" and that they impose on others certain "legal obligations."

(6) Not to hesitate to give official long-term pledges while intending—at the very instant these are given—to disown them when circumstances permit.

* * *

These are only some of the methods employed by Zionist diplomacy time and again over the past seventy years. If it is said that these methods are not confined to the Zionist Movement which, any way, has not invented them, the answer is as follows:

First: Zionism has employed these methods continuously to an extent that they have become characteristics of Zionist diplomacy. In other cases, they may occur as a passing phase, used only when necessary, whereas in the Zionist Movement they constitute a basic rule and are not the exception.

Second: More than any other movement, the Zionist Movement has succeeded in using these methods continuously without attracting any probing eyes or provoking any criticism, without even causing government and international organisations to take precautions against falling twice into the same Zionist trap. Zionism gets away with all this thanks to its domination over international communications media which are able and know how to make the Zionist voice drown the voice of truth when it is raised to expose, criticize or warn.

* * *

This study is too short to permit of a complete review of all the incidents which represent these methods, and any way that would amount to a full review of the whole diplomatic history of the Zionist Movement from its beginning up to the present. For this reason, we shall confine ourselves to some examples.

Let us begin by taking an example which illustrates the first method, that of the "historical right" to Palestine which Zionism claims, and on which it bases most of its political demands, affirming repeatedly that the international community has recognised that right officially and constantly. A study of this subject reveals that the Zionist Movement has never at any time been able to obtain such a recognition from any international organisation which represents the international community, and that every claim by Zionist diplomacy to the contrary is totally without foundation. Such a study, on the contrary, even reveals more: that the Zionist Movement has knocked on every door begging and entreating, but has always

met with total refusal (except in one case when the Movement was able to obtain a substitute for the term "historical right," a substitute which cannot be given that meaning at all). In spite of all this, time and again and at every diplomatic bout, it proclaims that it had obtained recognition of the "historical right" in previous bouts.

The story of the pursuit by the Zionist Movement of recognition from any source of the alleged "historical right" of the Jewish people in Palestine and the consequent results resembles a play composed of several acts and scenes. The significance of the play cannot be grasped unless those acts and scenes are briefly reviewed. In undertaking this brief review, we shall rely on the words of the principal actors as well as on the plot of the play, that is, the history of Zionist diplomacy itself.

The play opens at the point when negotiations for the colonisation of Palestine are started with the British Government. We have already pointed out³¹ that Weizmann, the chief Zionist negotiator at the time, had realised that it was not possible for Britain to agree to the establishment of a "Jewish state." He had, therefore, had to be content with a British promise to help Zionism set up a "national home," hoping later that this British commitment could be turned into a commitment to set up the "state." This hope was based on the attempt to link the idea of the "national home" with the idea of the "historical right" so that it would be possible later to say that the "historical right" gives the "national home" an

(31) See above, pp. 88-89.

international political content. For this reason the desire was stressed, throughout the negotiations, for the inclusion in the cherished British declaration of a text confirming Britain's recognition of the alleged "historical right" of the Jews in Palestine.

In the first official round of the talks held at the beginning of 1917 at which the British Government was represented by Mark Sykes and Zionism by a number of leaders including Weizmann, Sokolow, Sacher and Herbert Samuel, the Zionist demands were defined with precision. The first was:

"The right of the Jewish people over Palestine should receive international recognition."³²

Then the British asked the Zionists themselves to draft the cherished British promise. After studying three proposed drafts presented by three leaders, the Zionist Movement drew up one unified text which it submitted to the British Government on July 18th, 1917. This text opens as follows :

"H.M. Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organisation, accepts the principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people, and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National Life in Palestine."³³

On September 18th, both the British Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's office approved a milder version

(32) The "ESCO" study, p. 94.

(33) *Ibid.*, p. 103.

containing a declaration by Britain of its acceptance of the principle that "Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home for the Jewish people."³⁴ This text was submitted to the War Cabinet for approval. As a result of Montagu's opposition, — he was the only Jewish member of the Cabinet — the War Cabinet at its meeting held on October 4th, 1917, approved a new amended text, by which Britain's undertaking became a declaration to support "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People".³⁵ This meant the removal of any reference to "Jewish rights in Palestine", as well as the omission of any reference to the idea of "reconstituting" the National Home. Weizmann considered this amendment "a painful recession"³⁶ and wrote to the British Government requesting it at least to go back to the "reconstitution"³⁷ formula, but to no avail. So the text was issued in its final form on November 2nd, 1917, stipulating Britain's support for "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."³⁸ Weizmann relates his pain and regret at the Balfour Declaration having come out without reference to "Jewish right" or to the historical connection expressed by the phrase "reconstitution of a national home":

"While the Cabinet was in session, approving the final text, I was waiting outside... Sykes brought the document out to me with the exclamation: 'Dr. Weiz-

(34) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," p. 204.

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 206.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 207.

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 207.

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 208.

mann, it's a boy!' Well, I did not like the boy at first. He was not the one I had expected."³⁹

It is noteworthy that Weizmann himself, whose memory manages to recapture all those reactions when he writes his memoirs tens of years later, does not hesitate to say, in the same memoirs and in the very next paragraph following the one in which he expresses his disappointment at the newborn:

"In spite of the phrasing, the intent was clear"⁴⁰

Weizmann does not say whose "intent" he means. If he means the British Government's he does not explain how he can reconcile this with Britain's refusal to express that "intent" in an appropriate text, which was the one he himself was pressing for.

Any way, the curtain falls to close the first act of the play at the end of 1917. Its last scene shows the chief Zionist negotiator lamenting the omissions in the Balfour Declaration. But soon, a year or more later, the curtain is lifted to open the second act when we see the same negotiator and his colleagues trying once again to include in the Mandate Charter what they had failed to include in the Balfour Declaration.

The negotiations over the text of the Mandate Charter pass through many stages which constitute the scenes of the play's second act.

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 208.

(40) *Ibid.*, p. 211.

In the first scene, Zionism begins the preliminaries of political pressure by holding many conferences in Pittsburg, Jaffa, Philadelphia and other cities, all of which repeat the demand that the League of Nations, in the forthcoming Mandate Charter, recognise the "historical right" and the "reconstitution" of the homeland.⁴¹

In the second scene, semi-official talks are conducted with Britain in connection with the Mandate Charter. Weizmann begins by seeing Balfour on December 4th, 1918, and presenting to him three demands, the first of which requests "recognition of the historical and national rights of the Jews to Palestine."⁴² Then the Zionists submit to the Foreign Office an official memorandum containing the resolutions taken at the above-mentioned conferences. They are advised by the British Government to seek direct contact with the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference.

Here we come to the third scene, in which the Zionist side submits to the Peace Conference on February 3rd, 1919, its official memorandum, the first paragraph of which calls upon the Conference to:

"recognise the historic title of the Jewish people and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their national home."⁴³

At the meeting held by the "Council of Ten" of the Peace Conference on February 27th, 1919, before which the

(41) The "ESCO" study, pp. 151-155.

(42) *Ibid.*, p. 155.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Zionist Delegation appeared, Sokolow spoke in the name of the Delegation and defended the demand formulated in the first paragraph of the Zionist memorandum.⁴⁴

Then follows the fourth scene of the same act, when official negotiations are conducted between the Zionist Organisation and the British Delegation to the Peace Conference with a view to drawing up the final draft of the Mandate Charter. These negotiations pass through seven stages,⁴⁵ during which the "diplomatic tug of war" moves now to this side, now to that, with the question of recognising "national right" and the "reconciliation" of the homeland playing the leading role. At times the British Delegation would refuse to incorporate a straight forward text, at others they would agree to include a modified one. Without going into the details, it is sufficient to note that, when it encountered its greatest obstacles during the negotiations, Zionism resorted to its supporters in the British House of Commons to put pressure on the British Delegation and was able to obtain on November 9th, 1920, a resolution from a special parliamentary committee on Palestine "urging" the British Government to "include definite recognition of the historical connection of the Jewish People with Palestine."⁴⁶

Thus the "historical connection" became the middle-of-the-way solution between the official Zionist term "historical right" and the term suggested by non-Zionist Jews, namely, the "historical interest" of the Jewish people in Palestine.

(44) *Ibid.*, p. 160.

(45) *Ibid.*, pp. 164-177.

(46) *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

The author of this new text was Balfour himself, who had then ceased to be Foreign Secretary.

Weizmann describes the struggle over this point during the negotiations that accompanied the drawing up of the text of the Mandate Charter as follows:

"Draft after draft was proposed, discussed and rejected, and I sometimes wondered if we should ever reach a final text. The most serious difficulty arose in connection with a paragraph in the Preamble — the phrase which now reads: 'Recognising the historical connection of the Jews with Palestine.' Zionists wanted to have it read: 'Recognising the historic rights of the Jews to Palestine.' But Curzon, (the new Foreign Secretary) would have none of it, remarking dryly: 'If you word it like that, I can see Weizmann coming to me every other day and saying he has a right to do this, that or the other in Palestine! I won't have it.' As a compromise, Balfour suggested 'historical connection', and 'historical connection' it was."⁴⁷

It is therefore not surprising, after all that we have mentioned, for Weizmann to consider that subject, "the most important part of the Mandate."⁴⁸

When the Mandate Charter was finally issued, the second clause of its preamble provided for recognition of the "historical connection of the Jewish People to Palestine and

(47) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," pp. 274-280.

(48) *Ibid.*, p. 280.

the right of the Jews to reconstitute Palestine as their "national home." Compared with the Balfour Declaration which omitted those two ideas, the Charter was a victory for Zionism but it was only a partial victory in the face of persistent Zionist demands that insisted on "historic right" and "reconstitution". For whereas the Mandate Charter did uphold the second, it rejected the first and instead of "right", it spoke of a past "connection" which cannot be taken to mean recognition of any "right".

In spite of all this, in spite of the long months which Zionists spent in trying to induce first Britain and then the League of Nations to include the "historic right of the Jews" in the Mandate Charter, in spite of the many drafts and amendments, in spite of all the political pressures and propaganda, in spite of their failure in all these to attain their objective, they have continued to act since then, through their diplomacy, as though the Mandate Charter had in fact contained a definite text about their "historic right" and as though the Balfour Declaration had embodied an implicit recognition of that "right"

The whole of the third act of the play revolves around the Zionist Movement's allegations (in official memoranda, in evidence deposited by its representations before British enquiry commission, the Anglo-American Commission and the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine) that the League of Nations had recognised, in the Mandate Charter, that the Jews had a "historic right" to Palestine and that this recognition permits, in fact makes it imperative, to interpret "national home" as synonymous to "state".

In other words, the "historical connection" which was originally used in place of "historic right" was turned later by Zionist diplomacy into an alleged synonym for "national right".

The fourth act takes place in the halls of the United Nations, the heir and successor of the League of Nations, and closes with the General Assembly's recommendation to partition Palestine. This is well-known, but what many are apt to forget is that this recommendation, which takes a purely practical aspect, is devoid of any reference whatsoever to the rights of this side or that in Palestine. The General Assembly did in fact recommend the setting up of a Jewish state but it did not base the recommendation on an international recognition of the alleged Jewish historic "right" to Palestine, or their consequent "right" to establish a state. The recommendation had the character of a political compromise, not of a legal or historical verdict.

Every play has an end, and this play, whose acts and scenes we have reviewed briefly, ends with the Zionist proclamation of the May 14th, 1948, which establishes the state and which says:

"In the year 1897 the First Zionist Congress, inspired by Theodore Herzl's vision of the Jewish state, proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national survival in their country.

"This right was acknowledged by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, and re-affirmed in the

Mandate of the League of Nations, which gave explicit international recognition to the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their *right* to reconstitute their National Home.

“On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution requiring the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.. This recognition by the United Nations of the *right* of Jewish people to establish their independent State is unassailable.”⁴⁹

This proclamation, the first diplomatic document of the state, its first pronouncement on the diplomatic level, amounts to a forgery of Zionist and international diplomatic history. It attributes both to the Balfour Declaration and the General Assembly recommendation words which neither of them contained at all. It also attributes to the Mandate Charter the idea of “Jewish right”; and we have seen how the author had deliberately avoided any mention of this “right”, and had replaced it with a phrase which neither can nor should be interpreted to contain its meaning, in view of the continued and successful opposition with which the author met all attempts to incorporate it.

The proclamation is the best illustration of our assertion that Zionist diplomatic manœuvres and methods flagrantly falsify documents, resolutions and accords.

* * *

(49) Text of proclamation in “Israeli Government Yearbook” for 1950, pp. 43-45.

The example we have given permits us to study another of the six methods we have enumerated.

We have seen how Weizmann's disappointment over the Balfour Declaration had immediately prompted him to say that it would be interpreted in the light of its intent and not its literal text. Zionism never tires of repeating this, giving itself the "right" it denies the other party to explain the intention behind the joint pronouncement in bilateral agreements and taking upon itself the sole "right" to explain the intention of the party which had itself issued a unilateral declaration. And of course this "intention" is in all cases the intention of Zionism itself. At the same time, this method does not stop Zionism in different circumstances from ignoring the well-known and clearly stated intentions of other parties and upholding the literal text. Perhaps the best example of this method is Zionist insistence on the letter of the General Assembly resolution in connection with the positions to be taken up by the Emergency Forces which it set up after the Suez War of 1956. The resolution stipulated that these forces should be posted "along the Egyptian-Israel armistice line."⁵⁰ But Israel held on to the literal interpretation and refused to allow the United Nations forces to be stationed on the side of the line which was occupied by Zionist forces, arguing that the text of the resolution said "along" and not "one side of the armistice line."

* * *

The play we have been reviewing also helps provide an example of yet another of the methods of Zionist diplomacy.

(50) General Assembly Resolution No. 1125, (Session II), para. 3.

The most important Zionist document — that which proclaimed the establishment of the State — has, as we have seen, described the General Assembly recommendation to partition Palestine as an international “unassailable” resolution that was binding, although the resolutions of the General Assembly, by the very terms of the U.N. Charter are non-binding recommendations. It is well-known that, in addition to the Partition recommendation, the General Assembly has passed tens of resolutions in connection with Palestine, all of which Zionist diplomacy has chosen to neglect and all of which, constitutionally as well as in international law, are no different from the Partition recommendation. Zionist neglect did not stop at that point but went further to neglect other parts of the Partition recommendation itself, such as the parts dealing with frontiers, the treatment of Arabs residing within the Zionist State and Jerusalem and its internationalisation. These were integral parts of the Partition recommendation and enjoy the same degree of validity as the part which recommended the setting up of the Zionist State. So if this part was “unassailable”, the same should apply to the rest. We would even go further in our exposure of the contradictions of Zionist diplomacy in its oscillation between giving certain agreements a binding character and depriving others of that character although both enjoyed the same degree of validity: the Partition recommendation was being reconsidered by the same General Assembly at the very moment that Ben Gurion was reading the proclamation setting up the State. The resulting new recommendation of the General Assembly after the debate, which at least did not actually confirm its former Partition recommendation, did prepare the way for revoking it. In spite of this, Zionism proclaimed that the establishment of the

Jewish State was the result of a valid and binding resolution. Very soon after, the General Assembly reaffirmed the recommendation to internationalise Jerusalem twice after 1947, which, by the very criterion used by Zionism itself, makes it even more valid and binding. But Ben Gurion himself soon referred to the General Assembly's repeating three times its recommendation to internationalise Jerusalem as "wicked counsel" and added that Zionism had dealt "an unequivocal and resolute... rebuttal" when it decided to ignore and disobey it. He also said: "The Government and Knesset at once moved their seat to Jerusalem and made it Israel's crown and capital, irrevocably and for all men to see."⁵¹

* * *

A little while ago we spoke of the falsification of former agreements as one of the methods employed by Zionist diplomacy when it prepares for the transition of the Movement from one phase to another. But if no such agreements exist that are possible of falsification, is it supposed that Zionist diplomacy remains helpless and inactive? Not at all; in such situations it resorts to inventing non-existent agreements in order then to claim "rights" resulting from them.

Two recent examples suffice. The first concerns the waters of the Jordan, over which certain public, though indirect, negotiations were conducted and through which Zionism tried but failed to conclude an agreement. The second concerns a

(51) From Ben Gurion's speech on the second anniversary of the establishment of the Zionist State (1950). Text in his book "Rebirth and Destiny of Israel," p. 362.

Zionist claim from West Germany. The negotiations concerning this were bilateral and secret and their outcome was not announced until recently.

The Jordan Waters

Zionism has repeatedly claimed there was an "international accord" governing the distribution of the waters of the river Jordan and its tributaries between the Arab States and the Zionist State and allotting to each a "share" which was its own by "right", provided it did not over-reach the right.

It is well-known that in the mid-fifties attempts were made to conclude such an agreement and that the person who tried to carry out the Zionist plan was President Eisenhower's envoy Eric Johnston.

It is also well-known that Arab alertness had aborted the plan while it was still a dream in Johnston's head. So neither an agreement nor even a near-agreement was reached between the Arabs and the Zionists over the Jordan waters.

In spite of this, Zionist imagination and Zionist propaganda have turned that aborted idea into a living creature, turned the proposal submitted by a third party into an "agreement" that was binding on both sides, a contract with rights and obligations imposed on the two sides.

Although Zionist quarters sometimes admit that the Arab States never signed the alleged "contract", they nevertheless continue to speak about their transfer of the Jordan waters

as though the said "contract" existed and as though the "right" to use freely their "share" was based on a "binding international agreement."

Ever since the first Arab Summit Meeting, held on January 13th, 1964, to consider ways and means of countering the Zionists's transfer of Arab waters, Zionist diplomacy has not ceased to repeat these arguments publicly.

In his first statement before the Knesset on the subject on January 20th, 1964, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol says:

"The Arab countries and Israel *agreed* to the unified plan from every point of view connected with its technical and other merits. In October, 1955, however, the Arab League decided against ratification of the plan...

"But the three years of negotiation were not in vain. An agreed allocation of water had been determined which was based on accepted criteria, and against which the parties concerned had made no objection.

"We have undertaken to remain within the framework of the quantities specified in the unified plan."⁵²

On March 2nd, 1964, Golda Meir, then Foreign Minister, repeated what her Prime Minister had said, namely, that "the Israelis have undertaken not to draw a drop of water in excess of what is their right under the Johnston plan"⁵³ and that the Arabs "know well that our projects are confined within the limits of our share."⁵⁴

(52) "The Jewish Observer," London, January 25th, 1964.

(53) *Ibid.*, March 6th, 1964.

(54) "The Jewish Chronicle," March 6th, 1967.

On March 14th, 1965, Abba Eban, then Deputy Prime Minister, said:

"Our water project is not a unilateral Israeli project. It is a regional project, or part of a regional project, worked out by external and objective sources on the basis of established international principles. A great deal of energy and thought went into the negotiation of that project.

"In 1955 when Ambassador Eric Johnston came out to our region to help the governments of the Middle East work out a fair distribution of the water resources of the Jordan-Yarmuk river systems, he and the engineers with him worked out the kind of allocation that would have been worked out if it were a discussion between states in the United States or between friendly countries in Europe. We accepted this compromise. Although our neighbours did not sign an agreement, we are meticulously observing the quantitative and other limitations of the regional plan. Therefore, no harm whatever is being done to anybody...

"We rest upon the equity of the Johnston plan, upon the objective criteria on which it is based."⁵⁵

On March 7th, 1965 Eban again said:

"First of all, let it be understood that our national water project is not a unilateral grab. It is an internationally formulated compromise under which 60 per cent

(55) Abba Eban, "Israel in the World," pp. 35, 36.

of the total water of the Yarmuk-Jordan mixture goes to the Arab states and 40 per cent to Israel... This is the result of a compromise based on established international principles."⁵⁶

* * *

West Germany

If Zionist diplomacy is capable of using such flagrant fabrication as one of its methods where public negotiations are concerned, it is to an even greater extent capable of this when negotiations are secret so that knowledge of the truth is limited to the two parties concerned. The most recent example of this is the incident with West Germany in April 1966. The Zionist State claimed certain financial "rights" and called upon the Bonn Government to fulfil certain financial "obligations," basing itself on a secret "agreement" it pretended had been concluded between Adenauer and Ben Gurion at their well-known meeting at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel of New York on March 14, 1960—the same meeting, which West Germany admitted, had resulted in the agreement of a donation of arms to Israel.

To put the incident in its proper perspective, it is necessary to go back a little. The German Reparations Agreement concluded in 1952 was due to expire at the end of March, 1966, and the Zionist Movement was anxious to get money out of West Germany after that date. So after nine months of preparations, the two sides got together on February 22,

(56) *Ibid.*, p. 66.

1966, to negotiate further loans and donations. But the negotiations soon faltered and then came to a halt on March 3, 1966, with the understanding that they would be resumed on April 27, of the same year. A few days before the date assigned, the Prime Minister of the Zionist State, Levi Eshkol, said in an interview published by "Bamahni," the Israeli Army newspaper, that the "agreement concluded" between Adenauer and Ben Gurion in March 1960—in addition to its provision that West Germany present Israel with heavy weapons at a nominal price—had also provided for a loan amounting to five hundred million dollars to be paid by annual instalments of fifty million dollars, to begin at the expiry of the Reparations Agreement in 1966. Erhard's Government at once issued a categorical denial of this obligation as did Adenauer himself, whose statement was confirmed by his secretary and spokesman who had been present at the Adenauer-Ben Gurion meeting. The Bonn Government then instructed its ambassador in Tel Aviv to submit a protest against the Prime Minister's statement to the Foreign Minister of Israel and to ask that it should be withdrawn. Finally, official quarters in Bonn threatened to publish the minutes of the Adenauer-Ben Gurion talks, if necessary, to prove that Eshkol's allegations were unfounded.

What actually came out from those parts of the minutes that were published during the crisis was that, at the Waldorf-Astoria meeting, it was Ben Gurion who had asked Adenauer for an undertaking to continue to provide Israel with financial aid after the expiry of the "Reparations Agreement," that it was Ben Gurion himself who had set Israel's need at five hundred million dollars and that all Adenauer had done was to confirm his government's readiness to help Israel fi-

nancially after the expiry of the "Reparations Agreement" without committing it to anything and without fixing any amount.⁵⁷

In spite of the differences in substance and form between the above two examples, it is to be noted that the method employed by Zionist diplomacy in both cases is the same, namely, to invent "agreements" that had never been concluded and then to use them as a basis for claiming "rights", or insisting on the existence of "obligations" or "justifying" actions.

In the first case, Zionist diplomacy turns a proposal made by a third party, the United States, into an alleged "international agreement". Then on its strength it claims for itself legal and binding "rights", and "justifies" its usurpation of the water by calling it a "legitimate act" aiming at nothing more than those "valid legal rights."

In the second case, Zionist diplomacy turns a proposal or a request made by the Zionist side itself, Ben Gurion, into a "bilateral agreement". Then it claims that this "agreement" imposes on the other party certain legal and valid "obligations" so that it is "justified" when it demands that they be "fully honoured."

* * *

Talk about fabrication as a method leads to talk about a parallel method. Fabrication is falsely to pretend that certain

(57) Our account of the German-Zionist crisis is based on the following sources: "The New York Times" of 25/4/66, "The New York Herald Tribune" of the same date, the London "Times" of 20 and 30/4/66, "The Observer" of 17/4/66 and "The Economist" of 7/5/66.

things have occurred in the past which in reality never took place. The parallel method is to undertake to perform certain acts (or to desist from performing them) in the future, with the definite intention, while the undertaking is being made, of breaking it when circumstances permit. As we have already given several instances of this method, it is sufficient just to refer to them here.⁵⁸

* * *

We finally come to the sixth method, which relies on effecting a basic deviation in the meaning of political terms. It was Herzl who laid down the rule which he and his successors have followed when using this method. In more than one instance in his diary, correspondence and negotiations, Herzl has asserted that when he gives names to things he sometimes purposely chooses words to serve as an outer cover to hide their reality, or that in his negotiations he does not attach much importance to the words but to their meaning, or that he is always ready to relinquish a word or a name if it proves to constitute an obstacle in the way of his objective.⁵⁹ Flexibility in the choice of political terms is one of the aspects of the general principle of flexibility which, as we have seen, characterises the Zionist Movement.

However, the use of this flexibility is not fortuitous; it follows precise rules.

When the Zionist Movement realises that a demand or

(58) See above, pp. 81-87.

(59) "Herzl's Diaries," Vol. I, pp. 373, 374; Vol. II, p. 607; Vol. IV, pp. 1294, 1454, 1458, 1597.

a slogan contains a phrase which may create difficulties for it and when, inspired by its own realism and flexibility, it looks around for a substitute, it deliberately chooses one that has a broader base and a wider purport. The general sense of the new phrase rarely embraces the exact meaning of the old one, but it is always possible to interpret the broader phrase in such a way as to include the meaning of the narrower one.

After choosing the new appropriate substitute term, Zionist diplomacy proceeds to employ it ceaselessly, so that the old term seems furthest from the minds of Zionist diplomats. This goes on until the plan of phases requires that it should be abandoned and that a return should be made to the original term which is born of the pure, unadorned Zionist doctrine.

From the moment of its choice, as a veil covering the real and ultimate Zionist aims and as the descriptive phrase during the prevailing phase, to the moment of its final abandonment, the new cover-term passes through three stages:

In the first stage, Zionist diplomacy affirms to all concerned that the new substitute term and the temporary objective it symbolises do indeed replace the original term, that is the ultimate aim, and insists that the two are entirely distinct.

When circumstances permit the preparation of new claims, that is, during the transition from one phase to another, Zionist diplomacy begins to hint that the new substitute is more comprehensive than the original and that, therefore, it includes and does not contradict it.

Then comes the moment of a frank demand for the transition from one phase to another. At this time Zionist diplomacy raises a slogan to the effect that the substitute and the original phrases are synonymous. They say that the use of the substitute in the text of the political agreement which had initiated the present phase had been meant to express the exact sense of the substituted term, and that the choice of the one term rather than the other had never meant any abandonment of the meaning of the discarded term.

Every political term that has a decisive importance in the Zionist Movement has passed through this evolution at one time or another.

In relation to the ideological basis of the Zionist Movement, the word "people" was used in place of "nation" in order to avoid opposition by some Jews who had become assimilated in other nations.

The word "charter" indicates the political licence which Herzl had aimed at obtaining from the Ottoman Sultan to permit the colonisation of Palestine; he had continued to use the word in his negotiations with Germany and Britain, until he was advised to abandon it in negotiations with Britain, especially over the colonisation of El-Arish and Sinai, for political considerations connected with a power conflict, at least in theory, between Turkey, Britain and Egypt itself; and indeed he did abandon the word and began talking about a "concession" or a "licence" in place of "charter."

When Herzl found that the word "sovereignty" would not be accepted at all, he substituted the word "dependence",

or any other word which he thought would be more palatable to the Ottoman authorities.

But the most important of these political terms, the one that has, affected Zionist diplomatic history more than all the others, is the term "state". Herzl had used this term in the title of his booklet "Der Judenstaat", which he wrote in 1895, published in 1896 and thus launched the whole Zionist Movement in 1897. He had made the concept of the state the criterion for distinguishing between a Zionist and a non-Zionist Jew. Even the Jews, who like him believed in emigration and colonisation, were not considered by Herzl as Zionists so long as they did not believe it necessary to give that emigration an international political content. In consequence, the idea of the "state" was at the core of Zionist doctrine and planning; yet official Zionism avoided using the term "state" when defining its aims and claims throughout the first fifty years of its life.

The story of the abandonment of the original slogan, "the state", and its replacement with that of "homeland" or "home" in 1897, then the adoption of the "national home" as a slogan in 1917, the "commonwealth" in 1942 and finally the return to the original slogan "the state" in 1947 is very significant in that it illustrates clearly the diplomatic application of the policy of phases. We must, therefore, follow this story from one phase to the other.

As soon as Herzl was convinced, in the summer of 1895, that the establishment of the "Jewish State" was necessary, he proceeded to make preparations for turning the idea into

reality. So during the following two years he made preliminary approaches to create conditions for the setting up of the state.

Herzl came into contact with four groups and soon realised that the idea of the "state" met with some opposition from all those groups, strong resistance from two and no practical support from any of them.

The first group to which Herzl turned his attention was the wealthy Jews who had been financing Jewish emigration and colonisation projects for some years. He first met with Baron Hirsch who had been contributing generously towards Jewish emigration to and settlement in Argentina,⁶⁰ and then with Baron de Rothschild of Paris who had been spending money without reservation on the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine.⁶¹ But they both refused his call to channel their efforts and money into the political content, that is, the creation of the "Jewish state", which he regarded as the only solution to the "Jewish problem".

So Herzl turned to some of the Jewish organisations that were encouraging settlement operations in Palestine, focusing his attention in particular on two British organisations, the "Maccabean Club" and the "Lovers of Zion" movement. Again he failed to persuade them to adopt his idea formally.⁶²

(60) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 13-30, 35, 43-44, 79-80, 115-116, 193-195, 197, 217-219, 322-323, 354.

(61) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 36-38, 43-44, 92, 352, 427-431.

(62) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 276-284, 406-416, 418-421; Vol. II, pp. 513-515.

These two failures were among the reasons why Herzl wrote and published "Der Judenstaadt" and then summoned a public conference to be attended by those among the Jewish leaders who believed in the idea of the state and in organised political action.

But in the stage preceding the conference, Herzl had contacted two other categories from outside Jewish ranks: the Ottoman Government, which was then responsible for Palestine, and some European governments on whose help and protection he had counted; Germany was the first of these.

Herzl made his initial contacts in Germany between 1895 and 1897 through the Grand Duke of Baden, the Kaiser's uncle and counsellor, who welcomed the Zionist idea but desisted from proclaiming his support and was hesitant about preparing the way for a meeting between Herzl and Kaiser Wilhelm II.⁶³

During the same period, Herzl made his first contacts with the Russian⁶⁴ and British⁶⁵ governments as well as with the Vatican,⁶⁶ but here again he met with as little success as in Germany.

(63) Herzl relates the story of his first contacts with the Duke of Baden and includes the drafts of his letters in "Herzl's Diaries," Vol. I, pp. 331-341, 343-344, 404-405, 416-417, 426; Vol. II, pp. 445-446, 498-499. The official text of some of the letters Herzl addressed to the Duke during the period preceding the Basle Congress in "The Herzl Yearbook," Vol. IV (New York, Herzl Press, 1962), pp. 214-218, 211-222.

(64) "Herzl's Diaries," Vol. II, 497-498.

(65) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 500-501, 504.

(66) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 352-354.

However, Herzl's hope to set up a "Jewish State" received its greatest blow during his first visit to Turkey, which also took place about the same period before the conference was held. On June 15th, 1896, Herzl boarded the Orient Express at Vienna to go to the Turkish capital where he spent about two weeks.⁶⁷ Even before setting foot on Turkish soil, he came up against the first signs of Turkish resistance to the idea of establishing an independent Jewish state in Palestine. For on the train, he met by chance the Turkish ambassador in Paris who was on his way home and spoke to him about his aspirations and his mission on that trip and explained his plan by saying:

"We want to get Palestine as an independent state. Failing to do so, we shall go to Argentina..."

The Turkish Ambassador interrupted him and said:

"I must tell you that no one is likely even to have pourparlers with you if you demand an independent Palestine. The benefits in money and press support which you promise us are very great... but it is against our principles to sell any territory."

"Under no circumstances will you get Palestine as an independent country..."⁶⁸

When he reached the Turkish capital, Herzl soon heard similar words from the different Turkish officials he met. Although on that trip he did not meet the Sultan, the latter gave audience to one of Herzl's companions and said:

(67) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 364-403: Herzl's description of his first trip to Turkey.

(68) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 367.

"Advise him (Herzl) not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me but to my people... Let the Jews save their billions. When my empire is partitioned, they may get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I will not agree to vivisection."⁶⁹

Herzl returned from Turkey convinced that Turkish opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was indeed serious. He remained convinced of this until the First Zionist Congress was held in Basle over a year later.

On February 20th, 1897, Herzl heard a report which confirmed that the Sultan had not changed his views. For in the course of one of the many successive economic crises from which Turkey suffered, the Turkish Ambassador proposed to his Government that he be authorised to approach Herzl with a view to contracting a small loan that would help overcome the crisis. To this the Ambassador received a categorical answer to the effect that he "must not have any dealing" with Herzl because the latter had asked to have an independent Palestine.⁷⁰

It appears at this point that Herzl was totally convinced that Turkish policy on this issue was firmly established. On March 29th, 1897, in a letter to a supporter explaining the general situation, he says :

"They (the Turks) will not give us Palestine as an independent state at any price."⁷¹

(69) *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 378.

(70) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 518.

(71) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 533.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find Herzl meet this situation with realism and flexibility. If the term "state" in its political and legal content constitutes an insurmountable obstacle in the way of obtaining a "charter" from the Sultan to permit Zionists to settle in Palestine, then it must be abandoned and replaced by a new slogan. This new slogan would attain the same aim, but at the same time would not stimulate any resistance on the part of the Turks who had the final say in the coveted country.

That is exactly what Herzl does. For on May 20th, 1897, he puts into operation the first part of the process: to pretend that the aim is abandoned and to announce that the slogan which is not acceptable to the other party is relinquished.

Herzl does this when he receives a letter from an English journalist called Sidney Whitman, who had volunteered to intercede with the Sultan on Herzl's behalf. In the letter which Herzl receives on that day, Whitman says that he has succeeded in winning over one of the Sultan's close associates, a certain Ahmad Madhat effendi, who has advised him to proceed with circumspection and not to ask for much at one time so that the Sultan would not be forced to refuse. Madhat specifically advises that all talk about "autonomy" be avoided at that stage, for Turkey had embarked upon several wars to resist demands for self-government.⁷²

As is his habit, Herzl writes two letters to Whitman instead of one. In the first, which he writes in German and which is a personal letter addressed to Whitman himself,

(72) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 549.

Herzl promises him a reward for his services. Herzl writes the second in French for Whitman to show to whomever he pleased among Turkish officials, even to the Sultan himself if possible.⁷³ In it he says:

“My book on the “Jewish State” should not be taken as the definitive form of the project; I am the first to admit that there is a lot of ideology in it. A simple writer, I launched the idea without knowing how it would be received by the Jewish people...

“But since that publication the neo-Jewish movement has taken on an entirely different complexion, and it has become practical and practicable. We take circumstances into consideration, we want to conduct ourselves well politically...”⁷⁴

After wriggling out of his former stand and abandoning the idea of the “state”, Herzl goes on to set down a new basis for negotiations with Turkey which he envelops in ambiguity and which he couches in flexible terms:

“If H.M. the Sultan grants us the conditions indispensable for the settlement of our people in Palestine, we will gradually introduce order and prosperity into the finances of the Empire.

“Once this principle is accepted, both sides will gladly listen to the details.”⁷⁵

(73) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 549.

(74) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 550.

(75) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 550.

The abandonment of the original slogan is complete, but the new substitute is left ambiguous and flexible, studiously devoid of anything which might be offensive or might raise opposition in Turkey.

No new development takes place between this letter and the Basle Congress on August 27th, 1897. But Herzl is uneasy about possible reactions, especially in Turkey, to what will be said at the conference defining the aims of Zionism and its plan of action. Herzl's desire to avoid compromising any future Zionist diplomatic approaches is shown by an entry in his diary for August 24th, when he is on his way to the Congress. He describes what will take place there as a "great accomplishment" which no one will feel except the accomplisher — Herzl himself — and says that it will be "an egg dance amongst eggs" so that there will be no mutual destruction and no one will see the dancing eggs.⁷⁶ Herzl then goes on to enumerate the eggs taking part in the dance: "The egg of Turkey, of the Sultan, the egg of the Russian Government, against which nothing unpleasant may be said, although the deplorable situation of the Russian Jew will have to be mentioned," and other delicate eggs.⁷⁷

This caution is apparent in the opening speech of the Congress which Herzl delivered and which avoids all mention of the "Jewish State" as a Zionist claim.⁷⁸ It is also apparent in the programme which is drawn up by the Congress and which has since become known as the "Basle Programme". In

(76) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 578.

(77) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 578-579.

(78) The text of the speech can be found in "Herzl's Collected Works," pp. 307-312.

its preamble, the Zionist aim at that phase is defined as the setting up of a "home" for the Jewish people in Palestine.

Thus, as a result of the requirements of Zionist realism and flexibility, the aim of the Movement for the first phase was laid down after ostensible abandonment of the slogan of the "state" and the adoption of an ambiguous substitute which was calculated to create less controversy and opposition. Wealthy assimilated Jews who favoured the idea of practical settlement without its political connotation, the movements of practical settlement among Jews, the European States, the Ottoman Government — all these could not find in the vague idea of a "home", as they did in the politically and legally specific meaning of the "state", any cause for opposition or resistance. All the time, the only party which was directly concerned and which later proved that it opposed the Zionist colonisation of Palestine under every name — whether it was called "home" or "national home" or "commonwealth" or "state" — was not given a single thought, either to its feelings or reactions, so long as the Zionist colonialist logic considered that the new formula would satisfy the other four parties.

But it must be remembered that the abandonment of the "state" and its replacement by "home" as a slogan was merely ostensible and verbal. For while Herzl announced in his letter to Whitman (actually meant for the Sultan and Turkish officials) that he had abandoned the idea of the "state", he wrote in his diary that the diary was in fact "the history of the Jewish state."⁷⁹ And while Herzl was persuading his col-

(79) "Herzl's Diaries," Vol. II, p. 560.

leagues to replace "state" with "home" in the Basle Programme, he wrote in his diary that the Zionist state would definitely be created after five or fifty years. Here are his first entries upon his return from Basle to Vienna :

"Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word — which I shall guard against pronouncing publicly — it would be this: At Basle I founded the Jewish State...

"If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it."⁸⁰

For the twenty years following the Basle Congress, that is, until the first World War offered the opportunity for Zionism to obtain the Balfour Declaration from Britain, the creation of a "home" in Palestine remained the objective of the programme of that phase. We have explained⁸¹ that Zionist leaders had realised that the time had not yet come for them to make a public demand for the "state", which is the original and ultimate aim of Zionism. But at the same time they had also realised that, on the one hand the political atmosphere in Britain, and on the other the effective though limited settlement in Palestine, would permit the Zionist Movement to put in a claim for more than just a "home." So they took up a slogan that was of a wider scope than "home" and less specific than "state", namely, "national home" and so succeeded in obtaining a pledge for it, first from Britain and later from the League of Nations.

(80) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 581.

(81) See above, pp. 65 and 66, 84 and 85.

During that period, as in 1897, Zionist diplomacy stressed the fact that the aim was not to set up a state, thus drawing a clear distinction between the proclaimed objective of a phase and the unproclaimed ultimate aim, between the substitute and the original. At the same time Zionism, in collusion with its British champion⁸², was reassuring the Arabs that the "national home" did not mean the setting up of a "state" and that therefore the position of the Arabs in Palestine ran no risks and their rights would not be transgressed.

However, it can never be stressed sufficiently that what Zionist diplomacy and propaganda announced to the Arabs, the British and the League of Nations was one thing and what they propounded internally was quite another. For Zionist leaders never ceased reminding their followers all that time that the ultimate aim of the Movement was still the setting up of the state.⁸³

It was only in the mid-thirties that Zionist diplomacy began to desist from stressing the difference between "national home" and "state"; it was then that they began to hint that the latter was contained in the former, or that at least it did not contradict it. The slogan during that period was that the "national home" was a general term which might or might not include the "state" according to circumstances.

In the late thirties, Zionist diplomacy began to affirm that the creation of a "state" had in fact been a sequel of the Balfour Declaration, which the authors had had in mind

(82) As an example, see Meinertzhagen, "Middle East Diaries," pp. 52-53.

(83) See above, pp. 57-59, 69, 70, 87-89.

from the start. In its book entitled "Documents Related to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter over Palestine", published in 1939, the Jewish Agency says that the original intention behind the Balfour Declaration was to give the Jews the chance to emigrate to Palestine and to develop it; it was expected that this would ultimately lead to the establishment of a Jewish state.⁸⁴

In 1942, deciding to enter upon its final struggle against the 1939 British White Paper by relying on American support, the Zionist Movement issued the Biltmore programme which contained the first basic amendment to the Basle programme. Clause eight of the new programme stipulated that the whole of Palestine was to be turned into a "Jewish Commonwealth".⁸⁵ It is to be noted that this new term was also dictated by realism and flexibility. For some Jewish American organisations were then still against the slogan of the "state" and preferred the less specific "commonwealth".⁸⁶

Finally in 1947, the moment came for lifting the veil and thus reaching the climax of the developments which began fifty years earlier. It was the moment when the aim to establish a "Jewish State" and the claim that this had been always from the very beginning a part of the two slogans "home" and "national home" were publicly proclaimed.

(84) The Jewish Agency "Documents Related to the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Charter over Palestine" (London 1939), p. 5.

(85) See the full text in the "ESCO" Study, Vol. II, pp. 1084-1085.

(86) *Ibid.*, pp. 1078-1088. Also see article entitled "American Zionism and the Pursuit of the Jewish State between 1939-1943" in Herzl's Yearbook, Vol. IV, pp. 354-394.

Perhaps the most ingenious Zionist attempt to distort slogans raised fifty and thirty years earlier, according to the requirements of the present, was that made by Dr. Ernst Frankenstein in a legal study entitled "The Meaning of the Term National Home for the Jewish People"⁸⁷ in which he says:

"The meaning of the word 'home' itself is clear. A home is the centre of private life, the place where one lives, to which one belongs. My home is distinct from any other place in the world by virtue of the fact that it is always open to me and that no one else has access to it except with my consent or, in a very few cases, by authority of the law. It was the Basle Programme which, for the first time, applied the concept of a home to the needs of a people. The implications are obvious. A home for a people is the centre of the life of that people, the place where it lives, to which it belongs, the one place in the world which is always open to it and to which no one else has access except with the consent of the people or by authority of the law.

"This is the meaning of a home for a people from the view-point of language and logic. But the Jewish people is to have not only a home in Palestine but a national home. 'National' means pertaining to a nation... Logically, therefore, a national home appears to be an equivalent for State."⁸⁸

This argument is very similar to that used by Weizmann

(87) Study published in "The Jewish Yearbook of International Law" (Jerusalem, Ruben Mass, 1949), pp. 27-41.

(88) *Ibid.*, p. 28.

in his testimony before the Palestine Royal Commission (Peel's Commission) on November 25, 1936:

"What did the Balfour Declaration mean? It meant a National Home, 'national' meaning that we should be able to live like a nation in Palestine, and 'home' as opposed to living in sufferance everywhere else.

"...The meaning was clear and the Jewry of the world, in the trenches of Europe, in the pogrom-swept area of Russia, saw it clearly.

"...It meant ... speaking in political parlance, a Jewish state."⁸⁹

So, beginning with emphasis on the distinction between two entirely different terms, namely, "home" and "state", and on the fact that the first was a substitute for the second; going on to the allegation that "home" includes and does not contradict the "state"; and ending with the false assertion that the two are synonymous; the process of distorting slogans, that method so beloved by Zionist diplomacy, is completed.

(3) *The Unified, Common Nature of the Six Methods*

The following points were made in the first part of the present chapter:

★ Progress by phases is the main characteristic of Zionist policy and the prevailing pattern in the Zionist plan of action.

(89) Weizmann, "Excerpts . . .", pp. 42-43.

✧ The distinctive attribute of that policy is its constant adherence to the ultimate aim while trying to execute it gradually by instalments in accordance with certain set rules.

✧ The objective of each phase is defined at the beginning of that phase, and in this it is influenced by three principles: "realism" gives it its maximum limit, "no-retreat" its minimum and "flexibility" its form.

✧ As soon as the objectives of a phase are exhausted, the Zionist Movement proceeds to prepare for "escalation" towards the next phase which again goes through the same stages.

✧ Diplomacy—one of the two principal arms of the Zionist programme—plays its biggest role when it attempts to obtain the opposite party's acceptance of the phase objective and when it prepares the transition to the next phase.

✧ In the second part of the present chapter we explained that, in performing those two roles, diplomacy employs many methods. We referred briefly to six of these and illustrated them with examples from Zionist diplomatic history.

We should now consider the six methods against the general framework in which they were employed in order to discover the common nature which they all share.

This common, unifying characteristic is deception.

The choice of deceptive diplomatic methods to serve the policy of a phase is not fortuitous. For the overall plan, when executed in phases, cannot succeed unless the Movement is able to pretend in each phase that its proclaimed objective for that phase is all that it aspires to, and unless it is later able, when preparing for the transition, to pretend that the new claims are merely a natural extension of the former claim and not a new greedy and never-ending attempt to obtain further privileges.

Diplomatic deception therefore constitutes an integral part of the policy of phases, without which it cannot be complete. All the methods we have discussed share in the deceiving process.

* * *

In its effective application, this diplomatic deception takes two principal forms: ambiguity and cheating.

Ambiguity is primarily employed in the formulation of phase objectives. A condition of its success in deception to serve the phase policy is that the Zionist Movement should reserve for itself the ability to lift the masks, one by one, at a time of its own choosing. Diplomatic ambiguity cannot become a faithful servitor of the policy of phases unless the process of exposing and clarifying remains in the hands of those who set the objectives and define the aims.

If Zionism chooses the formulas and terms of claims and agreements, if it is skilful in substituting the

accepted slogan for the rejected one, and if later it is skilful in replacing this by a more daring but equally acceptable slogan, then it remains constantly able, as and when it wishes, to emphasise what the selected term does not imply and to stress later its increasing implications. Ambiguity becomes clarity the minute Zionism wishes to make it so but remains ambiguous as long as Zionism finds it in its interest that it should be so.

Clarifying the ambiguous is achieved sometimes by literal interpretation and verbal manœuvring, sometimes by speaking of the intent behind the text, as we have seen during the application of the methods of "deviation" and "invention."

Indeed, Zionist diplomacy has raised deliberate ambiguity to the level of an art and has made use of it with the skill of a professional.

* * *

Having finished with ambiguity as a form of deception, we now come to cheating, which is of two kinds:

One is cheating related to the past, as when agreements that have never been concluded are invented, and when claims are made for alleged rights acquired and obligations imposed under those agreements.

The other is cheating related to the future, as when apparent assurances or false pledges are given with the definite intention of disowning the one and breaking the other.

* * *

"Deception" and "ambiguity", which reveal only part of the truth, "deviation" in the sense of terms, "falsification" in the content of slogans and agreements, "invention" of non-existent agreements, "pledges" only made to be broken—all these methods employed by Zionist diplomacy in its application of the policy of phases point to the "immorality" which characterises Zionism, both in its diplomacy and its policies in general.

"Immorality" means that the Movement does not measure any of the steps it takes or any of the methods it employs by moral standards. It does not reject a policy merely because it does not conform to moral values, nor does it desist from embarking on an act out of consideration for ethics or conscience; rather, it resorts to any and every means so long as it can reach its end through it; it acknowledges only one criterion for its acts, namely, success in the service of its cause.

(4) Does the Road of Phases Come to an End?

Looking upon the policy of phases which Zionism has followed persistently since its inception, and giving careful consideration to its significance, one serious question comes to mind. Will this constant movement ever stop? And if so, when? Then a second question follows. When the Zionist Movement halts, how is one to know whether it is a break between two phases or a final stop?

In other words, how is one to distinguish between the falling of the curtain at the end of an act, and the final curtain at the close of the whole play?

In the light of the preceding parts of this chapter concerning the Zionist policy of phases, we are able to submit certain principles on the strength of which an answer may be inferred, as well as certain criteria which may help to distinguish the transient from the final case.

The ultimate aim of Zionism is the decisive factor which determines whether the movement by phases should stop or continue; for, as we have already pointed out, the principle of phases is a tactical and not a strategic principle. Zionism does not practice the policy of phases out of pleasure or just for the love of the principle itself; rather it practises it because it has been dictated by the nature of the Zionist task and as a result of the great chasm that is gaping between its reality and its aim. In consequence, Zionism will continue to espouse the policy of phases until it has achieved its ultimate aim.

We have also said that Zionism was constant in its pursuit of its ultimate aim. It, therefore, follows that every halt on the road towards that aim is temporary and that Zionism soon renews its endeavours to obtain further gains that bring it nearer to the ultimate aim. It would be naïve to suppose that when Zionism has achieved a great part of its aims this could move it to stop its pursuit of the rest. On the contrary, success stimulates and does not stop or stifle desires, and the ability to cover a great deal of the road leading to the final destination is a further invitation for more effort to cover the last stretch.

Furthermore the proclamation by Zionism—for all the world to hear—that it no longer has any territorial claims or

expansionist aims has absolutely no value whatsoever. For we already know that Zionism has the habit of making pledges and promises and of giving assurances while preparing to repudiate them, and that this method of appeasement is only one form of diplomatic deception which Zionism finds it necessary to practise when applying its policy of phases.

* * *

Zionism is still on the march along the road of phases, although nineteen years have elapsed since it set up its state; it is still pursuing and has not yet reached its ultimate aims. The present halt is a halt of preparation. But the Zionist state in its present phase differs from the ultimate Zionist aim in four directions: international status, territorial expansion, population and regional leadership.

International Status

The Zionist Movement realises the far-reaching significance (in the long run as well as for the present) of the Arabs' categorical refusal to recognize the Zionist state or to accept any compromise on the basis of its continued existence as a state. Zionism will not rest so long as this Arab rejection stands, and it has tried in various ways but without success to high-jump the Arab wall of rejection or to effect an opening in it. In spite of the fact that many governments recognise the state and that it is a member of numerous international organisations, the Zionist Movement will continue, because of this rejection, to feel that its statehood is not firmly established.

Territorial Expansion

The parts of Palestine which the Zionist State occupies form only a part of the area it calls "the land of Israel." It must be remembered that, when they spoke before the General Assembly of the United Nations during the session which issued the Partition recommendation, all the members of the Jewish Agency repeated the same theme, namely, that the Partition project had given them no more than one eighth of the original area of Palestine (that is, Palestine and Transjordan). It is also well-known that even "the original area of Palestine" itself forms only a part of what Zionism calls "the land of Israel" which includes, in addition to Palestine and Transjordan, southern Lebanon, southern Syria and Sinai.

Population

The Zionist State, as it now stands, is different from the concept which exists in Zionist aspirations and hopes, because Israel contains one quarter of a million Arabs and because millions of Jews still live outside its frontiers. For this present state of things to become reconciled with the aspirations, two processes are necessary: on the one hand the Arabs must be got rid of (both the Arabs now living in Israel and those who might later come under Israeli occupation as a result of Zionist expansionism), and on the other as many of the world's Jews as possible must be brought into Israel.

Regional Leadership

Anyone who is acquainted with Zionist political literature cannot overlook the fact that Zionist ambition does not stop

at the formation of an ordinary small state. It looks beyond this to the time when it will be in full control of the area's strategic installations, its resources and markets, its political disposition, so that the coveted Zionist State becomes the uncontested leader of the Middle East.

So the ultimate aim of Zionism is still far away and the present halt is only for preparing and waiting.

* * *

It is wrong to think that the ultimate aim of Zionism, as we have outlined it, is a theoretical product of the Movement in its infancy, and that Zionist realism will stop Israel and the World Zionist Organisation from attempting to achieve more than what they have so far achieved.

The past nineteen years have witnessed a persistent adherence to the original Zionist aims on the ideological phase, as well as the practical phase, a persistent attempt to expand the Zionist base in each of the four directions to which we have referred.

It is sufficient to mention only a few cases: the persistent attempts to persuade the international community to convince the Arabs—or any Arab party—to negotiate with Israel as a means of achieving even implicit recognition; the territorial expansion which has been attempted in the demilitarised zones since 1949 and later in Gaza and Sinai in 1956; the eviction of thousands of Arabs from demilitarised zones and occupied territory; the continued insistence on Jews abroad to emigrate; the seizing of Arab waters. All this goes to prove

that Zionism was not satisfied with what it was able to seize and achieve in 1948 and 1949, and has never ceased to over-reach this and obtain more.

As regards the continuing ideological definition of the ultimate Zionist aim, even after the establishment of the State, on the basis of the original aim and not the realities of the existing situation, it is sufficient to refer to the "Ideological Conference" which was held in occupied Jerusalem in 1957 and attended by government leaders, leaders of the Zionist Organisation and intellectuals. At this Conference, the fullest ideological discussions on the fate of Zionism were undertaken. These serve as a source and true witness of our point of view.

* * *

As a result of all this, the motion of Zionism will not stop, and the Zionist policy of phases will not reach its final phase voluntarily. The existence of Palestine as a base for the Zionist Movement provides a constant urge to expand; the size of the base, the type of organisation and the political form are all quite immaterial. For its mere existence provides the urge, because it is not a static presence. No containment will deter Zionism from its expansionism, even if it pretends to accept it at a given time. Zionist expansionism will not even be deterred by a retreat imposed upon it by a limited Arab victory or through international pressure; for retreat to Zionism is merely an incentive to Zionist resurgence. So neither will the encirclement of the Zionist State render it inactive, nor

will its forced retreat one or more steps backwards be sufficient to stop its growth by phases or its expansion.

* * *

Only the total annihilation of the Zionist base will immobilise it and stop Zionism from moving and expanding. For Zionist motion by phases will not subside except in one of two cases:

- A state of total self-sufficiency resulting from a satisfaction and attainment of the final goal.
- A state of total paralysis, resulting from the destruction of its base.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION

A study of Zionist diplomacy cannot be complete without a study of the theory of diplomatic action. Zionist political literature does not contain any exposition of this theory, so we have to deduce it from the study of Zionist diplomatic history, and from an investigation of the record of effective Zionist diplomatic action.

It would seem that the theory of Zionist diplomatic action is composed of these philosophical principles and some applied rules resulting from each principle.

(1) *Individualism*

The first of the philosophical principles is the assertion that the historical process is moved and directed by individuals—only a few of them.

Although international relations revolve around the interests of nations, peoples and states, and although such relations move according to these interests and in the direction of serving, consolidating and protecting them, yet it is the

individuals who delineate the interests in the course of history, who take decisions on behalf of the governments and who put people and popular movements in motion. It is individuals who make decisive historical resolutions, plan them and supervise their execution, although it is the masses and groups of people who actually execute them later. If this is true of political history generally, it is more so where its diplomatic aspect is concerned.

Diplomacy is a purely individual process. It aims at the individual, not the collective entity, in order to obtain his approval on behalf of the side whose interests he represents, or to reach a compromise with him where interests conflict. Diplomacy therefore speaks to the individual and to the group.

This principle is particularly applied by diplomatic action in its original classical form, that is, in negotiations that remain secret in the measures taken and results achieved. This is the form which the Zionist Movement has preferred from its inception to the more modern form—the public unveiled one—and has used constantly and in all cases, except when it employed diplomacy for other purposes, such as propaganda.

* * *

This principle of individualism leads to serious results in connection with diplomatic action:

1. The first is that each human individual is a unique creature. Even when the individual meets other individuals of his own group on a basis of common aspirations and interests, when he shares with them the same concepts and values

born from a common heritage and a unifying national culture, the conception of each individual human being of his nation's aspirations, values and interests is a unique conception influenced by the individuality of his personality.

It follows from this that successful diplomacy is that which, when it views each individual it aims at and addresses—even when he has an official capacity—perceives in him more than just the image of his people and his government. It sees his own individual, in addition to his public, image, and addresses the public through the individual one. People, officials included, are not all similar units of one general structure, rather they are different and distinct conceptions of the general structures to which they belong, which they influence, by which they are influenced, and which they direct and move as much as they themselves are directed and moved by them.

For example, Zionism does not just see Britain, it sees the British, particularly those few officials connected with its field of activity. It does not just see Britain, but also Lloyd George, Balfour, Lord Cecil, Lord Milner, and sees them as persons each of whom has his distinct individual characteristics with his own special embodiment of the common British characteristics.

As a result, Zionist diplomacy does not presume that each individual in every group should necessarily and automatically lend the Zionist Movement the support which his group extends. Adversely it does not presume that each individual should necessarily and automatically harbour the same enmity of his group towards Zionism. Even where the Arabs are

concerned, the Zionist Movement has never desisted from its attempts to use some leaders to lend support to its aims, or even to conclude agreements with it in the name of all the Arabs or only their own people or the people of Palestine.

So Zionist diplomacy exerts itself, when negotiating with an official, to gain his support, regardless of his national identity and the policy of his country *vis-à-vis* Zionism. If he is a supporter from a friendly country, it attempts to obtain more support from both. If he is an adversary or belongs to a hostile country, it strives to take the edge out of his enmity or to overcome his resistance.

* * *

2. The second practical result of the principle of individualism is that Zionist diplomacy never underestimates any individual, no matter how little the responsibility he carries or how junior he might be in the hierarchy. While it focuses its attention on the topmost people it can reach, it does not neglect their juniors who hold no key to any solutions and carry no authority to pass decisive resolutions.

This attitude was evident during the British Mandate. While the Zionist leadership always could, and did, reach the highest authority in London to obtain through them the British Government's approval of most of their demands, they did their best to win over British officials in Palestine, not only in the capital but also in the districts and sub-districts. For Zionism realised that political decisions depend in the final analysis on direct execution, and that the enmity

of local executive officials, can obstruct and compromise the best and most favourable decisions.

The same attitude is maintained in the present-day contacts of Zionist state with Afro-Asian countries, especially those whose heads entertain with the heads of some Arab countries relations bound on mutual friendship and respect. Realising its inability to win over the heads of state of Afro-Asian countries that are friendly to the Arabs, Zionist diplomacy concentrates its efforts on the lower echelons, attempting to achieve through them what it cannot achieve through the summit.

* * *

3. Perhaps the most important result of the principle of individualism is the third; that which moves Zionist diplomacy to give personal contacts especially on the non-official level, the greatest attention.

In this, there is no difference between negotiations with governments and talks with non-governmental bodies. The personal contacts which precede the negotiations and talks, pave the way for them and accompany them, are the object of special efforts on the part of Zionist diplomacy, which designates its cleverest and most astute men to the task.

Even to a greater extent, Zionist diplomacy devotes its energies to personal contacts when any of its problems comes up before international organisations. Statements made by Zionist representatives before international commissions and speeches delivered by them in official assembly halls present

merely a pale picture when compared to the activities of the members of Israeli delegations attempting to obtain support for the claims under discussions behind the scenes, at private meetings and at parties. Successful diplomacy, as Zionism sees it, is that which performs its task outside and before the formal meetings, not that which wrongly supposes that resolutions are passed in public and formal sessions and are influenced by the arguments laid down before them there; for such 'wrong' diplomacy it focuses its attention only on the preparation of eloquent speeches and the presentation of convincing arguments during the sessions, almost completely neglecting the manœuvres of canvassing, luring, pressurising and such.

In short, Zionist diplomacy puts more effort into lobbying in private, direct and informal contacts than into formal negotiations or the formal, regular meetings of international organisations. Zionists diplomacy has raised lobbying to a position of first importance and has practised it as a sophisticated operation with its own rules.

We shall review some of these rules presently, but now it is worth referring to some of the writings on the subject by the most successful diplomat who has served the Zionist Movement and achieved its greatest victories for it, who has played a prominent part over a long stretch of its history covering the whole first half of the century, who has been always present at all the politically decisive moments of the Movement: Chaim Weizmann.

It is clear, from Weizmann's own account of his many experiences and varying services to the Zionist Movement, that

all the gains he has accomplished have been achieved as the result of personal contacts with the officials concerned and in the course of private informal meetings. What comes out more clearly from Weizmann's memoirs is his deep-set belief in the political benefits which accrue from personal contacts and which it is not possible to obtain in any other way. This belief reaches a degree which convinces him that even the resistance of the Palestine Arabs themselves to Zionism can be overcome by constant personal contact. For example, when Britain proposed the idea of a Legislative Assembly towards the end of 1935, the vast majority of Zionists opposed it except Weizmann, who, because of his support of the project in principle, became the target of many attacks which reached the point where he was described as a British agent.¹ But Weizmann did not budge and later explained his approval of the project by attributing it to two reasons: one was for propaganda purposes and the other was inspired by his belief that the participation of Arabs and Jews in one assembly would create opportunities for "regular contacts between the two peoples," and this would permit Zionists to uproot some of the "fears which have kept the two peoples asunder"; for "fears are unconquerable by ordinary logic but they sometimes yield to daily contacts."²

If Weizmann believes that direct contact is capable of overcoming the hostility of the Palestine Arabs themselves towards the Zionist Movement while they are the most directly concerned, then he has more reason to believe that such contacts are able to make supporters lend more support and

(1) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," p. 381.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 381.

to overcome the opposition of those who are not directly concerned. So Weizmann is prompted by this belief in his talks with governments, especially Britain³ and the United States.⁴ He is more and more inspired by this belief in conferences and international organisations—starting with the Peace conference in Paris, going on to the session of the League of Nations which approved the Mandate Charter, to the sessions of the Mandates Permanent Commission,⁵ then in 1947 to the United Nations Commissions on Palestine when it sat in that country, and finally to the General Assembly in the session which approved the Partition recommendation.⁶

(2) *Discarding Logic*

The human individual, who pushes and directs the movement of history, is not purely a thinking creature; he is also a bundle of sentiments, reactions, emotions, passions, fears, doubts, instincts, desires, ambitions, hopes, etc.

From this aspect of human nature certain practical conclusions are drawn which influence the Zionist theory of diplomatic action.

1. The first of those conclusions is that successful diplomacy does not rely totally on logic alone.

For in its application, diplomacy is not a process of convincing and getting convinced in the logical sense. It is

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 109-111, 176-184, provide examples.

(4) *Ibid.*, pp. 457-459, provide examples.

(5) *Ibid.*, pp. 375-378, in particular.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp. 456-457, in particular.

not a dialogue purely between two minds. It is not an intellectual debate in a purely intellectual atmosphere where each side has no other object in mind except to arrive at the simple truth.

Diplomacy is certainly none of these things. It is rather an encounter between two human beings, each of whom represents a specific politico-social problem and the resulting interests and claims.

So the criterion of success in the diplomatic act is not the extent to which one argument has prevailed on the other, nor the extent to which one side has theoretically convinced the other of the justice of his case or the soundness of his logic. The real criterion is how much one side has conceded to the other's wishes, regardless of the causes and of whether the conceding side has been mentally and theoretically convinced.

2. This being so, successful diplomacy, according to Zionism, is that which knows how to knock on a door so that the party standing behind it may react favourably and open it. It is the diplomacy which realises that there is a separate key to each personality and so does not try to use one master key for all.

In its simplest and easiest sense, this means that the successful diplomat is he who tries to know every possible thing about the representative or representatives of the other sides and then uses this knowledge skilfully in the course of informal personal meetings as well as in official negotiations.

When we observe Zionist diplomacy in action, we find that it gives this consideration the widest interpretation. For knowing the other person may mean knowing his philosophical, theological and social beliefs, or his artistic tastes, his favourite hobbies, his family history, his weaknesses, his problems and crises.

Zionist application of this principle also shows that Zionist diplomacy resorts to intermediaries and friendships to attain its aims. At the outset of Zionist history Herzl has resorted to intermediaries to introduce him to the great of his era (his diary is full of letters requesting so and so to introduce him to such and such to help him with a third). Zionism has not discarded this habit even after it has won widespread recognition, as the closing chapters of Weizmann's memoirs show.

While applying this principle, Zionism also realises that a certain person who is useful for one task with a given party is not necessarily useful for a different task—or even the same task—with another party. To choose the right person for the required task and for the opposite party is a condition of successful diplomacy.

3. But the most important conclusion to be drawn from the principle we are discussing is the necessity to diversify the methods by which Zionist claims are presented.

It would appear that Zionist theory believes that each personality has a balcony from which he has the best and clearest view of Zionism, or that the angle, from which a certain individual looks upon Zionism and therefore admires

and supports it, may not be the same angle as a different individual. So it is essential to provide each individual with that picture of Zionism which suits his angle best. This diversification with all the creativeness and constant adjustments it entails to fit each angle are at the bottom of diplomatic skill according to Zionism.

Sir Charles Webster, a leading diplomatic historian and researcher and himself a British diplomat, in a piece he wrote on "The Art and Practice of Diplomacy"⁷ acknowledges Weizmann's great skill in this field. With representatives of some governments Weizmann emphasized the religious and cultural elements; with others he stressed national interests; even *vis-à-vis* representatives of the same government he would shift the emphasis from one element to the other according to the circumstances, personality and interests of each politician. As an example of this, Webster mentions Weizmann's diplomacy when he was trying to obtain from Britain the political licence which later became known as the Balfour Declaration. After explaining that he was acquainted with the course of negotiations because of the post he held during the First World War, and that therefore he was talking about a diplomatic act which he had watched closely, Webster says:

"With unerring skill he adapted his arguments to the special circumstances of each statesman . . . Mr. Lloyd George⁸ was told that Palestine was a little mountainous

(7) The piece was originally delivered as a lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science on December 7th, 1951, and then published as a booklet in 1952.

(8) Lloyd George, then British Prime Minister, came from Wales and was known for his national sentiments towards that country.

country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour⁹ the philosophical background of Zionism could be surveyed; for Lord Cecil¹⁰ the problem was placed in the setting of a new world organisation; while to Lord Milner¹¹ the extension of imperial power could be vividly portrayed. To me who dealt with these matters as a junior officer of the General Staff, he brought from many sources all the evidence that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish National Home to the strategical position of the British Empire, but he always indicated by a hundred shades and inflections of the voice that he believed that I could also appreciate better than my superiors other more subtle and recondite arguments."¹²

4. Another conclusion which is connected with all the foregoing practical conclusions and applied rules has great importance in defining the function and objective of diplomatic negotiations.

Successful diplomacy strives to create a favourable atmosphere before it tries to formulate a clear official agreement. It strives to obtain support before translating this support

(9) Balfour, then British Foreign Secretary, was a philosopher on top of being a politician. He wrote two books on philosophy which gave him widespread fame in the intellectual world: "Rules of Faith" and "In Defence of Philosophical Doubt."

(10) Lord Cecil played a prominent part in setting up the League of Nations and was a great believer in international organisation as a basis for world peace and a means for settling conflicts between states.

(11) Milner played a great part in expanding British control in South Africa where he occupied the highest offices in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, Transvaal and the Free Orange State. He was considered responsible for the Boer War.

(12) Webster, "The Art and Practice of Diplomacy," pp. 9-10.

into documents and accords. Its first aim is to win friends in order to turn them later into allies. For the alliance which is not based on friendship is not a lasting one, whereas friendship is apt to end up as an alliance, even if at the beginning it does not involve any commitments or pledges.

5. Diplomacy is an attempt to build bridges between the Zionist Movement and the other parties; but the nature of the bridges differs with each party as we have seen. One party may be sympathetic to Zionism out of pity for the Jews and the sufferings through which they have gone, another may lend it support out of a religious belief, yet another may support it as a suitable vehicle for the furtherance of its own national interests, and so on. Zionist diplomacy does not object to the existence of a variety of reasons for its support; on the contrary, it deliberately seeks to win each politician by using the quickest and most effective key. It follows from this that Zionist diplomacy also deliberately takes a different road to reach every individual. It, therefore, aims at building bridges but does not care where, or how, or on what the bridge-head on the other bank will rest.

This is because Zionist diplomacy also believes that support and sympathy, even if they start out on a limited scope and only from one specific angle, are sure to develop and open wide after some time. Whoever begins by supporting Zionism from one angle becomes a supporter from all angles after practice; and whoever begins by supporting one of its aspects will soon become a supporter of the whole cause with all its component parts and single basis. In this, Zionism resembles the camel and the bedouin's tent in the well-known story;

it is not important from which side of the tent the camel enters nor is it important whether his head enters first or his feet, for at any rate he will soon enter and occupy the tent with the whole of his body.

This belief has played an important part in Zionist diplomacy, especially in the relations between the Zionist Movement and non-Zionist Jewish bodies, that is, the groups which had rejected the Zionist doctrine on the existence of a Jewish nation and had also rejected the Zionist political aim to set up a Jewish state, but had been sympathetic towards some cultural, "humanitarian" and "development" projects carried out by the Zionist Organisation. The Zionist Movement followed a clear policy *vis-à-vis* these personalities and bodies; it attracted each one to support Zionism only from the angle of the project it favoured and obtained its assistance for the execution of that project, hoping it would become a full supporter of Zionism in the end, even to the extent of backing its political and national aims.

The first project for which Zionism attracted the support of non-Zionist Jews and even non-Jews was the Hebrew University.¹³ Then it used its "humanitarian" projects to secure the participation of non-Zionists in "The Keren Hayesod."¹⁴ But its manœuvring to "enlarge the Jewish Agency" was the most important.¹⁵ As a result of such limited support, the Zionist Movement was able—in addition to the financial, propaganda and political gains—to win over the individuals themselves so that they finally lent their unconditional and

(13) Weizmann, "Trial and Error," pp. 75, 119, 137-139.

(14) *Ibid.*, pp. 261-262.

(15) *Ibid.*, pp. 309-312.

unreserved support to the political and other activities of Zionism. Weizmann says that many of the Jews who rendered the Zionist Movement extremely valuable political services in 1947 (when the General Assembly of the United Nations was discussing the Partition Plan and when political pressure on the American Government to pressurise other governments for their support of the Plan was at its height) were non-Zionist Jews whose support for the Movement had been won many years earlier when the Jewish Agency was enlarged to include them.¹⁶

(3) *Immorality*

Finally, there lurks at the bottom of the Zionist theory of diplomatic action the philosophical principle of "immorality" which views the diplomatic act from the angle of its general service to the political-national cause, regardless of all moral restrictions which prompt the other aspects of human behaviour. In other words, Zionism believes that the only value which should apply to diplomatic action is the extent of its service to Zionist interests. The function which has only this end in view justifies the means used—of whatever description. Consequently "immorality" means stripping diplomatic action of the ordinary moral values, liberating it from moral restrictions and authorising diplomacy to employ any means to attain its ends.

We have already seen that Zionist diplomacy has resorted to "deception" and the resultant "falsification" and "cheating" as a method of work.¹⁷

(16) *Ibid.*, p. 457.

(17) See above, pp. 97-108, 111-118, 135-138.

Zionist diplomacy has also resorted persistently to bribery as a means of "persuasion" and of obtaining support. It has bribed governments and heads of state, in addition to bribing officials, civil servants and intermediaries. The bribery can be in money, gifts or different services rendered.

If we were to review all the types of bribery which Zionist leaders have, in their memoirs from the days of Herzl up to the establishment of the Zionist State, admitted giving to all those who refused to support them, that review would make up the greatest part of the whole history of Zionist diplomacy.

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